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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the evolution of infectious disease control in the European Union (EU). 
The overarching objective of the research is to analyse policy and polity developments at the EU level 
primarily in the fields of public health and food safety in order to identify key developments between 
1993 and 2014 and to investigate the conditions under which institutionalisation took place. The 
study approaches the field from a security perspective which is developed as an original 
advancement of the ‘securitisation framework for analysis’ (Buzan et al., 1998). Following the 
hypothesis that the institutionalisation of infectious disease control in the EU can be explained as an 
effect of a specific construction of infectious diseases as security threats, securitisation and 
institutionalisation processes at the EU level are tied together in a novel analytic and explanatory 
framework. The framework foresees the combination of qualitative and quantitative research 
methods in order to allow for a specification of the form of securitisation of an infectious disease 
along different ‘degrees’ and ‘kinds’. The assumed connection between securitisation and 
institutionalisation is subject to empirical investigation in two case studies that deal with the 
securitisation of BSE/TSEs and SARS on the one hand, and a set of most fundamental changes in the 
EU’s infectious disease control structures on the other, including the revision of the public health 
article in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and the Constitutional Treaty (2004) as well as the creation of 
the European Food Safety Authority (2002) and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (2004). In this way the dissertation offers new insights into a largely unstudied field of 
European integration in combination with the development and testing of a novel conceptual 
approach. 
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“Security / Is mortals’ chiefest enemy” 
William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Macbeth  
(Act 3, Scene 5, Line 31) 
 
1. Introduction 
Infectious diseases have caused more deaths than war and basically anything else in history (Price-
Smith, 2002). Ebola, HIV/AIDS, influenza or SARS are recent examples for diseases that constituted 
severe challenges to public health systems all over the world. Facilitated by increased travel and 
trade pathogens nowadays “travel at the speed of globalisation” (Stephenson, 2012: 103) and are 
capable of quickly spreading across borders. This is even more the case in a political space like the 
European Union (EU)2 which seeks to guarantee the free movements of goods and people in a 
Common Market. In the light of the European integration process a state-centric focus on infectious 
disease control has become questionable; in particular since the EU has resumed an important – but 
so far little-noted – role in this policy area over the last decades (Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 888). 
This dissertation examines the evolution of infectious disease control in the European Union. The 
objective of the research is to investigate the conditions under which respective structures became 
institutionalised at the EU level. The study approaches the field from a security perspective which is 
developed as an original advancement of the ‘securitisation framework for analysis’ (Buzan et al., 
1998). By arguing that the evolution of infectious disease control structures at the EU level can be 
understood as the effect of the specific constructions of infectious diseases as threats to security, 
securitisation and institutionalisation processes are tied together in an analytic and explanatory 
model. The model is subject to empirical testing in two case studies that deal with a set of most 
fundamental innovations in the EU’s infectious disease control structures which occurred in the 
course of two disease outbreaks3, the BSE/TSEs crisis on the one hand, and the SARS crisis on the 
other.4 
This first chapter of the study provides an introduction into infectious diseases as a security problem 
and into the relevance of infectious disease control at the European Union level. On the basis of a 
literature review it demonstrates in how far the work can take up existing studies from three strands 
of research – infectious disease control, institutionalisation and securitisation in the European Union 
– and in which parts it approaches unexplored territory. After having introduced the main research 
puzzle, the chapter closes with a section on the scope and the roadmap of analysis to set out the 
structure of the work. 
                                                          
2
 The term ‘European Union’ refers also to the political system of the ‘European Community’ before the year 
1993, when the European Union was established under its current name. 
3
 The terms ‘outbreak’ and ‘epidemic’ refer to the occurrence of an infection that “exceeds the expected level 
for a given time period.” It can be contrasted with ‘endemic’ which means a “persistent low or moderate level 
of disease. […] When an epidemic spreads over a wide geographical area, such as a continent or continents, it is 
called pandemic” (Hawker et al., 2012: 5). 
4
 BSE/TSEs stands for ‘Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy/Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies’, SARS 
means ‘Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome’. 
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1.1. Infectious Diseases, Infectious Disease Control and the European Union 
In the middle of the twentieth century optimism was great that the problem of infectious diseases 
could be overcome once and for all. Prominent quotes in this respect include statements of the 
Nobel-prize winning biologist Sir MacFarlane Burnett who declared in 1966 that it was “time to 'close 
the book' on the problem of infectious diseases”, and by US Surgeon General Jesse Steinfeld who 
claimed in 1976 that there were “no new diseases to be discovered” (quoted in Michaud, 2009: 6). In 
1979, the World health Organization (WHO) optimistically launched an initiative with the aim to win 
humanity’s war against disease by achieving ‘Health for All by the Year 2000’ (WHO, 1981, Hough, 
2004: 156, Elbe, 2010a: 163). These examples illustrate the conviction of the post-war decades that 
advances in science, public health and medicine would eventually enable mankind to ultimately 
eliminate or at least control infectious diseases. Unfortunately, the experts were proved wrong.  
For the year 2013 the WHO reported globally more than 280,000 cases of measles infections, more 
than 5.7 million cases of tuberculosis and more than 48 million cases of malaria (WHO, 2015b: 86f). 
The occurrence of chikungunya in Italy in 2007 exemplifies that diseases which were typically limited 
to specific geographic regions spread to previously unaffected areas (Angelini et al., 2007). The 
increase of antibiotic and antiviral resistant pathogens that render existing medical treatment 
ineffective go along with increasing number of new infections of once controlled diseases in all 
regions of the world (WHO, 2014). Since the mid-1980s new or previously unrecognised diseases 
such as HIV/AIDS, SARS or novel subtypes of the influenza virus have shown devastating effects 
worldwide; and are likely to do so in the future. A future influenza pandemic was estimated to affect 
1.5 billion (WHO, 2007) and kill up to 150 million people (UNO, 2005) leading to US$ 3 trillion in 
economic damages or 4.8% of global GDP (World Bank, 2013). Against this background “it is hard to 
argue that infectious diseases are not a problem” (Greer and Kurzer, 2012: 904). 
Infectious diseases are disturbances or anomalies in the normal functioning of the human body that 
are “caused by a contagious agent which may be transmitted from person to person by direct contact 
with an affected individual or by an indirect means such as exposure to a vector, fomite, product or 
environment, or exchange of fluid, contaminated with the contagious agent” (European Parliament 
and Council, 2013a: Art. 3).5 Typical transmissible agents are bacteria, viruses, parasites, worms or 
fungi; common modes of transmission include direct transmission by touching, sneezing, biting and 
sexual intercourse as well as indirect transmission via vehicles and vectors such as food, surgical 
instruments or insects (Hawker et al., 2012: 7).  
The instruments that are typically applied to control infectious diseases include (1) disease 
prevention to reduce the likelihood of its spread (for instance education and vaccination 
programmes), (2) preparedness to increase the capacities to respond to an outbreak (for instance 
through emergency plans and stockpiling), (3) surveillance activities for the purpose of directing 
public health action (understood as ongoing systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of health data, incl. risk assessment) as well as (4) response in order to eradicate a 
                                                          
5
 The notions ‘infectious disease’ and ‘communicable disease’ are used interchangeably in this study. 
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disease or to mitigate the effects of an outbreak (for instance through travel restrictions and medical 
treatment). In this sense, the notion of ‘infectious disease control’ encompasses, for the purpose of 
this study, the full spectrum of possible measures in the fields of infectious disease prevention, 
preparedness, surveillance and response that target diseases which are caused by a transmissible 
agent (CDC, 1986, European Parliament and Council, 1998, WHO, 2000, Krämer and Reintjes, 2003, 
ECDC, 2007: 4, Michaud, 2009: 20f, Reintjes, 2012: 956). 
The classic instruments of the health systems to control infectious diseases are located in the realm 
of public health, a policy field that is concerned “with the state of health of the population as a whole 
which it aims to protect and improve” (European Commission, 2000j: 5). Accordingly, public health 
law can be understood as “the authority and responsibility of government to ensure the conditions 
for the population’s health” (Gostin, 2000: 327). Reflecting the organisation of the health care 
systems and existing governance structures for health, public health is typically seen as a policy that 
belongs to the domain of the nation state or even the sub-national level. The principle of national 
sovereignty in public health affairs, however, is in stark contrast to the fact that germs do not respect 
borders. It belongs to the most obvious effects of today’s historically unprecedented global travel 
and trade, but also uncontrolled migration, that pathogens are able to spread more easily, rapidly 
and globally (Cockerham and Cockerham, 2010). Moreover, the measures of an individual country to 
control infectious diseases as well as economic and environmental practices ultimately affect the 
conditions to control infectious diseases in other countries (Schreck et al., 2009: 149, Krause, 2010: 
69). 
It becomes clear that infectious disease control is of a genuinely cross-border nature which requires 
states to operate “beyond the territoriality of any individual country” (Kickbusch and de Leeuw, 
1999) and opt for solutions that foresee collective actions of several (or all) governments (Karolinska 
Institutet and Global Health Europe Network, 2009: 9). In other words, while aiming at an effective 
and sovereign public health policy, nation states are facing the dilemma that they are forced to 
cooperate internationally and cede some of their sovereignty to international organisations (Eban, 
1995). Interstate cooperation in the field of public health is not a recent development and can be 
traced back in Europe at least to the nineteenth century (Fidler, 2001). With the Schengen 
Agreement on the abolishment of internal border controls and the stepwise establishment of an 
Internal Market in the European Community, however, EU Member States started to face a situation 
of a new quality due to a “growing open sanitary space in the EU” (Steffen, 2012: 1071) and the 
Market’s fundamental freedoms regarding the free movement of people, goods, services and capital 
which facilitate, as an unwanted side effect, the unhindered movement of disease agents within an 
increasingly borderless Europe (Martin and Conseil, 2012: 1098). 
The European integration project accounts for indirect effects on health since the 1950s (Preston, 
2007, Klomp and de Haan, 2009, Greer et al., 2013: 1135). An explicit public health policy and 
infectious disease control in particular, however, have developed since the 1990s only. Over the last 
two decades substantial structures were established at the EU level to contribute to the control of 
infectious diseases, including the establishment of specialised agencies such as the European Food 
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Safety Authority (EFSA) or the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), various 
surveillance, alert and response systems as well as a public health action programme (Guglielmetti et 
al., 2006, Ammon and Faensen, 2009, Schreck et al., 2009, Liverani and Coker, 2012: 923). 
Whereas institutionalisation processes at the EU level generally enjoy great popularity among 
political scientists interested in interstate cooperation and regional integration processes, infectious 
disease control in the European Union is largely understudied. The little attention neither matches 
the importance of the EU level for infectious disease control in Europe and beyond, nor does it 
reflect that the field comes “close to the heart of the modern state and its citizens” (Greer and 
Mätzke, 2012: 889). It has been argued that infectious disease control belongs to the least studied 
functions of the EU (Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 887). To make things worse, essential elements of the 
EU structures such as the ECDC can be regarded as “underresearched and underreported even by the 
standards of communicable disease control in the European Union. […] There has been almost no 
policy or political science work on it” (Greer, 2012a: 1017). The thorough literature review in 
preparation for the present study supports this finding. The literature that systematically deals with 
the EU’s contribution to the control of infectious diseases is actually so scarce that it is even difficult 
to get hold of a study that has detected and criticised the research gap.6 
The present study addresses this gap by mapping and analysing the evolution of infectious disease 
control at the EU level with a specific focus on the years from 1993 to 2014. It thus covers the time 
period between the introduction of the first dedicated public health article into EU primary law by 
the Maastricht Treaty and the most recent developments.  
 
1.2. A Security Perspective on Infectious Diseases 
Beyond the set-up of a comprehensive and so far unavailable overview of key developments of 
infectious disease control in the EU, the study also aims to investigate the conditions for this 
evolution. This investigation is carried out from a security perspective, one of the prominent research 
strands in the literature that deals with the governance of public health. The underlying idea is that 
infectious diseases do not only form public health problems but can also been seen in a wider sense 
as threats to security (Fidler, 2007b: 41). 
The link between security and infectious diseases is both an old and a recent development at the 
same time. On the one hand, it would be reasonable to start a respective study with the analysis of 
the bubonic plague in the fourteenth century (Howard-Jones, 1950, Goodman, 1971, Howard-Jones, 
1975, Hoffman, 2010). Also the use of pathogens and biological agents in warfare dates back some 
hundred years (Wheelis, 1999). On the other hand, it was not before the early 1990s that the 
recognition of trans-border health threats resulting from globalisation and emerging infections such 
as HIV/AIDS initiated an infectious disease-related ‘security turn’ (Morse, 1993, Garrett, 1996, 
Dodgson et al., 2002, King, 2002). In 1992, an influential report warned that “some infectious 
                                                          
6
 One of the few exemptions is the 2012 special issue of the ‘Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law’ on the 
politics of communicable disease control in Europe. See Greer (2012b). 
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diseases that now affect people in other parts of the world represent potential threats to the United 
States because of global interdependence, modern transportation, trade, and changing social and 
cultural patterns” (Institute of Medicine, 1992: v, Elbe, 2010a: 163f). The view on infectious disease 
through security lenses was fuelled when bioterrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) by rogue states shifted the infectious diseases into the debate on national 
security. Finally, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax scare fed a 
broadened security agenda encompassing a large set of public health components (Krause and 
Williams, 1996, Wright, 2006, Kelle, 2007: 225, Lee, 2009:35f). 
Today, there is wide agreement in the academic literature that the notions of ‘infectious diseases’ 
and ‘security’ are intrinsically tied to one another (McInnes, 2004, Fidler, 2005, Enemark and Selgelid, 
2012). In fact, given the high number of representatives from both the academia and the political 
world that have related infectious diseases to some form of security threat, it has been argued that 
“[t]he [current] prominence of security concepts in debates about public health threats and 
governance is historically unprecedented” (Fidler, 2007b: 42).  
In this context the literature often refers to the notion of ‘health security’ (e.g. Feldbaum and Lee, 
2004, Rodier et al., 2007, Aldis, 2008) and covers various fields ranging from a focus on biosecurity, 
biological weapons and bioterrorism (Collier et al., 2004, Wright, 2006, Fidler and Gostin, 2008, 
Stavrianakis et al., 2011) works on specific diseases as diverse as cholera (Lee and Dodgson, 2000, 
Enemark, 2012), tuberculosis (Koch, 2008), SARS (Hooker, 2007), influenza (Davis, 2005, van den 
Bulck and Custers, 2009, Abraham, 2011) or HIV/AIDS (Prins, 2004, Garrett, 2005, Selgelid and 
Enemark, 2008, Elbe, 2009). The connection of, for instance, HIV/AIDS to security concerns is also 
illustrated by the fact that the pandemic was addressed several times by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) (UNSC, 2000, 2005, 2011). 
Crucially, a large number of studies speak of a so called ‘securitisation of infectious diseases’, for 
instance in relation to war on terror, failed states, new wars, uncontrolled migrations, globalisation, 
the food chain, medical practices and social and behavioural change (Pereira, 2008, McCarthy, 2009, 
Cook, 2010, Elbe, 2012). A securitisation perspective can be found for the analysis of infectious 
diseases over time (Pereira, 2008, Elbe, 2012), for specific countries like China (Wishnick, 2010) and 
the US (Cook, 2010), specific institutions like the WHO (Davies, 2008) or for specific diseases such as 
influenza (Curley and Herington, 2011, Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012). A prominent case is the 
securitisation of HIV/AIDS (O'Manique, 2006, Rushton, 2010b, McInnes and Rushton, 2013) which 
has been examined inter alia with a view to the emergence and diffusion of international norms 
(Vieira, 2007), the United Nations (UN) system (Kay, 2009, Rushton, 2010a) as well as for specific 
countries such as India and China (Lo, 2012) or the US (Sjöstedt, 2011). 
In political science, the term ‘securitisation’ usually refers to the ‘framework for analysis’ as put 
forward in a series of publications revolving around the seminal work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever 
and Jaap de Wilde in 1998 (Buzan et al., 1998). The concept offers a complex constructivist reading of 
security that builds on the understanding that “[an] issue becomes a security issue […] not 
necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as a threat” 
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(Buzan et al., 1998: 24). The framework is a useful tool to elaborate on a set of fundamental 
questions, such as “what counts as a security problem? Why do certain challenges become security 
issues while other do not? How are threat images realised in policies? Are the realms of security and 
politics compatible or mutually exclusive?” (Balzacq, 2011a: xviii). In this sense the framework also 
suits the needs of an analysis of infectious diseases as political and security problems. Many studies 
on the securitisation of infectious diseases, however, mostly use securitisation in a loose sense to 
indicate some connection between security and diseases without referring to the original concept or 
without applying it with methodological rigour. 
The present study is different in this respect as it explicitly builds on the core elements of the original 
securitisation approach that asks from a constructivist understanding “for whom security becomes a 
consideration in relation to whom” (Buzan et al., 1998: 18). On this basis the study advances the 
framework in methodological and conceptual terms by introducing a set of innovations, namely the 
‘degree of securitisation’ and the ‘kind of securitisation’. It will be explained in the chapter on the 
concepts and the research framework (chapter 2) why these conceptual innovations are needed and 
how they serve the purpose to allow for an explicit differentiation of the security dimensions of 
infectious diseases in a ‘coordination system of securitisation’. Being able to identify the form of 
securitisation of a disease is of great importance not only to better understand and be able to 
compare infectious disease-related securitisation processes; the definition of a securitisation form in 
the coordination system is also crucial to be able to link securitisation to the institutionalisation of 
infectious disease control at the EU level. 
 
1.3. Research Puzzle: Securitisation and Institutionalisation 
The previous sections have indicated that infectious disease control in the European Union has been 
institutionalised in the last twenty years, albeit largely unnoticed by political science, and that 
infectious diseases are increasingly tied to security concepts, albeit with different ideas regarding the 
connection and the understanding of security. This study addresses both of these phenomena by 
examining the evolution and the institutionalisation of infectious disease control at the EU level from 
a novel security perspective that allows for the distinction between different securitisation forms of 
infectious diseases. Crucially, securitisation and institutionalisation are linked to each other in an 
explanatory model which argues that a specific form of the securitisation of infectious diseases can 
help explain institutionalisation processes in the field of EU infectious disease control.  
The link between securitisation and institutionalisation is established by assessing securitisation as a 
trigger for changes that occur at the EU level. Whereas most existing studies dealing with 
securitisation processes examine the causes of securitisation and “what explains when securitisation 
is successful” or achieved (Buzan et al., 1998: 32), the present study is primarily interested in the 
forms and effects of securitisation.7  
                                                          
7
 Two of the few studies that assess impact and results of securitisation of infectious diseases are Davies (2008) 
and Leboeuf (2009). 
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In other words, in order to shed light on the dynamic development of infectious disease control at 
the EU level and to identify major drivers of the process, securitisation at the EU level is not treated 
as the explanandum of the research, but as the explanans for institutionalisation. In this context the 
analysis works with a definition of institutionalisation that builds on the work of Wayne Stone Sweet 
and Alec Sandholtz (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, Stone Sweet et al., 2001), viewing 
institutionalisation – also referred to as ‘structural change’ – as a possible effect of securitisation in 
the sense of relatively persistent and systemic changes regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, 
resource allocation, division of competences and organisational structures in the field of EU 
infectious disease control (see chapter 2.3.4.1). 
The argument that securitisation can help explain the evolution of the EU’s infectious disease control 
is derived from two observations. First, wide acceptance exists that (specific) infectious diseases 
were or are subject to securitisation dynamics in different contexts and countries (e.g. Davies, 2008, 
Cook, 2010, Herington, 2010, Curley and Herington, 2011, Jin and Karackattu, 2011, Sjöstedt, 2011, 
Elbe, 2012, Enemark, 2012, Lo, 2012, McInnes and Rushton, 2013). Second, security threats to health 
such as disease outbreaks and health crises have repeatedly been identified as catalysts for changes 
in the governance of infectious disease control; be it anthrax, BSE, HIV/AIDS, influenza or SARS, 
previous studies have suggested that infectious diseases have played a prominent role for particular 
steps of structural development, be it in the European (Lezaun and Groenleer, 2006, Krapohl, 2008, 
Groenleer, 2009, Greer, 2012b, Liverani et al., 2012) or an international context (Fidler, 2005). In fact, 
it has been argued that “European public health policy is […] to a large extent crisis driven” (Steffen, 
2012: 1060) and that “[i]nstitutions and procedures [for communicable disease control] will tend to 
be strongly influenced by particular crises and particular responses” also in the future (Mätzke, 2012: 
971). In this context the dictum of a ‘good epidemic’ (Hamlin, 2009, Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 902) 
essentially refers to the assumption that repeated crisis could “keep the need for robust public 
health constantly at the top of the political agenda nationally and internationally” and thus enable 
breaking the “the sustainability conundrum” of public health (Fidler, 2004b: 169f). 
Puzzling in this context, however, is that “for every ‘good epidemic’ there is another one that came 
and went and never provoked big changes” (Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 902). Apparently, not all 
disease outbreaks, and most likely not those that resulted in the highest total number of deaths, 
were followed by institutional adaptation. Against this background it is hard to argue that the trigger 
for structural change can be reasonably sought only in the disease or the outbreak itself. The novel 
securitisation approach put forward by this dissertation is designed to deal with this peculiar 
situation on the basis of a constructivist reading. The key argument is that it is not the disease or the 
outbreak that have triggered institutionalisation in the European Union, but a specific form of 
securitisation of infectious diseases.  
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1.4. Scope and Roadmap of the Analysis 
To sum up, this dissertation is interested in (1) the institutionalisation of the EU’s infectious disease 
control, (2) the securitisation of infectious diseases at the EU level and (3) the connection of 
institutionalisation and securitisation. More specifically, it aims to track the key developments of EU 
infectious disease control, contribute to our understanding of infectious disease as security threats in 
the EU and explore the conditions under which the securitisation of specific diseases could explain 
the institutionalisation of EU infectious disease control. This research focus, however, has to be put 
in perspective with a view to three aspects.  
First, it should be stressed that the study is carried out first and foremost from a political science 
perspective that aims at exploiting and combining three strands of academic research, namely 
infectious disease control studies, securitisation studies and regional integration (institutionalisation) 
studies.  
 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
The book is not the first that examines these strands, but it constitutes an original contribution to 
bring elements of all of them together in a single analysis. Scholars have started examining the 
institutionalisation of EU public health and infectious disease control (Guigner, 2004, Greer, 2012b), 
but not from a securitisation perspective. Studies have dealt with the policy tools of securitisation in 
the EU and securitisation in specific EU policies such as border security and migration (Huysmans, 
2000, 2006, Balzacq, 2008, van Munster, 2009, Léonard, 2012), but not in the field of infectious 
disease control. Finally, publications dealing with the securitisation of infectious diseases have not 
covered the European Union; in fact, there is only a handful of studies that allude to the 
developments at the EU level (Fidler, 2004a, McInnes and Lee, 2006, Pereira, 2008).  
The connection of these in this combination so far largely unrelated strands of research is, thus, a 
unique feature of the work. Despite such a comprehensive analytical approach, however, the study is 
a piece of political science which should not be confused with medicinal or epidemiological 
perspectives. To illustrate, in line with the constructivist conceptual foundations it is not the 
Figure 1-1: Combining Three Strands of Research 
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objective to assess in how far infectious diseases constitute ‘real’ threats, to judge whether specific 
measures to combat diseases are legitimate or effective, or to generate policy advice on institutional 
reforms that could be deemed most functional to address public health threats. 
Second, it must be noted that infectious disease control is of genuinely intersectoral nature. 
Intersectoral means that infectious disease control is not subject to a single policy resort on its own 
right or restricted to one particular policy domain. Factors that produce microbial dangers include 
climate and weather, changing ecosystems, human demographics, economic development, 
international travel and commerce, technology and industry, poverty and social inequality, war and 
famine and, last but not least, intent to harm (bioterrorism) (MacLehose et al., 2002, Smolinski et al., 
2003: 54, Reintjes, 2008). Accordingly, a wide range of policies is of relevance, including trade 
(Williams, 2004, WHO, 2006, Drager and Fidler, 2007, Labonté et al., 2009, Lee et al., 2009), 
environment (Morse, 1993, Lee, 2000, Anderson, 2004), research (Van Aken, 2006, Rappert, 2007), 
global warming and migration (Khasnis and Nettleman, 2005), humanitarian aid, development and 
human rights (Marks, 2009, Tobin, 2012), but also foreign policy in more general terms (Garrett, 
1996, Fidler, 1998, Ingram, 2004).  
It is, however, beyond the scope of the study to analyse in detail the full set of infectious disease-
related policies. In contrast, the primary focus is put on the major policy and polity developments in 
the realms of public health and food safety. The areas can be regarded as the core of infectious 
disease control within the European Union due to functional and, as we will see in chapters 3 and 5, 
also historical reasons. Whereas the typical instruments of infectious disease control belong to the 
realm of public health, the safety of food products and food-borne pathogens occupy a specific 
position within the Community following from the EU’s Internal Market. The close interconnection of 
the two areas is today also visible in the structure of the European Commission which organises its 
works in these sectors in a joint Directorate General. 
Third, infectious disease control efforts is a matter of all political levels, from the local sphere, where 
the actual treatment of an infected person takes place, to the international sphere, where WHO, the 
International Health Regulations8 and initiatives such as the ‘Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis 
and Malaria’9 shape global health governance. The clear focus of this research is put on the level of 
the European Union, which implies that processes at neither the national (Member State) level nor 
the international level are systematically covered. Influences from non-EU levels feed into the study, 
but do not belong to the primary research interest. A detailed explanation of the levels and units of 
analysis is provided in chapter 2.5.3. 
                                                          
8
 The International Health Regulations (IHR) is an international legal regime “to prevent, protect against, 
control and provide a public health response to the international spread of disease” (WHO, 2005: Art. 2). It is 
considered a “centre piece for global health governance” (Hardiman, Fidler, 2005, Fidler and Gostin, 2006: 93, 
Baker and Forsyth, 2007). 
9
 The ‘Global Fund’ is a partnership organisation of governments, civil society, the private sector and people 
affected by the diseases designed to accelerate the end of AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria as epidemics. See 
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/ (accessed 22.05.2015). 
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Under consideration of these limitations the study proceeds as follows: The following chapter 2 
reviews key concepts of security and health security from the academic disciplines incorporated into 
the analysis and develops an original adaptation of the securitisation framework for analysis that 
includes inter alia a ‘coordination system of securitisation’. On this basis it sets out in more detail the 
research framework and establishes the hypothesis that a specific form of securitisation, as locatable 
on the coordination system, can be regarded as the cause for the adoption of institutional change at 
the EU level. In the following, the chapter elaborates on the operationalisation of the research focus 
and explains how the study complementarily combines qualitative and quantitative methods to 
generate and analyse the empirical data.  
The following empirical part of the study is structured into three steps. Chapter 3 serves the purpose 
to track the evolution of the EU’s infectious disease control with a particular focus on the realm of 
public health between 1993 and 2014. Ultimately, the analysis of relevant primary and secondary 
literature will yield a list of key developments in EU infectious disease control. On the basis of this 
overview, chapter 4 provides a reflection on the selection of two case studies and embeds them into 
the overall institutionalisation development. It will become clear that the case studies in chapter 5 
and 6 investigate into a combination of most fundamental forms of institutionalisation, namely the 
combination of the revision of the EU’s primary law (Treaty of Amsterdam and Constitutional Treaty) 
with the creation of a specialised EU agency (EFSA and ECDC). Crucially, the adoption of these 
structural changes can purposefully be reviewed in the framework of a securitisation analysis, as they 
occurred in the course of infectious disease crises, namely the outbreak of ‘bovine and transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies’ (BSE/TSEs) on the one hand (chapter 5), and the epidemic spread of 
‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’ (SARS) on the other (chapter 6).  
The final chapter 7 synthesises the results of the case studies and provides concluding remarks on 
the study as a whole and possible future research.  
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2. Concepts and Research Framework 
What is security and how is it related to public health and infectious disease control? There is neither 
a single nor an easy answer to this question, but responding to it and linking the key notions is a 
precondition for the envisaged analysis. This chapter 2 serves the purpose to do so by developing a 
novel analytical and explanatory framework on the basis of the ‘securitisation framework for 
analysis’ which is particularly suitable to grasp the developments related to (the control of) infectious 
diseases.  
This novel approach is needed as it is not possible to build on research that explicitly works at the 
intersection of the three research strands of securitisation, infectious disease control and 
institutionalisation in the EU. Furthermore, related securitisation literature struggles with two major 
problems that are particularly obstructive for the research objectives of the present study. The first 
problem is that existing securitisation concepts lack the tools to adequately define the form (or 
status) of an infectious disease as a security issue. The second problem is that the existing 
approaches do not offer a model that links securitisation to institutionalisation processes at the EU 
level. 
In order to advance the original securitisation framework in the respective ways, the development of 
the novel approach proceeds in five steps. First, the chapter starts with a brief introduction into the 
roots of Security Studies and the original securitisation approach (chapter 2.1). The overview 
basically serves the purpose to locate the study in the wider security discourse in political science 
and to familiarise the reader with the basic constituents of Security Studies.  
Second, an elaboration on the elements of the original securitisation concept will make clear that 
securitisation builds on the idea that security issues in international affairs are first and foremost 
something socially constructed (chapter 2.2). This overview of the key components of securitisation 
also provides the starting basis for the following advancement of the concept.  
Third, by drawing lessons from existing securitisation studies, two innovative elements will be 
introduced to be added to the original securitisation approach: the ‘securitisation degree’ on the one 
hand (chapter 2.3.1), and the ‘securitisation kind’ on the other (chapter 2.3.2). The former is meant 
to better structure the securitisation status of an issue along the spectrum between the political and 
the security realm, the latter serves the purpose to adequately reflect the different security 
understandings in the field of public health policy and infectious disease control. Ultimately, both 
innovations will be brought together in a ‘coordination system of securitisation’ (chapter 2.3.3) that 
eventually allows for the definition of the status of an infectious disease as a security issue. In a next 
step these elements are jointly integrated into the explanatory model that conceptualises 
institutionalisation processes at the EU level as a potential effect of securitisation (chapter 2.3.4).  
Fourth, on the basis of this conceptual work, chapter 2.4 elaborates in more detail on the research 
question and the hypothesis. The chapter closes, fifth, with an overview of the research design and 
phases, the operationalisation of the research question and the research methods employed 
(chapter 2.5). 
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2.1. The Roots of Security, Security Studies and the New Security Agenda 
The notion of ‘security’ has a rich and complex genealogy (Kaufmann, 1970, Der Derian, 1993). The 
word derives from Latin securitas (sine cura)10, but its roots go back to ancient Greek philosophy 
(Liddell and Scott, 1843 [1961]). When the term appeared first in the work of the Roman philosopher 
and politician Cicero (106-43 BC) it included a positive (carelesness, heedlessness, negligence) and a 
negative definition (freedom from danger) (Arends, 2008: 263ff). The term also had a religious 
connotation which was later incorporated into certitudo (certitude, certainty, absolute conviction) 
and became in this way an integral part of Christian theology.  
When Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) took up securitas, particularly in his work ‘Leviathan’, he 
associated the term to the modern States’ omnipotence to prevent civil war in the ‘state nature’s’ 
complete absence of security (bellum omnium contra omnes; nulla securitas). For Hobbes the 
provision of (individual) security was the core function of the ‘super state’ which loses its raison 
d’être once it turned incapable of producing security (Kaufmann, 1970: 68, Rothschild, 1995).11 
Further authors such as Baron Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694) and his understanding of securitas 
as “interior and exterior security, peace (pax), protection of property [and] common prosperity 
(commoditas)”, to be provided by the State, added to the roots of the contemporary concept(s) 
(Schrimm-Heins, 1992: 196, Arends, 2008: 274). 
Departing from this heritage, security entered the field of modern political science in the 1940s. 
Within the area of International Relations (IR) the sub-field ‘Security Studies’ is above all interested in 
the interactions of international actors that bear implications for the security of these actors. In this 
context the meaning of security became closely associated with threats to the political and territorial 
integrity of states, giving rise to one of IR’s key concepts ‘national security’ (Walt, 1991, Rosenberg, 
1993). IR scholars of a realist tradition eventually located security at the heart of ‘high politics’ and 
associated it with the ‘national interest’ and “the integrity of the nation’s territory, of its political 
institutions and of its culture” (Morgenthau, 1952: 973). Reflecting the tight connection between 
security and the integrity of the State and the State’s struggle to defend its freedom, independence 
and values, the analysis of security was at this time primarily defined as “the study of the threat, use, 
and control of military force” (Walt, 1991: 212, see also Buzan et al., 1998: 3f, Hough, 2004: 3ff, 
Herington, 2012: 8). In other words, the traditional notion of security was primarily founded on a 
violence paradigm and the threat of exogenous force targeting the State, its military or people 
(Ikenberry and Slaughter, 2006). 
Since the 1970s this traditional security definition applied by IR’s Security Studies was increasingly 
criticised for being too narrow as regards (1) the scope of threats considered central to security, (2) 
the actors deemed central to the security landscape and (3) the referent objects of security, i.e. the 
being that faces a threat and demands protection. 
                                                          
10
 Latin for ‘without cura’; cura meaning care, carefulness, concern. 
11
 More on Hobbes as a theorist of security can be found in Waldron (2006: 456ff). 
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In this way a widened security understanding (1) linked a number of so called ‘soft’ threats to 
security. Reflecting the discussion on globalisation effects, scholars proposed to go beyond the 
military sector and to include further fields such as economic interdependence, energy security, 
climate change – and infectious diseases (Ullman, 1983, Mathews, 1989, Buzan, 1991, Krause and 
Williams, 1996). In addition, pluralist theorists argued that in the new global arena it was (2) not 
merely the State but a plurality of actors, including intergovernmental organisations such as the EU, 
international non-governmental organisations or multinational companies that were crucial players 
in global affairs. Here the security debate intersected with the discussions on the constituents of the 
global governance system (Rosenau, 1992, Weiss and Gordenker, 1996, Young, 1997, Nye and 
Donahue, 2000, Muldoon Jr., 2003). Finally, advocates of a widened security approach proposed to 
(3) replace the focus on the State as the sole referent object of security by a definition that puts 
human beings and communities at the heart of the concept (Booth, 1991, Wyn-Jones, 1999).12 On a 
more general level the discussion about the referent object of security led to the question whether a 
given threat must ultimately target an actor (State, collective, human individual) or whether also the 
security of abstract concepts like ‘identity security’ (McSweeney, 1999) or ‘societal security’ (Waever 
et al., 1993, Huysmans, 2006) could fall into the realm of Security Studies. 
It becomes clear that the widening of the security debate in terms of (1) threats, (2) referent objects 
and (3) security provider prepared the ground also for the analysis of infectious diseases and the 
European Union from a security perspective. At the same time, the widening of the security debate 
resulted in a confusingly rich offer of security understandings. Apart from the idea that security is 
something particularly valuable and can be found only if someone or something is secure(d) due to 
the absence of or the invulnerability vis-à-vis a given threat, the term can refer to fairly different 
things. Security sometimes refers to a state of being, sometimes to political practices and sometimes 
to a political ideal (Bubandt, 2005, Herington, 2012). The term is sometimes applied to human and 
sometimes to non-human beings, sometimes to individuals and sometimes to (social) groups. Also a 
great variety from local to global and from natural to manmade threats is inherent to the set of 
concepts, just as various needs that must be satisfied or goods that one must hold to be secure(d).  
In fact, nowadays an almost endless list of conceptualisations exist and form the basis of ongoing 
discussions (Herington, 2012: 8), ranging from civilizational security (Bowden, 2010) through energy 
security (Dannreuther, 2010) and environmental security (Barnett, 2010) to emancipatory security 
(Booth, 1991, Wyn-Jones, 1999), financial security (de Goede, 2010), food security (Wiggins and 
Slater, 2010), human security (UNDP, 1994, Commission on Human Security, 2003, Centre, 2010, 
Owen, 2010), national security (Wolfers, 1952, Ullman, 1983, Walt, 1991) and ontological security 
(Giddens, 1991, Mitzen, 2006). 
                                                          
12
 A people-centred approach that has been widely received – although with differing conceptualisations – is 
the ‘human security’ concept which emphasises inter alia the protection of the individual from fear and 
freedom from want in various terms, also related to health (UNDP, 1994, Centre, 2010). The human security 
concept in relation to public health and infectious diseases is discussed in more detail in chapter 2.3.2.1. Basic 
information on human security can be found in, for instance, in King and Murray (2001), Paris (2001), Thomas 
(2001), Hay et al. (2002), Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2006) and (Owen 2010). 
14 
 
In the light of the plethora of security approaches, security has been labelled an “essentially 
contested concept” (Buzan, 1991: 6), a concept for which so many competing interpretations exist, 
each valuing different elements of the concept, that ultimately none appears to be acceptable to all 
(Herington, 2012: 9ff).13 Against this background the problem arises how infectious diseases can be 
reasonably analysed in a security context at the EU level, if (a) security is inconsistently defined and 
refers to different things at the same time, and (b) if infectious diseases in the EU context are so little 
explored that any ex ante or theoretically derived definition of security bears the risk to be 
misguiding or too narrow? In this context it appears most promising to work with an approach that 
does not exclude any specific security understandings from the start but rather reflects that security 
is at least partly a subjective matter. The securitisation approach to be introduced in the next section 
has its strong point exactly in the capability to grasp all sorts of security threats and situations and to 
produce insights into the definition of security as it becomes manifest in a given setup. 
 
2.2. The Securitisation Approach 
The securitisation framework for analysis offers a constructivist perspective on security. Following 
the basic understanding that security issues in international affairs are first and foremost something 
socially constructed, the approach offers a flexible framework that is particularly suitable when it 
comes to examining which issues are actually regarded as a security problem.  
The approach has its roots in the beginning of the IR security debate, when Arnold Wolfers argued 
that security is something that can be assessed both objectively (a threat is real) and subjectively (a 
threat is perceived) (Wolfers, 1952). In this sense ‘objective security’ is about the degree to which a 
referent object is actually secure, whereas ‘subjective security’ refers to the degree to which the 
referent object feels secure (Booth, 2007: 110, Herington, 2012: 20). When in the 1980s a general 
trend occurred to revise the conceptual basis of security analysis (Ullman, 1983, Krause and Williams, 
1996) scholars took up this argument and emphasised the performative (in contrast to 
representational) function of language in security (Der Derian and Michael, 1989, Fierke, 1998).  
Based on the theoretical groundwork of constructivist analysis of IR (Kratochwil, 1989, Onuf, 1989, 
Wendt, 1992)14 and influenced by the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy and social theory they argued 
that security was not simply an externally given condition following the ‘laws of nature’ but the result 
of human action and the discursive reproduction of the environment – and, thus, always potentially 
open for restructuration. Following this interpretation nothing essentially constitutes a threat or a 
necessary good on its own right; an issue turns into a security issue only through discursive practice 
(Dillon, 1996). This implies that insecurity is not primarily constructed by policy responses to a 
menace but by language games (Fierke, 1998), discourses (Weldes, 1996, Campbell, 1998) and 
speech acts (Waever, 1995, Buzan et al., 1998). In other words “insecurity is not a fact of nature but 
always requires that it is written and talked into existence” (Huysmans, 2006: 7). 
                                                          
13
 On the concept of ‘essential contestability’ see Gallie (1955). 
14
 For an overview of origins and evolution of constructivist thinking in IR see, for instance, Balzacq (2012). 
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Since the 1990s, when discursive and constructivists started to analyse the ‘production of 
(in)security’, the approaches have undergone a dynamic development and today belong to the 
dominant strands of IR and Security Studies (Ruggie, 1996, Wendt, 1999, Guzzini, 2000, Farrell, 2002, 
Zehfuss, 2002, Hansen, 2006, Balzacq, 2012: 56).15 Within the set of constructivist approaches and 
the diverse range of ‘wide concepts’ of security the securitisation approach proved to be of 
particularly influence. The notion of securitisation was originally coined in the banking system and 
worked into IR by Ole Waever (Waever, 1989). Together with his colleagues at the Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute and following Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear (Buzan, 1991) a 
particular approach to security analysis was established, today known as the ‘Copenhagen School’, by 
a series of publications with a core curriculum that essentially comprises four works (Waever et al., 
1993, Waever, 1995, Buzan et al., 1998 and Buzan and Waever, 2003). Their work has been taken up 
in countless contributions and variations, leading to the assessment that “[e]very discussion of the 
topic of security since has had to deal with it, in some way or another” (Herington, 2012: 14). 
In their perspective on security the Copenhagen School puts emphasis on the intersubjective 
elements of threat perception and construction. The framework constituted a substantial shift away 
from the ‘narrow’ conception of what is and what is not a security issue, not only beyond the military 
sector, but also beyond the assumption that threats are something objective. More precisely, the 
Copenhagen School argued that security should be understood as a political practice that can, under 
specific conditions, potentially take any issue into the realm of security: 
“Threats and vulnerabilities can arise in many different areas, military and non-military, but 
to count as security issues they have to meet strictly defined criteria that distinguish them 
from the normal run of the merely political. They have to be staged as existential threats to a 
referent object by a securitising actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency 
measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind (Buzan et al., 1998: 5). 
On a general level the securitisation approach sees security issues as something socially constructed 
that has been moved beyond the rules of normal politics. On a detailed level the process of 
securitisation proceeds in the form of „a speech act where a securiti[s]ing actor designates a threat 
to a specified referent object and declares an existential threat implying a right to use extraordinary 
means to fence it off.” If and once a relevant audience consents to this move and “thus grants the 
actor a right to violate rules that otherwise would bind”, the ‘securitised’ issue turns into a matter of 
security and “becomes […] a part of what is security” (Waever, 2000: 251). 
In this understanding a securitisation process consists of three sequences: 
(1) an actor’s attempt to label an issue as an ‘existential threat’ (‘securitising move’), 
(2) the relevant audience’s acceptance of this claimed threat, 
(3) the adoption of ‘emergency measures’ to respond to this threat (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). 
 
 
                                                          
15
 A good overview of ‘New Security Studies’ can be found in Burgess, 2010. 
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(1) For the conceptualisation of the ‘securitising move’, the first sequence that initiates the process 
of securitisation, Waever and his colleagues built on the language theory put forward by Austin 
(see also Searle, 1969, Austin, 1975 [1962]). Austin argued that statements do not only represent 
reality but also realise action and that in the sense of being ‘performatives’ rather than 
‘constatives’, speech acts can transform the world. Consequently, speech acts cannot be 
assessed as true or false. Examples referred to how utterances actually do things include 
‘betting’, ‘baptising’, ‘promising’ or ‘naming’. Hence, in the sense that issues ‘show themselves’ 
(from the Greek phainesthai) also security issues can emerge and develop through discursive 
practice (Dillon, 1996: 47). Rather than referring to some extra-discursive reality, the utterance 
of the word ‘security’, as Waever puts it, “is the act” (Waever, 1995: 55). The issue is thereby 
shifted into a security discourse which frames reality in a ‘security way’. In this understanding 
security is regarded as an illocutionary speech act, a self-referential practice. By saying it, 
something is done that comprises a “’social magic’ power of language, a magic in which the 
conditions of possibility of threats are internal to the act of saying ‘security’” (Balzacq, 2011b: 1). 
 
In practical terms the speech act is a ‘securitising move’ of an actor (the ‘securitiser’), who 
employs a specific rhetorical structure to label someone or something (the referent object) as 
existentially threatened. This is typically done by claiming absolute priority to address a certain 
problem since (otherwise) the survival of the referent object is acutely endangered. In the 
original securitisation approach the staging of an existential issue is considered a dramatic claim 
to consider a certain issue more important than others and, consequently, that it needs to be 
moved up to the very top of the political agenda, or even above politics. In international affairs it 
means “to present an issue as urgent and existential, as so important that it should not be 
exposed to the normal haggling of politics but should be dealt with decisively by top leaders prior 
to other issues” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). However, following the constructivist foundations of the 
approach the threats sometimes do not necessarily have to be existential (Williams, 2003). The 
important aspect is that the securitising actors argues that the “referent object’s level of security 
(as a state of being) is what is threatened” (Herington, 2012: 13). An issue becomes a security 
issue not “because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a 
threat” (Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Put crisply, the result of what is constructed by language is what 
ultimately matters; the real circumstances ‘out there’ are extraneous to this concept of security 
(Campbell, 1998, Knudsen, 2001, Balzacq, 2011b: 12). 
 
(2) The presentation of an issue as existentially threatened, however, leads to successful 
securitisation only, if the securitising move is – in a second step – also accepted by the relevant 
audience of the securitiser, thereby generating a shared understanding of what can be 
collectively regarded and addressed as a threat. In other words, talking up a problem or 
designating it as a ‘vital interest’ is not enough to cause securitisation; the securitiser’s 
securitising attempt also has to find acceptance by the relevant addressees. By acceptance, 
Buzan et al. mean “enough resonance for platform to be made from which it is possible to 
legitimise emergency measure or other steps that would not have been possible had the 
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discourse not taken the form of existential threats, point of no return and necessity” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 25). By integrating the audience into the framework the Copenhagen School posits that 
securitisation can be understood as an intersubjective discursive practice which is incomplete as 
long as the securitising move is not followed by indication of acceptance. Hence, “security 
ultimately rests neither with the objects nor with the subjects but among the subjects” (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 31, emphasis in original). 
 
(3) The third step in the securitisation process consists of the adoption of extraordinary means in 
response to the perceived threat. Classically, these measures refer to executive powers that fall 
within the juridical reserve area, immune to legal challenge (Gordon, 1991: 33) which allows 
governments to use all means necessary to address an emergency situation (Waever, 1995). In a 
wider sense these extraordinary measures refer to any means that “break the normal political 
rules of the game”, for instance in the form of secrecy or extraordinary allocation of resources 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 24). Linked to the (declared) urgency of the matter the claim for the need 
and right to adopt these measures is usually justified in the speech act. The securitising actor 
thereby aims at legitimising the envisaged emergency action, including the use of force or the 
violation of certain rights, by presenting the measures as unavoidably required to tackle a 
threatening development (Buzan et al., 1998: 21).16 
 
To sum up, the securitisation framework for analysis put forward by the group of scholars collectively 
known as the Copenhagen School sees the “intersubjective establishment of an existential threat 
with a salience to have substantial political effects” as the “definition and criteria of securitisation” 
(emphasis in original) (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). Security is understood not through its substance but 
through its performance, and the language of security does not primarily represent what is ‘really out 
there’ but is essentially constitutive of that very reality. In this understanding, the meaning of 
security is not made up ex ante analytically rather than on the basis of how securitiser and audience 
(consciously or unconsciously) frame and tackle an issue.  
Successful securitisation has neither taken place if something is only seen as an existential threat 
without triggering subsequent measures, nor if only rules are broken on unspecific grounds. In 
contrast, securitisation requires the framing of “existential threats that legitimise the breaking of 
rules” (Buzan et al., 1998: 25). In line with this understanding the reference definition of 
securitisation includes a successful speech act “through which an intersubjective understanding is 
constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued 
referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat” 
(Buzan and Waever, 2003: 491). This definition refers to securitisation as a process and provides the 
key elements of this process. The result of this process, in turn, is securitisation as a state of being, 
that is the ‘successful’ construction of a given issue or situation as a security problem.  
                                                          
16
 The idea of security as politics of prioritisation and exception can also be found in the work of other 
constructivists (for instance Huysmans, 2002 and McDonald, 2008; see also Herington, 2012: 12), some of them 
arguing that emergency measures also imply that they are beyond the public debate (Huysmans, 1998, 
Williams, 2003: 515). 
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It is important to note that the fathers of the securitisation approach considered the securitisation of 
an issue or of a situation as a status, which also can be de-escalated through the process of de-
securitisation to the status of merely politicised matter. Similar to the securitising process that shifts 
an issue into the sphere of emergency politics, de-securitisation works as a reverse mechanism that 
returns the issue back to the realm of normal politics and its normal bargaining processes (Waever, 
1995). In this sense, on a scale between issues which are not publicly debated or dealt with by the 
state (non-politicised), through issues which belong to the realm of public policy-making (politicised) 
to those which have been framed as an “existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures”, the latter, i.e. the securitised 
issues, constitute one extreme, but not a dead end (Buzan et al., 1998: 23f). 
 
Source: Own presentation on the basis of Buzan et al. (1998). 
 
Consequently, in this framework security was not meant to be seen as a conflict-free ideal in contrast 
to insecurity, but “as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics” (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). The 
designation of de-securitisation as the desired long-term status is also linked to the tactical potential 
of a securitisation move that could also be employed to exploit a threat in view of prioritisation and 
emergency measures on potentially unjustified grounds. Hence, securitisation is not “an innocent 
reflection of the issue being a security threat […], it is […] a political choice to securitise or to accept a 
securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). 
 
Figure 2-1: From A-Politic to Securitised 
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2.3. A Novel Approach to Study the Securitisation of Infectious Diseases  
and Its Effects on the Institutionalisation in the European Union 
The publication of the Copenhagen School’s approach to Security Studies triggered manifold 
reactions in the academic world, ranging from wide recognition and numerous applications of the 
concept through the label ‘politically irresponsible’ (Eriksson, 1999) to the reactivation of the much-
quoted impression that something must be ‘rotten in the State of Denmark’17 (Moravcsik, 1999, see 
also Williams, 2003: 512). A large number of studies also dealt with it in conceptual terms and 
proposed various advancement of the original approach. This discussion, however, was primarily fed 
by scholars who were interested in (de-)securitisation as a process which is initiated and influenced 
by various factors that are subject to investigation. In this sense, the debate revolved around the 
causes and conditions for securitisation as the explanandum.18  
Given the research interest of the present study in forms of securitisation that precede 
institutionalisation processes (securitisation as explanans), the novel securitisation approach as 
applied in the following includes innovations that are primarily designed to systematically analyse the 
forms of the securitisation of infectious diseases and to integrate an explanatory framework that 
defines institutionalisation as a potential effect of securitisation. In order to re-conceptualise the 
securitisation framework in such a way, the novel approach introduces four interrelated innovations: 
a ‘securitisation degree’, a ‘securitisation kind’, a ‘coordination system of securitisation’ and the 
concept of institutionalisation as a potential effect of securitisation. Complemented by an analysis of 
the group of securitisers the former three tools serve the purpose to assess the form in which a 
disease has been securitised; the latter links the framework for analysis with the integration 
dynamics at the EU level.  
What are these innovations exactly about, why are they needed and how do they fit together? 
First, it has become clear that the original securitisation approach works with a binary distinction to 
differentiate between ‘normal’ political issues on the one hand and security problems on the other. 
This spectrum between security and normal politics, however, is somewhat simplistic and was 
identified to deserve further investigation in view of the state of “partial securiti[s]ation” even by one 
of the original securitisation authors (Waever, 2003: 26). Hence, in order to grasp more accurately 
the securitisation form of a disease, the next section (chapter 2.3.1) introduces a ‘securitisation 
degree’ of infectious diseases. It builds on the idea of a ‘security continuum’ which essentially means 
                                                          
17
 Satirical reference to Shakespeare’s Hamlet (Act 1, Scene 4) in view of the country in which the home city of 
the securitisation approach, Copenhagen, is located. 
18
 In this context the debate inter alia addressed the securitisation approach’s focus on specific ‘moments’ 
(Weldes et al., 1999: 16f, Hansen, 2000: 300f, Wilkinson, 2007, McDonald, 2008: 564, 570) and the role of the 
State (Wyn-Jones, 1999, McDonald, 2008, Barthwahl-Datta, 2009). A prominent advancement of the original 
securitisation framework got to be known as the ‘sociological’ school of securitisation studies which 
emphasises the re-definition of speech act to better integrate the ‘audience’ and better reflect the powers of 
securitisers, the kind of audience(s) that matter(s) and differences regarding the tools and mediums of 
securitisation, incl. other mediums and forms of communicative action such as televisual communication, 
images, silence etc. (Hansen, 2000, Williams, 2003: 526, Balzacq, 2005, Booth, 2007, Möller, 2007: 180, Stritzel, 
2007, McDonald, 2008, Léonard and Kaunert, 2011). 
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that “security issues can be seen to move on a continuum from normalcy to worrisome/troublesome 
to risk and to existential threat” (Abrahamsen, 2005: 59). According to such an understanding, the 
states of ‘politicised’ and ‘securitised’ are not binary conditions “but the two end points of a 
spectrum” along which security issues can move “with most falling short of the existential threat 
required for full securiti[s]ation (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 128). 
Second, we have seen in chapter 2.1 that security is an essentially contested concept for which no 
generally accepted definition exists. It will become clear in chapter 2.3.2 that this ambiguity is also a 
dominant feature when it comes to linking security to public health and infectious diseases. 
Academics and practitioners regularly employ security and securitisation terminology, but they refer 
to different security definitions or do not make explicit the underlying security or securitisation 
concept. Consequently, when defining the form of securitisation of an infectious disease, we need to 
be capable of differentiating between different security understandings. Hence, in order to grasp 
what security actually refers to when an issue becomes securitised, the novel securitisation approach 
introduces the analytical concept of a ‘kind of securitisation’. This tool structures the spectrum of 
security understandings in relation to infectious diseases on the basis of a set of securitisation 
parameters. 
In other words, whereas chapter 2.3.1 introduces a degree of securitisation in order to express, on a 
vertical axis, the intensity of the security dimension for a given issue, the kind of securitisation as 
introduced by chapter 2.3.2 shall, on a horizontal axis, allow for the qualitative differentiation 
between different security concepts. Together, these innovations allow for a better definition of an 
infectious disease as a security issue. Ultimately, degree and kind of securitisation can be combined 
to establish a ‘coordination system’ (see Figure 2-2 below and chapter 2.3.3) that is suitable to locate 
the securitisation form of an infectious disease. 
 
Figure 2-2: The Coordination System of Securitisation (basic version) 
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Source: Own presentation. 
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Third, we have seen that the original securitisation framework lacks an elaborate explanatory model 
on the effects of securitisation. The question of causality has also been identified to be important for 
the development of a ‘securitisation theory’ (Guzzini, 2011). However, to the knowledge of the 
author the securitisation critique has not yet yielded a clear-cut model that would allow for a 
straightforward connection of securitisation and institutionalisation processes. Since such a link is 
essential for the analysis of the institutionalisation of infectious disease control in the EU from a 
securitisation perspective, the novel securitisation approach establishes this connection on the basis 
of a basic ‘security logic’ in chapter 2.3.4. In this context the above mentioned coordination system 
will be of particular value, seeing that a clearly defined form of securitisation of a disease can be 
employed as the independent variable in a testable hypothesis. However, before doing so it is 
necessary to elaborate on each of the innovations in detail. In particular, it is necessary to develop 
the analytic concepts of a securitisation degree and kind in a way that meets the demands of a 
securitisation study on infectious diseases. 
 
2.3.1. The Degree of Securitisation 
In order to establish a differentiation between different ‘degrees of securitisation’ the proposed 
framework takes up wide approaches to security which work with a continuum for the classification 
of securitisation and threats (Bigo, 2002, Abrahamsen, 2005, Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012, 
Léonard, 2012, McInnes and Rushton, 2013). This continuum builds on the classification by Buzan et 
al. that differentiates between issues which are ‘non-politicised’, those which have been ‘politicised’ 
and those which have been ‘securitised’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 23f; see also Figure 2-1). A major 
concern with this classification was that the status of ‘securitised’ could in reality hardly be observed 
as a ‘yes-or-no’ situation but often constituted a condition that easily transcended to the state of 
‘politicised’. Against this background the proposed ‘security continuum’ provided a spectrum on 
which any issue could gradually move back and forth between the extremes of ‘normalcy’ and 
‘existential threat’ (Abrahamsen, 2005: 59). 
The novel securitisation degree follows a similar logic. It starts from the assumption that there is not 
only a gradual transition between the states of ‘politicised’ and ‘securitised’, but also within the 
status of ‘securitised’. Against this background the realm of ‘securitisation’ can be split up into 
different levels or phases so that the spectrum between the end points of ‘lowly securitised’ and 
‘highly securitised’ is structured into different ‘securitisation degrees’. This innovation addresses one 
of the weaknesses of the original securitisation approach by allowing for a more adequate 
classification of securitisation states (Bigo, 2000). At the same time, it sets end points to the 
securitisation continuum, which are helpful when it comes to deriving hypotheses on the impact of 
the securitisation degree on the effects of securitisation, that is when a given form of securitisation 
serves as the independent variable. 
How can we identify the securitisation degree? The novel securitisation framework takes up the key 
elements of the original securitisation approach that occur in the securitisation process, namely 
security discourse and speech acts, securitisers, audience and emergency measures.  
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Security discourse and speech acts in this context refer to the prevalence and intensity of security 
language with regard to a perceived threat, considering the number of speech acts as well as the 
character and dominance of security vocabulary. The group of securitisers has an impact on the 
securitisation degree depending on the power position of the author of the utterance. For instance, a 
speech act by a prime minister indicates a higher securitisation degree than a speech act by a 
parliamentarian. Also the consent of the audience to the speech act can move on a spectrum 
between moderate to strong acceptance, the former indicating a lower, the latter a higher degree of 
securitisation.19 Similarly, emergency measures can range from few and soft initiatives (low 
securitisation degree) to the implementation of many and binding measures (high securitisation 
degree). This set of components is complemented by the ‘re-allocation of resources’, which covers 
the commitments in response to a security situation, in particular in form of financial means and 
personnel.20 In short, the underlying idea of the concept of a securitisation degree is that each of the 
components of the original securitisation approach essentially constitutes an indicator that can take 
different values representing an either lower or higher securitisation degree. 
Thus, when it comes to practically defining the securitisation degree, the different components of 
securitisation need to be assessed and combined to make up for an overall securitisation degree. In 
this context two extreme types help structuring the spectrum between low and high securitisation. In 
the case of an ideal type ‘lowly securitised issue’ – at the border to a merely ‘politicised’ problem – 
we expect only occasional securitising moves from securitisers in rather weak power positions and a 
moderately consenting audience. The issue is only occasionally referred to as a matter of security so 
that the discourse in general is dominated by other narrative. Measures that are adopted in response 
to the security challenge are expected to be few and of a soft nature only, for instance in the form of 
non-binding policy instruments that go along without a substantial re-allocation of resources.  
In contrast, in the case of an ideal type ‘highly securitised issue’ – in a most extreme variant – we 
expect the issue to be subject to a discourse that has reached the highest political level and is 
exclusively addressed as a security issue, fully dominated by security language. A high number of 
hard extraordinary reactions justified on the grounds of security concerns, for instance by imposing 
emergency rules, go along with a drastic allocation of resources and, thus, indicate a high degree of 
securitisation. In this context it is important to remember that the assessment of a securitisation 
indicator should be done under consideration of the relationship between the target and the means 
that are at the disposal of a securitising actor. To illustrate, earmarking a million Euros to a given 
protective counter measure may be a lot for an individual person, but not so much for a country. 
 
                                                          
19
 The minimum audience consent required for a lowly securitised issue is ‘moderate’ and not ‘low’, because 
the securitisation framework demands a predominantly consenting audience in order to regard an issue as 
being lifted into the realm of security in the first place. Since ‘low’ consent suggests that less than a majority of 
the audience accepts the securitising move and respective emergency measures, the lowest required consent 
of a securitised issue is defined to be at least ‘moderate’.  
20
 In the original securitisation approach the allocation of resources could be assigned to the realm of 
‘extraordinary measures’. With a view to the differentiation between securitisation degrees, however, it is 
helpful to list this particularly measurable indicator separately. 
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This understanding of securitisation differs from the approach of the Copenhagen School in some 
respects. Whereas Buzan et al. proposed that a speech act must claim that an issue represents an 
‘existential threat’ in order to qualify as a securitising move, the criterion applied here is less 
demanding. A securitising speech act covers basically any threat as long as the securitiser considers it 
to be a security issue. In this sense, the term ‘existential threat’ is opened to a less demanding 
‘exceptional threat’ (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012: S97). Adapting the notion in this way is 
justified for the analysis of health-related securitisation processes, because health issues seldom 
equal existential threats such as, for instance, exerted by a military invasion (McInnes and Lee, 2005).  
A flexible gradation is also helpful for the classification of emergency measures which do not 
necessarily have to be extremely exceptional or be completely contrary to established good practice 
to qualify as a contribution to the securitisation of an issue. The novel securitisation approach 
considers more measures as being part of the securitisation process as long as they have never or 
only rarely been applied before under the impression of urgency in response to a perceived threat.  
The following Figure 2-3 structures all components of the securitisation degree on the basis of the 
basic differentiation between a-politic, politicised and securitised issues as introduced by the 
Copenhagen School (see Figure 2-1). In order to help structure the various components, the 
indicators of the securitisation degree are grouped along a ‘verbal’ and an ‘operational’ dimension. 
Whereas the verbal dimension deals with the construction of (in)security by the means of language, 
the operational dimension refers to implemented action.  
Hence, the verbal dimension includes security discourse, speech acts, securitisers and the audience. 
In turn, the operational dimension refers to the emergency measures and the (re-)allocation of 
resources. Such a basic differentiation is useful against the background that an issue can be 
considered to have turned into a security problem only if securitising speech acts and audience 
consent (verbal dimension) are accompanied by emergency measures (operational dimension). 
When it comes to practically assessing whether and in how far an infectious disease has been 
securitised, the assessment along the two dimensions thus helps verify that the disease has not only 
been talked up as a security threat, but also been responded to in an extraordinary way. 
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Source: Own presentation. 
 
By gradating the key elements of securitisation in the proposed way, a more nuanced classification is 
possible to express how high an issue has risen the security continuum, that is whether a disease has 
turned to a smaller or greater extent into a security problem. However, it should be noted that the 
securitisation degree it is not designed to generate statistical data or to provide an exact calculation 
of a mark that expresses the securitisation degree in numbers. It is also beyond the scope of this 
study to develop an index that could exactly express the degree of securitisation on the security 
continuum, even if quantitative methods will complement the qualitative content analysis employed 
to analyse the securitisation degree (see chapter 2.5.6).  
In contrast, for the purpose of this study it is sufficient to split up the security continuum in three 
stages: lowly, moderately and highly securitised. Building on the distinction between verbal and 
operational securitisation, the highest degree of securitisation can only be achieved if we witness the 
combination of a high verbal degree and a high operational degree of securitisation. In turn, any 
combination with lower degrees of securitisation across the two securitisation dimensions ultimately 
leads to an overall result below the highest securitisation degree. Clearly, a more nuanced 
Figure 2-3: From A-Politic to Highly Securitised – The Indicators of the Securitisation Degree 
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differentiation would be possible on the basis of the securitisation degree indicators, but this basic 
assessment if sufficient for the purpose of the study which is, as will become clear in chapter 2.4, 
primarily interested in cases of high securitisation degrees. Figure 2-4 illustrates the staged 
classification system with basic pre-defined steps of low, medium and high securitisation in both the 
verbal and the operational dimensions.  
 
Figure 2-4: Schematic Overview of Degrees of Securitisation across Verbal and Operational Securitisation Dimension 
 Verbal Securitisation Degree 
Operational 
Securitisation 
Degree 
 Low High 
High Moderate High 
Low Low Moderate 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
2.3.2. The Kind of Securitisation 
As a second major innovation the novel securitisation approach introduces the differentiation 
between different ‘kinds of securitisation’. Whereas the degree of securitisation was introduced to 
help locate the securitisation status of a given issue on a vertical spectrum between low and high 
securitisation, the kind of securitisation focuses on a horizontal spectrum of diverging securitisation 
understandings, namely between the extremes of a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ kind of securitisation. The logic 
behind this differentiation is that securitisation occurs in the context of different underlying security 
understandings and that the inherent security understanding has an impact on the (potential to 
trigger) effects of securitisation. The basic argument is that it is not sufficient to reveal that a disease 
has been securitised, or to what extent an issue has turned into a security issue. In contrast, for a 
complete picture of a security reading of diseases, it is also necessary to disclose the concept of 
security that is inherent to the securitisation. 
The background for the idea of a ‘securitisation kind’ is the finding of chapter 2.1 that security is an 
essentially contested concept for which no generally accepted definition exists. A given matter can 
be regarded as a security problem by one person, but the same issue might not necessarily evoke a 
discomfort of insecurity for another person. We have seen that the IR security debate is 
characterised by competing interpretations, who or what needs to be threatened by what or whom 
so that one can actually talk about a security issue. It comes without surprise that also the link 
between security, public health and infectious disease control is characterised by diverging 
interpretations and competing understandings. As indicated in the introductory chapter, the field is 
often subsumed under the notion of ‘health security’ (see, for instance, Feldbaum and Lee, 2004, 
Rodier et al., 2007, Aldis, 2008). This term, however, can allude to basically everything pertaining to 
health (Elbe, 2010b).  
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Therefore, when it comes to the securitisation of infectious diseases, the sequences that construct 
health (in)security might be the same for all readings of the health security nexus (speech act, 
audience, emergency measure) but the construction occurs with reference to different definitions of 
the threat, different definition of the referent objects of security, different definitions of the security 
providers etc. Against this background, the kind of securitisation is designed as a tool that 
investigates the contestability of ‘security’ and its interpretative dimensions. 
How can we identify the kind of securitisation of a given infectious disease? Similar to the indicators 
that were established in the previous chapter to determine the degree of securitisation, a set of 
parameters that make up for a securitisation kind will be needed. In order to generate such a list of 
relevant parameters, a thorough review of existing approaches at the intersection of public health, 
infectious disease control and security appears most promising to grasp the existing understandings. 
Clearly, it would be possible to work with one of the existing health security concepts that offer a 
specific reading of the link between (in)security and infectious diseases. However, following the idea 
that the kind of securitisation potentially impacts the effects of securitisation and given that the 
securitisation of infectious diseases at the EU level is rather unexplored territory, it is not advisable to 
work with a pre-defined security understanding. Also, establishing the concept of a kind of 
securitisation on the basis of security parameters that cover basically any security understanding 
contributes to a broad applicability of the concept across diseases and securitisation settings. 
Hence, before developing in detail the concept of a securitisation kind, the following section will 
examine and structure the rich literature of the ‘health security nexus’ with the aim to compile a list 
of security parameters most relevant for the differentiation of constructions of (in)security related to 
infectious diseases. 
 
2.3.2.1. Making Sense of the Health Security Nexus 
We have seen in the introductory chapter that linking security to health and infectious diseases is 
both an old and a recent development at the same time. Against the background of the experiences 
of mankind with infectious diseases, for instance smallpox, which alone during the twentieth century 
killed three times the number of deaths caused by wars during that period (Oldstone, 1998), one 
might wonder how infectious diseases could be seen as something other than primarily a security 
concern. In this context it is important to consider a particularity of the link between health and 
security in general: the insight that being alive puts you at serious risk to death and that in the end 
we all have to die. In fact, there is nothing unnatural in dying of ill health. Otherwise, “[i]f everything 
that causes a decline in human well-being is labelled a ‘security’ threat, the term loses any analytical 
usefulness and becomes a loose synonym for ‘bad’” (Deudney, 1990: 463f). It therefore hardly makes 
sense to think of death, infectious diseases and health as security concerns as such; infectious 
diseases can cause a ‘natural’ death. Consequently, linking security to health and infectious diseases 
only makes sense if the cause of death is considered ‘unnatural’ or ‘premature’, that is if death is 
considered as at least partly avoidable (Hough, 2004: 15).  
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Accordingly, the circumstance that infectious diseases have caused more morbidity and mortality 
than war and essentially anything else in human history (Price-Smith, 2002) can reasonably be 
contextualised from a security perspective only if a lethal infection is thought of as evitable. Since 
this condition could not be taken for granted for most periods of human history, only the recent 
advances in medicine, biotechnology and public health to respond to infectious diseases provided 
the stimulating background for the development and discussion of various ‘health security’ concepts. 
Among these concepts at the intersection of security, public health and infectious diseases the most 
prominent and influential approaches in the academic and political debate are the partly overlapping 
concepts of (1) biosecurity, (2) pandemic security, (3) human security and (4) global health security.  
To take up the basic features of Security Studies, the biosecurity and pandemic security can be 
classified as the two most prominent approaches that follow the logic of a rather narrow, classic 
understanding of infectious diseases as a security issue. The human and the global health security 
approaches, in turn, represent rather wide approaches. Hence, it can be reasonably assumed these 
four approaches cover large parts of the wide spectrum of security approaches to infectious diseases. 
Their review is therefore particularly suitable to identify distinguishing features and to eventually 
generate a list of security parameters on the basis of which the end points of the spectrum for a kind 
of securitisation can be identified. 
 
2.3.2.1.1. Biosecurity  
The concept of biosecurity is usually understood as referring to the prevention of inadvertent, 
inappropriate, or intentional malicious or malevolent development, acquisition and use of biological 
agents or biotechnology (Government of Japan, 2008, cited in Kuhlau and Hart, 2010: 174, Koblentz, 
2010). With the aim to ensure the “health and safety of humans, animals, and plants” (Kuhlau and 
Hart, 2010: 175) it includes the measures taken at the laboratory level as well as wider “preventive 
security measures, […] disease surveillance, preparedness, and response in the event of the use of 
biological weapons or biosafety and biosecurity breaches” (Kuhlau and Hart, 2010: 174). Hence, the 
dangers of warfare with biological weapons used as “devices for the malevolent infliction of disease” 
(Kellman, 2012: 232) with bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae, fungi and toxins and questions regarding the 
compliance with the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling 
of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction’ (BTCW, 1972) are central 
components of the biosecurity concept (Kelle, 2007: 219). 
In this context dual-use science research that has the potential “to be used for harmful as well as for 
legitimate and beneficial purposes” (Kuhlau and Hart, 2010: 181) and the advances in synthetic 
biology and genetic manipulation have taken the biosecurity debate into the realm of cutting-edge 
life science (Van Aken, 2006, Garfinkel et al., 2007). Experts fear that with the spread of expertise in 
molecular biology also capacities and opportunities for misuse will raise, rendering current biosafety 
standards and protocols on laboratory safety insufficient (Collier and Lakoff, 2008: 10).  
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Also the notion of ‘bio-error’, a composite of the terms ‘bio’ and ‘error’ (without ‘t’), has recently 
entered the debate hinting at the risks arising from the un-intentional release of dangerous materials 
from laboratories (National Intelligence Council, 2012: 67). Bioterrorism (with ‘t), in turn, refers to 
questions about the threat posed by a potential terrorist attack involving the deliberate release of an 
infectious disease (Collier et al., 2004, Wright, 2006, Fidler and Gostin, 2008, Stavrianakis et al., 
2011). Triggered by reports in the 1990s on bioweapon programmes in the Soviet Union and Iraq and 
the menace of proliferation of WMDs by rogue states, the subway sarin terrorist attack in Tokyo and 
by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax scare in the US, infectious diseases 
took a central place in the lively debate about ‘asymmetric threats’ (Hough, 2004, Lakoff, 2010: 68f). 
 
2.3.2.1.2. Pandemic Security 
Similarly to biosecurity the concept of pandemic security – sometimes also referred to as ‘pandemic 
preparedness’ – has its roots in the ‘national security’ debate. However, the view is different in so far 
as pandemic security emphasises the direct effects of a naturally occurring disease such as AIDS, 
SARS or influenza on the State and its core functions and institutions. Accordingly a reading through 
the lenses of pandemic security includes the view on infectious diseases as security concerns in a 
traditional sense that can have serious effects on armed forces, combat effectiveness and military 
preparedness. An estimation that in the early 2000s in some African countries 40 to 60 per cent of 
the armed forces and, for instance, in Zambia also half of the police were HIV positive is a case in 
point (Price-Smith, 2001: 14, Elbe, 2010a: 165). 
At the same time, pandemic security also goes beyond the military domain and acknowledges the 
potential impact of infectious diseases on social and political stability and economic growth (Garrett, 
2005, McInnes and Lee, 2006, Maclean, 2008). In this context the exacerbating effects on social 
tensions, political struggle over access to medicine, reduced labour force, increased welfare costs 
and a “socially unstable high number of orphans” (Elbe, 2010a: 164ff, here: 166) play the most 
important role. Hence, following this understanding State-related insecurity can also be caused by 
‘medical problems’ that are widely present within a given population (Elbe, 2012: 89). 
In line with this concept infectious diseases have also found their way into the political sphere, for 
instance in the United States’ or United Kingdom’s national security strategies, where possible 
effects of pandemics on the own country, but also generally on international stability, peace and 
economic development were highlighted (The White House, 2006, Cabinet Office, 2008: 3, 2010: 31). 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic was subject of six meetings of the UNSC since the year 200021 which labelled 
the disease a threat to international peace and security. In this sense classic security issues such as 
peace, the functional existence of societies, internal and economic stability, and armed forces were 
linked to pandemics by influential political studies (National Intelligence Council, 2000, International 
Crisis Group, 2001), even if empirical evidence on the de facto influence might have been “thin 
and/or inconclusive” (McInnes and Lee, 2006, Selgelid and Enemark, 2008: 464). 
                                                          
21
 United Nations Security Council Meetings 4087, 4172, 4259, 4339, 4859, and 5228. 
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2.3.2.1.3. Human Security 
The third concept that figures prominently in the infectious disease-related security debate is that of 
human security. This concept does not emphasise a particular (source of) threat but links up with the 
broader developmental and human rights agenda and highlights a different referent object of 
security by shifting the attention away from the security of the State to the security of “ordinary 
people […] in their daily lives” (UNDP, 1994: 22). At the same time the concept encompasses many 
dimensions: “not just physical security, but the security of health; not just economic security, but 
that of food and of the environment; not just personal security, but that of community and even 
politics” (Thomas, 2001, Shaw et al., 2006, Hooker et al., 2012: 162f). 
The connection of infectious diseases with these elements is facilitated by the fact that health is 
often seen as the core of human security following the universal value of health and its ability to 
connect the human security approach’s claims to primarily consider the needs and welfare of 
individuals (Chen and Narasimhan, 2003, Maclean, 2008). In this vein the human-centric approach 
easily translates into a view on health as a fundamental individual human right that also needs to 
find expression in the general rights of the citizens and the social determinants of health (O'Manique 
and Fourie, 2012: 246).  
On a very basic level, the human security approach sees “premature and unnecessary loss of life [as] 
the greatest insecurity of human life” (Chen and Narasimhan, 2004: 5). Given the great number of 
premature deaths caused by infectious diseases, these diseases consequently constitute threats to 
security. Important in this context is that this understanding particularly highlights those infectious 
diseases that globally account for the most deaths. The concept thus implicitly shifts the geographical 
focus from the developed West southwards to endemic diseases in the developing world such as 
HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis (Elbe, 2012: 88, 92) and from the defence of borders against 
infectious diseases and bioweapons to relief, disease treatment and capacity building in the weak 
local health infrastructure. Crucially, compared to biosecurity and pandemic security, human security 
is grounded in a humanitarian and ethical motivation for which the self-protection of (Western) 
states is not the ultimate imperative. 
Human security was not only subject to the academic debate but also entered the political sphere, 
where it found support by a range of political and civil society actors (Africa Leadership Forum, 1991, 
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1999, Commission on Human Security, 2003, 
Cottey, 2007: 46). In this vein, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) proposed to 
change the concept of security “from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress 
on people’s security, from security through armaments to security through human development, 
from territorial to food, employment and environmental security” (UNDP, 1993). 
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2.3.2.1.4. Global Health (Security) 
The intertwined concepts of ‘global health’ and ‘global health security’ are perhaps the widest of the 
set of security related concepts that deal with infectious diseases. On a very general level, global 
health deals with “health problems, issues, and concerns that transcend national boundaries [and 
which] may be influenced by circumstances or experiences in other countries” (Institute of Medicine, 
1997: 1). In other words, the concept addressed all kind of health-related phenomena that cross 
borders and go beyond the agency of national governments. Given their cross-border effects, these 
phenomena call for joint action “to influence the global forces that determine the health of all 
people” (Karolinska Institutet and Global Health Europe Network, 2009: 11).  
Resulting inter alia from travel and trade between nations, infectious diseases can easily transcend 
national boundaries and therefore do fall under the definition of global health issues. However, the 
global health concept follows a wider agenda that also includes “inequities caused by patterns of 
international trade and investment, the effects of global climate change, the vulnerability of refugee 
populations [and] the marketing of harmful products by transnational corporations” (see also Lee, 
2003, Smith et al., 2006: 342). The World Health Organization establishes the link between global 
health and security by hinting at “the collection of preventative and response activities that 
minimi[s]e the vulnerability of populations to communicable disease transmission across 
geographical, national or regional boundaries” (WHO, 2007). Here global health security is at stake 
primarily if a disease is involved which can be transmitted directly from human to human (Zacher and 
Keefe, 2008: 183, FN 1). Other scholars, however, use the notion of global health security more 
generally in the context of “threats […] that can spread menacingly irrespective of established natural 
or political borders” (Hoffman, 2010: 511). 
Apparently, with a definition that generally applies to the health of people all around the world, the 
global health security concept shares a conceptual basis with the human security approach. A major 
difference, however, is that global health security does not concentrate on the health of the 
individual human, but on the protection of entire populations. Also global health security is not so 
much concerned about the security conditions for a healthy life, rather than threats of a global 
dimension.  
Another particularity of the global health approach is its acknowledgment of the increasing 
importance of a wide range of non-state actors, including international non-governmental 
organisations, multinational companies, influential philanthropic foundations and the media and 
their changing position in global health governance (Brown et al., 2006, Drager and Sunderland, 
2007, Fidler, 2007a, Garrett, 2007, Nichter, 2008: 156, Zacher and Keefe, 2008, Koplan et al., 2009, 
Aviel, 2011). Starting from the observation that an increasing number of non-state actors with 
significantly increased budgets has become active in the field of global health in general (Reich, 2002, 
Caines et al., 2004, Buse et al., 2009, Rushton and Williams, 2011), the concept highlights the 
involvement of these actors also in the response to the global challenge of infectious diseases. 
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2.3.2.2. The Parameters to Distinguish Infectious Disease-Related Security Concepts 
The review of the literature of the health security nexus reveals that legal scholar David Fidler might 
be right in concluding that “[t]he [current] prominence of security concepts in debates about public 
health threats and governance is historically unprecedented” (Fidler, 2007b: 42). The link between 
(in)security and infectious diseases is indeed established in a rich variety that is easily capable to 
render health and security fundamentally ambiguous. Put crisply, there is indeed no single 
understanding of the link between (health) security and infectious diseases, neither among 
researchers nor among policy-makers (Aldis, 2008). 
However, recalling the basic assumption that the way in which an issue is constructed as a security 
problem is fundamental to the effects it can trigger, it is necessary to structure the plethora of 
approaches and to establish a framework that allows for the differentiation between different kinds 
of securitisation. In order to do so, it helps work with a list of security parameters that distinguish the 
different security concepts or that the different concepts have in common. Even though additional 
security approaches, ‘key perspectives’ of global health governance (Lee, 2009: 29) and ‘global health 
regimes’ (Lakoff, 2010) could be added,22 the list of fundamental parameters can be compiled from 
the four presented concepts, that is biosecurity, pandemic security, human security and global health 
security, complemented by a number of cross-cutting factors. 
In order to ensure compatibility with the overarching framework of this study, the parameters 
defining the kind of securitisation are best structured along the components of the securitisation 
framework. In this context those components are of particular relevance, which are open to 
diverging interpretations depending on the underlying security understanding. Starting from the 
reference definition which understands securitisation as a successful speech act “through which an 
intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an 
existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional 
measures to deal with the threat” (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 491), three elements can be singled out 
in that respect: 
(1) The definition of the referent object (whose security is at stake?), 
(2) The definition of the threat (who or what threatens security?) and 
(3) The definition of the provision of security (who or what provides security?).  
A detailed look at each of the components helps reveal relevant parameters as well as possible 
values that these parameters can take.  
(1) As regards the referent object of security we see a major dividing line that separates State-
centred from human-centred approaches. Linked to the ideas of ‘national security’23 the 
concepts of biosecurity and pandemic security put emphasis on the protection of the State and 
its vital constituents such as military force or a functioning economy. The concepts of human 
                                                          
22
 A good overview also beyond the security focus is provided by Ng and Ruger (2011). 
23
 For a discussion on the historical relationships between public health and national security see, for instance, 
Fearnley (2005) and King (2002). 
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security and global health security, on the other hand, pursue a different approach by referring 
to the security of people. Here also the minimum number of referent objects plays a role. The 
human security approach with reference to the human rights discourse sees all people, that is 
every individual, entitled to health and security by virtue of their humanity (Donelly, 2003: 7). 
Global health security, in contrast, deals with the health of larger groups of referent objects and 
entire populations. 
(2) All presented concepts relate infectious diseases to security as a menace that affects the health 
of a given referent object, but the understandings of infectious diseases as a threat differ. In this 
context six interrelated parameters can be identified that distinguish the different security 
concepts. 
a. Source of threat: A disease qualifies as a security threat depending on its perceived 
source, which basically can be manmade, as it is in the case of the biosecurity approach, 
or natural, as in the pandemic security approach. 
b. Source of pathogenicity: A disease qualifies as a security threat depending on the 
perceived root causes that make a disease a threat, which can range from terrorism 
(biosecurity) through globalisation effects (global health security) to the lack of 
developed public health infrastructure (human security). 
c. Speed of threat: A disease qualifies as a security threat depending on the perceived 
speed at which the disease spreads. The speed of spread is influenced by a number of 
factors, primarily the infection path and the vector of the disease (food-borne, air-borne, 
water-borne, etc.). In this context the biosecurity concept considers fast spreading 
‘outbreak events’ as security threats. Contagious communicable diseases which are 
easily transmissible from person-to-person, for instance by droplet infection, are of 
particular concern. In contrast, the human security approach puts more emphasis on 
‘attrition diseases’ like HIV/AIDS or malaria which spread slower (Price-Smith, 2001: 15f, 
Selgelid and Enemark, 2008: 459).  
d. Geography of threat: A disease qualifies as a security threat depending on the perceived 
geographic prevalence. Contingent upon the infection path and the vector of the disease 
the morbidity of a given disease varies across (world) regions. Crucially, from a 
biosecurity or pandemic security perspective a disease turns into a security issue only if it 
appears close to (and likely to affect) the own territory. The human security, in turn, 
emphasises the impact of a disease in developing countries, the global health 
approaches the (potential) worldwide dimension of an outbreak. In short, a major 
distinction can be made upon the criterion whether the diseases affects ‘us’ or not. 
e. Severity of impact: A disease qualifies as a security threat depending on its perceived 
curability and the availability of treatment or vaccination. For most approaches it is more 
likely that the disease is considered a security threat, if no treatment exists and the 
course of disease is characterised by high mortality and quick death. By extending the 
view on effects of not lethal or chronic infections, global health and human security 
approaches apply a wider definition. 
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f. Predictability of threat: As a cross-cutting theme, a disease qualifies as a security threat 
depending on the perceived accurateness with which its speed, geographical spread and 
severity of impact can be foreseen. The notions of ‘new’ and ‘re-emerging’ diseases are 
related to the insight that mutation and change of microbes that threaten human 
survival are natural and can occur any time anywhere in the world, just as new 
pathogens, unknown strains of known viruses or drug-resistant strains of known viruses 
can emerge in unpredictable forms (Henderson, 1993).This unpredictability renders it 
difficult for policy makers to adopt effective counter measures; a problem that is often 
addressed in relation to both counter-bioterrorism as well as pandemic security (Cooper, 
2006). The human security and the global health security approaches, in contrast, 
consider first and foremost by now familiar diseases in the developing world as (most 
important) security threats (Selgelid and Enemark, 2008: 459, Liese et al., 2010).  
(3) Finally, the third question to classify security concepts focuses on the provision of security. In this 
realm the review of existing concepts of the health security nexus suggests differentiating the 
views on security along four parameters, namely (a) the ethical stance that justifies the adoption 
of counter measures, (b) the actor that is in charge of the provision of security, (c) the primary 
policy engaged as well as (d) the scope and kind of measures engaged to provide security. 
a. Ethical stance: This parameter reflects the fact that most security concepts work with 
specific underlying motivations and justifications why the challenge of an infectious 
disease should be addressed in the first place. The ethical stance is linked to the 
definition of the threat and the measures considered most appropriate to respond to the 
threat. The arguments range from biosecurity’s dictum of self-protection, most 
prominently advocated by the biosecurity approach, to the human rights logic of a 
‘common humanity’, which is fundamental to the human security approach (Lakoff, 
2010: 67). 
b. Security Provider: A basic distinction can be derived from IR’s Security Studies, which 
differentiates State-centred approaches from concepts that incorporate non-state 
actors. This dichotomy can also be applied to the health security concepts dealing with 
infectious diseases. The difference is most visible in the cases of biosecurity on the one 
hand, where the military as well as the State’s regulation and control of laboratories 
perform the role of security providers, and global health security on the other hand, 
where foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and humanitarian NGOs 
such as the Red Cross finance and carry out activities to respond to infectious diseases.  
c. Naturally, the definition of the security provider is linked to the instruments and policies 
which are considered most appropriate to respond to the threat of infectious diseases. 
To illustrate, whereas the human security concept stresses development policy and 
humanitarian aid, the global health security approach puts emphasis on global legal 
initiatives and public-private partnerships. In turn, the biosecurity approach sees foreign 
and security policy and classic public health interventions at the heart of infectious 
disease control. 
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d. Security measures: Following the definition of infectious disease control provided in the 
introductory chapter, measures principally fall into the interconnected realms of 
prevention, preparedness, surveillance and/or response. These measures play a role in 
all infectious disease-related security concepts, albeit with different geographical foci. In 
the framework of biosecurity, for example, interventions are tied to an inside-outside 
dichotomy with an emphasis on internal border control and widest possible surveillance, 
which also extends to traditional security tools such as intelligence, espionage and 
international observation (Der Derian, 1992). In this context health information gathered 
through surveillance is seen as data which is relevant to national security (Elbe, 2008, 
2010a, Salter, 2010: 192). Given its roots in the national security paradigm, biosecurity 
and pandemic security concepts imply “more invasive prescriptions such as shutting 
down airports, detaining the carriers of certain viruses and even waiving some 
international legislation in the name of the national interest” (O'Manique and Fourie, 
2012: 243). Wide security approaches such as the human security concept also consider 
preparedness and surveillance important measures but stress, in view of the needs of 
the most affected people in developing countries, preventive and responsive measures 
to contain a disease or to grant humanitarian relief. The fundamental difference to 
narrow health security concepts is that interventions should be carried out regardless of 
the global location of the people, rendering any inside-outside dichotomy invalid. 
The following overview provided in Table 2-1 (see below) shows how these security parameters, 
derived from the dominant strands of the security debate, can be brought together to constitute a 
framework for the analysis of the ‘kind of securitisation’. A short example and a respective question 
help illustrate which values a parameter can take. On order to ensure compatibility with the 
proposed category of a ‘degree of securitisation’ and to be able to differentiate between 
securitisation kinds in language on the one hand, and action on the other, it is useful to classify the 
security parameters along the distinction between the verbal and the operational dimension of 
securitisation. This classification is straightforward for the referent object, the definition of the threat 
(source, speed, geography, severity and predictability) and the ethical stance as elements of the 
verbal dimension. In turn, parameters related to an intervention in response to the threat of an 
infectious disease are classified as ‘operational’. Identifying a security provider is less obvious, given 
that deviations and tensions between utterances and actions are possible. More precisely, the verbal 
definition of a provider does not necessarily have to match with the actor who actually provides 
security. Therefore, the security provider is a parameter that deserves consideration in both the 
verbal as well as the operational dimension of the kind of securitisation. The same is true for the 
primarily concerned policy field to respond to the disease. 
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Table 2-1: Parameters to Distinguish Infectious Disease-Related Security Concepts 
Sec24 Dim25 Parameter Parameter Value Question Example / Explanation 
D
ef
. o
f 
R
ef
er
en
t 
O
b
je
ct
 
V
er
b
al
 
Referent Object Who or what is considered to be 
threatened / secure(d)? 
Human, State, IGO, concept 
Min. No. of Referent Object From which minimum number of 
referent objects upwards is a disease 
considered a security issue? 
1, >1 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
 o
f 
Th
re
a
t 
Source of Threat What is considered to be the source of 
the disease? 
Natural, manmade 
Source of Pathogenicity What is considered to be the root 
cause of the infectious disease to 
constitute a threat? 
Globalisation, 
pharmaceutical research, 
lack of development, 
terrorism 
Speed of Threat What is considered to be the infection 
path, how quick is the disease 
considered to spread? 
Air-borne, food-borne, 
zoonosis, contagious 
human-to-human 
Of what temporal nature is the impact 
considered to be? 
Outbreak event, attrition 
process 
Geography of Threat What is considered to be the proximity 
of the infectious disease? 
Close/internal, far/external 
At which level is the infectious disease 
considered to exert impact? 
Individual, local, national, 
regional, global 
Severity of Impact What is considered to be the 
prevalence of the disease? 
Morbidity 
What is considered to be the number 
of deaths related to the infectious 
disease? 
Mortality / death rate 
What treatment is considered to 
exists? 
Vaccinable, (non-)curable 
disease, access to 
treatment 
Predictability of Threat How well are the infectious disease and 
its characteristics considered to be 
known?  
Emerging disease, new 
strands of existing disease, 
old or eradicated disease 
D
ef
in
it
io
n
 o
f 
th
e 
P
ro
vi
si
o
n
 o
f 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Ethical Stance What is the ethical position and 
justification for (non-)action of the 
security provider? 
Self-protection, common 
humanity 
V
er
b
al
 &
 O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 Security Provider Who or what (is considered to) 
provide(s) security, i.e. provide 
necessary goods and/or secures the 
referent object from the disease? 
State, IO, NGO, individual, 
company, philanthropic 
foundation, public private 
partnership 
Primary Policy Which policy field is (considered to be) 
primarily concerned? 
Development, 
environment, public health, 
research, trade, veterinary 
policy, etc. 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 Target of Measure What is the major aim of the 
intervention? 
Disease prevention, 
preparedness, surveillance, 
response 
Geography of Measure Where does the intervention take 
place? 
Own-territory, source of 
threat, inside-outside 
Source: Own presentation inspired by Buzan et al. (1998), Lakoff (2010) and Balzacq (2011b).  
                                                          
24 Classification along the key components of the securitisation framework which are open to interpretation due to 
diverging security understandings. 
25 Dimension of Securitisation, see also Figure 2-3. 
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2.3.2.3. Soft and Hard Kinds of Securitisation 
It becomes clear that on an abstract level a high number of values and combinations of securitisation 
parameters exist which make it difficult to identify specific clear-cut kinds of securitisation. At the 
same time, an analytic framework suitable for explorative studies needs to be designed in a wide and 
open way to unbiasedly examine the so far unknown security understanding(s) and securitisation 
processes related to infectious diseases in the European Union. The strong tension between the 
demand for an open and at the same time manageable framework can be eased by introducing 
distinct kinds of securitisation prior to the analysis which define the end points of the spectrum of 
security kinds. These end points will be referred to as a ‘soft’ kind of securitisation on the one hand, 
and a ‘hard’ kind of securitisation on the other. 
In other words, rather than taking up each of the dominant readings of the infectious disease-
security nexus (biosecurity, pandemic security, human security and global health security) which are 
also neither exhaustive nor consistently defined and applied across scholars, the present study works 
with a set of two ‘ideal types’ or ‘most distant cases’. Although these ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ kinds of 
securitisation cannot exhaust the complex security landscape of infectious disease control, their 
juxtaposition can still set up a field of contrasting security understandings that is valuable for the 
identification and specification of the securitisation of infectious diseases in the European Union.26 
The ‘soft’ kind of infectious disease securitisation works with a wide concept of security derived from 
the human security and the global health security views. Following a comprehensive inclusive 
approach the referent object of security is the human being, principally also from a very small 
number of threatened or infected people upwards. The threat is a disease that typically stems from a 
natural source, spreads slowly, is known and predictable and occurs primarily in the developing 
world, where it exerts its impact over long periods rather than during unexpected outbreak events. 
On the basis of a feeling of ‘common humanity’ non-state actors are expected to join the forces to 
respond to the disease with measures that aim at the surveillance, prevention, preparedness and the 
response to diseases wherever they occur worldwide, employing the policy tools primarily of the 
fields of humanitarian aid, development and human rights policy. 
The ‘hard’ kind of securitisation works with a traditional understanding of what is considered a 
security threat in the context of infectious disease control. It builds on the biosecurity and pandemic 
security concept which share a number of essential features. In particular, both concepts have in 
common the idea that infectious diseases originate primarily from the developing or non-Western 
world and threaten the industrialised states and societies which have to seek for self-protection. The 
hard kind of securitisation restricts the definition of a referent object to the State, State-related 
institutions and vital functions of the State, in particular to elements which are traditionally seen as 
security matters – such as the military, and, in a next step, core elements of the State like a 
functioning economy.  
                                                          
26
 For a similar approach to global health regimes see Lakoff (2010). 
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From this perspective security is at stake if the severity of a disease is great in terms of a high 
mortality rate and a high speed of spread, in particular from human-to-human and if the disease is 
man-made. At the same time the classification of a disease as a security threat is contingent upon the 
fact that the own territory and citizens are affected by the disease, or that the impact of the disease 
is at least close. In this context outbreak events and the involvement of unknown pathogens mean 
greater insecurity than attrition processes related to known (and more predictable) diseases. 
Measures and practices related to this kind of securitisation are adopted and carried out by States or 
intergovernmental organisations rather than non-governmental organisation in the fields of foreign 
and security policy, the economy and, in a wider sense also public health, following from set of 
invasive public health instruments. The major motivation of the interventions is self-protection; that 
is why preventive and responsive interventions take place in the own territory only and surveillance 
is done with a focus on own territory and the closer neighbourhood. 
Clearly, we cannot expect to identify either of these kinds of securitisation in pure form in the speech 
acts and measures that contribute to the securitisation of infectious diseases. Quite the contrary, it is 
more reasonable to expect that the analysis of related processes for any actor reveals a mix of the 
hard and the soft securitisation parameter values to eventually make up a new distinct kind of 
securitisation. In this context it is important to bear in mind that the kind of securitisation can change 
over time and that the two antipodal kinds of securitisation are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it is 
principally possible to observe conflicting values for each parameter, even for speech acts and 
measures by one actor and possibly even at the same time in one speech act or securitising practice. 
It remains the task of the analyst to distinguish between the different views and to identify the 
dominant strands.  
In this sense, the following Table 2-2 condenses the securitisation parameters to the two extremes of 
a ‘soft’ and a ‘hard’ kind. The two extremes constitute useful points of reference when it comes to 
analysing with which underlying security concepts a given disease has been securitised. In this 
context two particularities should be noted. First, as indicated in the introductory chapter, the focus 
of this study is put on securitisation processes at the EU level. This focus implies that the parameters 
that refer to ‘national’ or the ‘State’, for instance the definition of the referent object, should not be 
understood as limited to the national (Member State) level but as referring to the EU as a multi-level 
system as a whole, including the national and the European level.27  
Second, the possible values for the security parameter ‘target of measure’ – which refers to core 
elements of infectious disease control: prevention, preparedness, surveillance and response – are 
interconnected and cannot be clearly assigned to either a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ kind of securitisation. 
Therefore, the differentiation along the soft and the hard extreme is done on the basis of the inside-
outside dichotomy which relates to the interpretation with which focus these measures should be 
taken, either globally where the disease occurs (soft kind), or primarily nationally or regionally in the 
case of the EU (hard kind).  
                                                          
27
 More information on the conceptualisation of the EU for the purpose of this study is provided in chapter 
2.3.4. Furthermore, chapter 2.5.3 explains in more details the levels and units of analysis. 
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Table 2-2: Soft and Hard Kinds of Securitisation 
Dimension Securitisation Parameter Soft Kind Hard Kind28 
V
er
b
al
 
Referent object Human 
State/EU / vital to 
State/EU 
Min. No. of Referent Object Few Many 
Source of Threat Natural Manmade 
Source of Pathogenicity 
Lack of Development, Lack 
of Access to Health Care 
Terrorism, Enemy State, 
Globalisation Effects  
Speed of Threat Slow Fast 
Geography of Threat Far / “Not Us” Close / “Us” 
Minimum Threat Severity Low High 
Predictability of Threat High Low 
Ethical Stance Common Humanity Self-Protection 
V
e
rb
al
 &
 
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
al
 Security Provider 
State + Non-State  
(INGOs, Foundations, Public 
Private Partnerships etc.) 
States (+IGOs) 
Primary Policy 
Humanitarian Aid, Develop-
ment, Human Rights 
Foreign & Security, 
Economy, Public Health 
O
p
er
at
io
n
al
 
Ta
rg
et
 a
n
d
 G
eo
-
g
ra
p
h
y 
o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 Surveillance Global National (+Regional) 
Prevention Global National (+Regional) 
Preparedness Global National (+Regional) 
Response Global National (+Regional) 
Source: Own presentation. 
  
                                                          
28
 When applied in the context of the EU the values referring to ‘State’ or ‘national’ can take the form of ‘EU’ or 
‘regional’. A conceptualisation of the EU in this sense is provided in chapters 2.3.4. See also chapter 2.5.3. 
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2.3.3. The Coordination System of Securitisation 
The degree of securitisation and the kind of securitisation are tools that help locate the status of 
securitisation of an infectious disease. In combination, the two innovations can be seen to make up a 
‘coordination system of securitisation’ that covers the spectrum between low and high degrees of 
securitisation on the vertical axis, and the spectrum between soft and hard kinds of securitisation on 
the horizontal axis. The coordination system covers all possible combinations of degree and kind of 
securitisation, but in order to work with manageable categories, it is helpful to assign labels to the 
system’s main areas.  
In the following, the distinct labels of ‘weak securitisation’, ‘moderate securitisation’ and ‘strong 
securitisation’ help differentiate between the fields in which a securitisation status can be localised. 
According to this differentiation a disease has achieved the status of a ‘weak’ securitisation once it 
has been securitised to a low degree in a soft kind. In turn, a disease qualifies as a ‘strongly’ 
securitised issue, if its securitisation is characterised by the combination of a high degree of 
securitisation of a hard kind. Any other combination – high degree of a soft kind, or low degree of a 
hard kind – are regarded as ‘average’ securitisation. A further differentiation between the latter two 
combinations would be possible in order to establish a fully-fledged four-field matrix. Such a matrix, 
however, would imply that all four fields of the matrix were comprehensively conceptualised, an 
endeavour which is beyond the scope of the present study. In contrast, as it will become clear in 
chapter 2.4, the present study is primarily interested in one specific form of securitisation as 
locatable on the coordination system, namely the status of ‘strong’ securitisation. 
 
Source: Own presentation.  
Figure 2-5: The Coordination System of Securitisation (structured version) 
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2.3.4. Institutionalisation as an Effect of Securitisation 
The necessity to be able to clearly differentiate between different forms of securitisations, 
understood as the degree to which and the kind in which a disease is constructed by relevant EU 
actors as a security threat, is grounded in the research interest of the study. Clearly, linking 
institutionalisation as a potential effect of securitisation is not possible without a tool that allows 
pinpointing a given securitisation status. After having established a coordination system that helps 
define the securitisation status, the question remains what the potential effects of (specific forms of) 
securitisation are. 
The research interest in the effects of securitisation is not new and the question of the unclear 
explanatory status of the original approach has been subject to critical reflection (Guzzini, 2011). 
Certain effects of securitisation were already mentioned in the Copenhagen School’s original 
securitisation approach, where Buzan et al. referred to the impact of securitisation on actor 
constellations, especially in a conflictual situation between two countries (Buzan et al., 1998: 26). The 
securitisation framework was also embedded in the overarching endeavour of the Copenhagen 
School to identify and examine the wider formation and development of a European ‘security 
complex’, understood as cross-sectoral security connections and “pattern of mutual references” 
among units (for instance countries), whose securitisation and/or de-securitisation processes were 
closely interrelated (Buzan et al., 1998, here: 169, Buzan and Waever, 2003). Also in the field of the 
securitisation of health and diseases some scholars have explicitly addressed the effects of 
securitisation when examining governance structures and the WHO’s changing mandate as emergent 
from the securitisation of infectious diseases (Davies, 2008, Leboeuf and Broughton, 2008: 19).  
However, despite the reflection on causality in securitisation studies, references to actor 
constellations, the EU or governance structures neither the original securitisation approach nor the 
following literature provided an elaborate model that fit the research focus of this study on 
institutionalisation processes. The Copenhagen School dealt with the European integration project 
but was primarily interested in exploring and understanding the combination of “concerns of major 
actors into a constellation, a knot of mutual security relations” (Buzan et al., 1998: 43), rather than 
testing specific causal effects of securitisation on the systemic evolution of the EU. In turn, the health 
and infectious disease-related securitisation literature did not embed their analysis into an 
institutionalisation or the EU context. Hence, the focus of the present study is fairly different from 
both the existing literature and the security complex approach; the effects of securitisation as 
conceptualised in this study are in fact little explored.  
Against this background the following sections serve the purpose to offer a fresh conceptualisation of 
institutionalisation as a potential effect of securitisation in the area of infectious disease control at 
the EU level. It should be noted, however, that the proposed linkage is limited to the field of 
infectious disease control and should not be regarded as a fully-fledged theory on the dynamics of 
regional integration. Having said that two definitional and conceptual questions deserve clarification:  
1) What is institutionalisation at the EU level? 
2) Why in basic conceptual terms should securitisation affect institutionalisation at the EU level? 
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2.3.4.1. Institutionalisation at the European Union Level 
For the purpose of this study, fundamental mid- or long-term changes regarding the EU’s structural 
setup in the field of infectious disease control are seen as potential effects of securitisation. The 
research focus on systemic key developments is compatible with the definition of institutionalisation 
put forward by Wayne Sandholtz and Alex Stone Sweet (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998, Stone 
Sweet et al., 2001), which serves as a point of orientation in the following. With a particular interest 
in the evolution of the European political space, understood as “supranational policy arenas or sites 
of governance, structured by EU rules, procedures, and the activities of the EU's organi[s]ations” 
(Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 1, 3), they understand institutionalisation as “the further expansion of 
cross‐border exchange, transnational policy networks, and the EC’s [European Community’s] 
authority to govern” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1998: 16-20, Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 4). 
Following this understanding an institutionalisation in the field of infectious disease at the EU level 
goes along with changes regarding EU rules, procedures as well as policy activities of EU 
organisations that contribute to an overall consolidation of the EU’s capacity to govern (Stone Sweet 
et al., 2001: 21). This process can be seen as generally characterised by an increase in formality, a 
shift of resources and competences to the European level, also expressed in the creation or 
modification of institutional actors. In fact, “[s]paces rarely emerge and institutionali[s]e without a 
concomitant development of organi[s]ations” (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 19). 
Viewing changes in the EU’s infectious disease control setup in terms of rules, procedures, policy 
activities, resource allocation, distribution of competences and organisational structures as effects of 
securitisation deserves conceptual clarification, if these changes are to be related to the process of 
securitisation. In fact, securitisation and institutionalisation work with constituents that appear to 
overlap, making it tricky to establish clear causal connections. More precisely, if securitisation is 
made up by speech acts, audience consent and emergency measures by the actors involved, and if at 
the same time changed rules, procedures etc., which are also possibly subject to speech acts and 
emergency measures, can be considered an effect of the former set of actions, we run the risk of 
ending up in circular reasoning. Put differently, given that securitisation constantly goes along with 
the production of activities that could fall into the realm close to what has been defined as 
‘institutionalisation’, how can we practically differentiate between an ongoing (de-)securitisation 
process and institutionalisation as the effect of securitisation? 
Although both processes in fact must be seen as dynamic and interdependent processes, for analytic 
purposes of this study, the puzzle can be solved by demarcating the effects of securitisation 
(institutionalisation, rules, procedures etc.) from the constituent elements of the securitisation 
process (speech acts, emergency measures) on the basis of the clear-cut criterions of durability on 
the one hand, and scope on the other. More precisely, whereas securitisation comprises emergency 
measures which are per definition of temporary nature and typically adjusted or renewed on a 
frequent basis, a change in the European space of infectious disease control is regarded a case of 
institutionalisation only, if it is implemented with the intention to be not easily reversible and if it 
alters the existing setup in a permanent way.  
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Also, emergency measures typically neither address overarching questions nor are they capable of 
modifying deep-going institutional structures; in contrast, they are rather narrowly targeted towards 
a specific threat. To illustrate, whereas the ad hoc and temporary detachment of an expert team into 
a region affected by a disease outbreak can be seen as an emergency measure, the permanent setup 
a pool of medical or technical experts and the establishment of a fund to finance respective field trips 
qualify as institutionalisation.  
In this understanding the research interest in institutionalisation as potential effects of securitisation 
refers to relatively persistent and systemic changes regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, 
resource allocation, division of competences and organisational structures in the field of EU infectious 
disease control, in the following also referred to as structural changes or systemic changes. 
In turn, the influence of a securitising emergency measure on the further securitisation or de-
securitisation process should, for the purpose of this study, not be viewed as an effect of 
securitisation rather than as an integral part of a constant re-production process that is inherent to a 
(de-)securitisation ‘loop’. Securitisation is not a closed process that typically comes to an abrupt halt; 
it progresses over time and is influenced by previous securitisation moves and emergency measures 
as well as new input or developments that had been previously external to the securitisation process. 
This is also true for periods after a systemic adaptation has taken place. Naturally, after their creation 
also structural changes feed into the following process. They become part of a changed game how 
(de-)securitisation progresses in the future and can contribute to either the perpetuation of 
securitisation or the de-securitisation of a disease (as probably intended when the systemic changes 
were adopted). Newly established institutions or new competences transferred to the EU are cases in 
point. However, as a major difference to emergency measures, they are not expected to dissolve or 
become repatriated in the course of the de-securitisation of a disease.29 
 
2.3.4.2. The Logic of (In)Security in the European Union 
In basic conceptual terms, why should securitisation of infectious diseases affect institutionalisation 
of infectious disease control in the European Union? It is beyond the scope of this study to 
comprehensively revisit the concept of the State and the EU as a state-like system, but two aspects 
deserve clarification: The logic behind politics and (in)security that drives decision-making on the one 
hand, and the adaptation of this basic logic to the multi-level system of the EU on the other. 
As regards the former, the study builds on the security logic of the original securitisation approach 
that sees securitisation as a specific, if not the ultimate form of prioritisation. Securitisation 
“introduces a generic structure of meaning which organises dispositions, social relations, and politics 
according to a rationality of security” which is comparable to the logic of war by defining existential 
                                                          
29
 On the institutionalist argument and the stickiness of institutions in general see in particular Pierson (1996). 
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challenges which endanger the survival of the referent object (Huysmans, 2006: 25).30 Due to their 
existential nature, threats to security are typically sought to be avoided or, if they could not be 
avoided, require top priority when it comes to their management; not only for the actors that seek to 
provide security, but also for the audience of the securitiser’s speech acts. This setup implies that 
decision-makers perceive exceptionally high political pressure in the face of security threats so that 
adequately addressing them both quickly and effectively has highest priority. 
In a democratic system security challenges naturally go along with consequences for policy-makers. 
First, actors who are considered to be responsible to provide security and who fail in doing so must 
expect severe political consequences. Second, actions outside the realm of normal politics, as it 
occurs during security crises in form of emergency measures, usually do not meet the democratic 
criterions in terms of representation, legitimation, standard processes etc. Hence, whereas in the 
light of a specific perceived security threat action on an exceptional basis is considered acceptable, 
such a state of emergency is democratically not accepted as a permanent condition. In this sense the 
necessity to deal with a security problem means a failure of politics to deal with the issue as a 
political problem (Buzan et al., 1998: 29). Against this background it can be assumed, although (de-
)securitisation has a tactical potential that may be employed for political objectives, that in a 
democratic system the desired long-term status of any problem in principle is the status of an un-
securitised affair. Decision-makers can be thus expected to principally seek for solutions that are 
within the realm of normal politics, that solve problems before they turn into security problems or 
that are capable of effectively de-securitising a given matter. Consequently, failing to find adequate 
solutions, in turn, fuels the political pressures that accompany securitisation in view of the need for 
more substantial reform, to ensure that similar situations do not occur in the future again. 
How does this basic security logic relate to the European Union? For the purpose of this study with a 
focus on the developments after 1993, the EU is defined as a fused multi-level political system 
(Wessels, 2000) whose actors – on all political levels from the local to the European – strive for 
security within their realms and mandates. Due to the interconnectedness of the different political 
spheres, the EU system provides channels for both (de-)securitisation and problem-solving processes 
across all levels. Problems and security issues can occur as limited up to a given political level, for 
instance the national, or as a problems or security issues for the EU as a whole. Institutionalisation at 
the EU level, however, is not a normal element of these processes; systemic changes, be it in view of 
a radical re-orientation of EU policy priorities or a re-distribution of competencies from the national 
level, are not integral parts of the usual business. In fact, due to the involved re-allocation of power 
and resources as well as potentially unknown or unequal distribution of costs and benefits, 
institutionalisation must be seen as conflictual. Political actors therefore typically do not envisage 
structural change. In particular, national governments are eager to protect their sovereignty and 
therefore do not see new solutions at the EU level as a preferred option, even less in the realm of 
typical domains of the nation state such as health affairs.  
                                                          
30
 Since such a rationality of security is rather stable and evolves slowly “like the grammar of a language” 
(Huysmans, 2006: 25), it cannot be manipulated or changed easily and thus ensures that securitisation can take 
place under comparatively stable conditions also over longer periods. 
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The core argument is that a security situation, that is the perception of insecurity, can modify this 
situation. Under the impression that accepted speech acts and emergency measures have moved 
infectious diseases into the realm of security and that the problem cannot be dealt with as a matter 
of normal politics anymore, the calculus of Member States and other relevant EU actors changes. 
These actors might have detected before that cross-border nature of infectious diseases, facilitated 
within an increasingly borderless Europe, undermine the capacity of states to control infectious 
diseases at the national level (Fidler, 1998: 6, Dodgson et al., 2002: 18, Liverani and Coker, 2012: 
915f). The argument, however, is that only in the course of the securitisation process do ideas that 
involve institutionalisation aspects eventually receive priority in political thinking. In this sense 
securitisation can explain the formation of coalitions of actors that seek to jointly (re-)design the 
setup in a way that is deemed suitable to respond to similar threats in the future (Stone Sweet et al., 
2001: 18f).31 
Securitisation is thus understood to be able to take the function of a game changer in favour of 
transnational problem-solving and new collective solutions, in the most extreme form even if they 
imply a loss of national sovereignty. Member States, when caught in the dilemma that their striving 
for security vis-à-vis infectious diseases appears to require problem-solving through collective action 
which contradicts their “inbuilt reflex to protect the national sovereignty of their home states” 
(Wessels, forthcoming), will eventually give priority to a revision of disease control structures in 
favour of an institutionalisation at the EU (or international) level due to the supremacy of the 
security situation. In this way securitisation can be understood as an enabler of the development of 
EU structures that are considered capable of responding to the threat within the realm of ordinary 
politics. 
Institutionalisation in infectious disease control thus typically occurs with the objective to structurally 
de-securitise the issue or a specific aspect. Due to the typical duration of the adoption of structural 
changes, institutionalisation influences the (de-)securitisation processes only in the mid- and long-
term. The major difference to a normal element of the securitisation process therefore is that a 
structural change constitutes an attempt to permanently de-securitise a problem, to shape a 
framework that is not an emergency measure to a given situation but that helps prevent the 
securitisation of the same or similar issues – or seems to facilitate the de-securitisation of respective 
threats – in the future. 
In this context it should be recalled that the constructivist foundation of the study (see also chapter 
2.5.1) implies that security situations do not have an unambiguous, self-evident meaning. It is 
therefore likely that different competing interpretations of the threat exist in parallel. Consequently, 
also the search for alternatives is usually characterised by competition. Securitisation therefore does 
not necessarily trigger transformations that address the perceived security-related dysfunctionality in 
a way that is judged by all involved actors to actually constitute an improvement (Stone Sweet et al., 
2001: 10). This implies that securitisation does not necessarily trigger a functional form of 
                                                          
31
 This line of argumentation has been adapted from Stone Sweet and Sandholtz who make a similar point in 
view of institutional innovation following exogenous shocks (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 18f). 
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institutionalisation; securitisation triggers first and foremost the need to do something. Furthermore, 
it should be noted that the conceptualisation of institutionalisation as an effect of securitisation in 
principle also implies a reduction of EU involvement or the transfer of competencies from the 
European to another political level. In line with the proposed security logic such a situation would 
turn likely should the EU itself become securitised and eventually be seen as a threat, for instance to 
the concept of territorial sovereignty, so that protection from the EU gains higher priority than those 
threats which the EU can help de-securitise. 
 
2.4. Research Questions and Hypothesis 
The previous sections have served the purpose to outline a revised model of the securitisation 
framework. On the basis of this detailed explanation of each of the core elements a clearer view on 
the research context, the exact research question and the proposed research hypothesis is possible. 
To recall, the objective set out for the present study is to contribute to the understanding of the EU’s 
evolution of policy and polity of infectious disease control, primarily as a sub-field of public health 
and food safety, and to explain structural changes in its development. The key developments of the 
EU’s infectious disease control and related institutionalisation processes in the sense of relatively 
persistent changes as regards rules, procedures, policy priorities, resource allocation, division of 
competences and organisational structures, thus, provides the overall research context for the study. 
The primary research interest is put on the developments between the introduction of public health 
policy to European Union law in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and the year 2014. 
The investigation into the causes for the evolution is carried out from a constructivist securitisation 
perspective. In this sense the research interest of the study goes beyond the evolution of infectious 
disease control and extends to the securitisation of infectious diseases at the EU level, most 
fundamentally with regard to the forms and effects of securitisation. As regards the former, the 
previous sections have developed innovative tools to determine core parameters of a disease’s 
securitisation status as locatable on the coordination system of securitisation. More precisely, the 
novel securitisation approach directs the analytic interest in the forms of securitisation to the 
analysis of degree and kind of securitisation across verbal and operational dimension, to the 
differentiation of phases and timings of securitisation as well as to the actors of securitisation.  
As regards the effects of securitisation, the previous sections have conceptualised institutionalisation 
as a potential result of securitisation. By doing so the study has established an analytical and 
explanatory framework to examine infectious disease-related crises, so called ‘good epidemics’, that 
have the potential to ‘break’ the institutional and political stability in public health (Fidler, 2004b: 
169f, Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 902). Viewing EU institutionalisation and securitisation as 
interconnected processes, however, does not tell us in which way the two phenomena are 
contingent upon one another.  
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The fundamental research question put forward in this study therefore asks: 
 
Under what conditions can the securitisation of (specific) infectious diseases explain the 
institutionalisation of infectious disease control32 at the EU level? 
 
The research question will be approached from a basic hypothesis on the conditions in question. 
Seeing that institutionalisation occurs rarely, that only specific outbreak were linked to structural 
change, that numerous diseases have been securitised and that the richness of security 
understandings allows for various forms of securitisation, it seems that the securitisation of 
infectious diseases as such cannot explain institutionalisation. In contrast, the hypothesis of the study 
is that systemic changes can result from the securitisation of infectious diseases only, if the 
securitisation is characterised by a specific combination of securitisation degree and kind, namely 
only in the combination of a high degree and a hard kind. Put crisply, the hypothesis runs as follows: 
 
‘Strong’ securitisation33 of infectious diseases by EU actors (independent variable) causes the 
institutionalisation34 of infectious disease control at the EU level (dependent variable). 
 
The hypothesis builds on the basic security logic as set out in chapter 2.3.4.2, but furthermore 
specifies the general causal linkage between securitisation and institutionalisation in the sense that 
weak or average forms of securitisation do not bear the potential to trigger systemic change. The 
argument is that neither a high degree of securitisation nor a hard kind of securitisation alone can 
make up for a security situation that ultimately results in structural changes, but that political 
pressure and will for fundamental reform is only high enough once a combination of high degree and 
hard kind characterise the securitisation status of a disease. To illustrate, a given disease might be 
talked up as a security threat and peak the political agendas, but as long as the disease is not seen to 
affect the EU, its Member States and vital elements of the State, as long as it is regarded far, 
predictable, an attrition process etc., systemic changes are highly unlikely. The same is true for a 
disease that is securitised in a hard way as a contagious, fast spreading, unpredictable etc. threat, but 
to such a low degree that the disease is hardly recognised as a security threat at all. In such a context 
it does not matter for a potential institutionalisation process if a lethal disease spreads or is feared by 
some people within the EU territory; the disease turns into a veritable strong security problem only if 
at the EU level many people speak about it, embed it strongly into a security discourse (verbal 
dimension) and perceive the need to take many and/or hard responsive emergency measures 
(operational dimension) – only then the political agreement is established that similar security 
situations must be avoided and that structural reforms are needed to return, treat and keep 
infectious diseases within the realm of ordinary politics. 
                                                          
32
 In the sense of disease prevention, preparedness, surveillance and response as defined in chapter 1.1. 
33
 In the sense of a high degree of a hard kind of securitisation as defined in chapters 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. See also 
chapter 2.3.3. 
34
 Defined as relatively persistent and systemic changes regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, resource 
allocation, division of competences and organisational structures in the field of EU infectious disease control, in 
the following also referred to as structural changes or systemic changes (see chapter 2.3.4.). 
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Taking up the coordination system of securitisation (see chapter 2.3.3 and in particular Figure 2-5), 
the hypothesis can be illustrated as provided in Figure 2-6 (see below). The schematic illustration 
locates the ‘institutionalisation box’ in the upper right corner of the coordination system of 
securitisation. The figure should, however, neither be viewed too narrowly in the sense of a binary 
yes-or-no distinction, nor as a comprehensive four field matrix. In contrast, the box rather indicates 
by approximation the location of the forms of securitisation that are hypothesised to bear the power 
to enable institutional change. 
 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Why has this combination of a hard kind and a high degree of securitisation be chosen as a point of 
reference for the empirical research as carried out in the next chapters? The arguments that speak in 
favour of a high degree might be obvious. Clearly, if a disease is only on an occasional or cursory 
basis subject to securitising moves, the disease is not related to the realm of security in the first 
place. But why is a hard securitisation required in addition to lively and predominantly security-
related discourse and emergency measures? First, the literature review indicates that throughout 
history institution building in the field of infectious disease control occurred primarily in the context 
of such disease outbreaks that provided a strong fundament for high and hard securitisation. The 
creation of the Office International d'Hygiène Publique (OIHP) in the course of the cholera epidemic 
is a case in point (Lee, 1998: 1, Hough, 2004: 162).35  
 
                                                          
35
 This development is addressed in chapter 3.1. 
Figure 2-6: Hypothesising on Institutionalisation as an Effect of Securitisation (schematic) 
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Second, previous studies revealed for individual security parameters – which add up for a kind of 
securitisation – that ‘hard’ parameter values can be considered more influential than ‘soft’ ones 
when it comes to decision-making. To illustrate, it was found that the conceptualisation of a disease 
and its characteristics, such as transmissibility and predictability, impact how threatening a disease 
appears (Baldwin, 2005b: 28, 2005a: 353, Cook, 2010: 19, Fox, 2012: 1127, Mätzke, 2012: 969)36 and 
that diseases, which are accompanied by a high degree of perceived unknown risks, are more likely 
to call for “stricter government regulation and legislative controls” than other health issues (WHO, 
2002a: 32).  
Third, opinion polls showed that news coverage, which can be seen as likely to fuel securitisation and 
thus political pressure, was particularly high for diseases that occur with ‘outbreak events’ (Ho et al., 
2007) and thus for diseases which bear a higher potential for hard securitisation. Fourth, a hard form 
of securitisation implies that security is expected to be provided by the State and intergovernmental 
organisations rather than privately or by non-governmental organisations. Consequently, in the 
context of the EU multi-level system, political decision-makers on national and possibly the EU level 
are held responsible for situations of insecurity so that their willingness to adopt reforms can be 
considered to be higher. 
Beyond that it should be recalled that institutionalisation belongs to the realm of political decisions 
which are characterised by conflict and for which the needed majority, often unanimity in the EU, is 
most difficult to achieve. Therefore, an actor constellation in favour of systemic change would form 
only as a last resort when the pressure to act reaches the highest level, that is under the impression 
of high and hard securitisation. Finally, due to the novel elements of the securitisation approach as 
applied in this study, there is also no clear pre-defined point of reference for the assumed impact of a 
given combination of degree and kind of securitisation. Consequently, respective predictions and 
attempts of generalisation need to be cautious. Given that the hypothesis reflects in part the debate 
between narrow and wide concepts of security, it seems appropriate to start from a conservative 
assumption that limits the influence on institutionalisation to a traditional security understanding. 
It thus becomes clear that strong securitisation as a pre-condition for system change has been, albeit 
constituting a demanding criterion, established for good reasons. It should, however, be noted that 
the study does not consider strong securitisation as the one and only force that drives the evolution 
of the EU’s setup in infectious disease control. Clearly, the cross-border nature of the problem and, 
linked to that, functional pressures exerted from both the EU common market and globalisation 
processes carry substantial explanatory value when it comes to identifying the sources for EU 
cooperation and integration moves (Greer, 2006, 2012b). The main hypothesis, however, is that a 
strong securitisation constitutes one of the few striking phenomena that possess an independent 
capacity to open ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon, 1983), ‘windows of opportunities’ in which structural 
change becomes possible. 
                                                          
36
 In this context HIV/AIDS occupies a strong position. More on HIV/AIDS as a security issue can be found in 
Peterson (2002), Price-Smith (2002), Singer(2002), Heymann (2003), McInnes (2006), Whiteside et al. (2006), 
Coupland (2007) and Ostergard (2007). 
49 
 
To sum up, the study combines an explorative interest in (1) the EU’s infectious disease policy and 
polity evolution and (2) in the forms in which, and the actors by whom (specific) infectious diseases 
have been constructed as security issues at the EU level with (3) the application and testing of a 
novel analytic and explanatory adaptation of the securitisation approach. Designed in this way the 
research approach does not only aim at contributing to the understanding of institutionalisation 
processes on EU level and at advancing the original securitisation approach, it also responds to one 
of the major criticisms on the constructivist analysis of international affairs in general, namely that 
constructivism misses to make distinctive predictions about the conditions under which certain 
phenomena occur (Moravcsik, 2001: 227).  
By focusing on the form of securitisation as a major explanatory factor the study embeds genuinely 
constructivist variables into a causal explanatory model. By this means it is possible to derive and test 
clear postulations regarding the phenomenon of structural changes on European Union level. At the 
same time, by tying together the many strands of security research the study’s approach can also be 
considered as an innovative response to the claim “that the main task facing students of 
securitisation is not to add to the already long list of arguments and conjectures but instead to 
unpack and re-present these diverse approaches into a coherent set of assumptions guiding 
empirical research” (Balzacq, 2011a: xiv). Despite the shifted focus on securitisation effects rather 
than causes of securitisation the work remains still compatible with the classic securitisation 
literature interested in the questions when and how something is established by whom as a security 
threat and “who securitises, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what 
results, and, not least, under what conditions” (Buzan et al., 1998: 32). 
 
2.5. Research Design, Operationalisation and Methodological Considerations 
The previous chapters served the purpose to clarify the exploratory and explanatory aims of the 
study, to outline the conceptual approach and to formulate both the main research question and the 
working hypothesis. It was also part of the study to carry out a thorough literature review to position 
the work and to show where it makes innovative contributions to the fields of EU integration 
research and securitisation studies.  
As set out in the introduction, the empirical study follows a two-step approach which foresees the 
consecutive analysis of key developments of infectious disease control in the EU and the detailed 
analysis of selected structural changes in the framework of a securitisation study. Before turning to 
this empirical analysis, it is central to explicitly reveal the steps and methods envisaged to perform 
the research (Manheim et al., 2008: 6, 386). In order to do so the present chapter 2.5 starts with a 
reflection about the implications of the theoretical basis (chapter 2.5.1) and makes explicit how the 
study’s conceptual foundation regarding the securitisation analysis can be conversed to the 
operational level (chapter 2.5.2). With a view to the fact that qualitative content analysis constitutes 
the most important research technique employed in the empirical analysis, the following part of this 
chapter serve the purpose to define the levels and units of analysis (chapter 2.5.3). 
50 
 
Chapter 2.5.4 sets out the consecutive phases of research and makes clear that the selection of case 
studies can be better contextualised after an initial empirical research phase has been completed. 
Therefore, the chapter provides only a brief introduction into the case studies.37 In the following, the 
procedure to collect the data set will be discussed in chapter 2.5.5, just as the methods of qualitative 
content analysis and expert interviewing in view of their application in the context of 
institutionalisation and securitisation studies in chapters 2.5.6 and 2.5.7. 
 
2.5.1. The Constructivist Foundation 
A research design can be understood as the “logical model of proof” that “guides the process of 
collecting, analysing and interpreting data” and that “allows the making of valid causal inferences” 
(Nachmias, 1979: 21). When engaging in its development, it makes sense to reflect, in a first step, on 
the function and implications of the theoretical foundations of the study. The decision to analyse 
policy and polity developments at the EU level from a securitisation perspective implies to direct 
research and link research questions and findings in a basically constructivist manner. It does not 
belong to the objectives of the study to address the meta-theoretical debate on social constructivism 
as a philosophical foundation in IR, but it is important to make clear that the study blends elements 
of social constructivist ontology with realist epistemology to arrive at the proposed causation.  
As set out before, the starting point of the securitisation approach is that language is constitutive of 
social reality, rather than a tool that simply describes an external reality. The rhetorical foundation of 
the securitisation approach reflects the general constructivist premise that “human practice makes 
the world intelligible and embeds this intelligibility in technological and social institutions and 
processes” (Berger and Luckmann, 1966/1991, Huysmans, 2006: 145). The assumption that “social 
relations are not laws of nature but the contingent product of human action and always potentially 
open for restructuration” does not prevent that a given construction – for instance an identity, the 
State or the language of security – is relatively stable so that it can be kept “as constant throughout 
one’s analysis” (Buzan et al., 1998: 204f, Huysmans, 2006: 25). In a similar vein, it is assumed that the 
meaning of a text can be regarded as something relatively stable and independent from time, place 
and analyst so that it can principally be re-retrieved by other investigators (Hardy et al., 2004: 20). 
Building on this social constructivist ontology, the study applies a modernist constructivist 
epistemology that incorporates scientific realist elements.38 In contrast to positivist approaches this 
interpretation acknowledges that many relationships between social phenomena are not directly but 
only indirectly observable (Carlsnaes, 1992, Ruggie, 1998, Sayer, 2000: 12) and attempts to explain 
their “causal and constitutive effects […] in world politics” (Balzacq, 2012: 58, Wendt, 1999). The 
argument on the relation between constructions and the real world ‘out there’ is that “[t]here may 
be real processes at work, but the way they affect outcomes is mediated by the discursive 
construction(s) of these processes” (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 35). 
                                                          
37
 More information on the selection, features and structure of the case studies can be found in chapter 4. 
38
 More on such a combination can be found, for instance, in Wendt (1999). 
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For the study of infectious diseases this means that outbreak events and disease characteristics such 
as mortality and morbidity are not irrelevant data. In fact, according to the understanding applied in 
this study infectious diseases do harm health and can actually cause the death of entire populations, 
regardless of the way how we linguistically depict them. That is why disease outbreaks mark 
important points of reference for the study of securitisation. When it comes to defining security and 
insecurity, however, the perspective suggests that social and political processes related to the 
disease are decisive for the approaches to identify solutions and to govern a specific situation 
(Huysmans, 2006: 2).  
To illustrate, viewing a disease as either a fateful, naturally given necessity or an avoidable result of 
ineffective disease surveillance makes a huge difference for both the perception of and the response 
to a given (security) situation. Death alone does not constitute a security problem in international 
affairs. Accordingly, it is not the ‘real’ spread, contagiousness, death rates, etc. of infectious diseases 
that are considered to affect the evolution of EU policies and polity, but the social and political 
construction of disease as a security issue. 
Clearly, the securitisation of infectious diseases can facilitated by events such as the pandemic 
spread of a disease or specific characteristics of a disease. This is why securitisation typically occurs 
under the impression of crisis or dysfunctionality. Despite such appeals to the real world, however, 
for the political reaction it ultimately is the discursive construction of that world what is considered 
decisive (Marsh and Furlong, 2002: 35). In this sense “security issues are socially constructed, but the 
securiti[s]ation process is not divorced from empirical considerations” (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 
120, emphasis in original).  
 
2.5.2. Operationalisation and Selection of Research Methods 
The philosophical basis of the study is clearly reflected in the proposed causal relationship between 
securitisation of diseases and the structural evolution of EU policies and polity. The question that 
follows from this basis is how to get from the abstract level of the research question and the 
understanding of the causal relationship to concrete (direct or indirect) observations that allow to 
answer the question and to test the hypothesis.  
In order to facilitate empirical analysis and testing, the abstract notions of securitisation and 
institutionalisation demand translation into statements with more precisely defined variables, 
understood as “as an empirically observable characteristic of some phenomenon that can take on 
more than one value“ (Manheim et al., 2008: 27). Seeing that the adaptation of the securitisation 
framework included a comprehensive set of indicators for the degree and kind of securitisation, and 
given that the main research interest lies on structural changes in the EU’s setup for infectious 
disease control, the operationalisation of the study’s conceptual basis can be carried out 
straightforward along the novel securitisation approach:  
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Whereas the study works on the side of the independent variable with the indicators of the 
securitisation degree (see Figure 2-3: From A-Politic to Highly Securitised) and the parameters of the 
kind of securitisation (see Table 2-1: Parameters to Distinguish Infectious Disease-Related Security 
Concepts), it deals with the components of the definition of institutionalisation (see chapter 2.3.4) on 
the side of the dependent variable; together they constitute the relevant reference points when it 
comes to making observations and to identifying values for the properties of the phenomena of 
securitisation and EU structural change. 
In order to examine the key developments of infectious disease control in the EU and the specific 
developments that meet the definition of institutionalisation, the study builds on a thorough review 
of secondary literature and a combination of qualitative content analysis and expert interviewing. In 
turn, for the analysis of the securitisation of infectious diseases the study works with a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative elements of content analysis, with a focus on the former. Hence, the 
securitisation analysis is carried out entirely on the basis of written texts, following the 
understanding that “if a security discourse is operative […], it should be expected to materiali[s]e in 
[…] text” (Buzan et al., 1998: 177). Qualitative content analysis constitutes the primary research tool 
of the study. It is serves the needs deriving from the research interest, since it is an methodological 
approach “for making replicable and valid inferences from texts […] to the contexts of their use” 
(Krippendorff, 2013: 24). It provides a set of methods that allows to systematically count, assess, and 
interpret both form and substance of a text (Manheim et al., 2008: 180) in order to shed “light on the 
ways [agents] use or manipulate symbols and invest communication with meaning” (Moyser and 
Wagstaffe, 1987: 20).  
In the present study, content analysis is employed to analyse a comprehensive set of primary sources 
from relevant EU actors. In this way it can contribute to the analysis of both securitisation processes 
at the EU level as well the evolution of EU infectious diseases policies and polity. The former also 
includes a mathematical handling of the securitisation assessment, the latter is complemented by 
elite and specialised interviewing; a research tool that aims at acquiring background information that 
is particularly valuable for an in-depth understanding of the research target from a practitioner’s 
perspective. Before explaining in detail how the research methods are applied, it is helpful to clarify 
which levels and units are actually subject to analysis and on the basis of which selection criterions a 
relevant text corpus can be generated. 
 
2.5.3. Level and Units of Analysis 
Constructivist scholars have argued that “before we can be constructivist about anything we have to 
choose ‘units’ and ‘levels’” (Wendt, 1999: 82). Also the preparation of content analysis starts with 
the definition of the set of documents envisaged to be analysed. In line with the focus of the study on 
the key developments at the EU level after the introduction of a genuine public health article into EU 
primary law in the Maastricht Treaty, the date of relevant documents on the one hand, and the 
author of respective documents on the other, are important selection criterions when it comes to 
compiling the set of documents (Manheim et al., 2008: 181). 
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As regards the former, the period of investigation from 1993 to 2014 sets the selection criterion for 
the text corpus as regards the date, with the exception of the first case study (chapter 5) which also 
includes BSE-related documents from the years from 1989 onwards.39 The period thus principally 
covers the most dynamic years in the evolution of infectious disease control at the EU level from the 
entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the most recent developments for which reliable 
data is available.  
The definition of the authors of documents to be included in the analysis is less straightforward, in 
particular in view of the securitisation analysis. In order to be able to generate a consistent and 
clearly demarcated text corpus, it is therefore helpful to provide a definition for each of the actors 
that appear in the securitisation analysis, namely (1) the group of securitisers who ‘speak’ security, 
(2) the group of security providers who ‘do’ security’ and (3) the audience that accepts securitising 
moves and measures (Buzan et al., 1998: 27). The former two are jointly addressed in the following 
chapter 2.5.3.1, the latter in chapter 2.5.3.2. 
 
2.5.3.1. The Definition of Securitisers and Security Providers at the EU Level 
In the understanding of Buzan et al. (1998) the group of securitisers, those actors who issue speech 
acts, typically includes “political leaders, bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists, and pressure 
groups” (Buzan et al., 1998: 40). Due to the plethora of players active across all levels of the EU 
system and the global health governance system more generally, speech acts to securitise infectious 
diseases at the EU level can principally come from a wide range of actors.40 Still, an analysis that fully 
covers the wide spectrum of securitising utterances is beyond the scope of the study so that a clear 
demarcation is needed. 
Against this background the study applies a rigour focus on communications of official EU actors. In 
this sense, documents issued by EU institutions, in particular from the European Commission, the 
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union,41 relevant committees and from the 
European Council, can be considered to most adequately incorporate the information needed to 
derive degrees and kinds of securitisation at the EU level.42 Emphasis is, thus, put on the EU as the 
                                                          
39
 The extension of the time period allows better grasping the full BSE/TSEs-related securitisation chronology. 
See also chapter 2.5.4. 
40
 As indicated before, a non-exhaustive list includes state actors such as national (health) ministries, non-state 
actors and non-governmental organisations such as the Red Cross, international organisations such as the 
World Bank or WHO, multinational companies, particularly from the pharmaceutical sector, and philanthropic 
foundations like the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. Further examples could be added (Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, 2002, Reich, 2002, Schuppert, 2006, Graz and Nölke, 2008, Zacher and Keefe, 2008, Spero, 
2011). 
41
 In the following also referred to as ‘Council’. 
42
 Utterances by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) are 
occasionally taken up, but will not be systematically analysed over time. Although the ECJ can principally 
contribute to the production of EU law following its interpretation of existing texts and therefore play into 
institutionalisation processes (Stein, 1981, Weiler, 1991), court-made law in the field of infectious disease 
control “tends to follow a pattern of incremental change” (Hervey, 2012: 980) with less capacity to account for 
structural changes among the key developments. Also, due to the tediousness of ECJ proceedings and the 
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level of analysis, and the EU bodies most substantively dealing with infectious diseases control as the 
relevant units. In turn, securitising moves of individual EU Member States or involved non-state 
actors will not be analysed.  
The same selection applies also to the definition of the group of security providers; rather than 
examining the activities of individual Member States or involved actors from other political levels, a 
clear focus is put on measures that were adopted, but not necessarily implemented, at the EU level.43 
Limiting the analysis of utterances and measures in this way helps clearly define the text corpus and 
to draw a manageable sample from an otherwise extremely large population of communications. The 
approach is methodological reasonable if EU documents are understood as the outcome of a political 
decision-making process into which the interests of actors from different political levels and relevant 
stakeholders as well as pressures of functional or systemic nature have been fed. In this sense, 
debate and action at the EU level can be understood as an expression of an EU-wide multi-level 
negotiation process which concludes the input from various sources. Consequently, issues can occur 
as limited up to a specific political level, for instance the national, or as an issue for the EU as a 
whole. However, regardless of the fact whether the construction of the security situation initially 
started at a specific level, in parallel in different national arenas or straightforward as security 
problems for the EU as a whole; should the problem bear a significant cross-border dimension it can 
be expected, due to existing political channels across all EU levels, that the sooner or later the 
securitisation becomes manifest at the European level – and thus at the level where the investigation 
of the present study takes place. 
It follows from this understanding that an issue can be regarded to constitute an EU-wide security 
problem once Member States opt to launch verbal and operational activity through the EU level, or if 
EU institutions do so on their own right. This focus is in line with the Copenhagen School’s original 
idea that “definition and criteria for securiti[s]ation is constituted by the intersubjective 
establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects” 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 25, emphasis added). In other words, as long as there is no effect and appearance 
of the issue at the EU level in form of EU speech acts and emergency measures, the securitising 
moves on national level or any other non-EU level are considered to not having had sufficient 
saliency to shift the issue to the EU arena, or the threat has been constructed without any European 
dimension.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
typical time lag between the ECA’s reports and the period under scrutiny, their utterances are not particularly 
suitable for the analysis of time-sensitive securitisation developments. 
43
 It should be recalled in this context that the definition of the actors who are supposed to provide security can 
be addressed also in speech acts, for instance when a given actor stresses the need for action to be 
implemented by another actor. Following this understanding the ex ante definition of the group of security 
providers as official EU actors is limited to the operational dimension of the securitisation process. 
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2.5.3.2. The Definition of the Audience at the EU Level 
Besides the group of securitisers, the securitisation approach also requires the identification of the 
audience, the unit that together with the securitiser intersubjectively defines the securitisation 
parameters. As explained in chapter 2.2, the concept foresees that an ‘enabling audience’ has to 
agree with the securitising move of the securitising actor in order to satisfy the conditions of a 
complete securitisation process. Hence, the audience has an important role in the process of the 
construction of (in)security, but it is not easy to define in the present case given the particularities of 
the EU’s institutional setup and in the absence of a clearly defined EU public realm (Laffan 1996: 93). 
In order to work with a definition that is consistent with the before mentioned conceptualisation of 
the EU as a multi-level negotiating and decision-making system, the audience is, for the purpose of 
this study, understood as an integral part of the political system. In this sense, the EU is considered as 
a political arena in which the full set of actors, including the major institutions like Commission, 
Council, European Council, Parliament, Court of Justice and Central Bank but also extending to the 
various committees, advisory bodies and forums, jointly make up for a political and discursive sphere 
that includes securitisers, security providers and audience. The argument is that due to the 
combination of intergovernmental and supranational elements and due to the cooperation of various 
political bodies with functions in the sense of ‘checks and balances’, the complex system inherently 
comprises (the) relevant ‘enabling audience(s)’, also across different political levels.  
To illustrate, Members of the European Parliament do not only reach out in their communications 
and activities to their constituencies and to the national and European public spheres, but also to a 
substantial degree to national governments and other EU institutions. Similarly, utterances issued by 
the Council or the European Council are not only addressed to the rather inconsistently connected 
national arenas, but also to EU institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament. In other 
words, all EU actors simultaneously engage in political and discursive processes – which they seek to 
influence and to which they respond – and assume, while doing so, in rotating roles the function of 
both (de-)securitisers and audience(s) that together intersubjectively define (in)security. Given the 
representation of interests and influences from all levels, the discursive interplay of institutions can 
in this way be understood as a suitable framework for the intersubjective construction of EU-wide 
(in)security; the role of an ‘enabling‘ audience is considered to be in-built into EU policy-making due 
to the contingency of EU decisions upon consent or majorities among different actors.  
The duality of securitiser and audience becomes particularly apparent when it comes to exercising 
legislative functions, for instance in the co-decision procedure which integrates EU institutions into a 
framework which puts the involved institutions in positions that allow or even foresee the 
performance of all functions of a (de-)securitisation process: speech acts, adoption of emergency 
measures and consenting audience. Similar processes often precede also the publication of individual 
decisions or documents, for instance when action by the European Commission is contingent upon 
the authorisation of a regulatory committee. In this way the EU setup includes a necessary ‘indication 
of acceptance’ of a securitising move (see chapter 2.2.) as soon as relevant EU actors cooperate – 
relatively consistently – in a securitisation process. 
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In short, in absence of an EU public sphere or other clearly defined audience comparable to the 
national level, and following the specific composition of EU institutions as well as the genuine 
decision-making processes, the discursive and political arena of the EU as a whole is understood as 
being capable of enabling securitisation at the EU level. Treating the EU system in this way as an 
entity which pursues and accepts securitisation by condensing and reflecting EU-wide processes in 
the output of its institutions certainly does not reflect the full complexity of the discursive structures 
at work across the EU’s multiple levels. This narrow view on the enabling audience, however, is 
sufficient for the purpose of this study, for which it is not decisive whether a given disease was 
securitised inside or outside the EU framework – important is the form of securitisation as expressed 
at the EU level. 
Crucially, this conceptualisation of the audience meets the fundamental criterions that the audience 
has a “direct causal connection with the issue [and] the ability to enable the securitising actor to 
adopt measures in order to tackle the threat” (Balzacq, 2011c: 34). Beyond that, it helps direct the 
focus of the study clearly on one political level, the EU level, in the securitisation analysis for all units. 
Such an approach is particularly useful in the light of the findings of previous studies which suggest 
that securitisers and audiences change from level to level (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 126). Hence, 
adding further levels or units to the analysis would imply the risk to overload the study and to 
prohibit an investigation in adequate detail. 
 
2.5.4. Research Phases and Case Studies  
For a period of more than twenty years, limiting the set of analysed utterances to those of the 
abovementioned official EU actors still leaves too many communications to reasonably analyse in 
depth within the scope of this study. The problem of an unfeasible high number of sources to analyse 
would be exacerbated if the large set of potentially relevant policy fields ranging from development 
and environment policy to humanitarian aid, research and trade policy would be included. As 
indicated in the introductory chapter, it is beyond the scope of this study to fully grasp the 
intersectoriality of infectious disease control and health policy as a whole. In contrast, the study 
concentrates on what can be regarded the core of EU infectious disease control in the realms of EU 
public health policy and food safety. 
Still, given the long period under scrutiny and the large number of potentially securitised infectious 
diseases it is obvious that an in-depth analysis of the securitisation of infectious diseases cannot be 
carried out for all years of the period under scrutiny, for all developments and in particular not for all 
diseases. This is why the study works with a combination of two research phases, starting with an 
overview chapter on the institutionalisation of infectious disease control in the EU, followed by two 
case studies that focus on securitisation and specific structural changes that occurred in the course of 
disease crises. The overview chapter on the key developments of EU infectious disease control is not 
only needed to provide the research context for the study, it also serves the purpose to be able to 
identify relevant case studies.  
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The authors of the original securitisation approach suggested that “security analysis [must be] 
interested mainly in successful instances of securiti[s]ation” (Buzan et al., 1998: 39). The notion 
‘successful’ refers in this context to instances where a speech act, accepted by the relevant audience, 
was accompanied by emergency measures to respond to a claimed existential threat to a valued 
referent object (Buzan and Waever, 2003: 491). This research focus seems still promising in the 
modified securitisation approach since studying the effects (or absence of effects) of securitisation 
can be performed only by looking at instances of successful securitisation. The challenge in this 
context is, however, that no study exists that could direct the focus straightforward to a 
comprehensive set of cases of successfully securitised diseases at the EU level. To make things worse, 
the study is not interested in any effect of securitisation, but has a particular interest in 
institutionalisation. Last but not least, the existing literature does not offer a comprehensive 
overview of the institutionalisation of EU infectious disease control. 
Against this background, how is it possible to identify case studies that involve all relevant 
components, EU structural change and securitisation of infectious diseases, so that a basic testing of 
the hypothesis becomes possible? In order to respond to this methodologically challenging situation, 
the study will complementarily approach the field of investigation from two sides; first, from the side 
of the dependent variable to identify the key developments in the evolution of the EU’s setup to 
control infectious diseases, and, second, from the side of the independent variable to analyse the 
securitisation of specific diseases that can be related to selected key developments.  
Concentrating in the first research step on the dependent variable of the study is a strategy that is 
particularly suitable in an early stage of investigation (George and Bennett, 2005: 23). Since the study 
applies a rather new focus, it is thus reasonable to begin the empirical analysis with an investigation 
into the key developments of EU infectious disease control. On the basis of this analysis a list of 
milestone developments can be compiled which can be principally assumed to meet the criterions of 
institutionalisation and which thus potentially qualify to constitute an effect of securitisation. This 
first part of the analysis, however, does not put emphasis on securitisation; it rather prepares the 
following securitisation analysis. Given that a comparable overview of the evolution of the EU’s 
infectious disease on the basis of an extensive review of relevant primary sources and secondary 
literature does not exist, this part of the study also has value as an independent piece of research. 
Subsequently, from the generated list of milestone developments, two sets of prominent changes 
are chosen as case studies to be scrutinised in detail from a disease-related security perspective. 
These case studies deal with: 
(1) The revision of the EU infrastructure for food-borne infectious diseases (1997), the legal basis in 
the field of public health as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the adoption of harmonised 
EU law on ‘transmissible spongiform encephalopathies’ (TSEs) (2001) as well as the establishment of 
the ‘European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)’ (2002); and  
(2) The update of the legal basis for the control of cross-border threats and communicable diseases 
by the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) and the creation of the ‘European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)’ (2004). 
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These case studies will analyse the key development not only in more detail than the overview 
chapter could do; crucially, the adoption of these structural changes will be analysed in the sense of 
cases of institutionalisation that occurred in the context of the securitisation of infectious diseases. 
The first case study focuses on the securitisation of ‘bovine and transmissible spongiform 
encephalopathies’ (BSE/TSEs) between 1989 and 2001. Since the disease was subject to political 
activity at the EU level before 1993, the period of investigation was extended to 1989 in order to 
allow for the full coverage of the politicisation and securitisation process. The second case study 
deals with securitisation of the ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’ (SARS) between 2003 and 2004.  
The reasons for selecting these ‘case groups’ will be set out in chapter 4, after the milestone list of 
structural changes could be compiled. It will become clear that the focus is put on a set of systemic 
changes that belong to the most fundamental reforms in the evolution of the EU’s setup to control 
infectious diseases. Both selected ‘case groups’ share a number of features such as the combination 
of a revision of the EU’s primary law (EU Treaty) with the creation of a specialised EU agency. At the 
same time, the selected diseases differ in a number of positivist features such as infection path, 
geographical spread, speed of spread, or mortality. In chapter 4 it will be explained in more detail 
why these circumstances make them interesting test cases for a comparative analysis from a 
constructivist securitisation perspective. 
Clearly, starting the analysis from the side of the securitisation of infectious diseases, the 
independent variable, would be desirable in the attempt to produce generalisable statements on the 
effects of (strong) securitisation, including cases in which institutionalisation has not taken place. Due 
to the research design statements of this kind will not possible on the basis of the following analysis. 
Starting exclusively from the securitisation end of the research object, however, would mean to 
begin with an analysis of the (possible) securitisation processes for all major infectious diseases at 
the EU level over a period of more than two decades, an endeavour which is due to the large number 
of potentially securitised diseases not feasible; and which could not even ensure that a testing of the 
hypothesis would indeed be possible, since the form of securitisation of a disease, in particular 
strong securitisation, can only hardly be anticipated ahead of a detailed analysis.  
Against the background and in the light of the research interest in securitisation as a condition for 
institutionalisation it is more reasonable to pursue the envisaged two-step research approach that 
starts with the identification of structural changes, followed by an analysis in how far these structural 
changes occurred in the context of the securitisation of an infectious disease. By proceeding in the 
proposed way the study not only overcomes the challenge to identify a pair of cases that is actually 
relevant for the analysis of the assumed connection between securitisation and institutionalisation 
processes, it also contributes to closing a basic research gap by providing a so far missing overview of 
key developments in the evolution of the EU’s setup for infectious disease control. 
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2.5.5. Collection of Documents 
The sources analysed in the framework of this study are not identical in all research phases and they 
also required the application of different collection methods. When it comes to analysing the 
evolution of infectious disease control, institutionalisation processes and the course of events related 
to the BSE/TSEs and the SARS crises, the set of analysed sources primarily include relevant academic 
literature, EU Treaties, EU legislation and communications as well as expert interviews. In addition, 
newspaper coverage of the topic can feed into the analysis to complete the picture. In turn, for the 
analysis of the securitisation developments, the focus on official EU actors implies that the study 
exclusively deals with EU primary sources.  
How have the respective data sets been compiled? For the investigation of key developments of 
infectious disease control at the EU level and the political processes related to the two diseases 
under scrutiny, academic literature was compiled on the basis of a systematic bibliographic search as 
well as access to EU Treaties and relevant EU legislation through internet research of the websites of 
the EU institutions and complementary online databases. A systematic screening of the respective 
webpages of the before mentioned EU institutions and media sources, however, sometimes does not 
provide access to documents of the early 1990s, a time when the EU did not yet pursue a fully-
fledged online publication policy. For the early years under scrutiny, the set of documents was 
therefore complemented by the compilation of communications collected through a systematic 
offline search of the Archive of European Integration (AEI) and the European Union Delegation 
Collection (EUDC) of the University of Pittsburgh.44 The latter is one of the most complete EU 
depository libraries which received a complete collection of public European Union official docu-
ments and publications from 1952 to 2007 (Wilkin, 2008). All in all, the result of this systematic 
online and offline search makes up, together with the information retrieved through expert 
interviews (see chapter 2.5.7), for a rich set of relevant sources.  
In turn, the research engaging in the analysis of the securitisation of infectious diseases builds on a 
set of documents that was generated through a complete extraction of EU legal output dealing with 
the selected diseases. For the purpose of this study, the notion of legal output refers to all EU action 
based on EU Treaties, comprising documents in the form of various treaty-defined legal instruments 
(secondary law) as well as the formal rules of procedure of EU institutions and, at the most informal 
level, established practices of EU policy-making.  
A comprehensive list of EU legal output relevant to a specific topic can be generated through ‘EUR-
Lex’, the EU’s central online database on EU law. It offers a search engine that provides direct access 
to and further information on all types of binding and non-binding EU legislation as well as case law, 
international agreements and preparatory acts. EUR-Lex is updated on a daily basis and contains a 
total number of more than 3 million documents, dating back to 1951.45 The set of items related to 
the selected diseases can be generated by the EUR-Lex search engine in various ways, the most 
straightforward of which is the specification of keywords.  
                                                          
44
 The search of the AEI/EUDC was carried out from March to May 2013. 
45
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/content/welcome/about.html (accessed 28.08.2014). 
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For the first case study (chapter 5) the EUR-Lex search covers the period from 1989 to 2001 and thus 
the period between the first BSE/TSEs-related output at the EU level and the creation of the 
European Food Safety Authority. The EUR-Lex search employed the search terms ‘bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy’, ‘BSE’, ‘Creutzfeldt’, ‘mad cow’ and ‘spongiform’. For the second case study (chapter 
6), EUR-Lex was searched for ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’, ‘respiratory’, and ‘SARS’ for the 
years between 2002 and 2004.46 It belongs to the advantages of an EUR-Lex extraction that the data 
set comprises all sorts of EU output, including legislative acts and preparatory acts such as White and 
Green Papers, as well as proposals, reports and further documents. That is why both speech acts and 
emergency measures, in the understanding of the securitisation approach, can be analysed on the 
basis of a data set generated by EUR-Lex. Since the database covers items by all major EU actors and 
across all EU policies, a respective categorisation of these items beyond the parameters of 
securitisation allows also for a differentiation between the author (EU institution or sub-unit) as well 
as the primary policy field of a securitising speech act or emergency measure. A particularity in this 
respect are the written questions from Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) which are part 
of a full EUR-Lex extraction but which are not included in the systematic analysis across both case 
studies due to the large number of respective documents (see also chapter 2.5.6.1). Beyond that, 
prior to the analysis the data set also underwent a clearing in view of items that are listed multiple 
times and to exclude corrigenda. 
Beyond EUR-Lex, the securitisation analysis also made use of the results of an extensive search of the 
webpages of the European institutions, in particular of the Commission and the European Council, in 
order to integrate documents and conclusions that are not covered by the official EU database but 
which clearly relate to the diseases under scrutiny. As the Commission set up specific web sections 
for individual diseases, the complementary search of dedicated EU webpages could help find key 
documents outside the scope of EUR-Lex, for instance issued by scientific committees or expert 
groups. Also the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council are generally not included in the 
EUR-Lex database and therefore require a manual integration into the text corpus. 
It should be noted that some of the original EU webpages of the periods in question could not be 
accessed anymore at the time of writing and that relevant documents were not provided on the 
respective updated webpages. In these cases the original documents were retrieved from the 
‘Internet Archive’, a non-profit internet library that provides permanent access to historical digital 
content.47 It offers a ‘Wayback Machine’ to access archived versions of websites over time.  
All in all, generated in this way the text corpus was designed to allow for the identification of the key 
institutionalisation processes at the EU level and for assessing securitisation processes in both the 
verbal and the operational dimension at the EU level. Given that the data set was compiled in a 
systematic way, a comparative view across time periods and case studies is facilitated. Crucially, it 
covers the full spectrum of relevant actors and therefore all relevant potential (de-) securitisers and 
audience(s). The following Table 2-3 summarises the sources analysed for this study. 
                                                          
46
 Further information on the method and use of EUR-Lex extractions can be found in Klein et al. (2013). 
47
 See http://archive.org/ (accessed 13.02.2015).  
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Table 2-3: Overview of Main Set of Analysed Sources along Research Phases 
 EUR-Lex 
Database 
Official EU 
Webpages48 
AEI/EUDC 
Archive 
Expert 
Interviews 
Institutionalisation and 
Response to BSE/TSEs & SARS 
x x x x 
Securitisation  x x o o 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
2.5.6. Qualitative Content Analysis and Classification of Communications 
In order to analyse the set of documents gathered, the study employs the instruments offered by 
qualitative content analysis. For the analysis of the EU key development in infectious disease control 
it is sufficient to carefully analyse and categorise the selected sources, also in view of their meaning 
for relatively persistent and systemic key developments regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, 
resource allocation, distribution of competences and organisational structures. A combination of the 
analysis of primary sources, secondary literature and expert interviews (see chapter 2.5.7) is best 
suited to ensure that the major developments are covered indeed. 
The analysis of securitisation is principally carried out in the spirit of the fathers of the original 
securitisation approach, who argued that the study of security does not need “any sophisticated 
linguistic or quantitative techniques” as long as the primary aim is to look “for arguments that take 
the rhetorical form defined here as security” (Buzan et al., 1998: 176f). Seeing that it is against the 
security argument’s nature to be hidden, the major task is to read the documents in view of 
securitising moves and emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998: 177).  
Since the present study works with a modified securitisation approach, this starting point has to be 
put in perspective. Clearly, the envisaged differentiation in terms of timing, actors, dimensions, 
degrees and kinds of securitisation is a more complex exercise which demands substantive detail 
work, in particular to identify whether and in how far the content of a given communication qualifies 
as rather one kind and degree, or another. In this context the securitisation components that indicate 
the degree of securitisation, as well as the security parameters established for the kind of 
securitisation, will be taken up to create a tailor-made code system.  
How does this work in practical terms? Coding texts means assigning values or categories to 
observations that can be made in the analysed communication. It can be applied to analyse both 
kinds and degrees of securitisation as well as to both securitising speech acts and documents that 
initiate emergency measures. In principle, the analysis can focus on the word, sentences, paragraphs, 
themes or the item, that is the communication as a whole (Neuendorf, 2002).  
                                                          
48
 Partly accessed through ‘Web Archive’, see foot note above. 
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Focusing on individual words is, however not advisable since “[a]ctors who securitise do not 
necessarily say ‘security’, nor does their use of the term security necessarily always constitute a 
security act” (Buzan et al., 1998: 33). Although notions such as ‘emergency’ or ‘crisis’ can serve as 
good points of orientation, securitisation often speaks through the lines. Therefore, “[w]hat is […] 
important is not the term itself, but the implication from the use of this term that ‘business as usual’ 
will not suffice and extraordinary measures are required” (Kamradt-Scott and McInnes, 2012: S96). 
Against this background content analysis does not rely on specific key words that necessarily have to 
figure in the text in order to make it a securitising move. Instead, it is necessary to assess word 
meanings, also key notions such as “scourge, threat, collapse or cripple (in reference to impact of the 
disease on the economy or governments)” (Cook, 2010: 17f) in larger context, sentences and 
paragraphs when it comes to relating a document to the parameters of securitisation. Also the 
analysis of longer text segments helps identify specific themes, which often incorporate “modifiers 
(adverbs, adjectives) and explanatory text that both accompany usage of a particular word and [thus] 
help to establish its meaning” (Manheim et al., 2008: 183). In this way the general tone of the 
document, the presence of the security discourse and the overall nature of the file are often more 
important than individual words. This is particularly true for the selected text corpus which 
incorporates many documents that were written in a distinct, rather technical ‘eurocratic’ language 
and which therefore cannot be expected to feature dramatic rhetoric. 
 
2.5.6.1. Analysing the Degree of Securitisation 
For the analysis of the degree of securitisation, the study works with an analysis of the documents 
along the securitisation indicators developed in chapter 2.3.1., namely the (strength of the) security 
discourse, the (number of) speech acts, the (number and strength of) securitisers and the (number 
and strength of) emergency measures, incl. the re-allocation of resources.49 The analysis and 
structuring of the text corpus is carried out in view of the identification of specific periods of times 
(‘(de-)securitisation phases’) for which the rise or fall of the securitisation degree could be detected. 
In order to substantiate the differentiation of the securitisation degree of a disease along the security 
continuum between lowly and highly securitised, the full set of EU documents is classified in the 
sense of a ‘scaling structuring’ or ‘evaluative categorisation’ (Mayring, 2008: 92-99, Kuckartz, 2014: 
98-114). This technique allows assigning a basic value to every speech act (verbal dimension) and 
emergency measure (operational dimension) that reflects the use and strength of security language 
as well as the ‘extraordinariness’ of the measure as laid down in a given communication.  
In order to work with a system that both structures the communications along a manageable scale 
and that at the same time accurately reflects the relative securitisation degree of a given 
communication, the scale was designed inductively after a majority of speech acts and emergency 
measures could be preliminarily evaluated. It is set up as a standard 5-point interval scale which 
                                                          
49
 See Figure 2-3. Following the conceptualisation of the EU ‘audience’ in chapter 2.5.3.2, the audience consent 
is not subject to separate analysis. 
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builds on the core elements of the verbal and the operational dimension of securitisation and offers 
a categorisation of all communications along the range from a (highly) securitising through a neutral 
to a (highly) de-securitising move. 
According to this system a speech act receives the attribute of a ‘highly securitising’ ( + + ) 
communication on the verbal securitisation dimension if the author employs language that puts a 
disease directly in the context of, for instance, a ‘severe’ or ‘acute’ threat or crisis and calls for 
‘immediate’ or ‘comprehensive’ responsive actions. Common elements of highly securitising speech 
acts are references to the disease’s strong capacity to cause death or relating the disease to classic 
security threats, such as terrorist attacks or particular severe disease outbreaks of the past. To 
illustrate, members of the European Parliament stated with reference to SARS that the “virus is also 
spreading within Europe in a way which threatens everyone’s health” (European Parliament, 2003b) 
and labelled it a disease which “has become the new plague of the third millennium” (European 
Parliament, 2003a). Such formulations, for instance, meet the criterions for a ‘highly securitising’ 
speech act.  
Also in absence of explicit security language an utterance may still qualify for a securitising move, if it 
contains references to an existing securitising document. A call for the urgent implementation of a 
given emergency measure is a case in point. In turn, if the utterance is less outspoken but still deals 
with the disease as a security issue, for instance by pinpointing at specific risks or particularly 
affected referent objects, the speech act qualifies to receive the attribute of a ‘securitising’ ( + ) 
communication.  
In the same understanding a ‘de-securitising’ or ‘highly de-securitising’ effect can be assigned to a 
speech act, if the text attempts to treat the disease as a non-extraordinary matter that is either 
harmless in principle or at least manageable by existing structures. Typically, de-securitising ( - ) 
elements describe the disease as not dangerous with overall few and negligible related risks. Also the 
language employed seeks to evoke the impression that ‘everything is under control’. Highly de-
securitising ( - - ) communications work in the same direction, but are more outspoken regarding the 
state of security. In the most extreme form, a ‘highly de-securitising’ utterance declares the 
containment or eradication of the disease.  
On the operational dimension a communication qualifies for the score of a (highly) securitising effect, 
if the document constitutes the normative or legal basis for emergency actions that are taken in 
response to the disease. Whereas extraordinary measures, such as an embargo on products related 
to a given disease, means that the disease is highly securitised ( + + ) by the document, less 
exceptional measures such as, for instance, the deployment of investigation groups, which still 
accounts clearly for an emergency measure, are classified as a merely ‘securitising ( + ) move. 
Accordingly, the massive re-allocation of resources would imply a high ( + + ) securitising score on the 
operational level, a modest investment a basic one ( + ). In turn, a highly de-securitising 
communication on the operational dimension would be, to illustrate, the lifting of a disease-related 
ban ( - - ) or the loosening of extraordinary inspections ( - ).  
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Speech acts without any direct or indirect formulations that relate the disease either to a threatening 
situation or the state of (in)security are labelled ‘neutral’ ( o ). These documents can be either of a 
rather technical nature or simply treat the disease outside the wider security context. Beyond the 
genuinely neutral communications the ‘neutral’ score is also assigned to those cases which bear both 
securitising and de-securitising elements in the same amount so that a distinct classification towards 
either of the directions is impossible. The same system is applied to classify communications 
regarding their impact on the securitisation degree on the operational dimension, even if it is less 
likely that both securitising and de-securitising actions are launched by the same document. 
Crucially, should a communication constitute a speech act that does not go along with the adoption 
of emergency measures, the attribute for the operational dimension of the respective document is 
‘neutral’, and vice versa for instances that adopt an emergency measure without explanations that 
employ any form of security language (verbal dimension).  
Since the values assigned to the EU documents will be subject to further mathematical handling (see 
below), the attributes ranging from + + to - - also have a numerical expression, the ‘securitisation 
score’. 
 
Table 2-4: The Classification of Speech Acts and Emergency Measures in View of the Securitisation Degree 
Symbol Score Meaning 
+ + 2 Securitising Content 
(identification of threat and/or adoption of emergency measure) + 1 
o 0 Neutral Content  
(elements of securitisation and de-securitisation or no relation to security) 
- -1 De-securitising Content 
(re-assuring statement and/or end of emergency measure) - - -2 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
The assessment and classification of the communications is a genuinely qualitative endeavour that 
occasionally implies difficulties to clearly differentiate between the different attributes/scores, for 
instance whether a given text is rather highly or a merely securitising case. This challenge and related 
methodological problems are alleviated by different means. First, all documents were assessed in a 
relatively short period of time so that a comparison among the communications could easily be done. 
Second, the classification was entirely undertaken by the author of this study so that the procedure 
could be applied consistently across all cases. Third, in order to make the evaluation and assignment 
of values most transparent, the documents are compiled in tables at the end of the chapters that 
deal with the securitisation processes of a specific period under scrutiny.  
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More precisely, the tables (see example below) make explicit the securitisation value assigned in 
addition to the date of the document as published in the EU Official Journal, the author of the 
document, the specific document number as assigned by the author, the reference specification as 
used in the list of references of the present study, as well as basic information on the content of the 
respective communication. Providing this comprehensive overview of reference data for each 
communication included in the analysis makes the list of communications not only better accessible 
for the reader, it also clearly relates EU activities to the respective documents as well as the impact 
on the overall securitisation degree of the disease. 
 
Table 2-5: Example for List of Disease-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures 
(OJ) Date
50
 Author
51
 
Reference
52
 Contents 
Securitisation
53
 
Doc. No.
54
 Verbal Oper. 
e.g. 11.11.11 e.g. CO 
…as referred to in the 
List of References 
e.g. Red alert / high risk warning: 
temporary (local) virus transmission 
(virus carnevalis) 
e.g. + + e.g. o 
e.g. A11. A – AF 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Building on the data generated, the rise and fall of the disease as a security matter can be illustrated 
in a timeline by setting off the scores of the securitising ( 2 or 1 ) against the de-securitising elements 
( -2 or -1 ) for a given ‘(de-)securitisation phase’, for instance a specific year. By reflecting the total 
number and values of securitising speech acts and emergency measures this mathematical handling 
of the data helps compare the securitisation degree across different points of time. In this way it 
allows to reveal in how far securitisation and de-securitisation happen as “single bombshell event[s]” 
or take the form of longer processes (Guzzini, 2011: 335).  
This simple addition, however, does not fully express the securitisation degree of a disease, as it 
misses to cover the overall strength of the security discourse that is linked to the disease. To recall, 
the concept set out in chapter 2.3.1 requires that a high number of securitising moves on both the 
verbal and the operational dimension is needed to shift a topic into the realm of security, it is, 
however, not sufficient to qualify an issue for a high securitisation degree. In addition to a substantial 
number of securitising documents also the overall discourse on the disease needs to be that of a 
security issue across the full number of communications. To exemplify, 20 securitising documents for 
a given disease issued over six months can be a lot in absolute terms, but the significance of this 
                                                          
50
 Date of publication of the document in the European Union’s Official Journal (OJ). 
51
 Official author of the document using the following abbreviations: Communicable Diseases Network 
Committee (CDNC), Commission (COM), Council (CO), Parliament (EP), European Court of Auditors (ECA), 
European Council (EUCO), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC), Scientific Steering Committee (SSC). 
52
 Document specification as used in the ‘List of References’ of the present study.  
53
 Along the verbal and the operational (oper.) dimension. 
54
 Official specification as provided in the document. 
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number is limited if the total number of disease-related EU documents for the same period is 200, a 
majority of which has a neutral or negative securitisation score.  
It is for that reason that the total number of disease-related documents needs also to be assessed in 
view of the percentage of documents that are located in the securitisation ( + + and + ), the neutral    
( o ) and the de-securitisation ( - and - - ) realms in the verbal securitisation dimension. Clearly, for a 
highly securitised issue we expect a clear majority of the total number of documents in the first 
realm, the realm of securitising moves.  
Finally, this assessment can be reasonably complemented by the calculation of an average score for 
individual securitisation phases on the basis of the scores assigned to all utterances. Building on the 
classification on the 5-point scale between +2 and -2, the individual scores assigned to the analysed 
documents can serve to calculate a mean by dividing the sum of all scores by the total number of 
documents. Such an average score can help substantiate the dominance of the security discourse 
and is a valuable point of reference when it comes to comparing the securitisation degree of two or 
more diseases whose securitisation occurred under different circumstances.  
It should be noted at this point that it is not the purpose of this study to establish an exact expression 
of the securitisation degree in form of an index. The further mathematical handling of the values 
assigned to the set of EU documents as set out before should be rather understood as a tool kit that 
supports the qualitative assessment of the empirical data in view of the securitisation degree. In fact, 
the numbers and figures alone are not considered to cover the full picture. They need to be put in 
perspective by a complementary assessment of the group of securitisers and in view of their power 
positions. To recall, a securitising speech act of the European Council requires a different 
interpretation than the utterance of a scientific committee. That is why measuring the number of 
securitising speech acts and emergency measures is of help only in addition to the qualitative 
interpretation of the content of the individual communications. The final classification of the degree 
of securitisation of a given disease for a given time as ‘low’ or ‘high’, or any intermediary degree, can 
only be undertaken as a last step of analysis on the basis of the full picture. 
 
2.5.6.2. Analysing the Kind of Securitisation 
In contrast to the degree of securitisation, the analysis of the kind of securitisation is a purely 
qualitative exercise. In order to assess dominant security understanding of a given securitisation 
period, the list of securitisation parameters established in chapter 2.3.2.2 to distinguish infectious 
disease-related security concepts serves as a point of orientation. Given the depth of detail 
developed for each securitisation element, Table 2-1 can be employed similar to a questionnaire and 
code-book. Once individual formulations and segments of the communication could be related to 
these securitisation parameters, the overall categorisation of the item along the lines of a rather 
‘soft’ or rather ‘hard’ kind of securitisation becomes possible. Clearly, intermediary forms that 
combine elements from both extreme forms are possible.  
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Pursuing this in-depth analysis for all selected communications shall ensure that for each document 
the relevant content can be identified. As it cannot be expected to find all potential parameters 
addressed in a single document, a definite classification table of each document along the lines of a 
‘soft’ or ‘hard’ kind of securitisation is not envisaged. Instead, it belongs to the final steps of the 
empirical analysis to condense the values gathered from securitising speech acts and emergency 
measures from different actors and different moment of times to a complete picture of one 
dominant or several competing securitisation kind(s). 
 
2.5.7. Expert Interviewing 
Whereas content analysis is a particularly valuable tool to analyse existing documents, in particular 
those that can reveal information about the securitisation of a disease, the analysis to track the 
developments in response to BSE/TSEs and SARS as well as the investigation of the 
institutionalisation of infectious disease control in the EU can – beyond the analysis of secondary 
literature and EU documents – benefit from information acquired from elite interviews. In the 
present study the technique of elite interviewing refers to one-on-one or roundtable conversations 
with persons who possess ‘elite status’ due to their particular knowledge and access to information 
that help gain in-depth understanding of the field of infectious disease control in general and the 
evolution of the EU’S infectious disease policies and polity in particular.  
Interviewing professionals who are or were professionally concerned with the political process under 
scrutiny is generally valuable for securitisation studies since they potentially belong to the group of 
practitioners who issue documents that qualify as securitising element and thus contribute to the 
definition of a security problem (Bigo, 2000, 2002). “Their discourses, routines and more generally 
their political role is often much less visible in the public and mediatised domain” (Huysmans, 2006: 
8f) so that interviewing them can mean a valuable complement to the text analysis. Interviews could 
potentially also contribute to the analysis of securitisation processes, but a structured survey among 
practitioners is beyond the scope of the study. In contrast, the expert interviews served the primary 
purpose to shed light on the background against which structural changes occurred at the EU level 
from the view of the involved practitioner. Beyond that they were meant to gain additional insights 
into the background of the production of speech acts and emergency measures that were issued in 
response to the analysed diseases. In this sense, respondents were treated individually to 
reconstruct internal political processes or the background for specific legislation (Manheim et al., 
2008: 372ff). 
A semi-structured interview guide helped break down the research interest in sub-fields and specific 
questions, allowing for flexible and open ended responses by the interviewees. The flexibility 
provided by the interview guide was especially useful to find out what respondents considered most 
important in a given development and when the discovery of facts and patterns was at the heart of 
the conversation (Manheim et al., 2008: 373). The interview guide used for the present analysis was 
set up on the basis of the work of Kvale and Brinkmann (2009). In order to adjust to the specific 
expertise of the interviewee, the guide differed depending on research phase and respondent.  
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The selection of interviewees was a combination of experts approached speculatively as well as 
persons selected on the basis of recommendations and from the network of contacts provided by 
previous interviewees. Purposely the group of interview partners was not restricted to EU officials 
but also covered active and retired professionals from other relevant institutions in order to gain a 
picture of the respective policy and polity developments as comprehensive as possible.  
The collection of information through interviewing proceeded in three steps. With the aim to gather 
background information on international efforts to control infectious disease in Europe in more 
general terms, a set of interviews was conducted at the WHO’s Regional Office for Europe at an early 
stage of the research process. These interviews served basic explorative purposes and helped gain 
insights on joint communication and collaboration structures, including the EU facilities. These 
conversations also established further contacts in the European field of infectious disease control.  
In a second step, halfway of the research process, research design and intermediate results were 
reflected with academic and professional scholars in the framework of two expert roundtable 
discussions. The participation of experienced practitioners such as Prof. Dr. Henderson, the head of 
the WHO’s only successful worldwide eradication campaign (Global Smallpox Eradication Campaign) 
or Dr. Merkel, a Commission official who significantly shaped the design of the EU’s first health 
programme (see chapter 3.4.1) proved to be particularly valuable for the collection of background 
information on the earlier phases in the evolution of global and EU-wide disease control structures.  
Whereas the first interviews and the roundtable conversations applied a broader focus, a final set of 
interviews was conducted with a specific view on the research question of the present study. The 
group of interviewed EU officials of the Directorate General for Public Health and Food Safety work 
at the heart of the EU’s public health infrastructure and are not only engaged in current disease 
control efforts of the EU but have also framed and participated in institutionalisation processes. 
The three interview phases thus followed the idea to move from a common approach to a specific 
approach and to purposefully schedule the most specific interviews for a late stage in the research 
process. This timing was envisaged on the grounds that interviews with experts have the capability to 
quickly and substantially influence the researcher’s view on the topic. This capability is not only an 
advantage but also bears the risk that research becomes excessively affected by the practitioners’ 
views. In the light of this risk the final set of expert interviews was purposefully conducted only after 
the major line of argumentation as regards the EU systemic development in the field of infectious 
disease control had been established. In this context the interviews primarily served the purpose to 
complement, double check and contrast the results of the research that was done on the basis of 
secondary literature and EU documents (Manheim et al., 2008: 374). 
The interviews carried out in the framework of the present studies were conducted between 
December 2011 and May 2015 as private and reflective conversations for which confidentiality was 
promised to the respondents prior to the interview. For this reason they are generally not cited in 
the text. Voice recorders were used unless the interviewee did not agree to record the conversation. 
All in all, the total number of 8 conversations with a total of 13 experts was conducted.  
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3. Key Development of Infectious Disease Control in the European Union 
Joint efforts to control the spread of infectious diseases in Europe date back at least to the Middle 
Ages. The European Union advanced into the field from the 1980s onwards, a process which 
unfolded an institutionalisation dynamic particularly since the 1990s. Having laid down in detail the 
research purpose, research design and research methods of the study in the previous chapter, the 
following chapter marks the start of the empirical analysis. More precisely, it serves the purpose to 
provide an overview of the major developments in infectious disease control with a focus on the 
most recent steps since 1993, the year when the first substantial article on public health in EU 
primary law entered into force. 
Seeing that historical events and established patterns of infectious disease control in Europe 
provided the background for the developments on EU level, the chapter starts with a brief 
examination of the history of infectious disease control in Europe. It will become visible that the EU 
did not enter a vacuum. Quite the contrary, particular ideas and features of infectious disease 
control, including the institutionalisation of international cooperation, have a long tradition in 
Europe. 
The section on the historical background is followed by an analysis of the evolution of the EU’s setup 
to respond to infectious diseases. Since the rapid evolution of the EU’s policy field is not sufficiently 
reflected in the academic literature, the consolidated overview of the developments at the EU level is 
of particular value. In fact, to the knowledge of the author there is no work on the market that has 
already fully drawn together the key development of the EU’s infectious disease control in the field 
of public health and food safety over time in a structured way. At the same time the chapter provides 
the background needed for the envisaged analysis of securitisation processes in the following case 
studies of chapters 5 and 6. 
In order to structure major developments over a period of more than twenty years, the chapter sets 
out three consecutive periods of infectious disease control at the EU level after the Maastricht Treaty 
entered into force: A first phase from 1993 to 2000, the second from 2001 to 2007 and the third 
from 2008 until 2014. The phases are based on shifting policy priorities following the implementation 
of different EU health programmes as well as on specific institutionalisation processes. The overview 
of both historical roots and key developments after 1993 culminates in a brief analysis of overarching 
patterns and a summary of key developments, including a list of milestones. 
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3.1. Historical Roots of Infectious Disease Control in Europe 
Infectious diseases have been influential factors for political order and social life throughout history. 
For example, when the ‘Plague of Justinian’ spread in the sixth century from Constantinople all over 
the Mediterranean, it contributed to the fall of the Byzantine Roman Empire (McNeill, 1989: 101ff, 
Hough, 2004: 154). Systematic political interventions in response to infectious diseases can be traced 
back to at least the years of the Black Death. The control measures of fourteenth-century Venice 
required ships and travellers from plague-infected areas to stay outside the walls of Ragusa for a 
period of at least a month before they were allowed to enter the city. Deriving from the Latin word 
for thirty, this system was known as trentina and later referred to as quarantina when the time scale 
was extended to forty days.55 Over the following centuries, procedures similar to the Venetian model 
were adopted in other places in Europe, but it was not before the mid-nineteenth century that 
countries started to coordinate their efforts internationally (Conrad et al., 1995: 196, King, 2002: 764, 
Gensini et al., 2004, Stern and Markel, 2004, Bashford, 2006).56 
In the nineteenth century, several pandemic waves of cholera spread from the Bengal region and the 
Ganges river delta throughout India and then to parts of Asia and the Western Pacific, the Russian 
Empire, and finally also to Prussia, France, England, and North America. The dynamics of the 
Industrial Revolution facilitated the risks of an epidemic due to an increased interaction of colonial 
powers with so far unknown diseases of other parts of the planet and rapidly growing urban 
populations that lived in poor sanitary conditions (Johnson, 2001: 11, O'Manique and Fourie, 2012: 
245). After major European cities had been strongly affected from 1848 onwards, representatives of 
twelve European countries convened in Paris in 1851 for the first International Sanitary Conference 
to discuss harmonised rules for quarantine practices and containment of the transnational threat of 
cholera, but also plague and yellow fever (Hays, 2005). This meeting set the starting point for a series 
of gatherings, and thus a forum for regular exchange, about the control of the international spread of 
epidemic diseases until 1938. The conference series ultimately yielded first international public 
health law, first and foremost the International Sanitary Convention for cholera of 1892 and three 
further conventions on cholera and plague in the subsequent years, which were finally merged to a 
single International Sanitary Convention in 1903 (Howard-Jones, 1975, Hough, 2004: 161). 
In the same year it was also agreed that a permanent institution could help better coordinate 
international efforts.57 The idea finally resulted in the International Sanitary Convention of 1907 and 
the establishment of the Office International d’Hygiène Publique (OIHP), an international 
governmental institution with a permanent secretariat in Paris (Lee, 1998: 1, Hough, 2004: 162). The 
OIHP’s major achievement was the original establishment of a standing platform to regularly discuss 
ideas and information on public health matters (Roemer, 1994). In the years after the first World 
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 Other scholars trace Venetian quarantine legislation even back to 1127 (Gostin, 2000: 205). 
56
 A crisp chronology of major International Sanitary Conventions can be found in Fidler (1999: 22f). 
57
 At that time, some regional health organisations existed already, for instance the ‘Conseil Sanitaire 
d'Alexandrie’, the ‘Conseil Supérieur de Santé de Constantinople’ or the ‘European Commission for the 
Danube’. For a comprehensive overview of the cooperation in health matters in the 19
th
 century see Howard-
Jones (1950, 1975) and Weindling (1995). 
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War, similar tasks were also performed by the Health Organisation of the League of Nations, a body 
of the League of Nations that worked in parallel to the OIHP with the aim to “to take steps in matters 
of international concern for the prevention and control of disease” (The League of Nations, 1920). All 
in all, the years between 1851 and 1914 yielded eighteen international conferences on health and 
the creation of twelve health-related international institutions (Murphy, 1994). In this framework 
international collaboration on disease control was extended to further areas such as the prevention 
and control of malaria, smallpox and typhus or the international traffic in opium (Boudreau, 1935, 
Howard-Jones, 1950, Arai-Takahashi, 2001: 116f, Dodgson et al., 2002: 10, Liverani and Coker, 2012: 
918f). By perpetuating their collaboration, national leaders eventuelly established the principle that 
joint and coordinated actions may better enable governments to protect their populations than 
national measures only (Dodgson et al., 2002: 9). 
In addition to these international efforts of governments, also a non-governmental sector started to 
develop and influence the cooperation in health matters from the nineteenth century onwars; be it 
in the form of organisations like the International Committee of the Red Cross, established in 1863, 
or in the form of specific health programmes of philanthropic foundations like the Rockefeller 
Foundation, established in 1913. They supported the idea of a humanitarian health agenda to the 
benefit of all people, a mission that was taken up by humanitarian NGOs after the war period. The 
idea is also to some extent encompassed by the principle of ‘universality of health’, a key vision of 
international health cooperation of the post-war period (Dodgson et al., 2002: 10). 
In the course of the Second World War, international cooperation in infectious disease control, and 
public health in general, ground to a halt. After the end of the war, when the entire League of 
Nations project had crumbled away, previous activities were taken up in the framework of the United 
Nations system and in particular its specialised agency in health matters, the World Health 
Organization. The WHO was established in 1948 and became the successor of not only the League of 
Nations Health Organisation, but also incorporated other international health institutions like the 
OIHP in Paris. The WHO was thus put in the centre of the new worldwide system of health 
collaboration.58 Although the previous euro-centric perspective on health cooperation was resolved 
into a universal approach, the six decentralised offices of the WHO, one for Europe located in 
Copenhagen, still served a regional approach. Besides the implementation of regional programmes, 
the World Health Assembly, the WHO’s key decision making body (WHO, 1948: Art. 21), also agreed 
on new international health law. In particular, in 1951 the WHO replaced the patchwork of existing 
sanitary conventions by a new set of rules, called ‘International Sanitary Regulations’, thereby inter 
alia obliging the WHO member states to report incidences of cholera, plague, smallpox and yellow 
fever. Over the next decades, the regulations underwent several amendments (1969, 1973, 1981 and 
2004)59 and were renamed ‘International Health Regulations’ (IHR). 
                                                          
58 Other UN institutions such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), the 
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) were created in the same period to perform specific health-related tasks. 
59 On the latest revision in 2004, see also chapter 6.3.3. 
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3.2. The Community’s Public Health and Infectious Disease Policy before 1993 
The brief review of the historical roots of infectious disease control in Europe has shown that the 
European Community did not enter a vacuum when Member States started to include health matters 
in the European integration project. However, in the first decades after the Second World War, 
health protection and infectious disease control did not emerge as distinct fields of cooperation in 
the Community’s Treaties. Neither the Coal and Steel Treaty (1951) nor the Treaties of Rome (1957) 
addressed health issues in an explicit manner or as an objective. Still, some health-related questions 
found a way into community law, primarily following the ruling by the European Court of Justice. In 
1976, the ECJ declared in a case on the free movement of goods related to pharmaceuticals that 
“health and life of humans rank first among the property or interests protected by [the Treaty]” 
(European Court of Justice, 1976: para. 15). Hence, rather than leaving this responsibility entirely to 
the national level, the principle of the protection of human health became – through ECJ jurisdiction 
– subject to Community law (Hervey, 2012: 982). 
From this period on, the interest in health matters generally rose within the Community. After a first 
Council meeting of the ministers of health in 1977, the further development was facilitated by the 
interest of a high-level politician in the beginning of the 1980s; the French President Francois 
Mitterand discovered, for personal reasons, an interest to launch concerted action related to cancer 
(Stein, 2003: 19). After a general decision of the European Council in 1985 (European Council, 1985), 
the first public health initiative of the Community ‘Europe Against Cancer’ was finally adopted in 
1986 (Council, 1986a) under the impression of the disaster at reactor 4 of the Chernobyl nuclear 
power station (Gilmore and Kee, 2004: 219, 224). Crucially, the generally raised interest in health 
matters also fed into the debate that led to the conclusion of the Single European Act. Although a 
general provision on health was not included in the new Treaty, it addressed for the first time a 
number of health aspects in other policies (Coleman, 2004: 5).60 
In the same year, a development similar to the cancer initiative can be observed for the first time 
with respect to an infectious disease. The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) had 
received some attention since 1983, when the Commission started to provide initial funding for 
scientific exploration in the framework of the medical and health research programme (MH3),61 but it 
was only since 1986 that the health ministers of the Member States devoted a specific series of 
meetings to the response to the new disease (Council, 1986b). Following the statements on AIDS 
during the G7 summit in Venice in 1987, the Member States of the European Community first agreed 
on the creation of ad hoc working groups and later on a joint programme to respond to the epidemic, 
the programme called ‘Europe Against AIDS’ (Council, 1991, Hervey and McHale, 2004: 337). The 
programme ran, after one extension, from 1991 to 1995, and focused on the collection of data and 
information exchange between the Member States. It was complemented by other AIDS-related 
programmes focusing on the reduction of intravenous drug use and migrant mobility, when open 
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 For instance, with regard to the single market (Art. 100 (a)), the protection of the health and safety of 
workers (Art. 118), research policy (Art. 130 (f-q)) and the environment (Art. 130 (r-t)). 
61
 Since then, research into AIDS and later also other infectious diseases was part of every European research 
programme (Steffen, 2012: 1068). 
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borders to the post-communist transition countries and looming Eastern enlargement intensified the 
discussions about trans-border health risks. In comparison to the resources devoted to research, 
however, the action programmes were small (Altenstetter, 1994: 420, Steffen, 2012: 1083).62 
Retrospectively, the political developments related to cancer and to HIV/AIDS can be seen as 
constitutive events for the further institutionalisation processes in health affairs at the EU level. Since 
then, throughout the following decades, the importance of infectious diseases as a topic on 
European level has increased (Schreck et al., 2009: 149). Both ‘Europe Against’-programmes were 
established without a specific legal basis in the Treaty, they “relied on the Treaty as a whole, 
including its general objectives such as the constant improvement of living and working conditions 
mentioned in the preamble” (Coleman, 2004: 5). The Chernobyl accident and the spread of AIDS 
made clear that trans-border risks to health required a trans-border view, but Community-wide 
epidemiological data collection turned out to be incomparable and incomplete at that time 
(Velimirovic, 1984). In this respect the cancer programme cleared the way for all future cross-border 
research and data collection efforts at the European level (Trubek et al., 2008, Steffen, 2012: 1065). 
Beyond that the responses to HIV/AIDS set the path for the future of the EU’s infectious disease 
control system.  
In this context the establishment of a coordinated network for the surveillance of AIDS cases and 
later also HIV infections across Europe, EuroHIV (since 1984), set the starting point for a general and 
long lasting development, namely the creation of disease specific networks of national medical and 
research institutions with financial support from the European Commission. Besides EuroHIV, the set 
of pioneering networks, which were partly co-run with WHO/Europe, comprised a European working 
group for legionella infections (EWGLINet, since 1986) and a European network of sentinel general 
practices (Eurosentinel, since 1987), followed by a cooperation to establish an early warning scheme 
for influenza (ENS-CARE, since 1992). These early disease-specific surveillance networks before the 
Maastricht Treaty had in common that they were established by national research centres to study 
epidemiological trends and health resources in a wider geographic space with funding from the 
European Commission. Albeit small in size and originally funded as temporary projects, they 
constituted the basis for a dynamic evolution in infectious disease affairs after the founding of the 
European Union in 1993.  
Political support for a more comprehensive European role in health matters had already crystallised 
before in the High Level Committee on Health, a body of senior representatives from the Member 
States and officials from the Commission. The committee was created in the beginning of the 1990s 
to facilitate reflection on Community level while at the same time safeguarding national sovereignty 
and responsibility for health care. The forum was active in the run-up to the intergovernmental 
conference in Maastricht and eventually contributed to the draft provisions for a genuine health 
mandate in the new EU Treaty (Coleman, 2004: 6). 
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 For an overview of HIV/AIDS-related policies of the European Communities before the Treaty of Maastricht 
see Altenstetter (1994). 
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3.3. The Years from 1993 to 2000 
3.3.1. The Legal Basis Provided by the Maastricht Treaty 
The Maastricht Treaty entered into force in 1993 and introduced a public health article which not 
only caught up with established practices and ECJ jurisprudence, but which also initiated a 
fundamental modification in the constitutional setup of the EU’s health affairs. The protection of 
“human health and life was already an established principle of EU law” (Hervey, 2012: 982). The new 
Treaty, however, specified for the first time the general vision that „the activities of the Community 
shall include […] a contribution to the attainment of a high level of health protection” (Art. 3 (o)). In 
this sense, human health protection was, although closely linked to the other activities of the Union, 
“consecrated […] as a general and free-standing goal” (Coleman, 2004: 7).  
The instruments to achieve this goal were laid down in Article 129, the first article at the EU-level 
that explicitly addressed public health as a matter of Community competence. The Treaty 
emphasised cooperation between the Member States, optional support of their actions to protect 
human health and soft measures such as research, information and education to prevent diseases 
(Art. 129 (1)). At the same time, Article 129 also stressed that incentive measures to achieve the 
objectives should be adopted “excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States” (Art. 129 (4)). Furthermore, in view of substantial overlaps of EU activities with 
other international organisations such as the WHO, the Council of Europe and the OECD, the Treaty 
also provided a clause which obliged the Commission to foster “cooperation with third countries and 
the competent international organisations in the sphere of public health” (Art. 129 (3)). 
All in all, the Treaty set out health protection requirements to “form a constituent part of the 
Community's other policies” (Art. 129 (1)), for instance in relation to consumer protection (Art. 129 
(a)) and environment policy (Art. 130 (r)). Although the mandate for Community action was relatively 
weak and did not approach infectious diseases as such, it nevertheless consolidated a legal basis for 
existing networks and initiatives such as the ‘Europe Against AIDS’ programme and EuroHIV. 
Crucially, it provided the fundament for the establishment of a ‘Framework for Action in the Field of 
Public Health’ and, as an intertwined process, the institutional setup and the funding of further 
networks in the field of infectious disease control (Steffen, 2012: 1071). 
 
3.3.2. The Framework for Action in the Field of Public Health 
Taking up the new mandate of Articles 3 (o) and 129 as laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, the 
Commission put forward a comprehensive communication on health (European Commission, 1993), 
the philosophy of which remained a point of orientation for the next decade (European Commission, 
1999h: 7). The document aimed at providing a framework for action by the Community in the field of 
public health and to develop a comprehensive Community approach. Crucially, on the basis of an 
analysis of the major health issues at the Community level the Commission identified a set of priority 
areas of activities that ranged from horizontal issues like disease surveillance to specific diseases 
such as AIDS and other infectious diseases. 
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On the basis of the approval of the priority areas by the Council in 1994 (Council, 1994), a series of in 
total eight multi-annual programmes was launched in the following years, beginning with 
programmes that addressed cancer (European Parliament and Council, 1996c) and health promotion, 
education, information and training (European Parliament and Council, 1996a), followed by 
programmes on drug dependence (European Parliament and Council, 1997b), health data and 
disease surveillance (European Parliament and Council, 1997a), accidents and injuries (European 
Parliament and Council, 1999c), pollution-related diseases (European Parliament and Council, 1999a) 
and rare diseases (European Parliament and Council, 1999b). A specific programme of community 
action was also adopted for the priority area of ‘Prevention of AIDS and Certain Other Communicable 
Diseases’ (European Parliament and Council, 1996b). The programme was designed to fund project 
that addressed the surveillance and monitoring of infectious diseases and their transmission or that 
contributed to information, education and training elements, in particular regarding AIDS (European 
Commission, 1994a, Hervey and McHale, 2004: 338ff, Steffen, 2012: 1069f). 
The eight health action programmes shared two basic characteristics: Their budgets were tiny and 
they supported the establishment of networks among experts and stakeholder in order to facilitate 
“exchange of information and personnel, joint analysis of common problems, training, and sharing 
best practice” (Coleman, 2004: 7). In the case of the programme dealing with infectious diseases, the 
programme envisaged inter alia “a Community network of public health epidemiologists” (European 
Parliament and Council, 1996b: Annex, Art. 3). Despite the small budget of an earmarked ECU 49,6 
million, the largest share of which went into disease monitoring and surveillance (European 
Commission, 1999g: 12), some of the activities under the action programme unfolded a remarkably 
durable impact.  
For instance, the regular production of a peer-reviewed pan-European bulletin on disease 
surveillance and prevention called ‘Eurosurveillance’ started in 1995 in the framework of the 
Community action programme; today, it belongs today the basic infrastructure of the public health 
community in Europe (Ammon, 2005: 1041).63 Also in 1995, the ‘European Programme for 
Intervention Epidemiology Training’ (EPIET) recruited its first cohort of trainees to form an expert 
cadre of public health surveillance professionals in Europe that share methods, standards and 
language for investigation and response. Originally built up on the basis of project funding, EPIET is 
nowadays an internationally recognised institution that recruited its 20th cohort in autumn 2014 (van 
Loock et al., 2001, Ammon, 2005: 1041, Bremer et al., 2009, Krause et al., 2009).64 
Also facilitated by technological advances of the 1990s, when new means of electronic 
communication allowed for a direct connection of the participating institutions and easier exchange 
of data regardless of geographical distance (Liverani et al., 2012: 575), the setup of new, largely 
disease-specific networks accelerated rapidly in the following years (Casteren and Leurquin, 1992, 
Fleming et al., 2003, Ammon, 2005, Reintjes, 2008, Ammon and Faensen, 2009). 
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 See http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ (accessed 12.03.2015). 
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 See http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/epiet/Pages/HomeEpiet.aspx (accessed 12.03.2015). 
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3.3.3. The Communicable Diseases Network and the Early Warning and Response System 
In this context the creation of a European Community Network for the Control and Surveillance of 
Communicable Diseases in Europe in 1998 was of particular importance. This network, also labelled 
Communicable Diseases Network (CDN), was funded through the framework for action in public 
health and comprised designated national bodies responsible for communicable diseases within the 
EU Member States and the Commission. The respective Decision 2119/98/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council (European Parliament and Council, 1998) established for the first time 
a firm legal basis for a permanent collaboration in matters of epidemiological surveillance of 
communicable diseases. With the aim “to promote cooperation and coordination between the 
Member States, with the assistance of the Commission, with a view to improving the prevention and 
control” (European Parliament and Council, 1998: Art. 1) it included inter alia the commitment for 
Member States to provide information regarding the appearance of infectious diseases and 
respective control measures, and to consult among each other in the case of an epidemiological 
emergency. Furthermore, the Commission was given the power to adopt binding guidelines, 
procedures or protective measures to be implemented by the Member States provided the approval 
of these measures by the Network Committee, the CDN’s decision making body made up of Member 
State representatives (European Parliament and Council, 1998: Art. 7, Schreck et al., 2009: 151ff).  
In addition to this overarching approach, the CDN was designed to operate on the basis of a ‘network 
of networks’ that comprised an (increasing) number of so called ‘Dedicated Surveillance Networks’ 
(DSNs). The underlying concept of these DSNs was that they were run by different public health 
institutions in one of the Member States which assumed responsibility for the surveillance of a 
specific disease. For instance, the ‘Institut de Veille Sanitaire’ in France assumed responsibility for the 
surveillance of AIDS (‘EuroHIV’) and the ‘Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre’ of Great Britain 
for food-borne pathogens (‘Enter-Net’). The networks were also financed by the annual subsidies 
from the health programme. In this way, together with the already existing networks that were 
created before the CDN, new and follow-up networks for the surveillance of infectious diseases 
mushroomed in the following years with various foci, for instance on vaccine preventable infectious 
diseases (‘EUVAC.NET’) or invasive bacterial infections (‘EU-IBIS’) (Ammon, 2005, Reintjes, 2008, 
Ammon and Faensen, 2009, Liverani et al., 2012). In the following years, further legislation defined 
the scope of the activities of the networks under Decision 2119/98/EC more precisely. In particular, 
the Commission and the Network Committee updated definitions of key terms (European 
Commission, 2003e, 2007a), the lists of diseases to be progressively covered by the network 
(European Commission, 2003d, 2007a, 2009c, 2009b, 2012b) and agreed on (new) case definitions 
for individual diseases (European Commission, 2003e, 2008e, 2009f, 2009d, 2012c). 
Epidemiological surveillance, however, constituted only one pillar of the Community Network which 
was complemented by a second pillar, the ‘Early Warning and Response System’ (EWRS) (European 
Commission, 2000k). EWRS was designed as a web-based, confidential telematics notification system 
with the aim to immediately circulate important information on specified events and outbreaks of 
Community relevance to accredited EWRS contact points (European Commission, 2000k). Its general 
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aim was to disseminate alerts „with a potential impact on the EU, share information, and coordinate 
their response” (European Commission, 2015) and allow for “immediate exchange of views on risk 
assessment and risk management crucial for timely public health action” (European Commission, 
2003f). Member States were required to report outbreaks of defined notifiable diseases and related 
intervention measures, but also “any other as yet unclassified serious epidemic disease” (European 
Parliament and Council, 1998: Annex). Hence, the system was also meant to cover unknown 
pathogens, not on the list of communicable diseases to be progressively covered by the Community 
network under Decision No 2119/98/EC. This circumstance proved to be of particular value during 
the SARS crisis (see chapter 6.2). The legislation on the EWRS was also updated several times over 
the following years (European Commission, 2008d, 2009a).65 
 
3.3.4. The Innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty and Structural Adaptations 
The set-up of a framework for action in the field of public health that included a strand on 
communicable diseases, the establishment of the training programme EPIET and of the bulletin 
Eurosurveillance, the creation of numerous project-based ad hoc networks for the surveillance of 
specific diseases as well as the formalisation and integration of these networks in an overarching 
‘network of networks’ combined with an early warning and response system belonged to the major 
developments in infectious disease control at the European level in the 1990s.  
Beyond that, also a development in the EU’s primary law influenced the Community’s setup in health 
matters and fields related to infectious disease control when the Member States of the EU decided 
on a revision of the Maastricht Treaty in 1997. The Amsterdam version of the ‘Treaty establishing the 
European Community’, which entered into force in 1999, included a general extension of the 
Community’s mandate in health affairs. The new Treaty Article on public health (re-numbered 152) 
foresaw that action should aim at “improving public health, preventing human illness and diseases, 
and obviating sources of danger to human health ”by fighting“ against the major health scourges, 
promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health 
information and education” (Art. 152 (1)). In contrast to the Maastricht Treaty, which only permitted 
Community action, the Amsterdam Treaty explicitly called for EU legislation on high standards of 
safety of organs and substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives. Crucially, it shifted the 
veterinary and phytosanitary chapters for the protection of human health from the title on the 
common agricultural policy to public health. This step was of particular relevance for the control of 
food-borne infectious diseases at the EU level.  
By doing so public health and consumer protection were no longer secondary effects of the Single 
Market; instead, their attainment was to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
Community policies and activities (Art. 152 (1)). The Amsterdam amendments thus established 
health and consumer protection as independent EU policy objectives (Vos, 2000, Coleman, 2004: 7, 
                                                          
65 
For further information on the EWRS, see Guglielmetti et al. (2006) and European Commission (2005f, 2007d, 
2009g). 
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Krapohl and Zurek, 2006). The adoption of the Treaty of Nice in 2001 did not imply substantial 
revisions with an impact on the EU’s setup for infectious disease control. Therefore, the provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty remained in force until they were replaced by the innovations of the Treaties 
of Lisbon in 2009 (see chapter 3.5.2). Against this background, the Treaty of Nice is not further 
discussed in the following. 
In line with the stronger connection of public health with questions related to veterinary policy and 
consumer protection also the Commission underwent a re-orientation in health matters. It 
established a new Directorate-General XXIV for Consumer Policy and Health Protection (Vos, 1999, 
2000) which was re-named DG SANCO in the course of the installation of the new Commission under 
Romano Prodi. Crucially, together with the foodstuff-related competencies the new DG also received 
the dossier for food-borne infectious diseases. Even if the portfolios for health and consumer 
protection did not remain under the responsibility of one Directorate General in all of the following 
Commission configurations, the resorts of public health and food safety remained intertwined since 
this reform. 
 
3.4. The Years from 2001 to 2007 
3.4.1. The First Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health 
The transition from the first (1993-2000) into the second phase (2001 to 2007) in the evolution of the 
EU’s infectious disease control was initiated by the Commission’s attempt to update the guiding 
communication on public health of 1993 (European Commission, 1993, 1999h). The Commission 
presented a ‘Health Strategy of the European Community’ (European Commission, 2000j) which 
identified new public health priorities. The comprehensive strategy identified various activities in the 
public health field with infectious disease control as one of the major foci (European Commission, 
2000j: 3). It described new risks to health, in particular the resurgence of major infectious diseases 
and the emergence of new diseases, such as new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, as serious health 
problems (European Commission, 2000j: 7) and proposed to strengthen the surveillance and control 
of communicable diseases (European Commission, 2000j: 12). Crucially, the strategy was presented 
along with the proposal for a ‘Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health’. 
The new programme had been designed in 1999 and 2000, but it was not adopted before the year 
2002 (European Parliament and Council, 2002c). Constituting the first overarching EU health 
programme it was meant to better respond to the new legal basis provided by the Amsterdam 
Treaty. In contrast to the Community action plans from 1996 onwards, which had been a set of eight 
separate programmes, the new programme was one overall public health programme, split into 
annual work plans covering the years between 2003 and 2008. The budget was still relatively small, 
even after the increase to an indicative EUR 354 million in 2004 to accommodate the ten 
enlargement countries. However, in general terms it meant a substantial expansion compared to the 
group of previous programmes (European Commission, 2005g: 2, Oortwijn et al., 2007: 3).  
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Against this background the Commission decided to set up an executive agency, originally named 
‘Executive Agency for the public health programme (PHEA), in order to run the enlarged programme 
in technical and financial terms. The agency gradually took over the implantation from DG SANCO 
after 2005 and became fully operational in 2007 (European Commission, 2004a).66 
The Decision of Parliament and Council setting up the public health programme followed the 
Commission’s original proposal in large parts and confirmed three general objectives, namely 
improving information for the development of public health (health information), reacting rapidly to 
health threats (health threats) and tackling health determinants through health promotion and 
disease prevention (health determinants) (European Parliament and Council, 2002c: Preamble (6), 
Art. 1, 2 (a –c)). The priority dealing with “threats to public health of a cross-border nature” explicitly 
included aspects related to ”infectious diseases, environmental pollution or food contamination” 
(European Parliament and Council, 2002c: Preamble (22)). By doing so the programme also integrated 
priorities of the European Council which had identified the need to address threats to health, in 
particular related to the “safety and quality of food, use of chemicals and issues related to outbreaks 
of infectious diseases and resistance to antibiotics” (European Council, 2001b: 7). Also the former 
HIV/AIDS and communicable disease networks, activities, and projects became part of the new 
programme (Steffen, 2012: 1072). 
At the same time, the programme also comprised new elements that had not been part of the 
original considerations. In particular, new elements were added in the field of rapid response to 
health threats, which also extended to emergency situations “relating to terrorist acts” (European 
Parliament and Council, 2002c: Annex 2.4). The inclusion of responses to the threat of terrorism in 
the EU’s public health programme occurred under the impression of the terror events on September 
11, 2001 and the following anthrax scare in the US (Hervey and McHale, 2004: 82). In this vein the 
new health programme foresaw inter alia activities to “react to unforeseen events” (European 
Parliament and Council, 2002c: Art. 3 (a)). Consequently, concerns about the use of infectious 
diseases in the context of terrorism also fed into the annual work plans for the implementation of 
the public health programme. To illustrate, the work plan for 2003 stated that “[a]ctivities regarding 
countering the threat of deliberate release of biological and chemical agents will be undertaken in 
tandem with on-going activities on communicable diseases” (European Commission, 2003i: 29). 
 
3.4.2. The ‘Health Security’ Agenda 
Integrating activities against bioterrorism into the public health programme was not the only change 
that occurred in the period after the 9/11 incidences. In a declaration following the attacks the 
European Council in Ghent examined the “threats of the use of biological and chemical means in 
terrorist operations” and called “for adapted responses on the part of each Member State and of the 
                                                          
66 
The agency was renamed two times in the following years, first as Executive Agency for Health and 
Consumers (EAHC) for the period from 2008 to 2013, and as Consumer, Health, Agriculture and Food Executive 
Agency (CHAFEA) since 2014. 
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European Union as a whole” (European Council, 2001a: 9). The Council and the Commission 
responded by creating a ‘Health Security Committee’ (HSC) as an informal cooperation and 
coordination forum. It was meant to serve the representatives of Member States’ health ministries 
and the Commission as a forum to discuss common health threats from acts of terrorism, share 
information on preparedness and response plans and review crisis management strategies that 
include, for instance, different actors from the health sector and the policy, but also aspects related 
to public transport (European Commission, 2003l: 8f, 23, Council, 2007a: 26f, Schreck et al., 2009: 
154). Its mandate was originally of temporal nature but was prolonged (European Commission, 
2006b, Council, 2007a) until the body became eventually formalised in 2013 (see chapter 3.5.3.1). 
The informal body did not generate a lot of public output until 2009, when the full health security 
framework was outlined in a comprehensive way (European Commission, 2009e). In the meantime, 
however, the HSC’s mandate was extended over the years by working on pandemic influenza and 
generic preparedness and response planning as well as on public health emergencies (European 
Commission, 2010c, Martin and Conseil, 2012: 1105).67 
Beyond the creation of the HSC the infectious disease control at the EU level further developed in the 
course of the bioterrorism debate. HSC and Commission agreed on the so called ‘Health Security 
Programme’ (European Commission, 2001e) with the aim to improve cooperation between the 
different national authorities involved in public health preparedness for bioterrorism, partly funded 
from the EU’s public health programme. In addition, the Commission set up an ad hoc task force on 
deliberate release of chemicals and biological agents that consisted of seconded experts from 
Member States under the guidance of a Health Security Committee with the major goal to 
implement the health security programme (European Commission, 2003b: 10, Tegnell et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, the Commission installed a crisis room and communication centre facility as well as the 
rapid alert system for biological and chemical attacks RAS-BICHAT. The latter was set up on the basis 
of the existing communicable diseases network to fulfil, although with a different focus and primarily 
targeted to inform the members of the HSC, a purpose similar to the Early Warning and Response 
System EWRS (Schreck et al., 2009: 154). Finally, an update of the list of diseases to be covered by 
the Communicable Disease Network (CDN) included inter alia anthrax and smallpox, two diseases 
that had figured prominently in the debate about potential bio-threats (European Commission, 
2003d). 
In the following, further re-structuration also occurred within the Commission, most notably when 
the ‘Task Force on Bioterrorism’ was linked with the former ‘Unit on Communicable, Rare and 
Emerging Diseases’ by establishing a ‘Health Threats Unit’ within DG SANCO in 2003 (Athanassoudis 
et al., 2006). The new unit took over the risk management functions of the Commission in the 
respective fields, in particular by coordinating the activities of the national health authorities in 
response to a given health threat. In 2005, the Commission furthermore installed a general rapid 
alert system called ARGUS as an information platform internal to the Commission with the aim to link 
all specialised systems for emergencies with a ‘Central Crisis Centre’ (CCC) in the case of an emerging 
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On the EU’s health security framework after 2008 see chapter 3.5.3. 
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multi-sectoral crisis (European Commission, 2005a). Finally, a further advancement of these 
structures was the creation of the ‘Health Emergency Operations Facility’ (HEOF) which was created 
as a part of DG SANCO’s overall coordination infrastructure for emergency management and the 
central hub to partners, from other DGs to national health ministries and the HSC, from the EWRS 
and other alert systems, from the WHO to relevant EU agencies (European Commission, 2007e: 4f). 
ARGUS, CCC and HEOF belong to the area of generic preparedness planning for public health 
emergencies in which infectious diseases can play a central role. In fact, the Commission considered 
public health emergencies to be “dominated primarily by events related to pathogens transmitted 
from person to person or through unsafe food or products” (European Commission, 2005b: 4). In the 
field of generic preparedness the EU developed a comprehensive framework for preparedness 
cooperation in the EU that focused on the review of national preparedness plans and their 
interoperability (European Commission, 2005b), including technical guidance files (European 
Commission, 2005c), and eventually led to an EU ‘Strategy on Generic Preparedness’ (European 
Commission, 2011c). 
Besides generic preparedness planning in preparation for different types of health threats, special 
emphasis was put on pandemic influenza preparedness and response planning, for which key actions 
were established in the fields of “management and coordination, surveillance, prevention, mitigation 
and response, communication, civil protection and research”, including health legislation to control 
influenza in animals (European Commission, 2004h: 3, revised in 2005 European Commission, 
2005d). By doing so EU Member States could considerably strengthen their preparedness against 
pandemic influenza by developing respective plans (Mounier-Jack and Coker, 2006a, Mounier-Jack 
and Coker, 2006b). 
 
3.4.3. The Creation of Specialised EU Agencies – EFSA and ECDC 
It becomes clear that the health security programme and the preparedness planning were pursued 
with high priority since 2002 at the EU level, complemented by efforts at the international level 
(Coleman, 2004: 8, European Council, 2004a).68 These infrastructural adaptations and shifts in policy 
priorities occurred in parallel to the build-up of new agencies in the EU’s setup to control infectious 
diseases: the creation of a European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on the one hand, and the creation 
of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) on the other.69  
                                                          
68
 At the international level the revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR) and the Global Health 
Security Initiative (GHSI) were of major importance. The IHR is an international treaty for the coordination of all 
health emergencies. It was revised in 2005 (see also foot note 8 and chapter 6.3.3). GHSI was formed in 
reaction to the incidences of September 11, 2001. Originally envisaged as “an informal group of like-minded 
countries to address health issues of the day”, the GHSI Ministerial Form today comprises members from G7+ 
countries and the European Commission to regularly discuss concerted action to combat the threats of 
international biological, chemical and radio-nuclear terrorism as well as pandemic influenza (GHSI, 2015). 
69 
As mentioned before, in addition an Executive Agency for the Public Health Programme (PHEA) was 
established to manage the programme (see chapter 3.4.1). As an executive agency, however, PHEA was rather 
a by-product of the establishment of the Public Health Programme and therefore did not alter the EU’s 
infectious disease control setup on its own right. 
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Strictly speaking, EFSA and ECDC were not the first EU agencies to become active in the field of 
infectious disease control. The ‘agencification’ process had begun earlier with the creation of the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) in 1990 (Council, 1990b), the establishment of the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) (Council, 1993c) and the setup of the 
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) in 1993 (Council, 1993a), later 
renamed European Medicines Agency (EMA). Whereas the relevance of the EEA for infectious 
disease control is due to its competence to deal with climate change as well as air- or water-borne 
pollutants, the relevance of EMCDDA is grounded in its expertise regarding drug-related infectious 
diseases. EMEA/EMA, in turn, has a central role in the centralised procedure for market authorisation 
of pharmaceuticals (Hervey, 2012: 984). Hence, all agencies were not established to specifically 
engage with infectious disease control, but given their overarching functions their work nevertheless 
contributes to the EU response to infectious disease. In this vein, the EMEA was, for instance, 
involved in the actions of the 2001 Health Security Programme, in particular in the evaluation of 
existing stocks and production capacities, as well as instruments allowing the development of 
medicines for the biological and chemical agents (European Commission, 2001e: 3f). 
In contrast to the overarching mandates of EEA, EMCDDA and EMEA/EMA, the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA) was specifically designed to work in the realm of food safety and foodstuff 
regulation. The regulation of foodstuff and agriculture policy in general is an important dimension in 
infectious disease control since animal products can serve as a vector for food-borne pathogens that 
cause disease (Paarlberg, 2010: 155). The creation of the new agency in 2002 went along with new 
general principles and requirements of food law as well as new procedures in matters of food safety 
(European Parliament and Council, 2002a). As regards the latter, in particular the revision of a rapid 
alert system for food and feed (RASFF) belonged to the major innovations. EFSA became operative in 
2003 and was dedicated to provide independent scientific advice and scientific and technical support 
– on request or on own initiative – that should “serve as the scientific basis for the drafting and 
adoption of Community measures” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Art. 22.6, Art. 23). 
Additionally, the agency communicates on risks and provides information on all matters within the 
fields that have a direct or indirect impact on food and feed safety (European Parliament and Council, 
2002a: Art. 22.2).  
The establishment of EFSA as one of the best embedded and most powerful of the EU agencies (Vos 
and Wendler, 2006) occurred in the context of a general revision of the foodstuff and veterinary 
sector in the course of a series of food scandals, in particular the ‘mad cow’ disease. In this context 
further substantial modifications occurred, such as the reinforcement of the European Commission’s 
Food and Veterinary Office (FVO), the abolishment of a complex foodstuff committee system in 
favour of EFSA, as well as the adoption of harmonised rules on the prevention, control and 
eradication of certain transmissible spongiform encephalopathies including (variant) Creutzfeldt–
Jakob Disease. As mentioned before, the above listed revisions of the food safety sector will be 
subject to detailed analysis in chapter 5. 
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The Regulation on the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control was adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council in April 2004 (European Parliament and Council, 2004a) and 
although it took up the work even earlier, the agency was officially established in 2005 (Wigzell, 
2005, Guglielmetti et al., 2006, Ammon and Faensen, 2009: 178). The founding Regulation defined 
ECDC’s mission to “identify, assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health 
from communicable diseases” (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: 1). In particular, the Centre 
was commissioned to act on its own initiative in the case of “outbreaks of illness of unknown origin, 
which may spread within or to the Community” (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: 1). In 
order to perform these tasks, the ECDC gathers scientific and technical data, provide scientific 
opinions and assistance to EU and international institutions, coordinate the European networking of 
bodies and exchange information, expertise and best practices to facilitate the development and 
implementation of joint actions (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: Art. 3 (2a-e)). 
In contrast to the previous system, in which various initiatives of national authorities or research 
centres had been supported by the Commission, the ECDC provided a new centralised hub for these 
activities. The creation of the ECDC thus meant a clear step of centralisation at the EU level (Liverani 
et al., 2012) due to the integration of existing network structures for the surveillance of specific 
diseases into the new agency and due to the perpetuation of their funding (Reintjes, 2008: 148, 
Ammon and Faensen, 2009: 178). The Centre, however, did neither receive a legislative nor a direct 
regulative mandate. It was primarily designed as a capacity of risk assessment, whose advice has no 
legally binding power so that the responsibility for the adoption and implementation of protective 
measures stayed with the Member States, coordinated by the ‘Health Threats Unit’ of DG SANCO 
(Liverani et al., 2012: 576). As explained before, as one of the most important systemic changes in 
the structures to control infectious disease at the EU level, creation and mission of the ECDC will be 
discussed in more detail in the second case study (chapter 6). 
 
3.5. The Years from 2008 to 2014 
3.5.1. The Second Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health 
The transition from the second (2001-2007) to the third phase (2008-2013) of EU infectious disease 
control was initiated by the Commission’s White Paper ‘Together for Health’ (European Commission, 
2007b) which developed a new strategic approach to the EU’s health policy for the EU on the basis of 
a consultation procedure. Together with the accompanying Staff Working Document (European 
Commission, 2007c) the White Paper set out three strategic fields of activity: demographic change, 
health threats and new technologies, of which in particular the second one was related to the field of 
infectious disease control. In this context “pandemics, major physical and biological incidents and 
bioterrorism” were identified as the major (potential) threats to health (European Commission, 
2007b: 3). Furthermore, a series of principle for actions were established, including the ideas to 
strengthen the EU's voice in global health and to integrate ‘Health in All Policies (HIAP)’. Together, 
these concepts reflected the interdependence of actors and the intersectoral nature of public health 
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policy, thereby placing communicable disease patterns in relation to external policies such as climate 
change, humanitarian aid and development policy. 
The key instrument to finance related activities was the ‘Second Programme of Community Action in 
the Field of Health (PHP2)’, with an indicative budget of EUR 365.6 million for the years from 2008 to 
2013 (European Parliament and Council, 2007: Art. 3).70 Although the objectives remained similar to 
the first public health programme, the PHP2 applied a less specific focus to follow broader aims, in 
particular to generate and disseminate health information and knowledge (health information), to 
improve citizens’ health security (health security) and to promote health, including the reduction of 
health inequalities (health promotion) (European Parliament and Council, 2007, Steffen, 2012: 1072).  
The largest share of funding for infectious disease-related activities came from the ‘health security’ 
strand of the programme with activities that penetrated a wide spectrum, ranging from “strategies 
and mechanisms for preventing [and] responding to health threats from communicable and non-
communicable diseases and health threats from physical, chemical or biological sources, including 
deliberate release acts [to] the development of prevention, vaccination and immunisation policies” 
(European Parliament and Council, 2007: Annex). The programme also served to implement a list of 
priorities of the Health Security Committee that had agreed to focus on preparedness and response 
to health threats from CBRN acts of terrorism, generic preparedness for health emergencies as well 
as influenza preparedness and response (European Commission, 2008b: Annex 1, 3.2.1.1, see also 
European Commission, 2008c). In this way, numerous projects on different aspects of infectious 
disease control were realised, for instance dealing with the lessons learnt from recent influenza 
pandemics or setting up a European Network for Highly Infectious Diseases (European Commission, 
2011b, 2012a). 
 
3.5.2. The Innovations of the Lisbon Treaty  
Only one month after the second public health programme was adopted, the heads of state or 
government of the European Union put their signatures under a fundamental revision of the EU’s 
primary law during their meeting in Lisbon in December 2007. The Lisbon Treaties entered into force 
in 2009 and implied substantial changes for the EU’s setup to control infectious diseases; not only in 
the public health realm but also in other related fields. In particular, the ‘Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union’ (TFEU) comprised a number of elements that fall into the category of ‘health 
security’, including a solidarity clause and the legal basis for EU disaster management and civil 
protection. 
                                                          
70
 Article 3 specified an amount of EUR 321.5 million. The total indicative budget, however, added up to EUR 
365.6 million, a part of which was dedicated to the year 2007. The programme was originally meant to cover 
the period between 2007 and 2013 but the starting year had to be postponed to 2008 due to delays in the 
legislative procedure (European Parliament and Council, 2007: Annexed Commission Declaration). For more 
information on the budget of the Public Health Programme see European Court of Auditors (2009). 
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The solidarity clause was an innovation that introduced the principle that “[t]he Union and its 
Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist 
attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster [and] mobilise all the instruments at its 
disposal” (Art. 222). Similarly, the Treaty article on civil protection provided that Union action shall 
aim to “support and complement Member States’ action at national, regional and local level in risk 
prevention, in preparing their civil-protection personnel and in responding to natural or man- made 
disasters within the Union” (Art. 196). Furthermore, Member State “in difficulties or […] seriously 
threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control” could also receive financial assistance (Art. 122), just as third countries could receive 
assistance in the form of operations “intended to provide ad hoc assistance and relief and protection 
for people […] who are victims of natural or man-made disasters” (Art. 214). 
Whereas these provisions implicitly included the mission to respond to infectious diseases due to the 
overarching objective to respond to “natural or man-made disasters”, the new and re-numbered 
public health article, Article 168 of the TFEU, comprised also direct modifications. More precisely, by 
introducing a paragraph on “early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health” 
the Treaty provided a new legal mandate for action in particular in infectious disease affairs; 
excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States. Whereas in the Nice 
Treaty “combat[ting] the major cross-border health scourges” had not been subject to more than 
vague and soft ‘incentive measures’, the revised formulations clearly reinforced the Union’s mandate 
for infectious disease control as one of the serious cross-border threats by defining the latter as 
primary subjects of Union actions in the field of public health to complement national policies. 
The Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) that resulted in the adoption of the Lisbon Treaties finished 
its work in 2007. It is, however, important to note that the revision of the Treaty had started already 
in 2001 following the ‘Laeken Declaration’ (European Council, 2001d). The Convention on the Future 
of Europe concluded its work in 2003 (European Convention, 2003b), on the basis of which the 
‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ was drafted and finally signed in October 2004. 
Although the ratification process was stopped so that the Constitutional Treaty did not enter into 
force, it nevertheless comprised central innovations which later became part of the Lisbon Treaties. 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaties on December 1, 2009, the new legal basis served as 
the new main point of reference for the following developments in infectious disease control. A 
complete overview of the change of the article on public health between the Maastricht Treaty and 
the TFEU is provided in Annex 1; the revision of the public health article in the Constitutional Treaty 
also dealt with in more detail in the second case study (chapter 6).  
 
3.5.3. The Broadened ‘Health Security’, ‘Global Health’ and ‘Civil Protection’ Agenda 
In line with the updated public health article of the Lisbon Treaty as well as the renewed health 
strategy and the public health programme, ‘health security’ remained a central point of orientation 
for the EU’s infectious disease policies also in the years after 2008. Member States agreed that in 
addition to the established structures and initiatives improved coordination was necessary to public 
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health alerts and cross-border threats “by taking better account of communication issues, 
operational aspects, interoperability and the intersectoral dimension” (Council, 2008: 2). On this 
basis a series of initiatives was launched which shared the importance assigned to the multi-sectoral 
coherence between different policies, both internally and externally. Such a broadened focus on 
health security and infectious disease control had already been part of the ‘Together for Health’ 
strategy, which did not only stress the general intersectoriality of health but also that “in our 
globalised world it is hard to separate national or EU-wide actions from global policy” (European 
Commission, 2007b: 6). 
The new approach was further developed in the Commission’s strategy paper ‘Health Security in the 
European Union and Internationally’ (European Commission, 2009e) which took up the Council’s 
considerations on health security (Council, 2008) and influenza (Council, 2009) as well as recent 
developments at the international level.71 In this way the Commission prepared a strategic 
framework for health security by combining (global) efforts in health-related fields ranging from 
bioterrorism (Council, 2007b) to disaster management (European Commission, 2008a). An important 
feature of the strategy was to go beyond the narrow connection between infectious diseases and 
classic security concerns, such as CBRN agents, by adding a stronger emphasis to related fields such 
as disaster management or the ‘one health’ approach.72 
Increased resilience to crises and disasters was also part of the ‘Internal Security Strategy’ (ISS) which 
was adopted in 2010 (Council, 2010b, European Commission, 2010b). By identifying “hostile or 
accidental releases of disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and failures in 
infrastructure” as cross-sectoral threats that required long-standing crisis and disaster management, 
the prevention, preparedness, assessment and management of infectious diseases outbreaks 
became part of the EU’s ‘all hazard approach’ which covered in principle all natural and man-made 
disasters (European Commission, 2010b: 13f). On this basis the EU’s setup for infectious diseases 
control underwent fundamental changes that went along with a stronger embeddedness into new 
contexts such as development policy, health diplomacy or disaster management. In particular, the EU 
aimed to implement its new priorities  
(1) by revising the legislative basis on serious cross-border threats to health, including the launch of 
a joint procurement procedure to procure medical countermeasures, 
(2) by modifying the coordination structures for civil protection both within as well as outside the 
EU, as well as by 
(3) by developing a distinct agenda for the EU’s role in global health. 
                                                          
71 
Input from the international level came in form of the revision of the International Health Regulations (IHR), 
(see foot note 68) and the WHO’s Annual Report 2007 in which the concept of global health security was 
advocated (WHO, 2007). 
72 
‘One Health’ is an interdisciplinary „collaborative and all-encompassing way to address, when relevant, 
animal and public health globally”. World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE): http://www.oie.int/for-the-
media/onehealth/. See also http://www.oneworldonehealth.org/ (accessed 17.04.2015). 
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3.5.3.1. The Framework for Serious Cross-Border Threats and Joint Procurement 
On the basis of the reinforced legal basis of the TFEU, the White Paper on Health, the Internal 
Security Strategy, a consultation procedure and a set of impact assessments the Commission 
proposed to streamline and strengthen the EU capacities for responding to serious cross-border 
health threats (European Commission, 2011d, 2011a). The new framework was adopted under 
Decision 1082/2013/EU and repealed the long-standing legal basis of Decision 2119/98/EC for the 
epidemiological surveillance and control of communicable diseases, which had turned outdated in 
some respects, for instance with regard to the ECDC.  
The new legal basis extended preparedness and response planning, risk monitoring and assessment, 
risk management and risk and crisis communication to basically all threats other than those 
associated with radio nuclear events. In fact, the new framework was extended to cover also new 
threats such as biological agents responsible for non-communicable diseases and threats of chemical, 
environmental, or unknown origin. In other words, whereas the setup of 1998 was focused on 
communicable diseases, the new framework included all serious cross- border threats to health 
regardless of their origin. In this way also the existing surveillance structures for communicable 
diseases, such as the ECDC operated EWRS, were expanded to cover serious cross-border threats to 
health on a generalised basis (European Parliament and Council, 2013a).  
Beyond the general expansion of the scope of activities the revised framework on cross-border 
threats also included a formalisation of the Health Security Committee (HSC), a revised preparedness 
and response planning as well as a legal footing for the development and implementation of the joint 
procurement of medical countermeasures. As regards the HSC, Decision 1082/2013/EU provided the 
existing forum for representatives of Member States’ health authorities and the Commission with a 
legal basis. Since its creation in 2001, the HSC had been an informal advisory and coordination group 
that operated under a transitionally prolonged mandate (Council, 2007a). Despite its originally 
limited agenda in the area of bioterrorism it had expanded the activities over the years to other 
fields and thus developed into one of the decisive institutions for the overall coordination of public 
health risk assessment and the management of serious cross-border threats to health (European 
Commission, 2009e). However, participation in the HSC was voluntary and the body lacked cross-
sectoral interlinkage in its decision-making processes (European Commission, 2011d: 6).  
The new framework placed the HSC in a central position to be able to communicate and advise 
quickly and coherently in a public health emergency on the coordination of national responses as 
well as on communication messages to the public and healthcare professionals. The task of the HSC 
was also defined to coordinate in liaison with the Commission the national preparedness and 
response planning. Despite the important and formalised role of the HSC, the new regulation did not 
place the HSC in the legislative centre for risk management in the EU. Instead, implementing acts in 
the case of an emergency situation remained the business of the Commission, whose respective 
decisions were made contingent upon the approval of a regulatory committee, the ‘committee on 
serious cross-border threats’. The latter thus took over the functions which had been performed so 
far by the CDNC under Decision 2119/98/EC (European Parliament and Council, 2013a: Art. 18). 
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As for preparedness and response planning, the new framework foresaw the coordination of 
“national planning and between key sectors such as transport, energy and civil protection” 
(European Parliament and Council, 2013a: 2). Crucially, Regulation 1082/20137EU provided the legal 
basis for a joint procurement mechanism73 for medical countermeasures74, such as vaccines and 
antiviral medication, designed to enable Member State to jointly acquire products or develop 
approaches to contract negotiations with the pharmaceutical industry. An initiative of the 
Commission for the creation of a European stockpile of antivirals to be distributed at the regional 
level in the event of pandemic influenza had failed in 2006 (European Commission, 2006a). In 2010, 
however, the Council mandated the Commission to start the preparation of the joint procurement of 
vaccines as one of the lessons learned from the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic (Council, 2010c, 2010d) 
which was then taken up in the new Regulation on cross-border threats. This form of harmonisation 
of pandemic disease policy, on a voluntary basis, has recently progressed rapidly, illustrated by the 
fact that by 2015 at least 20 countries had already signed the Joint Procurement Agreement 
(European Commission, 2014b).75 
 
3.5.3.2. Health Emergencies and Disaster Management 
In 2010, departing from the Internal Security Strategy’s definition of “hostile or accidental releases of 
disease agents and pathogens, sudden flu outbreaks and failures in infrastructure” as cross-sectoral 
threats that required long-standing crisis and disaster management, the prevention, preparedness, 
assessment and management of infectious diseases outbreaks became part of the EU’s ‘all hazard 
approach’ which covered in principle all natural and man-made disasters (European Commission, 
2010b: 13f). In this context the ISS served also as the starting point for a general revision of the EU’s 
emergency response system which developed in 2013 and 2014. More precisely, a new ‘Union Civil 
Protection Mechanism’ with a new ‘Emergency Response Coordination Centre’ (ERCC) as its 
operational heart was established within the Commission's Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection department (ECHO).  
Its aims were defined to improve the joint planning and response coordination across the EU, to 
circulate information and complement the response capabilities of countries affected by any disaster 
that “causes or is capable of causing trans-boundary effects or is capable of affecting other Member 
States” (European Parliament and Council, 2013b, European Commission, 2014c). The envisaged 
                                                          
73 
“'Joint procurement' means combined purchasing of goods by two or more contracting authorities, so that 
only one tender is published on behalf of them all” (European Commission, 2013). 
74
 The term ‘medical countermeasures’ refers to “all potential medicines, medical devices, other services and 
goods that could be used to mitigate/treat a life threatening or otherwise serious hazard to health of biological, 
chemical, environmental or unknown origin which spreads, or entails a significant risk of spreading across the 
national borders of Member States, and which may necessitate coordination at Union level in order to ensure a 
high level of human health protection” (European Commission, 2014a: 4). 
75 
The Joint Procurement Agreement precedes the Joint Procurement Procedure which is a still ongoing process 
at the time of writing. For further information see 
http://ec.europa.eu/health/preparedness_response/joint_procurement/index_en.htm (accessed 22.03.2015). 
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protection also included “acute health emergencies, occurring inside or outside the Union”, and thus, 
extended to infectious disease control in the EU. The creation of the new mechanism went along 
with the setup of a Common Emergency Communication and Information System (CECIS), a voluntary 
pool of pre-committed response capacities of the Member States labelled European Emergency 
Response Capacity (EERC) (European Parliament and Council, 2013b: Art. 11) and a financial envelope 
for the period 2014-2020 of EUR 370 million (European Parliament and Council, 2013b: Art. 19). 
 
3.5.3.3. The EU’s Role in Global Health 
Finally, for the years after 2010 a widening of the EU’s perspective to the control of infectious 
disease control can be observed, most visible in the Commission’s approach to the ‘EU’s Role in 
Global Health’ in 2010 (European Commission, 2010a). Community support, activities and joint 
programmes for and with developing countries had extended to infectious disease since many years, 
in particular in the framework of the WHO’s International Health Regulations and the United Nation’s 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG)76 to respond to HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other 
major diseases (Council, 1997b, European Parliament and Council, 2002b, European Commission, 
2005e, European Council, 2007: Annex). Still, the Commission’s communication on global health was 
the first overarching attempt to define the EU’s envisaged multi-sectoral contribution to the 
“worldwide improvement of health, reduction of disparities, and protection against global health 
threats” (European Commission, 2010a: 2). It included the sustained support for the MDGs, but 
added further elements such as “fair financing mechanisms” and the allocation to health of 
development countries’ national budgets (European Commission, 2010a: 7). 
Despite the strengthened perspective on infectious disease control also in relation to development 
policy and humanitarian aid, the global health approach also put “communicable diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, SARS, Avian Influenza, Influenza A (H1N1), zoonoses [and] food poisoning” in the context 
of peace building strategies, the growth of trade and migration and capacity building to fulfil early 
warning obligations (European Commission, 2010d: 17f). Crucially, as a constituent element of the 
external health policies the contribution to the global fight against infectious diseases was also seen 
of “importance for alliances, for reputation and for trade issues” (European Commission, 2010d: 24). 
In this understanding the EU’s infectious disease policies became part of a form of ‘health 
diplomacy’, a concept that refers to the cooperation in health matters as a tool for achieving foreign 
policy goals. In line with this understanding, the Commission declared that the EU’s global health 
activities could not only turn the EU into “a more trusted, more efficient and more powerful global 
player in the field of health”, they could also help achieve overarching goals such as “increased 
visibility, competence, credibility and effectiveness” (European Commission, 2010d: 28). 
                                                          
76 
In 2000, the Member States of the United Nations Organisation agreed on eight so called Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) to foster progress in addressing poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental 
degradation and discrimination against women. MDG No. 6 deals with HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
with the aim to have halted the spread of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other major diseases and begun to reverse it 
by 2015 (UNO, 2000). 
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3.6. Conclusions 
Infectious diseases threaten human health since the beginning of mankind. Diseases have also been 
influential factors for the political order and the social life throughout history. Systematic measures 
to control diseases date back to the bubonic plague in the 14th century (Hoffman, 2010). 
Collaboration in the framework of the European Union was pioneered on the regional level by 
international conferences, treaties, and institutions such as the WHO Regional Office for Europe. For 
the European Community, a direct link to the idea of health protection can be traced back to the 
time of the European Economic Community. From the 1980s onwards the European Community 
progressively advanced into the field of infectious disease control. After the introduction of a clear 
reference to public health in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a complex coordination system for the 
surveillance of, preparedness for and response to infectious diseases developed at the EU level. As 
we have seen, this evolution occurred in basically three phases. 
In the initial phase infectious disease control at the EU level between 1993 and the year 2000 was 
characterised by the transition from cooperation outside the framework of the Community Treaties 
into official Community activities after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty. The striking 
features of this period were the establishment of networks, primarily in the field of disease 
surveillance and collaboration in research and information management. In addition, the first phase 
provided for a strengthening of the weak public health mandate following the adoption of the 
Amsterdam Treaty, with effects on the joint response to infectious diseases, not least in the field of 
food-borne pathogens. In this way, the period meant a formalisation of mutual obligations to 
exchange information and to collaborate in specific aspects of infectious disease matters (Schreck et 
al., 2009: 149). 
In the second period of infectious disease control at the EU level between 2001 and 2007 was 
characterised by the consolidation and institutionalisation of the early structures. The public health 
programme became a sustained part of the EU’s infectious disease policy, supported by an executive 
agency to run the programme. The period after 2001 was also the phase of the appearance and 
growing importance of the concept of ‘health security’. The notion appeared first in the context of 
the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, and proved to become a pivotal point of reference for the 
following years. The major innovations of the second period, however, were the creation of EFSA and 
ECDC along with the implied centralisation and structural changes at the EU level, in particular in the 
area of disease surveillance, risk assessment and scientific advice. Establishing these new key players 
in their respective fields of competence also meant a substantial step toward the permanent 
establishment of infectious disease policy at the EU level as a whole. 
Finally, the third phase from 2008 onwards was characterised by the integration of infectious disease 
control into a combined ‘health in all policies’ and ‘all-hazard’ approach which aimed at including 
more threats and at stronger combining not only the instruments of different EU policies but also the 
EU with the global health level. Fuelled by the innovations of the TFEU, infectious disease control was 
thus further consolidated by incorporating dedicated structures into an overarching steering and 
coordination system, best illustrated by the Civil Protection Mechanism. Making infectious disease 
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control one of various natural or man-made cross-border threats to health did not mean a decrease 
in importance. Quite the contrary, the expansion of activities to further issues also implied that 
infectious disease control could build on more resources from different fields, ranging from public 
health programmes to disaster management. In the light of its important functions performed in the 
EU’s response to the ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014/2015, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, 
supported by the Commission's Emergency Response and Coordination Centre (ERCC), is a case in 
point. 
Given that surveillance, preparedness and response in the field of infectious disease control were 
pioneering innovations that prepared the ground for the combat of further threats at the EU level, 
the existing setup is comparatively advanced. ‘Comparatively advanced’ means that today the EU 
possesses a “solid architecture for disease monitoring and risk assessment, which can help national 
decision makers cope with the uncertainties of public health threats of international concern” 
(Liverani and Coker, 2012: 927). The primary responsibility for the protection against infectious 
diseases and health crises, however, lies with the Member States which are still in charge to 
individually report surveillance data and to implement the actions needed to control a given 
outbreak. Despite the coordination efforts at the EU level, Member States do not always work 
together in a coherent way. Great variation still exists among the EU Member States in national 
surveillance systems, the quality and comparability of data, vaccination management as well as 
national preparedness plans (ECDC, 2008, Reintjes, 2008: 145, Health Protection Agency and 
CRISMART, 2010, Liverani et al., 2012: 577, Reintjes, 2012: 958). Also the TFEU did not shift measures 
concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health to the 
areas of shared competences. Furthermore, the current legal basis also explicitly excludes, just as the 
Maastricht Treaty did since 1993, the harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States in this field. Notably, the EU’s role in disease control differs for specific diseases. Whereas the 
control of infectious diseases generally falls under the weak EU’s public health mandate, exceptions 
exist for infectious disease control in the realms of veterinary and food safety policy, where the EU 
can make use of stronger financially backed regulatory measures linked to the Common Market. 
It thus becomes clear that the existing structures at the EU level still have substantial room for 
development, best illustrated by the ongoing establishment of a Joint Procurement Procedure. With 
a view to the lack of a comprehensive public health infrastructure in the EU, some have even gone so 
far to label infectious disease control in the EU to be still in “its infancy” (Elliott et al., 2012: 936). As 
the third and ongoing programme in public health, which runs from 2014 to 2020, currently 
contributes to the further evolution of the EU’s infectious disease setup (European Parliament and 
Council, 2014), it is far from certain that the next phase of the EU’s polity and policy setup to control 
infectious diseases will be characterised by stability. Also the review process scheduled for 2015 to 
draw lessons from the handling of the ebola crisis in 2014/2015 might provide momentum for 
further steps. Hence, the need to add new elements to the list of key developments in the evolution 
of the EU’s infectious disease control as provided in Table 3-1 (see next page) is almost as certain as 
death. 
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Table 3-1: List of Key Development in EU Infectious Disease Control (1993 - 2014) 
Date (OJ)
77
 Author
78
 
Reference
79
 Key Development 
Doc. Number
80
 
12.02.1993 CO 
(Council, 1993c) 
Establishment of a European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) R 302/93 
24.08.1993 CO 
(Council, 1993a) 
Establishment of a European Agency for the Evaluation of 
Medicinal Products (EMEA) - renamed European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) by Regulation 726/2004 (European Parliament and 
Council, 2004b) 
R 2309/93 
24.11.1993 COM (European Commission, 
1993) 
Framework for Action in the Field of Public Health 
COM(93) 559 final 
16.04.1996 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 1996b) 
Programme of Community Action on ‘Prevention of AIDS and 
Certain Other Communicable Diseases’ D 647/96/EC 
30.04.1997 COM 
(European Commission, 
1997j) 
Re-organisation of the Commission, foodstuff-related 
competencies moved to single directorate for consumer policy 
and health protection 
COM(97) 183 final 
02.10. 1997 IGC 
(Treaty of Amsterdam) 
Extension of public health mandate; introduction of human health 
and consumer protection as an independent policy objective; 
competencies in the veterinary field added to public health field 
Article 152 
03.10. 1998 EP+CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 1998) 
European Community Network for the Control and Surveillance of 
Communicable Diseases in Europe; incl. subsequent creation of 
Dedicated Surveillance Networks, list of diseases, case definitions 
etc.; establishment of ‘Eurosurveillance’ and ‘EPIET’ 
D 2119/98/EC 
26.01.2000 COM (European Commission, 
2000k) 
Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) for the Prevention 
and Control of Communicable Diseases Under D 2119/98/EC D 2000/57/EC 
16.05.2000 COM (European Commission, 
2000j) 
Health Strategy of the European Community 
COM(2000) 285 final 
31.05.2001 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2001) 
Harmonised EU Law on the Prevention, Control and Eradication of 
Certain Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) R 999/2001 
17.12.2001 COM (European Commission, 
2001e) 
 
Health Security Programme of Cooperation on Preparedness and 
Response to Biological and Chemical Agent Attacks, incl. 
establishment of the Health Security Committee and RAS-BICHAT 
G/FS D(2001) GG 
01.02.2002 EP+CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2002a) 
Establishment of European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), incl. new 
general principles and requirements of food law and procedures in 
matters of food safety, revision of Rapid alert system (RASFF) for 
the notification of a direct or indirect risk to human health 
deriving from food or feed 
R 178/2002 
09.10.2002 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2002c) 
First Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public Health 
(2003-2008) D 1786/2002/EC 
30.04.2004 EP+CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2004a) 
Establishment of European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) incl. the modification of the system of scientific 
advice and the perpetuated funding of previously ad hoc-financed 
networks 
R 851/2004 
16.12.2004 IGC 
(Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for 
Europe) 
Introduction of monitoring, early warning of and combating 
serious cross-border threats to health as field of EU action 
(supporting competence)  
// not ratified, but elements transferred to ‘Lisbon Treaty’ (TFEU) 
Article III-278 
16.12.2004 COM 
(European Commission, 
2004a) 
Establishment of Executive Agency for the public health 
programme (PHEA) – (re-named several times in the following; 
currently operating as Consumer, Health, Agriculture and Food 
Executive Agency (CHAFEA)) 
D 2004/858/EC 
(continued) 
  
                                                          
77
 Date of publication of the document in the European Union’s Official Journal. 
78
 Official author of the document using the following abbreviations: Commission (COM), Council of the 
European Union (CO), European Parliament (EP), European Council (EUCO), Intergovernmental Conference 
(IGC). 
79
 Document specification as used in the ‘List of References’ of the present study.  
80
 Official specification as provided in the document; ‘D’ means ‘Decision’, ‘R’ means ‘Regulation’. 
93 
 
(continued) 
2005 COM 
(European Commission, 
2005a, 2005b, 2005d, 
2011c) 
Generic Preparedness and Influenza Pandemic Preparedness 
Planning, incl. Strategy for Generic Preparedness Planning, re-
structuration within the Commission and establishment of health 
emergency capacities such as ARGUS and HEOF 
COM(2005) 605 final 
COM(2005) 607 final 
COM(2005) 662 final 
20.11.2007 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2007) 
Second Programme of Community Action in the Field of Public 
Health (2008-2013) D 1350/2007/EC 
2007 - 2010 COM 
(European Commission, 
2007b, 2007c, 2009e, 
2010b) 
Health Strategy and Health Security Agenda in the EU and 
internationally, incl. elements from Internal Security Strategy (ISS) 
COM(2007) 630 final 
SEC(2007) 1376 
SEC(2009) 1622 final 
COM(2010) 673 final 
30.03.2010 IGC (Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union, 
2010b) 
Introduction of monitoring, early warning of and combating 
serious cross-border threats to health as field of EU action 
(supporting competence) 
Article 168 
2010 COM+CO 
(Council, 2010a, 
European Commission, 
2010a, 2010d) 
Definition of the EU’s Role in Global Health, emphasis on 
intersectoral linkage and external policies, elements of ‘health 
diplomacy’ 
COM(2010) 128 final 
SEC(2010) 380 final 
Concl. 9505/10 
05.11.2013 
EP+CO+ 
COM 
(European Commission, 
2011a, European 
Parliament and Council, 
2013a) 
Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health, incl. extension of EWRS, 
formalisation Health Security Committee 
(Repealing D No 2119/98/EC) 
SEC(2011) 1519 final 
D 1082/2013/EU 
2013 - 2014 
EP+CO+ 
COM 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2013b, 
European Commission, 
2014c) 
Development of Civil Protection Mechanism and creation of 
disaster management facilities covering health emergencies, e.g. 
Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) 
D 1313/2013/EU 
D 2014/762/EU 
21.03.2014 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2014) 
Third Programme for the Union's Action in the Field of Health 
(2014-2020) R 282/2014 
2014 COM (European Commission, 
2014b, 2014a) 
Joint Procurement Agreement / Procedure 
in progress 
Source: Own presentation.  
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4. Selection, Features and Structure of the Case Studies 
The previous sections have drawn a picture of the dynamic evolution of the EU’s infectious disease 
control from the beginnings of public health policy in the EU until the most recent developments, 
with a focus on the last twenty years. It has not investigated into the reasons behind a given 
development, but could nevertheless confirm, on a general level, the relevance of the security 
perspective on infectious diseases and systemic change. Major outbreaks of lethal disease like 
cholera or influenza took the form of ‘existential’ security issues in Europe (Elbe, 2012: 81). 
Historically developed and still applied measures to control diseases, such as quarantine and ban,81 
go along with the curtailment of individual liberties and civil rights and, thus, easily meet the criteria 
of securitising ‘extraordinary measures’. The link between security and infectious diseases is also 
visible in more recent developments, best illustrated by the prominent position of the notion of 
‘health security’ in the infectious disease control infrastructure and activities at the EU level. 
At the same time, the previous chapter has shown that infectious disease control developed also in 
economic contexts. The tension between the desire for trade and travel without barriers on the one 
hand, and the striving for protection from diseases on the other, is a theme that runs through all 
historical phases. Responses to infectious diseases, such as quarantine, can mean a severe obstacle 
to rapid movement of goods and people. In turn, the development of international health law and 
institutions also developed to prevent negative effects of disease outbreaks on international trade 
(Murphy, 1994). In this sense, the aim to “ensure the maximum security against the international 
spread of disease with the minimum interference with world traffic” (WHO, 1951: 5) is a principle 
that is stressed particularly in times of globalisation.  
Against this background and given the EU’s historically strong focus on the resolution of borders in 
favour of a Common Market, the EU is a particularly interesting case for the analysis of the 
securitisation of infectious diseases in view of related internationally concerted responses. It has, 
however, become clear that the development at the EU level, even with a focus on the period after 
1993, is too rich and complex that it could be reasonably studied in detail in the framework of a 
single study, in particular not in combination with an in-depth analysis of the securitisation of 
infectious diseases.  
The present study therefore proceeds with two case studies that deal with a set of selected key 
developments as identified in the previous chapter and assesses their adoption in more detail in the 
framework of a securitisation study of specific diseases. Following the basic understanding that 
securitisation often occurs in the context of a disease outbreak (Steffen, 2012: 1065f) and that 
institutionalisation in the EU has been crises-driven (Sauer, 2013), these case studies concentrate on: 
  
                                                          
81
 The key difference between ban and quarantine is the time period for which ill or potentially ill people were 
separated from the community. Whereas quarantine foresees as limited time period, ban refers to the 
permanent exclusion (Elbe, 2012: 83ff). 
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(1) The revision of the EU infrastructure for food-borne infectious diseases (1997), the legal basis in 
the field of public health as amended by the Amsterdam Treaty (1997), the adoption of harmonised 
EU law on ‘transmissible spongiform encephalopathies’ (TSEs) (2001) as well as the establishment of 
the ‘European Food Safety Authority (EFSA)’ (2002) in the context of the securitisation of bovine and 
transmissible spongiform encophalopathies (BSE/TSEs); and  
(2) The update of the setup for the control of cross-border threats and communicable diseases by the 
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004)82 and the creation of the ‘European Centre for 
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)’ (2004) in the context of the securitisation of the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS). 
Since the overview of milestones in EU infectious disease control (Table 3-1) has made clear that 
quite a number of developments might principally meet the criterions of institutionalisation in the 
sense of relatively persistent and systemic changes regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, 
resource allocation, division of competences and organisational structures (see chapter 2.3.4.1), 
other than the selected developments could constitute equally interesting research objects. Also, 
BSE/TSEs on the one hand, and SARS on the other were by far not the only diseases whose 
(potential) securitisation could have impacted these developments. Clearly, in the years between 
1993 and 2014 a large number of infectious diseases appeared in the political agenda at the EU level 
with the potential to turn into securitised matters. To illustrate, alone for the year 1993, when the EU 
was still in an early phase of its involvement in infectious disease control, the EUR-Lex database 
comprises EU output that mentions diseases as diverse as anthrax, BSE, chikungunya, cholera, 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob, diphtheria, ebola, hepatitis, herpes, influenza, Lassa, legionella, malaria, 
meningitis, polio, rabies, salmonella, tuberculosis and Wesselsbron disease – to mention just a few. 
Against this background, for what reasons have the two case studies with regard to both 
institutionalisation developments and infectious diseases been selected?  
As to the first question regarding the structural changes at the EU level, the following arguments 
speak in favour of the proposed selection: First, both ‘case groups’ share the combination of a 
revision of the EU’s primary law (Amsterdam Treaty and Constitutional Treaty feeding into the Lisbon 
Treaty) with the creation of a specialised EU agency (EFSA and ECDC). The resulting modifications 
were not only of durable nature, they are also of greatest importance both in the historical evolution 
and for the current functioning of the EU’s setup to control infectious diseases. More precisely, after 
the introduction of the public health article in the Maastricht Treaty, the respective article was 
changed only twice, namely in 1997/1999 (Amsterdam Treaty) and in 2007/2009 (Lisbon Treaties) 
with the latter taking up first and foremost the innovations that had been agreed on already in the 
Constitutional Treaty (2004). Hence, the case studies cover the major revisions of the EU’s 
fundamental legal basis regarding infectious disease control.  
                                                          
82
 As shown in the previous chapter, after being signed by the head of state or governments of all EU Member 
States in October 2004, the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (‘Constitutional Treaty’) was not 
ratified. Still, its content provided a strong point of reference for the Lisbon Treaties as adopted in 2007 (at that 
time referred to as the ‘Reform Treaty’). Hence, important elements that were meant to be introduced by the 
Constitutional Treaty became eventually primary law following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaties. 
96 
 
Similarly, the Commission, EFSA and the ECDC belong to the essential infrastructural bodies on 
whose activities the EU’s infectious disease policy is nowadays centred so that an investigation into 
their setup or re-organisation is particularly interesting. In terms of EU agencies, EFSA’s and ECDC’s 
importance for the EU’s preparedness and response to infectious diseases is paralleled only by the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA).83 In other words, investigating the revision of the EU Treaties 
and the setup of the EFSA and the ECDC, complemented by the examination of the re-organisation of 
the EU infrastructure for food-borne infectious diseases in 1997, is particular valuable in the light of 
their political relevance, since these developments can be regarded as belonging to the most 
important milestones in the entire evolution of the EU’s setup for infectious disease control. 
Second, we have seen that infectious disease control in the EU is heavily under-researched. The 
research gap is particularly huge in the case of the ECDC. Scholars working in the field have noted 
that “[m]ultiple literature reviews of sources […] produced almost nothing about the prehistory, 
origins, or current activities of this agency” and that “[t]here has been almost no policy or political 
science work on it” (Greer, 2012a: 1017); despite a set of contributions in the last years, the situation 
has not changed a lot so that the assessment is supported still today by the recent literature review 
undertaken for the present study. In the light of these findings, the selection of the specified 
institutionalisation steps for detailed analysis is also justified on the grounds of academic relevance. 
When it comes to identifying the diseases for which the securitisation analysis is carried out, a 
selection from a wide range of potentially securitised diseases was principally possible. As argued in 
chapter 2.5, forms of securitisation are difficult to predict in advance; we don’t know whether, by 
whom and in which way a given disease was securitised (or not) until we have pursued the analysis. 
Provided that “security issues are socially constructed, but the securiti[s]ation process is not divorced 
from empirical considerations” (McInnes and Rushton, 2013: 120), the social construction of a 
security threat may relate to the characteristics of a disease, for instance an outbreak event, and 
these characteristics might facilitate the securitisation of the disease; in principle, however, it is also 
possible that speech acts and emergency measures turn a relatively harmless disease into the subject 
of dynamic securitisation processes. In turn, it is also possible that a highly lethal disease is kept, 
intentionally or not, outside the security realm. Hence, although the fact that a disease actually 
appears in EU documents is a pre-condition for securitisation at the EU level, a high number of 
references does not necessarily imply that the disease is referred to in a security context. 
Against this background, from a rich set of politically and medially visible diseases that occurred 
between 1993 and 2014, the selection of BSE/TSEs and SARS must be by definition to a certain extent 
speculative. Still, at least three reasons make BSE/TSEs and SARS particular promising cases for a 
comparative in-depth analysis. First, most basically, both diseases figured prominently in the political 
debate at the EU level during the years in which the respective decisions for the abovementioned 
structural changes were taken. In other words, they can not only be assumed to be sufficiently 
addressed at the EU level to enable securitisation in the first place, they also bear a clear temporal 
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 The European Medicines Agency is decisive in the process of marketing authorisation of medicines in general, 
and thus also for the treatment and vaccination against infectious diseases (see also chapter 3.4.3). 
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relation to the reforms at the EU level. The latter is important, as the connection of securitisation and 
institutionalisation implies that the prioritisation, which derives from strong securitisation, requires a 
rather prompt reform – within the EU’s bounds of possibility. 
Second, existing literature claims a connection between the course of the respective disease crisis 
and structural innovations at the EU level, in particular with a view to the creation of the two 
selected agencies and the revision of the EU’s food regime (Chalmers, 2003: 532, Groenleer, 2009: 
178, Greer, 2012a: 1010). These statements were also supported in the expert interviews carried out 
for this study. Beyond the statement on a given relation, however, existing studies have not 
elaborated on the proposed linkage or explained why these disease crises constituted cases of a 
‘good epidemic’ that had the potential to break the political and institutional stability. Although both 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy with resultant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and SARS were also 
identified as public health threats that had an impact on European integration (Coker et al., 2004, 
Liverani et al., 2012: 575f), the connection was not thoroughly examined from a securitisation 
perspective; not to mention the novel elements of the securitisation approach put forward in this 
study. To make things worse, literature that deals with the EU’s response to the SARS outbreak is 
scarce in general.  
Third, in contrast to the analysed structural changes, which share a number of common features, the 
two selected diseases have fundamentally different characteristics. Both diseases are under 
surveillance in the EU (European Commission, 2000a, 2009c) but whereas BSE/TSEs belong to the 
group of food-borne infectious diseases, SARS is a disease that is transmissible directly from human-
to-human. Another major difference is that the BSE/TSEs crisis took place primarily in Member States 
of the European Community, whereas SARS occurred globally but spread predominantly outside the 
EU, in particular in Asia. Also, whereas BSE/TSEs remained a political issue over a long period of time, 
at least 12 years from 1989 to 2001, SARS occurred as a short-term outbreak that was declared 
contained after a couple of months already. Numerous further characteristics, including the 
fundamentally different incubation periods84, could be listed to distinguish the two diseases. These 
differences are interesting in view of the social construction of threats, and ultimately also on the 
linkage between securitisation and institutionalisation processes. Clearly, if the diseases are 
fundamentally different but are still capable of triggering similar systemic changes, the reason for 
this change is unlikely to be found in the disease itself. In this way the case study selection 
deliberately operates with the foundations of the securitisation approach. 
The following Table 4-1 illustrates the combination of institutionalisation and securitisation elements 
in the two case studies. For illustrative purposes it is shown that besides BSE/TSEs and SARS other 
infectious diseases played an important role on the political agenda between 1993 and 2014 so that 
further case studies would be possible. On the basis of the findings of chapter 3 other promising case 
studies could be, for instance, an analysis of the securitisation of anthrax in view of EU’s health 
security programme and the creation of the HSC in 2001, or a securitisation analysis of influenza in 
                                                          
84
 The incubation period describes “the time from infection to onset of clinical symptoms of disease” (Anderson 
et al., 2004: 1093). 
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relation to the EU’s generic and influenza pandemic preparedness initiatives (2005) and the joint 
procurement initiative (since 2014). Further examples could be added. Still, given the specific value 
of the selected focus for the understanding of the institutionalisation of infectious disease control in 
the EU, the securitisation of infectious diseases in the EU and the possible connection of the two 
phenomena, the selected cases constitute a particularly promising research setting. 
 
Table 4-1: Topical Infectious Diseases and Key Developments in EU Infectious Disease Control (1993-2014, schematic)
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 .  Treaty of Maastricht Article 128: Introduction of Public Health Article 
Regulation 2309/93 European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products 
COM(93) 559 final Framework for Action in the Field of Public Health 
Decision 647/96/EC Programme ‘Prevention of AIDS and Other Comm. Diseases’ 
 
COM(97) 183 final Re-Organisation of COM, Veterinary & Foodstuff, DG SANCO  
Treaty of Amsterdam Article 152: Extension of Public Health Mandate 
Decision 2119/98/EC Communicable Disease Network (CDN). Network of Networks 
2001 
Decision 2000/57/EC Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) for Comm. Dis. 
COM(2000) 285 final Health Strategy of the European Community 
Regulation 999/2001 Harmonised Law on Transm. Spongiform Encephalopathies  
G/FS D(2001) GG Health Security Programme, HSC and RAS-BICHAT 
 Regulation 178/2002 European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), Food Law, rev.RASFF 
Decision 1786/2002/EC First Public Health Programme (2003-2008) 
 Regulation 851/2004 European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
Constitutional Treaty Article III-278:  Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health 
Decision 2004/858/EC Executive Agency for the public health programme (PHEA) 
 COM(2005)605&07/662 Generic & Influenza Pandemic Preparedness, ARGUS & HEOF 
 Decision 1350/2007/EC Second Public Health Programme (2008-2013) 
Treaty of Lisbon Article 168 TFEU: Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health 
COM(2007) 630 final 
SEC(2007) 1376 
SEC(2009) 1622 final 
SEC(2010) 380 final 
COM(2010) 673 final 
COM(2010) 128 final 
Concl. 9505/10 
Health Strategy ‘Together for Health’   
Health Security Agenda in the EU and Internationally 
Internal Security Strategy (ISS) 
Role of the EU in Global Health 
2008 
 
 
SEC(2011) 1519 final 
Decision 1082/2013/EU 
Serious Cross-Border Threats to Health, Formalisation of HSC 
 Decision 1313/2013/EU 
Decision 2014/762/EU 
Civil Protection Mechanism, Disaster Management, ERCC 
2014 Regulation 282/2014 Third Public Health Programme (2014-2020) 
in progress Joint Procurement Agreement / Procedure 
Source: Own presentation.  
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 Blue marks structural changes that occurred in the course of the BSE/TSEs crisis (chapter 5), red marks 
structural changes that occurred in the course of the SARS crisis (chapter 6). 
86
 The list of diseases is not exhaustive. The focus was put on diseases that figured prominently in the political 
and/or public debate in the EU. 
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5. The Adoption of Food Safety Reforms and the Creation of the European 
Food Safety Authority in the Course of the BSE/TSEs Crisis 
We have seen in chapter 3 that major revisions of the EU structures for the prevention and control of 
food-borne infectious diseases and for food safety in general occurred in the years between 1997 
and 2002. In 1997, a first set of changes occurred, when the EU’s infrastructure in the foodstuff 
sector underwent a persistent re-organisation. In the same year, the Treaty of Amsterdam was 
concluded (entered into force in 1999) which introduced health and consumer protection as 
independent policy objectives and shifted food-related veterinary competences away from the 
agricultural sector to the realm of public health. In addition to these structural changes of the late 
1990s, a second wave of innovations took place in 2001/2002, when Regulation 999/2001 provided 
for harmonised EU law on the prevention, control and eradication of certain transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies and when Regulation 178/2002 created the European Food Safety 
Authority (EFSA), laid down general principles of food law and procedures in food safety and 
established a revised rapid alert system (RASFF) for the notification of threats from food or feed. 
Chapter 4 has emphasised that these reforms occurred following a period in which the so called ‘mad 
cow’ crisis took place in Europe. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a zoonotic disease87 
which appeared for the first time in 1986 in the United Kingdom (UK). It is one of a set of 
transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs)88 which share the characteristic of the presence of 
an abnormal form of a protein, known as the prion – derived from protein and infection. In humans, 
prions are suspected to cause inter alia (variant) Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, a rare and currently 
incurable degenerative neurological disorder that affects the structure of the brain or other neural 
tissues. TSEs are not contagious, meaning that they are not transmissible by physical contact, 
through the air or by casual contact to contaminated objects, but they are transmissible if ingested, 
typically due to the entrance of the infectious agent into the food chain (Ray and Ryan, 2004: 624ff).  
The aim of this case study is to assess the structural changes in the realm of food safety and food-
borne infectious diseases that could be identified for the years 1997 and 2002 in the context of the 
developments that evolved around the BSE/TSEs crisis. More precisely, the case study takes up the 
fundamental research interest in the timing, context and conditions for the mentioned structural 
changes and the forms of securitisation of BSE/TSEs at the EU level, in particular regarding the 
questions when, by whom, in which dimensions, to what degree and in which kind have BSE/TSEs 
been securitised. On the basis of this analysis the case study aims at testing the proposed hypothesis 
on the connection between the specific form of ‘strong’ securitisation and institutionalisation 
processes at the EU level. 
                                                          
87 The term ‘zoonosis’ refers to infectious diseases of animals that are transmissible to humans (Hawker et al., 
2012: 6). 
88
 The specification of 'BSE/TSEs' is used hereinafter to simultaneously refer to the interlinked animal and 
human diseases ‘bovine spongiform encephalopathy’ (BSE), scrapie and (variant) Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease 
(vCJD), unless a specific form of TSEs, for instance BSE, is addressed individually. It will become clear in the 
following that the transmissibility of BSE from bovines was disputed and that political response initially 
addressed only BSE.  
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The chapter is structured as follows. The first part comprises a review of primary sources and 
secondary literature to re-construct the political responses to the spread of bovine and transmissible 
spongiform encephalopathies. This overview is provided along two phases, the first of which covers 
the years between 1989 when BSE showed up in EC documents for the first time and 1997 when the 
internal re-organisation of the foodstuff related EU bodies and the Amsterdam Treaty were adopted 
(chapter 5.1). The second phase deals with the years after the Amsterdam Treaty from 1998 until the 
beginning of 2002 when the European Food Safety Authority and the harmonised EU food-law were 
established (chapter 5.3). Each phase concludes with a section that analyses in detail the structural 
changes of the respective period (chapters 5.2 and 5.4). 
This overview is followed by an analysis of the securitisation of BSE/TSEs as observable in the 
systematically generated set of EU documents (chapter 5.5). It ties together the investigation on the 
crisis years from a securitisation perspective in order to draw findings regarding the (evolving) degree 
(chapter 5.5.1) and kind of securitisation of BSE/TSEs (chapter 5.5.2) across both securitisation 
dimensions. In addition to this investigation, a separate section explores the roles of the different 
actors involved in the securitisation processes in order to gather information on the main EU 
securitisers (chapter 5.5.3).  
Finally, chapter 5.6 serves to thoroughly examine the assumed linkage between securitisation and 
structural change, before chapter 5.7 closes with a set of conclusions on the case study as a whole. 
 
5.1. Crisis and Response: 1989 – 1997 
The regulation of foodstuff is an important dimension in infectious disease control, since animal 
products can serve as a vector for food-borne pathogens that cause disease (Paarlberg, 2010: 155). In 
the European Community the food product sector had developed since the famous 1979 Cassis-de-
Dijon ruling (European Court of Justice, 1979) which established the principle of mutual recognition. 
Accordingly, in principle a product could enter the market of all Member States once it met the 
product standards of at least one Member State. Exceptions existed for cases in which special 
circumstances could be justified, for instance in relation to health and consumer protection 
(Dehousse, 1998: 85). In this way the Single Market for foodstuffs could be established in the 1980s, 
but the harmonisation of the standards of specific products was not a priority at the European level. 
Consequently, interventions from the European level in national food safety were limited to cases 
when barriers to trade where in question (Paul, 2009: 2645).  
In this context European secondary veterinary legislation enabled the Commission to implement 
counter measures in response to the outbreak of animal diseases (Council, 1989, 1990a). With the 
aim to “avert any danger where it is found that there has been an outbreak of an epizootic disease, 
any new serious and contagious disease or other cause likely to constitute a serious hazard to 
animals or to human health”, Directive 89/662/EEC obliged EC countries to “notify the other Member 
States and the Commission of any outbreak in its territory” (Council, 1989). Furthermore, Article 9 
also specified that the Member State of origin should immediately implement control measures. The 
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Commission’s task was to review the situation and adopt “necessary measures” on the basis of the 
scientific advice presented by the ‘Scientific Veterinary Committee’. This advisory committee was 
composed of national experts nominated by the Commission and served the purpose to be consulted 
by the Commission on all scientific and technical problems concerning animal health, veterinary 
public health, and animal welfare (European Commission, 1981). Following the consultation of the 
Scientific Veterinary Committee decisions by the Commission could be adopted only on the basis of a 
favourable vote of the representatives of the Member States in the ‘Standing Veterinary Committee’ 
or the Council (Council, 1968a). With other words, Community action was subject to a regulatory 
procedure in which Commission and Member States had to jointly agree on regulatory measures; this 
system implied that Member States could stop their adoption any time. In this sense, in the early 
1990s the regulation of foodstuff constituted more a ‘patchwork’ (Héritier, 1996) with various 
regulatory gaps than a coherent food law (Nentwich, 1995: 200ff, Krapohl, 2008: 124f). 
The existing setup was confronted with the BSE challenge at the end of the 1980s, at a time when the 
state of knowledge about the disease was much lower than nowadays.89 In 1989, the Commission 
identified BSE “to be a new serious contagious or infectious animal disease whose presence may 
constitute a danger to cattle in other Member States” and in view of the “significant risk […] in 
respect of live animals”, infected or suspected infected live cattle was not allowed to be exported 
from the UK (European Commission, 1989). In spring 1990, the Commission labelled BSE “a serious 
new disease which could threaten Community livestock” and introduced the obligation for Member 
States to notify the prevalence of BSE in their territories (European Commission, 1990a). Soon after, 
first disputes arose at the Community level, when certain Member States considered restricting 
British beef imports (European Parliament, 1997b: A.I.4, Vincent, 2004). Although it was discovered 
already at that time that BSE was transmissible from cattle to other species, the UK government 
insisted on the interpretation that it was not transmissible to humans. An extraordinary meeting of 
the Agriculture Council resolved the conflict by a compromise that dropped the envisaged import 
ban in favour of British export quality certificates for beef and the introduction of a system to identify 
cattle in the UK (Krapohl, 2008: 128). In the following, BSE was not addressed by any further 
Community action besides the introduction of additional requirements and export restrictions for 
some tissues and organs with respect to BSE (European Commission, 1990e, 1990c), a decision 
concerning the export of bovine embryos (European Commission, 1992c) and some non-legislative 
activity of the European Parliament. 
In 1994, after three years in which the Council did not hold debates on BSE at all, the discussion on 
the transmissibility of BSE to humans was re-launched by the German and the French delegations 
who proposed additional regulation and stronger guarantees on British meat exports. Meanwhile, 
feed containing processed contaminated ruminant waste was identified as the key factor to the 
transmission of the disease. As a consequence, the EU adopted counter measures concerning the 
processing, feeding and export of live cattle and meat and bone-meal. The legislation banned 
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 Even today the before mentioned ‘prion hypothesis’ is still debated. See 
http://www.who.int/zoonoses/diseases/bse/en/ (accessed 24.04.2015). 
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proteins derived from mammalian tissues for the feed of ruminants (European Commission, 1994e), 
set up heat treatment requirements to ensure the in-activation of BSE agents in ruminant waste 
(European Commission, 1994b) and further toughened the provisions regarding the dispatch of live 
cattle from the UK (European Commission, 1994d) and the British beef health certificates (European 
Commission, 1994c).  
Although the counter measures of the second round (1994) of Community responses to the BSE 
disease included stricter measures than the first round (1990), both were directed predominantly to 
one Member States, the UK, and to BSE as an animal disease.  
The third wave of measures in 1996 was of another quality. It was initiated by a statement of UK 
officials on March 20 that the non-transmissibility of BSE to humans could no longer be taken for 
granted and that there might be a causal link between BSE and a number of atypical cases of 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (Will et al., 1996, Scheu, 2003: 616). As a result, first, a number of Member 
States unilaterally decided to ban the entry of live bovine animals and beef and veal into their 
territory from the United Kingdom, and not much later also the EU level responded. Following a 14-
to-1 vote in the Standing Veterinary Committee90 – the political body of Member States 
representatives working in the relevant comitology procedure – the Commission Decision 96/239/EC 
of March 27 on “emergency measures to protect against bovine spongiform encephalopathy” 
imposed, as a radical extraordinary measure, an EU-wide export ban on British beef, products from 
bovine animals, live animals as well as meat- and bone-meal to both all EU Member States and third 
countries (European Commission, 1996b). By building on Article 9 of Directive 89/662/EEC, the 
disease was identified to constitute a “serious hazard to animals or to human health”. The ban went 
along with monitoring obligations and followed by further measures, for instance concerning the 
processing of animal waste.  
In a resolution on the Commission's measures with regard to BSE the European Parliament supported 
these steps, declared the ban “inevitable” and an “urgent measure” and claimed for “priority to 
safeguarding public health and protecting consumers” (European Parliament, 1996d). Beyond that it 
also demanded support measures to prevent the “drastic collapse” of the beef industry which faced 
a dramatic reduction in beef consumption. In this context the Commission could take up Regulation 
(EEC) No 805/68 (Council, 1968b) which provided for the payment of premiums to compensate 
producers for the consequences of a substantial fall in beef and veal prices. Also the Agriculture 
Council at its extraordinary meetings in March and April underlined the seriousness of the situation 
and “urged the adoption of a number of urgent measures for health protection and support of the 
beef market” (European Parliament, 1997b).  
On this basis a series of “exceptional support measures for the beef market” was adopted, 
repeatedly updated in the following, starting with Regulations to support the United Kingdom 
(European Commission, 1996d) as well as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, where veal calves 
imported from the United Kingdom had to be destroyed and where owners were compensated for 
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 The EU comprised at that time 15 Member States; the single negative vote apparently came from the UK 
representative. 
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the destruction under the market regulation rules (European Commission, 1996e). The exceptional 
financial contribution to the purchase and slaughtering of animals was on the one hand justified on 
the grounds of the necessity to kill and destroy the animals “in a manner which does not pose any 
threat to human health or the health of other animals”. On the other hand, the Commission also 
hinted at the “magnitude of efforts needed to support the market” in the light of “a lack of consumer 
confidence in beef and a disturbance of the markets” (European Commission, 1996d, 1996e). 
In parallel to these supportive measures the situation escalated politically following the UK 
government’s announcement that it did not intend to cooperate any longer in the decision-making 
processes of the EU in general as long as the export ban on British beef was in place (Westlake, 
1997). The UK’s ‘empty-chair’ politics was followed by a partial lifting of the ban for certain cattle 
products (European Commission, 1996f) and contributed to pushing the BSE/TSEs crisis to the 
highest political levels. The Presidency Conclusions of the European Council meeting on June 21 and 
22 in Florence included a special section on BSE that comprised two key messages. First, “a step by 
step relaxation of the […] restrictions on the export of bovine products” could be envisaged as soon 
as a plan for the eradication of BSE in cattle in the United Kingdom, as put forward by the 
Commission, showed the desired effects. And second, support for the affected beef industry was 
important following the fall in beef consumption and its impact on market prices. In this context the 
European Council devoted ECU 850 million to support European livestock farmers in addition to the 
already amended budget of the Commission, which included ECU 650 million plus a reserve of ECU 
200 million for beef market support (European Council, 1996). Clearly, with the focus on a framework 
for the removal of the UK ban, the restoration of the Single Market in beef and the agreement on 
further market support measures, economic questions dominated the negotiations of the Heads of 
States or Governments when adopting the so called Florence Agreement.  
In the same vein, the Council Regulation to implement additional top-up payments to producers 
within the agricultural guideline for 1996 declared the market for beef “seriously disturbed as a 
result of consumer concerns in relation to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)” (Council, 
1996d). In the same year, in the light of “continuing serious difficulties in the beef and veal sector 
resulting from consumer concerns”, additional measures for the direct support of producers in all 
Member States (Council, 1996c) as well as further „exceptional support measures” for the beef 
market in Portugal and the UK were adopted (European Commission, 1996g, 1996d) soon after the 
eradication plans for the two countries had been set up (European Commission, 1996a, 1996j). 
Concern regarding the beef consumption, aid for the beef market and financial support for affected 
countries also played a prominent role for many Members of the European Parliament. Amounting to 
the total number 79, the year 1996 yielded a large number of written questions to the Commission 
related to BSE/TSEs (after 1 in 1993 and 0 in 1994 and 1995), of which roughly every fifth dealt with 
the economic implications of the crisis and the lack of consumer confidence. Other prominent topics 
were connected to the uncertainty how the transmission of BSE to other animals and humans took 
place (milk, water, gelatine, medical or cosmetic products), the Commission’s (in)activity and 
communication policy or the inspection and containment measures adopted in the UK. Similar 
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questions were also brought up by the Economic and Social Committee which expressed great worry 
about the harmful consequences of the economic crisis in beef-farming and related job losses 
throughout the meat production, processing and marketing industry, caused by the collapse of 
consumption and the loss of consumer confidence (EESC, 1996).  
Besides the concerns regarding the consequences for industry and employment, the respective 
opinion of the Economic and Social Committee also illustrates the great uncertainty regarding the 
characteristics of BSE and vCJD in 1996, leading to a strong call for further research into the diseases. 
The Commission shared the view that further research was needed and launched a sizeable research 
initiative at the end of the year (European Commission, 1996k). Furthermore, it tried to strengthen 
the independent scientific advice for its decisions and set up the ‘Multidisciplinary Scientific 
Committee on BSE’ which was meant to work complementarily to the already existing bodies of the 
advisory system. The Council supported this institutional reform and asked the new Committee to 
make “recommendations […] relating to specific policies to combat TSEs […] as an essential and 
urgent measure” (Council, 1996b). It also demanded “the rapid establishment of epidemiological 
surveillance of CJD in all Member States, on the basis of comparable data” (Council, 1996b, 1996a).  
Also the year 1997 witnessed further extraordinary events. Besides the continuation of emergency 
measures of the previous year, two conferences were held jointly by the Parliament and the 
Commission on animal-meal91 and food law and food policy92. Additional eradication plans for France 
and Ireland were set up and exceptional market support measures adopted for both countries as well 
as Germany. Furthermore, the Commission decided on further animal waste treatment provisions 
and shipping restrictions (European Commission, 1997a). In addition to these steps, the Council 
introduced a system for the identification and registration of bovine animals and the labelling of beef 
and beef products from 1 January 2001 onwards (Council, 1997a). In other words, also in 1997 the 
BSE/TSE issue and the implications for food safety and health remained a top-priority, well-illustrated 
by the fact that at the end of the year, the European Council addressed the matter in a separate 
declaration annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of the summit in Luxembourg. The heads of state 
or government took up the reading of the BSE crisis and current food safety challenges as a matter of 
“concern for the public” and a question of “public confidence”. Confirming that “the production and 
supply of safe food must be one of the European Union's priorities”, which implied “a high level of 
health protection, ensured on the basis of high-quality, transparent scientific advice”, the European 
Council made clear the support for the ongoing reform of the sector, including supplemented and 
simplified legislation (European Council, 1997). Furthermore, the statement “that the European 
Union should remain constantly alert to food safety concerns”, made clear that the crisis was not 
considered to be overcome yet (European Council, 1997). 
At that time, the functioning of the EU’s institutional setup that dealt with BSE/TSEs was already 
subject to investigation by the European Parliament’s temporary Committee of Inquiry, set up in July 
1996 “to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of 
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 1-2 July 1997, Brussels. 
92
 3-4 November 1997, Brussels. 
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Community law in relation to BSE” (European Parliament, 1996b). The committee was the first of its 
kind, as the European Parliament had been granted the right to establish such a temporary body of 
inquiry in the Maastricht Treaty only (Westlake, 1997, Vos, 1999). Consequently, the management of 
the BSE crises was a test case for the application of the new competence. The committee’s report 
gathered evidence from various sources, including national and Commission representatives, and 
was published in February 1997 (European Parliament, 1997b). It thoroughly analysed the 
developments at the EU level related to BSE with a focus on public health implications until 1997, 
and brought forward massive criticism concerning almost every actor involved, from the UK 
authorities through the Commission to the Council and the relevant comitology bodies (Chambers, 
1999). 
The report concluded with a comprehensive list of recommendations. The fact that the report’s 
findings were linked to the announcement of a motion of censure against the Commission underlines 
the importance and urgency the Parliament attached to the issue (European Parliament, 1997b). In 
this context the “practical proposals for improvements to ensure that a similar situation does not 
occur in future” primarily addressed the need to reform the organisation, the work and the 
transparency of the scientific and standing committees in the veterinary field. A major reason for this 
claim was the Parliament’s finding that scientific opinions on the transmission path were overheard 
during the early years of the outbreaks and that the advisory input provided to the Commission 
regarding BSE/TSEs was dominated by UK officials. Besides the restructuring of the committee 
system, the Parliament furthermore proposed a general reform of the legislative foundation of the 
foodstuff regulation and the idea of a European Agency for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection 
that could improve the EU’s surveillance capacity (European Parliament, 1997b). 
 
5.2. Legal and Institutional Reform in 1997 
5.2.1. The Re-Organisation of the EU’s Food Safety Infrastructure 
In April 1997, two months after the report of the European Parliament’s Committee of Inquiry into 
BSE had been published (European Parliament, 1997b), the European Commission initiated a series 
of reforms that built basically on two publications, the Commission’s Communication on “Consumer 
Health and Food Safety” on the one hand (European Commission, 1997j), and the “Green Paper on 
Food Law” on the other (European Commission, 1997h).  
The documents developed the Commission’s “new political departure” towards foodstuff regulation 
which aimed at the reinforcement of the “the protection of consumer health” (European 
Commission, 1997j: 7) and “the manner in which it obtains and makes use of scientific advice, and in 
which it operates its food, veterinary and phytosanitary control and inspection services (European 
Commission, 1997j: 3). Against this background it set out in detail how the processes of scientific 
advice, regulatory decision-making and control could be better separated from each other in the 
future by re-structuring both administrative organisation of food safety affairs within the 
Commission as well as the provision of scientific advice. 
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As regards the internal organisational structure, the foodstuff-related competencies, which had so 
far been scattered to the Commission’s DGs for Agriculture, Consumer Policy, Enterprise and Internal 
Market, were moved to a single Directorate General (DG), DG XXIV for Consumer Policy and Health 
Protection (Vos, 1999, 2000). The new DG received the name DG SANCO in the following Commission 
under President Prodi.93 The poor coordination and overlapping responsibilities, also among further 
DGs such as industry and social affairs, had been subject to massive criticism by the Parliament 
(European Parliament, 1997b, Grant, 2012: 1035).  
In a similar step, the Office of Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control, which was 
attached to the Directorate General for Agriculture, was transferred to the new and upgraded DG, 
strengthened in its capacity to perform food, veterinary and phytosanitary inspection and renamed 
the Food and Veterinary Office (FVO).94 Finally, a new unit on the assessment of consumer health 
risks was established here, too (European Commission, 1997j: 4, Chambers, 1999, Krapohl, 
2008:132). 
In view of the advisory system, the Commission re-organised the scientific committees within the 
Commission in the field of consumer health and food safety by re-structuring the existing scientific 
committees into a set of eight reshaped committees, along with a reform of the appointment 
system.95 In addition, the full set of food safety-related committees was transferred under the 
authority of a single Directorate General, the new DG responsible for ‘Consumer Policy and Health 
Protection’. Finally, the Commission established a ‘Scientific Steering Committee’ (SSC) on the basis 
of the already existing Multidisciplinary Committee (European Commission, 1997k) which was 
mandated to be responsible only for BSE/TSEs as well as the coordination of the work of the other 
scientific committees (European Commission, 1997l, Krapohl, 2008: 132). By doing so the “the 
scientific committees were distanced from the legislative wing of the commission services, being 
subjected to the exclusive control of a DG totally oriented to consumers. At the same time, they were 
removed from direct industrial pressures” (Alemanno, 2006: 245). 
 
5.2.2. The Revision of the Public Health Article in the Amsterdam Treaty 
As a second structural innovation the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the year 1997 included 
a revision of the Community’s public health mandate. The new Treaty re-numbered the public health 
Article from 129 to 152 and introduced a range of new elements, beginning with the formulation that 
“Community action should be directed towards improving public health, preventing human illness 
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 The DG was renamed as DG SANTE as of 2015. 
94
 Already in summer 1996, the Commission had issued a proposal to convert the existing Community Office for 
Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection and Control into a European Agency for Veterinary and Phytosanitary 
Inspection (European Commission, 1996c). This idea was adapted by establishing a new affiliation and a 
strengthened role of the FVO. The FVO was later relocated to its today’s location in Grange, Ireland. 
95
 Scientific Committee on Food, Scientific Committee of Animal Nutrition, Scientific Committee on Animal 
Health and Animal Welfare, Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public Health, Scientific 
Committee on Plants, Scientific Committee on Cosmetic Products and Non-Food Products intended for 
Consumers, Scientific Committee on Medicinal Products and Medical Devices and Scientific Committee on 
Toxicity, Ecotoxicity and the Environment (European Commission, 1997l: Art. 1). 
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and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to human health” by fighting “against the major health 
scourges, promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as 
health information and education” (Art. 152 (1)). 
Beyond this overall call for the improvement of public health, the Treaty also introduced and re-
organised the Union’s competences. Crucially, the masters of the Treaty shifted the veterinary and 
phytosanitary chapters for the protection of human health from the title on the common agricultural 
policy to the new article on public health. EU legislation in these matters, as well as in the field of 
standards of safety of organs and substances of human origin, blood and blood derivatives, were not 
only merely permitted, but explicitly called for by the new Treaty. A development that was assessed 
as a decisive step to establish health and consumer protection as an independent EU policy objective 
(Vos, 2000, Coleman, 2004: 7, Krapohl and Zurek, 2006). Following the Amsterdam amendments 
public health and consumer protection were no longer a secondary action of the Single Market; in 
contrast, their attainment was to be ensured in the definition and implementation of all Community 
policies and activities (Art. 152 (1)). Furthermore, the Treaty provided that the legal foundation for 
future veterinary proposals relating to health protection were to be based upon the co-decision 
procedure.  
Even if the Treaty of Amsterdam defined public health – despite these innovations – still in a 
restrictive manner with an emphasis on the respect for the responsibilities of the Member States 
(Guigner, 2004: 97), in particular regarding “the organisation and delivery of health services and 
medical care” (Art. 152 (5)), the reformed Treaty still “established a new legal basis on which future 
EU measures of health and consumer protection could be based” (Krapohl, 2008: 137). In particular, 
by establishing a new and close connection of the fields of veterinary policy and public health 
protection, the Community’s competence to address food-borne infectious diseases was 
considerably modified. 
The public health article remained unchanged in the Nice Treaty (signed in 2001, entered into force 
in 2003), but was addressed by the ‘Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union’ 
(European Council, 2001d: 22) and became, as we will see in chapter 6.3.2, subject to revision in the 
Constitutional Treaty (not ratified) and the Lisbon Treaty. The new linkage between veterinary issues 
and public health objectives, however, remained unaltered after the Amsterdam amendments.96 Also 
the tight connection between the formerly separated policies for food safety and public health is a 
key feature in the EU’s internal setup still today, best illustrated by the fact that the current 
Commission under President Jean-Claude Juncker in 2015 includes a Commissioner and a DG for 
‘Health and Food Safety’.97  
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 A comprehensive overview of changes of the public health article is provided in Annex 1 of this study. 
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 See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_food-safety/index_en.htm (accessed 23.04.2015). 
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5.3. Crisis and Response: 1998 – 2002 
After the series of reforms of the year 1997, the BSE/TSEs crisis initially continued comparatively 
unspectacular in the second phase between 1998 and 2002. The year 1998 was characterised by a 
series of follow-up steps by the EU institutions and the Member States, including the partial lifting of 
the UK embargo for beef and certain beef products in respect of Northern Ireland under the new 
‘Export Certified Herds Scheme’, combined with stricter control measures, further eased in 1999 for 
the entire UK under the newly established ‘Date Based Export Scheme’. Furthermore, the 
Commission set the requirements regarding the epidemio-surveillance for all animal TSEs and 
commenced its series of follow-up reports on BSE (European Commission, 1998b).  
At that time the impression started to prevail among most involved actors that “[s]atisfactory 
progress to eradicate the disease ha[d] been made” (European Commission, 1998f: 1). At the same 
time costs and consequences of the disease outbreak became clearer; the EU looked back at over 3 
million cattle slaughtered and destroyed under the various programmes of the eradication plan 
(European Commission, 1998f: 1) as well as a total of ECU 2.149 million Community expenditure on 
BSE related measures, which equalled an increase of 32 per cent in relation to the normal premium 
scheme expenditure (European Court of Auditors, 1998a: 6).  
Just when the European Parliament and the Commission prepared for another joint conference to 
draw lessons from the BSE crisis for the safety of foodstuffs,98 it turned out that the crisis was still not 
overcome since in Portugal not all BSE/TSEs risk factors were adequately managed. As serious 
concerns existed regarding the development of the disease in the near future, a total ban on dispatch 
of live cattle and all cattle products from Portugal was implemented (European Commission, 1998c). 
If this re-emergence of the problem served to bear in remembrance the acute implications for animal 
and human health, the Court of Auditors in a “Special Report concerning the community financing of 
certain measures taken as a result of the BSE crisis” recalled the heavy economic impact of the crisis, 
stating that “[t]he Community beef market was pushed to the verge of collapse almost overnight as 
consumer confidence plummeted” (European Court of Auditors, 1998a: 27). 
The following months were dominated by further follow-up reports on BSE/TSEs, further 
specifications of the agreed compulsory beef labelling system, further emergency measures in 
response to the BSE outbreak in Portugal and lively judicial activity, including a number of 
infringement procedures for failing to comply with BSE/TSEs legislation (European Commission, 
1998b: 19ff, 1999e: 66). Beyond that, the year 1999 yielded a set of initiatives for further substantial 
reform steps. On the one hand, “in view of the magnitude of the risk posed to human and animal 
health by certain TSEs” the Commission launched a co-decision procedure by proposing a 
comprehensive set of general, harmonised EU rules on prevention, control and eradication these 
agents (European Commission, 1999f). On the other hand, members of the Scientific Steering 
Committee, the Committee that had been established as part of the structural reform package of 
1997 to fight TSEs and to coordinate the work of the other scientific committees (see chapter 5.2.1), 
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presented an influential report to the Commission on the future of scientific advice. Under the title 
‘European Food and Public Health Authority’ the three leading scientific advisors set out a proposal 
for yet a further reaching reform of the EU infrastructure for food safety by proposing the creation of 
an independent EU institution that could take over the tasks of risk assessment, management and 
communication, including the competence to take legally binding decisions (James et al., 1999, see 
also Buonanno, 2006, Krapohl, 2008: 138). 
The Commission included the idea of an independent food agency into its draft for a ‘White Paper on 
Food Safety”, which became subject to discussions even before its final publication in January 2000 in 
the framework of the European Council meeting in Helsinki on December 10 and 11, 1999. In this 
context the European Council instructed the “Council to examine as a matter of urgency the 
forthcoming Commission White Paper on food safety […] as well as its communication on the 
precautionary principle” and agreed to keep the issue on the European Council’s agenda for the next 
meetings (European Council, 1999).  
The aim of the Commission’s White Paper was to outline “[a] radical new approach” on food safety 
(European Commission, 2000h: 3) which consisted of essentially five components:  
1. the establishment of an independent European Food Authority; 
2. 80 separate actions in the field of food safety legislation; 
3. the development and operation of national food safety control systems; 
4. a better consumer information policy, as well as 
5. the integration of the new approach into the EU’s international trade system. 
Justifications for reformed and strengthened capacities on EU level were located in a) the Internal 
Market, which required that “all aspects of food safety are addressed at EU level […] in line with the 
principle of subsidiarity” (European Commission, 2000h: 6), and b) the “unprecedented pressure [on 
Community and Member State food safety systems] during recent feed and food emergencies”, 
which had “exposed weaknesses which call for action by the responsible authorities (Commission, 
Member States and the Parliament), to re-enforce, improve and further develop existing systems” 
(European Commission, 2000h: 7).  
Almost at the same time of the publication of the White Paper, the Commission also published a 
Communication on the so called ‘precautionary principle’, a key concept in risk management 
decisions to which the Commission also made reference in its new food safety approach (European 
Commission, 2000m). Although the document did not provide an explicit definition, it entailed the 
core understanding that in cases of scientific disagreement as to whether a given activity is harmful 
to the public or not, health protection measures may be adopted, pending further scientific 
information. In such a case, the burden of proof that the activity was not harmful should fall on those 
who seek to undertake the activity. The ‘precautionary approach’ became an influential source and 
“general principle” for many following EU policies, not least in matters of product safety (Recuerda, 
2006: 282f).  
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Although the communication only indirectly made reference to BSE/TSEs, the link to food safety is 
apparent throughout the document. In particular with regard to the ‘burden of proof’ and food 
substances the Commission states that “[a]s long as the human health risk cannot be evaluated with 
sufficient certainty, the legislator is not legally entitled to authorise use of the substance” (European 
Commission, 2000m: 20). 
With the White Paper on Food Safety in January and the Communication on the Precautionary 
Principle in the beginning of February, the year 2000 had kick-offed with two documents which 
turned out to be influential points of reference in the future (see chapter 5.4), inter alia taken up by 
the European Council. The heads of state or government concluded their meeting in Santa Maria da 
Feira on June 19 and 20, 2000 with a reference to the White Paper and demanded that “[f]ood safety 
policy must apply to the entire animal and human food chain” and “that food legislation meeting the 
most stringent public health criteria is in place by 2002” (European Council, 2000a). 
The preparations for these structural changes at the EU level were carried out, while the existing ban 
against Portugal (‘Portugal embargo’) was expanded (European Commission, 2000g), a compulsory 
Community-supported BSE tests for fallen stock and emergency-slaughtered animals were 
introduced (European Commission, 2000f) and the identification system and beef labelling system 
were amended (European Parliament and Council, 2000). Besides, following long political discussions 
since 1996 on specified risk materials, the Commission could finally adopt a Decision to update the 
list of risk materials, to prescribe slaughter techniques and introduce respective official controls 
(European Commission, 2000e, Krapohl, 2008: 135).  
At that time, the BSE/TSEs case already headed toward another critical moment, when the Scientific 
Steering Committee presented a report on the geographical risk of BSE (Scientific Steering 
Committee, 2000) which concluded that almost all Member States were still at high risk to witness an 
outbreak in their territories. In the following, intensified surveillance measures were adopted at the 
EU level which soon yielded the unpleasant certainty that new BSE cases had occurred in Denmark, 
Germany and Spain and that Belgium, France, Ireland and the Netherlands were facing rising 
infection rates.99  
At the end of the year 2000, “beef disappeared from Christmas menus all over Europe” (Krapohl, 
2008: 134). New counter measures to prevent the spread of the disease included the prohibition to 
feed processed meat and bone-meal to any farm animal throughout the entire EU and the adoption 
of twice reinforced epidemio-surveillance programmes, backed up by the allocation of additional 
financial contributions for both surveillance and further exceptional support measures for the beef 
market (Council, 2000, European Commission, 2000d, 2000c, 2000b, 2000i). The disease once more 
became subject to the deliberations of the European Council which took notice of these measures to 
combat BSE during the meeting in Nice in December 2000 and demanded their swift and rigour 
implementation “in order to give consumers a lasting guarantee that beef is safe” (European Council, 
2000b). The heads of state or government also demanded “[m]ore intense efforts in the field of 
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 See http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-data/annual-incidence-rate/ (accessed 
10.12.2014). 
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human medicine and veterinary research” and addressed the issue of a European Food Safety 
Authority which was already under preparations at that time. With regard to the latter the 
constitutional architects called for “the highest possible level of scientific excellence, independence 
and transparency, thus helping to prevent crises” and invited the Council and the Parliament “to 
speed up work so that the future European Food Authority may become operational as from the 
beginning of 2002” (European Council, 2000b).100 
In 2001, the various measures of the year 2000 in response to BSE/TSEs were carried on, including 
special market support and exceptional support measures in the beef sector (European Commission, 
2001j, 2001h), the large scale monitoring and testing programme (European Commission, 2001k, 
2001n), and additional provisions as regards risk materials (European Commission, 2001o) and 
feeding stuff (European Commission, 2001a). Only when the dispatch ban against Portugal could be 
lifted as of 1 August 2001, the situation started to ease up to some extent. Also afterwards, bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy did not disappear from the political agenda, but the peak of discussions 
and measures related to the disease was passed. To illustrate, whereas in the year 2001 Members of 
the European Parliament addressed the Commission with more than 80 written questions concerning 
BSE/TSEs, the number decreased rapidly to 20 in 2002, 11 in 2003, 5 in 2004 and 0 in 2005.  
Important legal acts of the years after 2001 were primarily concerned with amendments of the 
reform package of the year 2002 (see chapter 5.4) regarding ovine and caprine animals, rapid tests, 
breeding programmes, trade conditions and continued surveillance programmes. BSE/TSEs were still 
subject to numerous political decisions, but after 2002 these decisions did not take place in 
exceptional or urgent circumstances but were adopted and implemented principally on the legal 
basis as updated in 2001/2002 (see next chapter). Also judicial activity can be observed for the years 
after 2001, with highest numbers of case law in the years between 2001 and 2003. These cases were 
mainly occupied with the emergency measures of the crisis years, the special market support 
measures and exceptional payments. In line with a normal time lag that can be expected between 
policy-making and judicial review, case law related to BSE decreased considerably after 2003. 
 
5.4. Legal and Institutional Reform in 2001/2002 
5.4.1. Harmonised EU Law on TSEs 
The major development in 2001 in terms of legal reform was the agreement of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 (European Parliament and Council, 
2001) which summarised into a single piece of legislation the numerous legislative steps of the years 
between 1990 and 2001 which had been taken in response to the BSE outbreak. The new legal basis 
comprised of a scheme for the classification of a country’s BSE and scrapie status, both within and 
outside the EU, laid down the provisions for the monitoring and notifications of TSEs, prohibitions as 
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 In 2001, when the European Council meeting in Stockholm underlined once more the determination to 
eradicate the disease, the preferred schedule of the European Council even foresaw “the establishment of a 
European Food Authority […] before the end of this year [2001]” (European Council, 2001c: Art. 54). 
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regards the feeding of animal as well as the specified risk materials, measures to eradicate TSEs and 
the framework for the trading, inspections and controls of cattle, sheep and goats. Furthermore, the 
Regulation moved additional competencies to the European Commission, which was allowed to 
implement certain amendments to the Regulation.  
Although the new Regulation did not significantly change the existing policies or procedures related 
to BSE/TSEs and food safety, in particular not in respect to the Commission’s autonomy which was 
still tied into a committee system (Krapohl, 2008: 136), it still meant an important step for the 
consolidation of food safety law. Many of the measures of the previous years had been initially 
adopted with a temporary and exceptional nature and were now merged into one central piece of 
legislation. Furthermore, the new legislative basis also foresaw stronger regulation and was no longer 
limited to specific countries but became applicable in the entire EU. With other words, whereas most 
original BSE/TSEs measures of the years before were country-specific, temporary and based on the 
veterinary safeguard clauses, the new Regulation institutionalised preventive, responsive and 
monitoring measures with a new BSE/TSEs status system at its heart for all EU Member States and – 
in view of trade – also third countries. At the time of writing, Regulation 999/2001 is – updated and 
amended numerous times – still in force. 
 
5.4.2. The European Food Safety Authority and the New EU Food Law 
The official procedure leading to the establishment of the European Food Safety Authority has its 
origin in the Commission’s proposal for a respective Regulation of March 2001 (European 
Commission, 2001b). The idea and plans for the creation of a central European institution in charge 
of food safety matters, however, had developed already in the years before. Not only had Romano 
Prodi as the new Commission President proposed such an institution in his first speech before the 
Parliament in October 1999 (Vos, 2000: 247, Groenleer, 2009: 179), the idea was also prominently 
enshrined in the report of three scientific advisers from the Scientific Steering Committee to the 
Commission in 1999 (James et al., 1999) and in the Commission’s White Paper on Food Safety of 
January 2000 (European Commission, 2000h). 
The group of experts from the Scientific Steering Committee had been commissioned to review the 
system of scientific advice after its revision in 1997. Along with the presentation of their findings the 
expert proposed the establishment of a “European Food and Public Health Authority” with an 
encompassing mandate far beyond food safety, meant to introduce a system for the monitoring 
European public health in general including the shift of competencies of risk and crisis management 
and decision-making to the new agency. The Commission took up the idea of an agency in its White 
Paper as an integral part of the EU’s overall “radical new approach” on food safety (European 
Commission, 2000h: 3). It, however, did not include the encompassing mandate for regulatory 
powers, being incompatible with the EU Treaty for an independent agency, and limited the agency’s 
objectives to risk assessment and communication in food safety matters (Buonanno, 2006: 264ff).  
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The Commission explained “that [these] major structural changes [emphasis added] [were] necessary 
in the way food safety issues are handled, having regard to the experience over the last few years” 
and that “[t]he establishment of a new Authority [would] provide the most effective instrument in 
achieving the changes required to protect public health and to restore consumer confidence” 
(European Commission, 2000h: 14). The need for reformed and strengthened capacities at the EU 
level was grounded in the functioning of the Internal Market and the “unprecedented pressure” of 
recent feed and food emergencies (European Commission, 2000h: 6f). The Annex of the White Paper 
comprised a timetable which lined out the envisaged reform steps of the next three years, with the 
most important innovations to be put forward before the end of the year 2000 “allowing for a 
coherent and up-to-date body of food law supported by a new European Food Authority to be in 
place by the end of 2002” (European Commission, 2000h: 7). 
 
5.4.2.1. The Establishment of the European Food Safety Authority 
Taking the White Paper on Food Safety as a reference point, the European Council pushed the 
establishment of the agency in its Presidency Conclusions of June 2000 by stating that “[f]ood safety 
policy must apply to the entire animal and human food chain and be supported by an independent 
European Food Authority to complement preventive surveillance by the national authorities”. More 
precisely, the heads of state or government stipulated that “[t]he first of these proposals, dealing 
with the establishment of a European Food Authority, [was] expected by September 2000 at the 
latest” (European Council, 2000a). 
The Commission’s proposal was put into the legislative process in November 2000 as the first agency 
under the co-decision procedure (European Commission, 2001b). The procedure empowered the 
Parliament to make its opinions heard regarding the agency’s scope and structures. Whereas the 
composition of the management board was of concern for the Council (Council, 2001), the 
Parliament insisted on strengthened control mechanisms and on specifying the authority’s mandate 
to food safety (European Parliament, 2001, 2002). In turn, the European Council repeated the 
urgency of the issue (European Council, 2001b).  
Finally, in contrast to the Commission’s original design which had referred to a ‘European Food 
Authority’, the compromise agreement established a ‘European Food Safety Authority’ (Kelemen, 
2004:139f, Buonanno, 2006: 270, Groenleer, 2009: 180f) following the adoption of Regulation (EC) 
No 178/2002 by the European Parliament and the Council. On a general basis the legislative actors 
widely agreed on the need and interest of the new agency and the respective re-organisation of the 
regime so that the legislative act was adopted after second reading in the Parliament without going 
through conciliation (Krapohl, 2008: 139). Because of an enduring disagreement between Italy and 
Finland over the location of the new agency, EFSA became transitionally operative during 2003 in 
Brussels before it was eventually moved to Parma in 2005 (European Council, 2001a, Groenleer, 
2009: 107). 
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Table 5-1: Overview of the Documents in the Process Related to Regulation 178/2002 Establishing EFSA 
Date
101
 Author 
Reference Contents 
Doc No. 
08.11.00 COM 
(European 
Commission, 2001b) 
Proposal for a Regulation laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food 
Authority, and laying down procedures in matters of food 
COM(2000) 716 final 
28.03.01 EESC 
(EESC, 2001) Opinion on Proposal 
2001/C 155/08 
12.06.01 EP (European Parliament, 
2001) 
Legislative Resolution on Commission Proposal (1
st
 Reading) – 
Approval with Amendments A5-0198/2001 
14.06.01 CoR (Committee of the 
Regions, 2001) 
Report on Commission Proposal 
2001/C 357/05 
28.06.01 CO 
(Council, 2001) Common Position 
10235/01 (Presse 257) 
07.08.01 COM 
(European 
Commission, 2001c) 
Amended Proposal for a Regulation laying down the general 
principles and requirements of food law, establishing the 
European Food Authority, and laying down procedures in matters 
of food safety 
COM(2001) 475 final 
17.09.01 CO 
(Council, 2002a) Common Position 
2002/C 4/02 
11.12.01 EP (European Parliament, 
2002) 
Legislative Resolution on Amended Proposal (2nd Reading) – 
Approval with Amendments A5-0416/2001 
21.01.02 CO 
(Council, 2002b) Approval by the Council of the EP Amendments at 2nd Reading 
5283/02 (Presse 7) 
28.01.02 EP+CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2002a) 
Adoption of Regulation Laying Down the General Principles and 
Requirements of Food Law, Establishing the European Food Safety 
Authority and Laying Down Procedures in Matters of Food Safety 
R 178/2002 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
5.4.2.2. The Mission of the European Food Safety Authority 
The establishment of EFSA meant an important step of re-organisation and centralisation indeed. 
Building on the assessment that “the present system of scientific and technical support [was] no 
longer able to respond to increasing demands” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 33), 
the founding Regulation defined EFSA’s tasks in the realm of risk assessment, scientific advice as well 
as scientific and technical support for the Community's legislation and policies “in all fields which 
have a direct or indirect impact on food or feed safety” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: 
Art. 22 (2)). In particular, it belongs to the tasks of the agency to provide best possible scientific 
opinions, meant to “serve as the scientific basis for the drafting and adoption of Community 
measures” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Art. 22.6, Art. 23). These scientific opinions can 
be issued following a request from the Commission, from the Parliament or from Member States, or 
on EFSA’s own initiative.  
In addition to its primary role as the source of independent scientific “advice, information and risk 
communication in order to improve consumer confidence” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: 
Recital 35), EFSA is also mandated to provide independent information on all matters within these 
fields and to communicate on risks and food safety issues to the public, together with the 
Commission and the national authorities. Furthermore, it was assigned a competence in the realm of 
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risk prevention, namely “the anticipatory task of collecting information and exercising vigilance and 
providing evaluation of and information on emerging risks with a view to their prevention” 
(European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 50 and Art. 34).  
For cases when a food crisis could not be prevented, the EU’s new approach included a revision of 
the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF), a network of contact points from the Member 
States, the Commission and EFSA, managed by the Commission. The major task of the system is to 
communicate and respond to direct or indirect risks to human health deriving from food or feed and 
to exchange information about measures taken (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 59, 
Art. 35, Art. 50). In consequence, the information communicated via RASFF can lead to products 
being recalled from the market. The revision of the network, originally created in 1979, was needed, 
the Regulation set out, because “[r]ecent food crises [had] demonstrated the need to set up an 
improved and broadened rapid alert system” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 59).  
Complementarily to the creation of EFSA, the founding regulation also called for a comprehensive 
approach to emergency food safety measures in the light of “[r]ecent food safety incidents [that had] 
demonstrated the need to establish appropriate measures in emergency situations ensuring that all 
foods, whatever their type and origin, and all feed should be subject to common measures in the 
event of a serious risk to human health, animal health or the environment (European Parliament and 
Council, 2002a: Recital 60). In this vein, EFSA was integrated into a crisis unit during food 
emergencies, providing the Commission with scientific and technical assistance “to determine the 
most effective measures on the basis of the best scientific information” (European Parliament and 
Council, 2002a: Recital 61, Groenleer, 2009: 181).  
It becomes clear that Regulation 178/2002 meant a substantial revision of the EU’s food safety setup, 
and thus for zoonoses and food-borne infectious diseases, with the creation of an authority that is 
one of the best embedded and most powerful of the EU agencies (Vos and Wendler, 2006). By 
replacing every reference in previous Community legislation to the Scientific Committee on Food, the 
Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition, the Scientific Veterinary Committee, the Scientific 
Committee on Pesticides, the Scientific Committee on Plants and the Scientific Steering Committee 
by a reference to the European Food Safety Authority, the old committee system was abolished in 
favour of a centralised body that encompasses different scientific thematic panels and a Scientific 
Committee which took over the role of the old Scientific Steering Committee. The new body was thus 
detached from the Commission in order to provide more independent information.102 
  
                                                          
102
 For more details on the structure and internal organisation of EFSA see 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/aboutefsa/efsawho.htm (accessed 12.12.2014) and Krapohl (2008: 140ff) and 
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Despite these innovations, however, EFSA was set up as a tool only in the field of risk assessment103 
to identify and evaluate risks in view of different policy options, but the setup for risk management104 
to actually implement responsive measures was not changed in a similar fashion. The new system 
foresees that the Commission builds on EFSA’s advice when drafting proposals, but is still free to 
follow them or not. The Commission also remained in charge of risk management decisions, 
embedded into the comitology (‘regulatory’) procedure. Experts argue that “[s]uch a separation […] 
may prove more than a little tricky”, in particular “when the Authority is expected to communicate 
directly with both risk managers and the general public” (Randall, 2006: 413). Also, while EFSA 
cannot enforce its views and assessments (Marsden and et al., 2010: 90f), the Commission’s 
decisions in response to an emergency are still subject to a potentially blocking qualified majority of 
the Member States in the Council. Once adopted, it is also on the Commission and not EFSA to 
monitor and enforce the implementation of the measures (Krapohl, 2008: 142, Groenleer, 2009: 
181).  
EFSA, however, “has sought to persuade its most powerful stakeholders that it can become the vital 
hub of a new European institutional architecture in which risk assessors and communicators, armed 
with superior scientific and communications instruments, endow the Commission’s actions and 
policy-making with greater authority” (Randall, 2006: 415, Grant, 2012: 1037). The agency can thus 
provide “the basis for the assurance of a high level of protection of human health and consumers' 
interest in relation to food” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Art. 1.1), but it operates, at 
the same time, in the mission to ensure the effective functioning of the Internal Market. The balance 
between the free movement of goods and a high level of protection of human health is, thus, a 
tension inherent to the agency’s design and constitutes also the major theme that runs through the 
formulations of the Regulation (Kanska, 2004: 713). 
 
5.5. The Securitisation of BSE/TSEs 
Tracking the BSE/TSEs-related developments at the EU level between 1989 and 2002 has shown that 
the crisis went along with lively activity in terms of political debate fed from a wide range of EU 
actors, a series of actions to contain the disease as well as a set of substantial changes to structurally 
reform the EU’s setup for food safety and the control of food-borne infectious diseases. With a view 
to the identification of the (forms of) securitisation of BSE/TSEs at the EU level, the political response 
needs to be analysed from a security perspective by assessing words (verbal dimension) and actions 
(operational dimension) to differentiate between securitisation degrees, kinds and securitising 
actors. 
                                                          
103
 Understood as “a scientifically based process consisting of four steps: hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: 
Art. 3 (11)). 
104
 Understood as “the process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing policy alternatives in consultation 
with interested parties, considering risk assessment and other legitimate factors, and, if need be, selecting 
appropriate prevention and control options” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Art. 3 (12)). 
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To recall, securitisation analysis is done on the basis of the full set of official EU output as generated 
in line with the method for the collection of documents set out in chapter 2.5.5. The degree of 
securitisation can be analysed by combining, counting, weighting and classifying the set of primary 
sources along the basic spectrum of (highly) securitising, neutral, or (highly) de-securitisation 
parameter values, complemented by an assessment of a possible (re-)allocation of resources, the 
overall strength of the security discourse and the composition of the group of securitisers (see 
chapters 2.3.1 and 2.5.6.1.).105 In this way, it can be assessed whether and how the EU documents 
qualify as securitising speech acts and emergency measures.  
In turn, the analysis of the kind of securitisation is done by scrutinising the security understanding(s) 
of the BSE/TSEs securitisation as comprised in the set of EU documents. In this context it will be of 
particular interest to investigate into the BSE/TSEs-related security construction as made up by the 
definition(s) of the threat, the threatened referent objects and the provision of security. In order to 
retrieve respective information from the EU legal output the list of security parameters as developed 
in chapter 2.3.2.2 serves as a basic questionnaire.106 In order to also draw also lessons regarding the 
securitising actors at the EU level, the investigation into the degrees and kinds of securitisation of 
BSE/TSEs is complemented by a cross-cutting section that explores the role of the different EU actors 
in the securitisation process. 
 
5.5.1. The Degree of Securitisation 
Given the long period under scrutiny the analysis of the securitisation degree is split into four phases 
which reflect the overall securitisation development. The first and second section cover the years 
from 1989 to 1995 and from 1996 to 1997 respectively, the third and fourth section deal with the 
years between 1998 and 1999 and between 2000 and 2002. At the end of each phase a table 
provides an overview of the analysed BSE/TSEs-related documents as well as an interpretation of 
their meaning for the overall securitisation degree of BSE/TSEs in line with the classification system, 
including securitisation scores as established in chapter 2.5.6.1 (see Table 2-4). 
 
5.5.1.1. The Years from 1989 to 1995 
For the late 1980s and early 1990s, we find only few attempts to establish BSE as a security threat, 
although the Commission occasionally labelled BSE a “serious contagious or infectious animal disease 
whose presence may constitute a danger to cattle” (European Commission, 1989). By referring to the 
problem as a matter that bears “minimal risk for consumers” (European Commission, 1990b), 
however, the overall concern at that time was located outside the security realm. First weak 
exceptional measures in veterinary and common market policy were adopted in the early 1990s 
regarding the notification of detected BSE cases and the introduction of additional requirements for 
some tissues and organs with respect to BSE (European Commission, 1990f, 1990b), followed by 
                                                          
105
 See Figure 2-3: From A-Politic to Highly Securitised – The Indicators of the Securitisation Degree. 
106
 See Table 2-1: Parameters to Distinguish Infectious Disease-Related Security Concepts. 
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stronger counter measures in 1994 which included British beef health certificates (European 
Commission, 1994c), provisions regarding the inactivation of BSE agents (European Commission, 
1994b) as well as first limited dispatch bans of live cattle from the UK (European Commission, 
1994d). Given some derogations and limitations that followed from amendments of original counter 
measures, also de-securitising elements occurred in the legal output.  
Although some of these measures can be categorised as ‘weakly securitising’ extraordinary 
measures, in particular the restrictions on the dispatch of bovine embryos and live cattle from the UK 
(European Commission, 1992a, 1994d), the wordings of the respective legal output only seldom 
employed clear security language. Still, the exceptional meeting of the Council on BSE in June 1990 
and a hand full of questions brought up by the Parliament between 1989 and 1995 document that 
the disease was about to be securitised temporarily also in the verbal dimension. All in all, given the 
limited number of speech acts and emergency measures in combination with the occasional and 
weak use of security language by the Commission and the Parliament as the main securitisers, both 
of which range not highest in the political hierarchies, the years between 1989 and 1995 can be 
understood as a period in which BSE/TSEs became politicised – rather than downright securitised. 
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Table 5-2: BSE/TSEs-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures, 1989-1995 
OJ Date 
107
 
Author
108
 Reference
109
 Contents 
Securitisation
110
 
Doc. No.
111
 Verbal Oper. 
03.08.89 COM (European Commission, 
1989) 
Restrictions on the dispatch of certain live 
cattle from the UK 
++ + 
D 89/469/EEC 
15.02.90 COM 
(European Commission, 
1990d) 
Dispatch limitation to calves under 6 
months old only. Amendment of 
89/469/EEC 
o - 
D 90/59/EEC 
22.03.90 COM 
(European Commission, 
1990f) 
Compulsory notification of BSE and 
temporarily amending the frequency of 
notification for BSE 
++ + 
D 90/134/EEC 
25.04.90 COM (European Commission, 
1990b) 
Additional requirements for some tissues 
and organs with respect to BSE 
+ + 
D 90/200/EEC 
09.06.90 COM 
(European Commission, 
1990c) 
Guarantees on identification of animals and 
certification for beef dispatch from the UK. 
Amendment of 89/469/EEC and 
90/200/EEC 
+ + 
D 90/261/EEC 
16.07.90 EP (European Parliament, 
1990) 
Resolution on Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy (BSE) 
+ o 
n.a. 
22.02.91 COM 
(European Commission, 
1991) 
Financial provision for a project relating to 
the inactivation of the agents of scrapie and 
BSE  
 
o o 
D 91/89/EEC 
04.06.92 COM (European Commission, 
1992a) 
Restrictions on the dispatch of bovine 
embryos from the UK 
+ + 
D 92/290/EEC 
28.08.92 COM (European Commission, 
1992b) 
Compulsory notification of BSE (Repeals 
and replaces D 90/134/EEC) 
o + 
D 92/450/EEC 
07.07.94 COM 
(European Commission, 
1994e) 
Ban on the use of proteins derived from 
mammalian tissues for the feed of 
ruminants 
o + 
D 94/381/EC 
07.07.94 COM (European Commission, 
1994b) 
Processing of ruminant waste , inactivation 
of BSE agents 
o + 
D 94/382/EC 
29.07.94 COM 
(European Commission, 
1994d) 
Dispatch restrictions live cattle + ruminant 
products from UK; destruction of bovine 
offal 
o + 
D 94/474/EC 
17.12.94 COM (European Commission, 
1994c) 
Certification for beef dispatch from the UK. 
Amendment of 94/474/EC 
o + 
D 94/794/EC 
18.02.95 COM (European Commission, 
1995b) 
Batch rendering systems. Amendment of 
94/382/EC 
o + 
D 95/29/EC 
11.03.95 COM (European Commission, 
1995c) 
Derogation to the feed ban. Amendment of 
94/381/EC 
o - 
D 95/60/EC 
01.08.95 COM (European Commission, 
1995a) 
Certification for beef dispatch. Amendment 
of 94/474/EC 
o + 
D 95/287/EC 
+ 4 written questions from MEPs on BSE/TSEs (unclassified). 
Source: Own presentation.  
                                                          
107
 Date of publication of the document in the European Union’s Official Journal (OJ). 
108
 Official author of the document using the following abbreviations: Commission (COM), Council (CO), 
Parliament (EP), European Council (EUCO), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). 
109
 Document specification as used in the ‘List of References’ of the present study.  
110
 Along the verbal and the operational (oper.) dimension. 
111
 Official specification as provided in the document. ‘D’ means ‘Decision’, ‘R’ means ‘Regulation’. 
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5.5.1.2. The Years from 1996 to 1997 
The degree of securitisation underwent a strong development in 1996 and 1997. The change 
commenced with the ‘UK embargo’ of March 1996 which imposed, as an “emergency measures to 
protect against bovine spongiform encephalopathy”, an EU-wide export ban on British beef, products 
from bovine animals, live animals as well as meat- and bone-meal to both the entire EU as well as 
third countries (European Commission, 1996b).  
This unprecedented step was followed by various financial support measures, market interventions 
and BSE eradication programmes in the next 1,5 years. Broadly speaking, reactions had two 
objectives: 1) the elimination of (suspected) infected animals and products of animal origin as well as 
production and transport controls, and 2) financial support aiming at the alleviation of the 
consequences of the slaughtering and the fall of market prices.  
As regards the former, the eradication programmes in the UK, Portugal, France and Ireland 
(European Commission, 1996j, 1996a, 1997i, 1997g), the approval treatment systems for animal 
waste and shipping restrictions (European Commission, 1996l, 1997a) and the prohibition of the use 
of risk materials (brain, eyes, spinal cord) (European Commission, 1997f) made up for a 
comprehensive set of extraordinary measures explicitly targeted to combat BSE/TSEs. Due to the 
legal justification of these measures, partly referring to Council Directive 89/662/EEC (Council, 1989: 
Art. 9), the recitals and the legislation articles employed an explicit security language, referring to the 
disease as a “serious hazard to animals or to human health”. 
With a view to the economic implications of the crisis, the Council found that the market for beef 
was “seriously disturbed as a result of consumer concerns in relation to bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE)” (Council, 1996d) and facing “continuing serious difficulties” (Council, 1996c). 
Against this background a series of “exceptional support measures for the beef market” was adopted 
to support the United Kingdom as well as Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the 
Netherlands (European Commission, 1996d, 1996e, 1996g, 1997e, 1997d, 1997c), where veal calves 
imported from the United Kingdom had to be destroyed and where owners were compensated for 
the destruction under the market regulation rules (European Commission, 1996e). 
These interventions in the Internal Market, altering the rules on the free movement of goods and 
competition policy on the grounds of an urgent security situation, clearly meet the criterions of 
radical emergency measures, just as the compulsory slaughtering programmes. To illustrate, the UK’s 
‘over 30 months slaughter scheme' and the 'calf processing premium' together have resulted in the 
elimination of 1.1 million cows and 522.000 calves during 1996, which represented about 2% of the 
EU herd at that time (European Court of Auditors, 1997: 100). All in all, these measures accounted for 
a strong rise of the securitisation degree during 1996 and 1997 in both the verbal and the 
operational dimension. 
Furthermore, the labelling of these actions as “emergency measures [emphasis added] to protect 
against bovine spongiform encephalopathy” (European Commission, 1996b) and “exceptional 
support measures” (for instance European Commission, 1996h) speak a clear language (of 
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securitisation), just as statements declaring that “the British meal manufacturers caused a major 
threat to health” (European Parliament, 1997b). Although for the purpose of this analysis the 
BSE/TSEs-related written questions by Members of the European Parliament were not systematically 
assessed with regard to the inherent security discourse, the drastically risen number of 119 for the 
period from January 1996 to December 1997 in contrast to 4 for the period from January 1989 to 
December 1995 contributes to the picture of a risen prioritisation in the verbal dimension. Hence, in 
addition to an increased number and an increased strength of emergency measures, we observe an 
increased number of securitising speech acts with a clear prevalence of security language in the 
analysed key documents. 
Beyond that, for the period from 1996 onwards the analysis has revealed an enlarged group of 
securitisers, reaching from ‘weak’ actors such as the European Economic and Social Committee 
through the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council up to the highest political 
level, the European Council. The heads of state or government had started to become active in 
BSE/TSEs affairs in June 1996 following the UK’s ‘empty-chair’ politics (European Council, 1996) 
which resulted in two parallel effects: On the one hand it led to a partial lifting of the ban for certain 
cattle products (European Commission, 1996f) and thus to one of the few elements that contributed 
to a temporary de-securitisation. On the other, the UK’s approach ultimately accounted for the 
shifting of the matter to the highest political spheres which was involved in the crisis from then on, 
for instance addressing it in a separate declaration annexed to the Presidency Conclusions of the 
summit in Luxembourg (European Council, 1997).  
An extraordinary strong combination of securitisation moves was put forward by the European 
Parliament when it set up a Committee of Inquiry on BSE whose report was then combined with the 
announcement of a no-confidence motion. This motion bore the potential to cause the dismissal of 
the entire European Commission in case that no substantial reform was envisaged by the 
Commission (European Parliament, 1997b). 
All in all, the rising securitisation degree was thus also reflected in the change of the composition of 
the group of securitisers towards a higher number of securitisers, towards more influential 
securitisers and towards securitising moves that were linked to far-reaching consequences.  
Finally, part of the set of emergency measures was a substantial allocation of resources to support 
the combat of the disease and to finance related market support programmes (Council, 1996e, 
European Commission, 1996h, 1996i). The decision of the European Council in June 1996 that 
“funding of ECU 850 million will be devoted to supporting European livestock farmers seriously 
affected by this crisis” (European Council, 1996) is a good example for this development. The figures 
presented by the Court of Auditors specify ECU 1.022,3 million post-BSE budgetary expenditure in 
1996 (European Court of Auditors, 1997: Table 4.1., 101) and a total of ECU 2.149 million of BSE-
related expenditure of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund in 1996 and 1997, 
which constituted an increase of 32 per cent in relation to the normal premium scheme expenditure 
(European Court of Auditors, 1998a: 6, 19). 
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To sum up, given the amount and the strength of emergency measures, the radical allocation of 
resources, a dominant security discourse and an increasing number of both speech acts as well as 
(politically strong) securitisers, the EU’s reaction made up for a high securitisation degree in the years 
from 1996 to 1997, on both the verbal as well as the operational level. 
 
Table 5-3: BSE/TSEs-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures, 1996-1997 
OJ Date Author 
Reference Contents 
Securitisation 
Doc. No. Verbal Oper. 
28.03.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996b) 
‘UK embargo’; Total dispatch ban for live 
cattle and all cattle products from the UK 
++ ++ 
D 96/239/EC 
20.04.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996h) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market in the United Kingdom 
++ + 
R 716/96 
20.04.96 COM 
(European Commission, 
1996i) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
and veal market in Belgium, France and 
Netherlands 
++ + 
R 717/96 
22.04.96 EP (European Parliament, 
1996d) 
Resolution on the Commission' s measures 
with regard to BSE 
++ o 
B4-0458/96 
12.06.96 COM 
(European Commission, 
1996f) 
Conditional lifting of the ban for certain 
cattle products. Amendment of D 
96/239/EC 
o - 
D 96/362/EC 
21.06.96 EUCO 
(European Council, 1996) 
Support for producers affected by the fall in 
beef consumption and by the impact on 
market prices 
+ ++ 
SN 300/96 
22.06.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996a) 
Eradication programme for BSE in Portugal + ++ 
D 96/381/EC 
26.06.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996j) 
Eradication programme for BSE in the UK + ++ 
D 96/385/EC 
05.07.96 CO 
(Council, 1996b) 
Multidisciplinary scientific committee 
entrusted to launch activities 
o + 
96/C 194/01 
08.07.96 EP (European Parliament, 
1996a) 
Major crisis within EU; disastrous economic 
repercussions for the agricultural industry 
++ o 
B4-0733 
13.07.96 CO 
(Council, 1996e) 
Additional payments to be made in 1996 
with the premiums 
+ ++ 
R 1357/96 
24.07.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996l) 
Pressure cooking to inactivate TSE agents 
when processing mammalian waste 
o + 
D 96/449/EC 
27.07.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996d) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market in the United Kingdom 
+ ++ 
R 1484/96 
30.07.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996g) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market in Portugal 
+ ++ 
R 1508/96 
17.08.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996c) 
Proposal to establish a European Agency 
for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Inspection 
+ o 
COM(96) 223 final 
07.10.96 EESC 
(EESC, 1996) 
Opinion on BSE crisis and its wide-ranging 
consequences for the European Union 
++ o 
96/ C 295/13 
13.11.96 COM (European Commission, 
1996k) 
Research initiative on BSE + + 
COM(96) 582 final 
11.12.96 CO 
(Council, 1996a) Conclusions on cooperation in BSE matters + o 
96/C 374/02 
21.12.96 CO 
(Council, 1996c) 
Additional direct support measures for 
producers' incomes / for the beef and veal 
sector 
+ ++ 
R 2443/96 
10.01.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997i) 
Eradication programme for BSE in France + ++ 
D 97/18/EC 
31.01.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997e) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market in France 
+ ++ 
R 164/97 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
20.02.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997d) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
and veal market in Germany 
+ ++ 
R 299/97 
07.05.97 CO 
(Council, 1997a) 
Systems for the Identification and 
Registration of Bovine Animals and 
Labelling of Beef 
+ ++ 
R 820/97 
24.05.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997g) Eradication programme for BSE in Ireland 
+ ++ 
D 97/312/EC 
19.06.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997c) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market in Ireland 
+ ++ 
R 1112/97 
08.08.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997f) 
Prohibition of the use of risk materials 
(brain, eyes, spinal cord) 
+ + 
D 97/534/EC 
28.10.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997a) 
Animal waste treatment and shipping; 
Restrictions on trade 
o + 
D 97/735/EC 
06.12.97 COM (European Commission, 
1997b) 
Protection of workers from risks related to 
exposure to spong. enceph. agents at work 
+ + 
D 97/65/EC 
08.12.97 EP 
(European Parliament, 
1997a) 
Follow-up Committee on BSE: considerable 
steps toward making the action to combat 
BSE 
- o 
B4-0920ff 
12.12.97 EUCO 
(European Council, 1997) 
Declaration by the European Council on 
food safety 
++ o 
SN400/97 
+ 119 written questions from Members of the European Parliament on BSE/TSEs (unclassified). 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
5.5.1.3. The Years from 1998 to 1999 
In terms of speech acts and emergency measures the situation generally eased in 1998 and 1999. 
Although a series of securitising elements both on the verbal and the operational dimension occurred 
in the legal output, in particular related to the notification of BSE and TSEs (operational) (European 
Commission, 1998e, 1998h) and in the framework of the retrospective analysis of the previous years 
(verbal) (European Commission, 1998i, European Court of Auditors, 1998b), the general tenor of BSE-
related legal output was rather unagitated. Many of the key documents of this period were follow-up 
measures of the dynamic years before, for instance in the form of extensions of temporary measures 
or minor amendments of previous legislation. The basic message, however, was that the institutions 
had responded to the disease and that a series of effective counter measures were put in place 
(European Commission, 1998b). By dealing with the disease in a tranquilised manner without the 
adoption of further extraordinary measures, BSE/TSEs moved back into the realm of a lowly 
securitised disease.  
In contrast to the overall trend, one exception took place in response to the situation in Portugal, 
when Commission inspections led to “serious concerns with regard to the development of the 
disease in the near future” (European Commission, 1998a) and served as the justification for a total 
ban on the dispatch of live cattle and all cattle products from Portugal, the so called ‘Portugal 
embargo’ (European Commission, 1998c, 1999d). Naturally, respective documents shifted the topic 
to greater securitisation heights. However, at the same time, the partial and stepwise lifting of the 
‘UK embargo’ also accounted for a number of de-securitising elements (European Commission, 
1998a, 1999a).  
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Beyond the review of previous activities and the follow-up work resulting from the previous period, 
also the elaboration and implementation of additional regulation, for instance with regard to 
specified risk materials, the treatment of animal waste and the beef labelling system was still on the 
agenda (Council, 1999a, 1999b). These initiatives, however, were of a technical nature and did not 
entail significant elements of securitisation, neither in form of security language nor in the form of 
far reaching emergency measures. Although the need for further reforms “to deal, in a coordinated, 
effective and timely manner with this kind of crisis” in the future was voiced (European Court of 
Auditors, 1998b), neither substantial regulatory nor new market measures were introduced in this 
period (European Court of Auditors, 2001: 10).  
All in all, it becomes clear that in 1998 and 1999 BSE/TSEs were no longer treated as an exceptional 
and prioritised issue. This interpretation is also supported by the lower number of written questions 
by Members of the European Parliament, which did not exceed the number of 33 in total for the 
entire period. 
 
Table 5-4: BSE/TSEs-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures, 1998-1999 
OJ Date Author 
Reference Contents 
Securitisation 
Doc No. Verbal Oper. 
08.01.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998h) 
Further compulsory notification of BSE. Repeals 
and replaces D 92/450/EEC. 
o + 
D 98/12/EC 
27.01.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998i) 
Report on the Integration of Health Protection 
Requirements in Community Policies (1996) 
+ o 
COM(1998) 34 final 
06.04.98 EP (European Parliament, 
1998) 
Resolution on the Commission Green Paper on 
the general principles of food law in the EU 
o o 
A4-0009/98 
15.04.98 CO 
(Council, 1998c) 
Partial lifting of UK embargo (Northern Ireland), 
reinforcement of controls. Repeals D 
96/239/EC 
+ o 
D 98/256/EC 
24.04.98 COM 
(European Commission, 
1998e) 
Requirements for diagnostic staff &notification 
of TSE; Epidemio-surveillance for all animal 
TSEs 
o + 
D 98/272/EC 
06.05.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998b) 
First Bi-Annual BSE Follow-Up Report 
 
o o 
COM(98) 282 final 
30.05.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998d) 
Commence of dispatch from Northern Ireland 
on 01.06.1998 
- - 
D 98/351/EC 
04.06.98 CO 
(Council, 1998b) Council Conclusions on TSEs o o 
98/C 169/02 
04.06.98 CO 
(Council, 1998a) 
Council Conclusions on the integration of 
health protection requirements in Community 
policies  
o o 
98/C 169/01 
30.07.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998g) 
Information necessary to support applications 
for the evaluation of Member States’ TSE status 
+ o 
98/477/EC 
17.11.98 ECA (European Court of 
Auditors, 1998b) 
Annual Report concerning the financial year 
1997. Need for crisis action plan 
+ o 
98/C 349/01 
20.11.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998c) 
‘Portugal embargo’; Total dispatch ban for live 
cattle and all cattle products from the UK 
++ ++ 
D 98/653/EC 
05.12.98 COM (European Commission, 
1998a) 
Principles of further lifting of the UK embargo 
under the Date-based Export Scheme 
- - - 
D 98/692/EC 
09.12.98 ECA (European Court of 
Auditors, 1998a) 
Special Report No 19/98: Community Financing 
of Measures Taken as a Result of the BSE Crisis 
+ o 
98/C 383/01 
28.07.99 COM (European Commission, 
1999a) 
Commence of dispatch of certain bovine 
products from the UK on 01.08.1999 
- - 
D 1999/514/EC 
(continued) 
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(continued) 
29.07.99 COM (European Commission, 
1999d) 
Extension of the Portugal embargo + ++ 
D 99/517/EC 
18.11.98 COM (European Commission, 
1999b) Second Bi-Annual BSE Follow-Up Report 
o o 
COM(98) 598 final 
30.07.99 EP (European Parliament, 
1999) 
Resolution on Second Bi-Annual BSE Follow-Up 
Report 
++ o 
A4-0083/99 
04.08.99 CO 
(Council, 1999a) 
Conditions for the processing of certain animal 
waste. Repeals D 96/449/EC 
o o 
D 1999/534/EC 
04.11.99 COM (European Commission, 
1999c) 
Dispatch of meat and bone meal for 
incineration and fighting bulls 
o o 
D 1999/713/EC 
01.12.99 SSC 
(James et al., 1999) 
A European Food and Public Health Authority: 
The Future of Scientific Advice in the EU 
(Report Presented to the European 
Commission)  
+ o 
 
11.12.99 EUCO (European Council, 
1999) 
Presidency Conclusions on public health and 
food safety 
+ o 
00300/1/99 
28.12.99 CO 
(Council, 1999b) 
Temporary application of rules for a 
compulsory beef labelling system  
o o 
R 2772/1999 
+ 33 written questions from MEPs on BSE (unclassified). 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
5.5.1.4. The Years from 2000 to 2001 
The year 2000 started with yet another extension of the Portugal embargo (European Commission, 
2000g) and continued over the summer with various securitising initiatives. In the verbal dimension, 
the report by the Scientific Steering Committee on the geographical risk of BSE, arguing that BSE 
constituted a cross-national threat with the potential to affect basically every country in Europe, set 
a new starting point for the re-securitisation of the disease (Scientific Steering Committee, 2000). The 
introduction of BSE tests (European Commission, 2000f) and reinforced surveillance measures 
(European Commission, 2000l) were soon followed by new emergency measures and revealed that 
the disease had in fact not been dealt with in a terminatory manner. Similar to the first BSE/TSEs 
securitisation wave in 1996/1997, counter measures had two interconnected targets: the monitoring 
and eradication of the disease as a threat to health in all Member States on the one hand, backed up 
by the allocation of additional financial contributions (Council, 2000, European Commission, 2000c, 
2000f), and the financial support of the beef market on the other (European Commission, 2000i, 
2000b, European Council, 2001c).  
The special market support and further exceptional support measures in the beef sector (European 
Commission, 2001j, 2001h), the large scale monitoring and testing programme (European 
Commission, 2001k, 2001n), and additional provisions as regards risk materials (European 
Commission, 2001o) and feeding stuff (European Commission, 2001a) were also carried on in 2001, 
before in August the end of the ‘Portugal embargo’ marked the beginning of a falling securitisation 
degree. 
A major difference between the securitisation in 1996/1997 and in 2000/2001 was the scope of the 
measures. In the first wave the issue was primarily a British and to some extend a Portuguese 
problem that was exported to a limited set of Member States and thus demanded Community 
action; nevertheless, BSE/TSEs remained first and foremost a national issue. In contrast, the second 
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wave established BSE/TSEs as a fully-fledged Community problem that demanded rapid and 
encompassing reactions in all Member States. Another important difference was that in the 
operational dimension of securitisation, measures were not primarily of responsive nature anymore. 
Beyond immediate protective measures, also surveillance measures significantly contributed to the 
securitisation of BSE/TSEs. Interestingly, these surveillance measures had been triggered as a 
consequence of the first securitisation wave and were finally put in place in June 2000. From then, 
the reinforced monitoring activities in the year 2000 constituted an important factor to move 
BSE/TSEs out of the area of a non- or weakly securitised matter into the realm of a highly securitised 
matter again.  
In addition to the high securitisation of BSE/TSEs in the operational dimension, the accompanying 
justifications of the legal output also contributed to the securitisation of BSE/TSEs in the verbal 
dimension. Addressing the “instability in the market in beef and beef products caused by the bovine 
spongiform encephalopathy crisis” (European Parliament and Council, 2000) and the “deep crisis” in 
the beef sector characterised by “[c]onsumption as well as production [rates] fallen to 
unprecedented levels” (European Commission, 2000i), however, indicate that the lack of consumer 
confidence and the questions of transparency and communication in food safety affairs dominated 
the discourse. In this context the disease also appeared several times on the agenda of the European 
Council. The heads of state or government showed not only concern about the “severity of the 
situation in the agriculture sector” (European Council, 2001c) and welcomed the market support 
measures, but in this context also stressed a further revision of the structural setup (European 
Council, 2000a, 2000b). 
All in all, between summer 2000 and spring 2001 the securitisation of BSE in the EU entered a second 
phase of a strongly rising degree, with a peak at the end of the year 2000. The high securitisation 
degree was to a large extent result of the strong statements and emergency measures related to the 
combat of the disease and the support of the respective market, including the comprehensive 
allocation of funds. After BSE-related expenditures had already added up to 2.149 million for the 
years 1996 and 1997 (European Court of Auditors, 1998a: 6), the overall share in the EU budget to 
implement market support measures for the years between 1996 and 2000 added up to 4.696 
million Euros (European Court of Auditors, 2001: 3). Seeing that BSE/TSE-related measures were 
taken beyond the field of market support and also by Member States individually, the total costs 
were even much higher.  
Beyond that, further steps to close existing regulatory gaps supported the trend, for instance related 
to animal feeding or specified risk materials. The fact that utterances were issued by basically the full 
set of EU actors involved, ranging from the Scientific Steering Committee and the Court of Auditors 
through the Parliament and the Commission to the Council and the European Council, supports the 
classification of BSE/TSEs as highly securitised in the years between 2000 2001. Most likely, the 
overall assessment would be even clearer if the numerous written questions from Member of the 
European Parliament were systematically classified and included in the analysis; they added up to 98 
for the years 2000/2001 and stand thus in stark contrast to 33 in the period from 1998 to 1999. 
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Table 5-5: BSE/TSEs-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures, 2000-2001 
OJ Date Autor 
Reference Contents 
Securitisation 
Doc No. Verbal Oper. 
04.02.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000g) 
Extension of the Portugal embargo + ++ 
D 2000/104/EC 
23.05.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000n) 
Starting date for the dispatch from Portugal of 
meat/bone meal for the purpose of incineration 
o o 
D 2000/345/EC 
07.06.00 COM 
(European Commission, 
2000o, 2000p) 
Starting date for the dispatch from Portugal of 
fighting bulls to France and Spain 
o o D 2000/371/EC 
D 2000/372/EC 
08.06.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000f) 
Introduction of rapid post-mortem test in 
monitoring for BSE 
o + 
D 2000/374/EC 
19.06.00 EUCO (European Council, 
2000a) 
Presidency Conclusions on public health and 
food safety 
+ o 
SN 200/1/00 REV 1 
30.06.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000e) 
Prohibition of the use of risk materials. Repeals D 
97/534/EC 
+ + 
D 2000/418/EC 
06.07.00 SSC (Scientific Steering 
Committee, 2000) 
Geographical Risk of Bovine Spongiform 
Encephalopathy 
++ o 
 
11.08.00 EP/CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2000) 
Revision identification and registration system of 
bovine animals; Community beef labelling 
system. Repeals R 820/97 
+ ++ 
R 1760/2000 
06.12.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000l) 
Reinforcement of the surveillance; Amendment 
of D 98/272/EC 
+ + 
D 2000/764/EC 
07.12.00 CO 
(Council, 2000) 
Prohibition of the feeding of processed 
animal proteins 
+ ++ 
D 2000/766/EC 
08.12.00 EUCO (European Council, 
2000b) 
Pres. Conclusions on combat of BSE, market 
support measures and European Food Authority 
+ o 
SN 400/1/00 
08.12.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000c) 
BSE monitoring and eradication programmes in 
all Member States; financial contribution 
+ ++ 
D 2000/773/EC 
19.12.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000i) 
Exceptional support measures for the beef 
market 
++ ++ 
R 2777/2000 
19.12.00 COM (European Commission, 
2000b) 
Further exceptional support measures for the 
beef market in Germany 
+ + 
R 2778/2000 
04.01.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001o) 
Extension of risk materials; Intestines of all 
bovines any age. Amendment of D 2000/418/EC 
o + 
D 2001/2/EC 
05.01.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001i) 
BSE surveillance and testing. Amendment of D 
2000/764/EC and update of D 98/272/EC 
o o 
D 2001/8/EC 
05.01.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001l) 
Conditions for feeding certain animal proteins o o 
D 2001/9/EC 
11.01.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001a) 
Prohibition of the use of dead animals in the 
production of animal feed 
+ ++ 
D 2001/25/EC 
20.01.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001j) 
Further exceptional support measures for the 
beef market in Luxembourg 
+ + 
R 112/2001 
23.03.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001d) 
Extension of the list of risk materials. 
Amendment of D 2000/418/EC 
+ + 
D 2001/233/EC 
24.03.01 EUCO (European Council, 
2001c) 
Presidency Conclusions on the situation in the 
agricultural sector 
+ o 
100/1/01 
05.04.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001h) 
Special market support measures in the beef 
sector 
+ ++ 
R 690/2001 
15.05.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001f) 
Principles for lifting the Portuguese ban; Date-
based Export Scheme. Repeals D 98/653/EC 
- - 
D 2001/376/EC 
28.07.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001g) 
Commence of dispatch of bovine products from 
Portugal on 01.08.2001 
- - 
D 2001/5777EC 
20.11.01 ECA (European Court of 
Auditors, 2001) 
Follow-up Special Report on BSE + o 
2001/C 324/01 
04.12.01 COM (European Commission, 
2001k) 
BSE monitoring and eradication programmes in 
all Member States; financial contribution 
+ ++ 
D 2001/854/EC 
Source: Own presentation.  
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5.5.1.5. The Rise and Fall of the Securitisation Degree 
We see that bovine and transmissible spongiform encephalopathies were subject to various 
responses and reform processes at the EU level. The basic constituents for a securitisation of the 
disease (speech acts and extraordinary counter measures issued by EU securitisers) were clearly part 
of these political developments. Speech acts that declared BSE/TSEs a serious threat which demands 
top priority counter action have occurred in all phases of the process from EU actors of various kinds. 
First emergency measures to respond – as a matter of urgency – to a threatening situation related to 
BSE were adopted in 1996 and continued until the end of the period under scrutiny. 
All in all, the analysis has shown that the securitisation degree underwent a series of basically four 
phases. Between the beginning of first securitisation moves in the late 1980s until the end of the 
period of analysis in 2002, the disease has reached the status of a highly securitised issue two times: 
first during the securitisation wave in 1996/1997 and again during the years 2000/2001. The 
allocation of funds, the composition of the group of securitisers and also singular events and 
documents such as the ‘empty-chair politics’ of the UK government in 1996 and the Parliament’s 
menace to table a motion of censure against the Commission in 1997, support the overall 
interpretation of BSE/TSEs as an extraordinary issue beyond the realm of normal every day-to-day 
politics in these particular periods. 
As developed in chapter 2.5.6.1, the present study does not claim to offer a precise measurement of 
the securitisation or the expression of the securitisation degree in form of an index. Still, a schematic 
representation of the securitisation degree is valuable to illustrate the phases and peaks of the (de-) 
securitisation process. Such an illustration to reflect the number of utterances as well as their 
classification along the securitisation spectrum between lowly and highly (de-)securitising is possible 
in a timeline, if the scores of the securitising moves as classified in Table 5-2, Table 5-3, Table 5-4 and 
Table 5-5 are set off against the de-securitising elements for the given period.112 In this way, without 
taking into account the further indicators for the securitisation degree, the rise and fall of the overall 
securitisation of BSE/TSEs becomes visible. 
                                                          
112
 ++ accounts for 2 on the y-axis, + for 1, o for 0, - for -1 and -- for -2. See chapter 2.5.6.1. 
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Source: Own presentation on the basis of securitisation degree scores assigned to the documents listed in Table 5-2, Table 
5-3, Table 5-4 and Table 5-5. 
 
Considering that a securitisation in both the verbal as well as the operational dimension is necessary 
to meet the criteria of a high securitisation degree, it is valuable to break the securitisation degree 
into the two dimensions. The distinction between speech acts and emergency measures reveals that 
in some years (1992, 1994 and 1997) the EU legal output securitised BSE/TSEs stronger in the 
operational dimension than in the verbal dimension. This circumstance can be explained to some 
extent by the selection of documents. Clearly, EU legal output derived from the EUR-Lex database 
contains a disproportionately high number of activity-related documents, the relative share of which 
would be much lower if parliamentary debates, press releases etc. were included in the analysis. 
Hence, it is not possible to put the two dimensions into absolute relation. However, it is interesting 
to note that the EU apparently adopted many measures in response to the diseases, dealing with it 
as an exceptional matter, without clearly defining a threat or providing explanations for the 
measures in security language in the same document. All in all, taking together the elements from 
the full set of analysed documents, the securitisation degree can be assessed to peak high at least 
temporarily in both dimensions. 
 
Table 5-6: The Degree of Securitisation of BSE/TSEs Across Securitisation Dimensions 
 Verbal Securitisation Degree 
Operational 
Securitisation 
Degree 
 Low High 
High Medium BSE/TSEs 
Low Low Medium 
Source: Own presentation.  
Diagram 5-1: The Rise and Fall of the Securitisation of BSE/TSEs (1989-2001) 
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Whereas Diagram 5-1 could illustrate that a high number of securitising moves shifted BSE/TSES 
(temporarily) into the security realm, it does not show the relative strength of the security discourse 
within the set of analysed EU documents. To substantiate the finding that security concerns were a 
dominant point of reference for the EU’s activities, it helps classify the documents along the broad 
categories of either the securitisation ( + + and + ), the neutral ( o ) or de-securitisation realm ( - and - 
- ) for the verbal securitisation dimension as provided in Table 5-7 (see below). By doing so it 
becomes clear that the total number of analysed BSE/TSEs-related documents was located in the 
former realm during the second (1996-1997) and the fourth (2000-2001) securitisation phase with 
shares of roughly 84 and 70 per cent respectively. In contrast, in the years from 1989 to 1995 and 
from 1998 to 1999 we observe a share clearly under 50 per cent of verbally securitising EU output.  
A similar result can be found by calculating the average securitisation score (Ø) assigned to the 
complete EU disease-related output for a given period. As explained in chapter 2.5.6.1 this mean can 
be calculated by the division of the sum of all values of all utterances by the total number of 
utterances. Given the low number of de-securitising moves the average is above 0 in all phases. 
Assessed against a possible maximum score of +2, the scores of roughly +1 and +0,7 can be 
considered as high in the second (1996/1997) and still relatively high also in the fourth (2000/2001) 
securitisation phase.113  
All in all, the calculations regarding the share of securitising elements as well as regarding the 
average securitisation score support the view that a strong security discourse on BSE/TSEs can be 
verified in particular for the two periods in which we also witnessed the highest number of EU output 
and the highest total securitisation score, namely in 1997/1997 and 2000/2001. The following table 
shows in detail the average for each period as well as the distribution of the analysed documents 
along the spectrum between highly securitising and highly de-securitising speech acts and emergency 
measures. 
  
                                                          
113
 In this context two particularities should be noted. First, of a total number of 96 analysed documents only 9 
documents contained a de-securitising component. This circumstance feeds into the finding that the average 
score for all securitisation phases was above 0. Second, the figures for the first period (1989-1995) have to be 
put in perspective, since the period covers, in contrast to the other phases, 6 and not only 2 years. The total 
number of 16 documents for the entire period is very low in comparison to the other phases. Hence, despite 
certain strength of the security discourse on BSE/TSEs reflected in the average score, the overall presence of 
the issue was too low to qualify BSE/TSEs as a highly securitised matter between 1989 and 1995.  
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Table 5-7: The Strength of the Security Discourse on BSE/TSEs
114
 
Securitisation 
score115 
        securitising   neutral     de-securitising  
2 1 0 -1 -2 total Ø 
1
9
8
9
 -
 9
5
 Nr. of Docs. 2 4 10 0 0 16 
0,50 % 12,50% 25,00% 62,50% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
% / Cat. 37,50% 62,50% 0,00% 100,00% 
1
9
9
6
 -
 9
7
 Nr. of Docs. 8 18 4 1 0 31 
1,06 % 25,81% 58,06% 12,90% 3,23% 0,00% 100,00% 
% / Cat. 83,87% 12,90% 3,23% 100,00% 
1
9
9
8
 -
 9
9
 Nr. of Docs. 2 8 10 3 0 23 
0,39 % 8,70% 34,78% 43,48% 13,04% 0,00% 100,00% 
% / Cat 43,48% 43,48% 13,04% 100,00% 
2
0
0
0
 -
 0
1
 Nr. of Docs. 2 16 6 2 0 26 
0,69 % 7,69% 61,54% 23,08% 7,69% 0,00% 100,00% 
% / Cat. 69,23% 23,08% 7,69% 100,00% 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the securitisation scores assigned to the documents in the verbal securitisation 
dimension as specified in Table 5-2, Table 5-3, Table 5-4 and Table 5-5. 
 
5.5.2. The Kind of Securitisation 
The assessment of the rise and fall of the securitisation degree in the verbal and operational 
dimension does not allow making statements on the underlying security understanding with which 
BSE/TSEs were securitised at the EU level. In order to elaborate on the kind of securitisation the 
following section explores the EU’s key activities and documents along the list of security parameters 
as developed in chapter 2.3.2.2, ranging from the definition of the referent object(s), through the 
definition of the threat to the definition of the provision of security (see Table 2-1). 
In this vein, identifying the referent object(s), the source, speed, geography, severity and 
predictability of the threat as well as the actors, policies and measures to provide security as 
specified in the EU legal output will help understand with which understanding BSE/TSEs were 
constructed as a security issue. The previous chapters have already indicated that several of the 
securitisation parameters changed their value in the course of the crisis, but we will also see in the 
following that different security constructions existed in parallel at the same time. However, since 
changes in terms of the kind of securitisation of BSE/TSEs were less dynamic than in terms of the 
degree of securitisation, the analysis does not have to follow the short time sections used in the 
previous chapter, but can be provided in a single, complete overview.  
 
                                                          
114
 ‘Nr. of Docs.’ specifies the number of documents with the respective score. ‘%’ refers to the share of the 
respective group of documents with the same securitisation score in per cent of the total number of 
documents. ‘% Cat.’ summarises the share of the two securitising (+2, +1), the neutral (0) and the two de-
securitising categories (-1, -2) into three broader categories, specified in per cent of the total number of 
documents. ‘Ø’ refers to the average score as calculated by the division of the sum of all scores of all EU 
documents by the number of documents for the specified periods. 
115
 Securitisation score in line with Table 2-4 which relates + + to 2, + to 1, o to 0, - to -1 and - - to -2. 
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5.5.2.1. The Securitisation Parameters 
For the late 1980s and early 1990s, we find first attempts to establish BSE as a security threat by 
labelling it “serious contagious or infectious animal disease whose presence may constitute a danger 
to cattle” (European Commission, 1989) and contingently a “minimal risk for consumers” (European 
Commission, 1990b). Translating such references to the securitisation vocabulary means to identify 
the referent objects of the BSE threat at this time as animals, only a couple of which, that is a small 
number of referent objects, were found to be threatened by the disease. Measures took place at the 
national level, because BSE was regarded first and foremost a problem of animal health in or of the 
UK, which was also expected to be solved by the UK. Still, the disease considered to carry a potential 
risk also for other Member States. 
Interestingly, the rise of the securitisation degree in 1996/1997 was accompanied by a fundamental 
change of the kind of securitisation. The BSE agent was classified by the Commission’s Advisory 
Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) as a human pathogen in 1997 only (European Court of 
Auditors, 1998a: 5), but it was with the start of the ‘UK embargo’ that the primary referent object 
threatened by BSE/TSEs was no longer the cattle population of the UK, but humans who were seen at 
risk to acquire a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease. Besides, also the number of (potential) 
referent objects rose dramatically as BSE/TSEs were no longer seen as a British problem only. In fact, 
the disease quickly became subject to interventions also in EU countries outside the UK. At the same 
time, the predictability of the threat was still considered problematically low; whereas some of the 
analysed documents explicitly speak about a high or serious risk, in particular the Commission 
generally seems to have had avoided formulations that declared the de facto transmissibility of BSE 
to humans. The uncertainty regarding the disease can be found interlined in formulations such as 
that “a definitive stance on the transmissibility of BSE to humans is not possible” (European 
Commission, 1996b). 
In parallel to the shift of the primary referent away from animals to humans, the beef market in 
specific countries, producers of beef and veal and eventually the entire agriculture sector of the EU 
turned into equally important referent objects in the securitising measures of the EU. In this context 
the BSE/TSEs threat translated into BSE- and food safety-related “consumer concerns” (Council, 
1996e, European Commission, 1996b) which – in turn – threatened the beef and veal market. With 
other words, it was not BSE and the threatened health of animals or humans that was problematic 
from an economic point of view, but the “lack of consumer confidence” following from the BSE crisis 
(European Commission, 1996i, Council, 1997a, European Council, 1997).  
This interlinkage of BSE/TSEs, consumer confidence and the beef market was also coined by the 
Court of Auditors when summarising the developments of the year 1996/1997 as follows: “[t]he 
Community beef market was pushed to the verge of collapse almost overnight as consumer 
confidence plummeted” (European Court of Auditors, 1998a: 27). Beyond that, given the nature of 
the measures intervening in the free movements of goods, BSE/TSEs were ultimately constructed as 
a threat to the Community’s Internal Market as a whole, as illustrated by the Commission’s 
Communication on consumer health and food safety which stated that “[r]ecent experience ha[d] 
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clearly demonstrated that food safety is not only of concern to the consumer, but is also at the very 
root of a proper functioning of the market” (European Commission, 1997j: 7). 
The parallel and interconnected securitisation of BSE/TSEs as a threat to the health of animals, the 
health of consumers, the confidence of consumers and, ultimately, the beef and veal market and the 
Internal Market as a whole is a phenomenon that can be observed for all years after 1996. In this 
context the problems related to BSE/TSEs became synonymous with problems related to food safety 
in general, even if the dioxin scandal in Belgian poultry in 1999, which is not covered by this analysis, 
fed into the development as well (Shears et al., 2001, Olsson, 2005, Lezaun and Groenleer, 2006, 
Groenleer, 2009: 179). 
Finally, in 2000 and 2001, the kind of securitisation underwent yet another important change due to 
the changing geography of the threat. More precisely, the major difference to the securitisation 
wave in 1996/1997 was that during these years the issue was primarily seen as a British and to some 
extend a Portuguese problem that occasionally spread into a limited number of other countries and 
therefore demanded Community action and support, but nevertheless remained first and foremost a 
national issue. EU surveillance and support measures were limited to few countries and the risk was 
not regarded high anymore that the disease could spread to further countries. In contrast, in 2000 
and 2001, BSE/TSEs were established as a fully-fledged threat across the entire Community that 
demanded rapid and encompassing reactions in all Member States. 
On the basis of this chronological overview of the evolution of the securitisation kind it is possible to 
assess the individual securitisation parameters one by one. The changes occurred in a way that the 
periods before 1996 and after 1996 are most clearly distinguishable, with further adjustments in 
2000.  
As regards the referent object of security, we have seen that a major change occurred from the 
health of animals to that of humans and, in parallel, to consumer confidence, the beef and veal 
sector and eventually the Internal Market. In addition, the number of referent objects changed from 
few (animals/humans/national markets) to many, in particular after 2000 when the BSE/TSEs 
problem was no longer seen as a problem of individual countries but as an issue for all Member 
States. 
Although the source of the threat was unknown until 1996 and is still disputed today, the 
construction of BSE/TSEs as a security threat never took place on the basis of suspicions regarding a 
deliberate release of a pathogen. Still, to some extent the disease was still considered ‘man-made’ 
after feeding practices and regulatory gaps in the foodstuff sector were identified as the main source 
of pathogenicity, that is the root causes that makes the disease a threat. In this context it is 
important to note that the threat for the beef market, strictly speaking, was not the disease as such 
but the lack of consumer confidence resulting from the BSE/TSE crisis.  
At no time of the period under scrutiny was the speed of the threat considered high, in particular not 
after the opinion became accepted that the infectious agent in TSEs could not be transmitted 
through the air or casual contact but only through direct contact with infected tissues or 
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consumption of infected animals. With the definition of BSE/TSEs as a food-borne disease in 1996, 
also the perception of the predictability of the disease increased to some extent, even if 
comprehensive surveillance measures that allowed for an accurate stock-taking of the situation were 
introduced only with the second securitisation wave. Despite the rather slow infection path, the wide 
spread of contaminated material at the time of detection and the sudden appearance of a 
(suspected) high number of infections in animals, in particular in 2000, however, contributed to the 
construction of BSE/TSEs as an outbreak-like event. All in all, given that the view prevailed that 
effective treatment of the disease did not exist, neither for BSE nor vCJD, that the threat of the 
disease appeared to have fatal consequences and that the morbidity in the animal stock was seen as 
relatively high, the impact of BSE/TSEs was established as critically severe. 
The geography of the threat, the securitisation parameter that covers the definition of the proximity 
of the threat, did not change between 1989 and 2001 when it comes to distinguishing between the 
EU and third countries. BSE/TSEs were, from the start, a European problem and despite some 
references to third countries in the framework of extra-EU trade, the disease was never explicitly 
constructed as a security problem for any other country or region in the world. Accordingly, the 
ethical stance to justify the response to the disease can be rather located in the idea of ‘self-
protection’, be it the own animals, citizens or market(s), although a clear assessment is difficult since 
truly ethical justifications and positions were hardly detectable in the analysed documents. 
Within the EU, however, the geography of the threat underwent a change, as we have seen, namely 
from the national (UK, Portugal) and limited EU level to the full regional (EU) level in 2000. 
Accordingly, the definition of the security provider was altered in a similar way. At the beginning of 
the crisis, disease surveillance and responsive measures such as slaughtering were left completely to 
the Member States, and EU regulation in the foodstuff sector was weak and patchy. The situation 
changed when EU actors started to regard the agriculture economy as being threatened, followed by 
substantial market support measures financed from the EU budget. And although the outbreak 
management to eradicate the disease was, on the operational level, principally left to the individual 
Member States, the Commission at least partially turned into a security provider in the (veterinary) 
health field, when it initiated and funded inspection trips to the Member States to monitor the 
disease and compliance with EU law.  
The analysis has shown that the adopted counter measures primarily fell into the realms of 
veterinary policy, food safety at the intersection of public health and consumer protection as well as 
the Internal Market and competition policy. Beyond that, BSE/TSEs were also addressed by trade and 
research policy. As for many securitisation parameters, a major change regarding the composition of 
the set of active policies took place in 1996. Whereas BSE/TSEs had been first and foremost a matter 
of veterinary policy before 1996, it turned into a matter of economic interventions and public health 
affairs afterwards, the latter not least due to the fact that the Amsterdam Treaty had moved 
veterinary policy with the objective to protect public health to the public health mandate of the EU.  
With a view to the target of the interventions along the interconnected categorisation of prevention, 
preparedness, surveillance and response, most initial measures were of responsive nature, best 
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illustrated by the various eradication and market support programmes which usually occurred as 
immediate emergency reaction. By closing regulatory gaps in the years after 1996, for instance 
regarding the specification of risk materials or provisions on the treatment of animal waste, 
preventive measures accompanied these immediate responses, before in 2000 also disease 
surveillance was expanded and strengthened. Finally, encompassing tools in the realm of disease 
preparedness, mostly related to the creation of EFSA, were introduced only as part of the legal and 
institutional reform packages rather than as part of the securitisation process. Against this 
background, we can retain as an overarching trend in the EU’s extraordinary measures in response to 
BSE/TSEs a shift from initially immediate response measures towards elements of persistent 
surveillance and prevention. All interventions, however, were targeted primarily internally at the 
national and EU level, with only side effects on extra-EU trade. 
 
5.5.2.2. Soft and/or Hard Securitisation 
The change of several security parameters in the course of the crisis makes it difficult to identify a 
clear-cut kind of securitisation of BSE/TSEs. The most consistent distinction can be made along the 
referent object, and the closely connected parameters of the primary policy and the target of the 
measures. Taking these parameters together, we can identify a ‘health-focused’ and an ‘economy-
focused’ securitisation of BSE/TSEs, the former employing the tools of veterinary policy and public 
health to protect human and animal from the disease, the latter concerned with the stabilisation of 
the affected industry sectors by relevant policy tools.  
Interestingly, the health-centric kind of securitisation appeared already before 1996 with a focus on 
animal health, but in this form did not exceed the status of a merely politicised matter. Only when 
the referent object changed to human, the health-centred securitisation kind also moved up to a 
higher securitisation degree. In other words, for the year 1996 we can observe a parallelism of the 
rise of the overall securitisation degree and the change of the kind of securitisation (from animal to 
health). Additionally, the economic kind of BSE/TSEs securitisation can be found from 1996 onwards, 
with a high degree particularly in the beginning of the first securitisation wave.  
The following Diagram 5-2 illustrates how the securitisation of BSE/TSEs was not only driven by 
(animal and human) health concerns, but also to a substantial, and occasionally even to a larger 
extent by economic concerns.116 Crucially, it reveals that BSE/TSEs reached the highest securitisation 
degrees at the EU level only when both health and economy were considered severely threatened at 
the same time.  
                                                          
116
 The importance of the economy-centred securitisation kind would be even clearer, if the allocation of funds 
was included in the illustration. 
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Source: Own presentation on the basis of securitisation degree scores assigned to the documents listed in Table 5-2, Table 
5-3, Table 5-4 and Table 5-5 divided along the distinction of the dominant referent object. 
 
In order to assess the overall kind of securitisation, it is helpful to structure the different elements of 
the securitisation process of BSE/TSEs along the extremes of the kind of securitisation of an 
infectious disease as developed in chapter 2.3.2.3, the soft kind of securitisation on the one hand, 
and the hard kind on the other.117 With a view of these ideal types, it can be argued that despite the 
differences between the health- and economy-centred securitisation, both strands can be classified 
as oriented more towards the hard securitisation extreme, rather than to the soft securitisation 
extreme. After 1996 the securitisation of BSE/TSEs was dominated by a rationale of the protection of 
a high number of human referent objects and of vital parts of the EU system in form of the economy 
against a slow but extremely close and suddenly occurring, very severe threat which turned more 
predictable only over the years. BST/TSEs were furthermore seen to be best combatted by strong 
and immediate interventions from Member States and the EU inside the EU territory by public 
measures that covered all forms of disease control. 
The following Table 5-8 provides a schematic classification of the securitisation of BSE/TSEs along the 
securitisation parameters. For each of the parameters a categorisation is provided on the basis of the 
examples developed for the soft and the hard kind, so that the securitisation of BSE/TSEs can be 
assorted for each parameter as leaning rather to the soft or to the strong extreme kind. Not designed 
to constitute an elaborate tool that expresses the securitisation kind with highest precision, the table 
still helps illustrate the findings that could be generated on the basis of the previous text analysis. It 
becomes visible in this way that the overall picture leans towards a hard security understanding 
across both securitisation dimensions. 
                                                          
117
 See chapter 2.3.2.3 and in particular Table 2-2. 
Diagram 5-2: The Securitisation Degree of the ‘Health’- and the ‘Economy’-Centred Kind of Securitisation (1989-2001) 
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Table 5-8: The Kind of Securitisation of BSE/TSEs (schematic) 
Dimension Security Parameter Soft Kind Hard Kind 
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Surveillance Global     x National / EU 
Prevention Global     x National / EU 
Preparedness Global     x National / EU 
Response Global     x National / EU 
Source: Own presentation.  
                                                          
118
 Initial referent objects were animals. 
119
 Feeding practices, lack of consumer confidence; not clearly attributable to either of the extremes. 
120
 Slowly spreading, but with character of an outbreak event due to the sudden detection of many cases. 
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5.5.3. The Role of the Different EU Actors 
Before it is possible to elaborate on the linkage between securitisation and institutionalisation in the 
case of the BSE/TSEs crisis, it belongs to the complete analysis of the form of securitisation to analyse 
not only when, how, in which dimensions, to what degree and in which kind BSE/TSEs were 
securitised at the EU level, but also by whom. Therefore, the next section offers a detailed look at the 
BSE/TSEs-related securitisation processes in view of the securitisers. 
We have observed that speech acts were issued by members of the European Parliament, from the 
Commission, the Court of Auditors, EU committees and also from the European Council. Although all 
these (and more) EU actors have issued speech acts, they differ significantly in terms of content and 
timing. On the operational securitisation dimension, the division of tasks among EU institutions plays 
an important role. Whereas the Commission in its role as the coordination hub of crisis management 
naturally was the source for numerous securitising activities, the Parliament could influence EU 
action in the revision of legislation in the co-decision procedure, but could seldom launch a 
securitising activity (operational dimension) itself. The motion of censure was a clear but powerful 
exception in this respect. The actors can be analysed in detail as follows: 
According to the data set employed for this study the European Commission was the most active 
securitising actor. In its role as the EU’s executive, it is not surprising that the majority of speech act-
like interventions and emergency measures were penned by her. The Commission was not only the 
most active player, it also accounted for the highest number of highly securitising moves. A high 
share of these securitising moves, however, occurred in the operational dimension, when the 
Commission performed its function to take decisions on responsive measures. In the verbal 
dimension the Commission played a different, rather modest role. This can be partly explained by the 
technical nature of many of the Commission documents, but it is also certainly linked to the fact that 
the Commission operated in dependence of a comitology procedure that was characterised by the 
tensions among Member States. Also given the strong criticism regarding the Commission’s 
management of the crisis, in particular put forward by the European Parliament, it is also 
unsurprising that in its texts the Commission prevented the use of dramatic language that could have 
fostered further concerns.  
In fact, many of the securitising moves in the operational dimension did not go along with an 
equivalent securitisation degree in the verbal dimension. Furthermore, in particular in the early years 
the Commission belonged to the group of de-securitising actors by claiming that infection rates were 
in decline. Also later in the process the Commission usually did not issue any highly securitising 
moves on the verbal dimension. It, however, took up the challenges linked to the BSE/TSEs crisis 
when proposing a stronger role of the supranational level (European Commission, 1998i). In this 
sense, following its drafting power for the harmonised EU food law and the creation of EFSA, the 
Commission became an influential factor for the institutional reform process once securitisation had 
fostered agreement among all actors that structural changes were necessary indeed. 
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The strongest securitiser in the verbal dimension was the European Parliament. With its resolutions 
and in particular the thorough investigation into the BSE affair it significantly strengthened the 
perspective on BSE/TSEs as a security threat to both the health of consumers as well as the beef 
market. Crucially, the Parliament combined the finding that “the British meal manufacturers caused a 
major threat to health” with a criticism to the involved actors and the announcement to table a 
motion of censure (European Parliament, 1997b). The decision to threaten the entire EU 
configuration with a no-confidence motion that would have led to the dismissal of the entire 
European Commission can be understood as an enormous securitisation move by the Parliament for 
the BSE/TSEs case, with great impact in particular on the structural changes as regards the re-
organisation of the Commission. But also the revision of the committee system and the creation of 
EFSA were influenced by its interventions (European Parliament, 1999). 
Besides its role as a securitiser in the verbal dimension, the European Parliament also turned into an 
important actor for the modification of the EU setup after the legal base for veterinary proposals 
concerning health protection had to be based upon co-decision following the entry into force of the 
Amsterdam Treaty. 
The Council did not play an equally prominent role in the securitisation processes for two reasons. 
First, before the crisis, scientific advice as well as decisions on disease management belonged to the 
tasks of the Commission. The Commission’s decisions, however, were dependent on the positive 
votes in the committee system, which guaranteed a strong influence of the Member States’ interests 
and were moved up to the level of the Council only in cases when no decisions could be taken. In 
other words, part of the activities in the realm of the Council took place on the less transparent 
comitology level which EUR-Lex and the institutions’ online documentations do not cover in an 
extensive way.  
Second, the work in the Council was many years characterised by strong tensions during the BSE 
crisis, making it difficult to jointly issue strong securitising moves. The positions of the United 
Kingdom, which for a long time insisted on the non-transmissibility of BSE to humans and finally 
pursued a non-cooperative approach in response to the ‘UK embargo’, speak a clear language. The 
solution to the fundamental conflict was found only after a partial lifting of the ban the intervention 
of the European Council. Despite the occasional circumvention of the (blocked) Council in favour of 
either the lower or the higher political level, the Council still contributed to the securitisation of 
BSE/TSEs and shaped the new regulatory framework, partly in conjunction with the Parliament in the 
respective co-decision procedure. 
The struggles within the Council show that securitisation at the EU level can be hampered or even 
fought by individual Member States if the system allows for respective veto options. The Scientific 
Veterinary Committee is a case in point. Following its function to provide scientific advice to the 
Commission, the BSE subgroup of the Veterinary Committee could have directed the Commission 
towards a stronger securitisation of BSE/TSEs before 1996. Given the facts, however, that the group 
was almost invariably chaired by UK nationals, that the minutes were drafted by Commission officials 
of British nationality and that the composition of the group was characterised by a clear 
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preponderance of UK scientists and officials, a strong influence of the interpretations of the British 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Scientific on the Veterinary Committee prevailed in the 
committee’s work (European Parliament, 1997b: A.1.2.5). In the light of the individual interests of 
the UK government to prevent trade bans or restrictions for its beef market, the original committee 
structure eventually enabled the UK to avert strong securitisation moves originating from this 
potential source.  
Another example is the partial lifting of the UK embargo in 1996 which was enforced by political 
pressures linked to the UK’s non-cooperation politics in the Council in the run-up to the European 
Council agreement in Florence. In this case an individual Member State eventually succeeded in the 
enforcement of a (temporary) de-securitising move. 
The European Council is a special actor in the securitisation-institutionalisation nexus for several 
reasons. As a discussion within the European Council implies that the issue has reached the highest 
political level, respective discussion on BSE/TSEs also meant a massive boost for the securitisation 
degree. At the same time, however, a matter discussed at the level of the European Council is a 
security issue only if it is addressed in a security language under specification of a referent object and 
other securitisation parameters. For BSE/TSEs this was not always the case given the controversial 
views of different Member States. Consequently, BSE/TSEs were addressed in a relatively soft 
manner so that the European Council was not a primary driver of the securitisation process, partly 
due to the fact that its intervention fed the economy-centred kind of securitisation only.  
An important contribution, however, was the link confirmed by the European Council between the 
securitisation of BSE/TSEs and the need for institutional reform, in particular with regard to the 
establishment of EFSA. In this way the European Council played a decisive role, the role of the 
institutional architect, for the overall securitisation and reform development by approving the 
structural changes in response to the perceived crisis under application of its political weight. 
Finally, apart from the set of main EU institutions, also the Scientific Steering Committee was an 
interesting actor in terms of securitisation and structural changes. As outlined before, it was created 
in 1996 in the course of the first securitisation wave and from then on, following its dedicated task to 
deal with the disease, contributed to the further securitisation of BSE/TSEs which culminated in the 
second securitisation wave of 2000/2001. In this sense, and possibly deviating from the original 
intention of the decision-makers, the Scientific Steering Committee was an institutional reform that 
perpetuated the securitisation of the issue rather than contributing to its de-securitisation. In 
addition, it were members of the same committee who presented the idea to the Commission to 
establish an institution like EFSA. Hence, the influence of the actor went beyond securitisation to the 
realm of reform and systemic change. 
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5.6. Securitisation and Structural Change 
BSE/TSEs were subject to dynamic securitisation processes at the EU level in the analysed years. By 
constructing the diseases as a severe security threat to animal and human health as well as the 
economy, speech acts and counter measures jointly lifted the issue to the top of the political agendas 
in particular in the years between 1996 and 2001. Speech acts that declared BSE/TSEs a serious 
threat which demanded top priority and counter action came from the full spectrum of relevant EU 
actors and affiliated institutions, up to the highest political level. Measures to combat the threat 
comprised inter alia embargoes, mass slaughtering, research into the disease, strengthened 
epidemio-surveillance, exceptional market support measures, new standards of processing of risk 
materials, provisions and bans related to feeding, the introduction of an animal identification and 
beef labelling system, as well as the monitoring and enforcement of these measures. The measures 
went along with a radical allocation of resources. 
In other words, the analysis has shown that in the case of BSE/TSEs all major ingredients for 
securitisation were part of the political developments. Crucially, the BSE-related (legal) output of EU 
actors comprised information on almost all relevant security parameters. By scrutinising the set of 
documents with regard to the securitisation degree, chapter 5.5.1 has revealed that BSE/TSEs rapidly 
rose on the vertical securitisation spectrum from a non-existent political phenomenon to a matter 
that can be regarded as highly securitised in 1996/1997 and 2000/2001. With a view to the 
predominant kind of securitisation for BSE/TSEs, chapter 5.5.2 has shown that the overall 
combination of security parameters eventually changed into the direction of a rather hard kind of 
securitisation. 
Put crisply, we could observe that the disease was not only pushed (twice) to a high degree of 
securitisation, but that the securitisation also took place in the form of a hard kind. Building on the 
securitisation approach as developed and applied in this study, this specific combination of 
securitisation degree and kind qualifies BSE/TSEs as an issue that has been securitised at the EU level 
in the form of strong securitisation, at least during the years 1996/1997 and 2000/2001. Accordingly, 
for these phases the disease can be located in the upper right corner of the coordination system of 
securitisation as introduced in chapter 2.3.3. Figure 5-1 (see below) schematically locates the form of 
securitisation in the four phases, thereby reflecting that the highest securitisation degree in 
1996/1997, and the hardest kind of securitisation in 2000/2001 after the threat was constructed as 
an EU-wide phenomenon. 
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Figure 5-1: BSE/TSEs in the Coordination System of Securitisation 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Recalling the working hypothesis as developed in chapter 2.4, the disease was, thus, constructed as a 
security threat in a form which is hypothesised to have the power to trigger institutionalisation 
processes in the political system. Chapters 5.2 and 5.4 have shown that indeed a series of systemic 
modifications occurred in the course of the BSE/TSEs crisis in the EU’s setup for food safety affairs, 
and thus also for the control of food-borne infectious diseases.  
The changes occurred basically in two phases, a first in 1997 and a second in 2001/2002. The first set 
of structural changes in 1997 started with the Commission’s Green Paper on the general principles of 
food law in the EU (European Commission, 1997h), and was advanced by the simultaneously 
launched Communication on consumer health and food safety (European Commission, 1997j). 
Together they established the basis of the set of fundamental changes which occurred in the 
following, namely the re-organisation of the advisory Committee System, the re-organisation of the 
Commission as well as the amendment of the legal basis for health and consumer protection in the 
Treaty of Amsterdam.  
The second set of structural changes could be observed for the years 2001/2002. First, Regulation 
999/2001 laid down a full package of harmonised EU rules on prevention, control and eradication of 
certain TSEs. Parts of the new regulation were not new in substance, as they basically replaced a 
series of individual measures as already adopted in the previous years. A major difference, however, 
was that the temporary and extraordinary nature of these measure was lifted in favour of a single 
comprehensive and permanent piece of regulative legislation. Furthermore, regulation foresaw 
stronger regulation and was no longer limited to specific countries but became applicable in the 
entire EU. Second, Regulation 178/2002 established the European Food Safety Authority and 
introduced revised general principles and requirements of food law.  
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Table 5-9: Institutionalisation that Occurred in the Course of the BSE/TSEs Crisis 
Date (OJ) Author 
Reference
121
 Key Development 
Doc. Number 
30.04.97 COM 
(European Commission, 
1997j) 
Re-organisation of the Commission , foodstuff-related competencies 
moved to single directorate for consumer policy and health 
protection; reinforcement of the Commission’s Food and Veterinary 
Office (FVO) 
COM(97) 183 final 
27.06.97 COM 
(European Commission, 
1997k, 1997l) 
Re-organisation of the Committee System, moved away from 
industry pressures under the authority of consumer protection 
D 97/404/EC  
D 97/579/EC 
02.10.97 IGC 
(Treaty of Amsterdam). 
Introduction of health and consumer protection as an independent 
policy objective; shift of responsibilities from common agricultural 
policy to public health, competence to adopt measures in the 
veterinary and phytosanitary fields which have as their direct 
objective the protection of public health 
Article 152 
31.05.01 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2001) 
Harmonised EU rules on prevention, control and eradication of 
certain TSEs R 999/2001 
01.02.02 EP+CO 
(European Parliament 
and Council, 2002a) 
Establishment of the European Food Safety Authority; General 
Principles and Requirements of Food Law and Procedures in Matters 
of Food Safety, incl. precautionary principle; Rapid alert system 
(RASFF) for the notification of a direct or indirect risk to human 
health deriving from food or feed 
R 178/2002 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Together these measures meant a sea change for the EU’s food safety regime and the setup to 
control food-borne infectious diseases. They also established the close connection between food 
safety, consumer protection and public health in general.  
A series of arguments indicate a clear linkage between the securitisation of BSE/TSEs and these 
institutionalisation processes. First, on a general level, the systemic reforms were designed in a way 
that explicitly addressed the problems that were identified in the securitisation phase and which 
occurred as an expression of the securitisation parameters. To illustrate, after BSE/TSEs had been 
constructed as a key threat to consumer confidence, which in a chain reaction turned translated into 
a threat to the beef and veal sector, the revision of the advisory system and the creation of a 
specialised agency were adopted with the explicit aim to restore consumer confidence. Accordingly, 
Regulation 178/2002 setting up EFSA stated that “[t]he safety and confidence of consumers within 
the Community, and in third countries, are of paramount importance” (European Parliament and 
Council, 2002a: Recital 23). The formulations related to the structural change thus took up explicitly 
the core referent objects as identified for the securitisation of BSE/TSEs. 
Except for the Amsterdam Treaty, for which no justifying texts could be analysed in the framework of 
this study, the reasons provided in the legislation for the comprehensive innovation package speak a 
clear language, even if BSE/TSEs usually do not figure by name. The absence of a direct reference to 
the diseases can be explained due to the fact that legislative documents dealing with structural 
changes are typically written in a specific technical language and are of an overarching and persistent 
nature beyond the scope of an individual disease. Furthermore, they are often drafted by political 
actors who were also responsible for the previous (mis-)management of the crisis and who try to not 
                                                          
121
 Document specification as used in the ‘List of References’ of the present study.  
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incriminate themselves. Against this background, the legislative texts typically referred to the 
‘experiences of the previous years’ when it came to justifying revised control and response measures 
or new procedures “in order to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market and to protect 
human health” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 10).  
Indeed, when the rationale of a given process was grounded on ‘certain recent events’ (European 
Commission, 1997h) or ‘experiences’ (European Commission, 1997j), they doubtless referred to the 
BSE/TSEs case, in particular if the design of the reform was so closely tied to the BSE/TSEs 
experience. Formulations that addressed the production, manufacture, transport and distribution of 
feed given to food-producing animals (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 13), the use 
of the precautionary principle (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 20) and the 
traceability of food and feed to avoid “the potential for unnecessary wider disruption in the event of 
food safety problems” (European Parliament and Council, 2002a: Recital 28) are obvious cases in 
point.  
Second, beyond the linkage established by the design and the justification for the structural reforms, 
the process through which the institutionalisation process was initiated suggests a direct link to the 
securitisation processes of BSE/TSEs. To illustrate, the establishment of EFSA was first proposed in 
the report by three members of the Scientific Steering Committee (James et al., 1999). At that time 
the report constituted, technically speaking from a securitisation perspective, nothing else than a 
(modest) securitisation move. By taking up the priority and attention assigned to the disease in 
general and by including the idea of an independent agency into the White Paper on Food Safety 
(European Commission, 2000h), the document eventually helped the Commission establish a link 
between the high profile of the topic and challenges to review the general principles of food law.  
In this sense, the White Paper built a sort of bridge for the transition from the securitisation phase to 
the phase of institutional reform. It combined a clear reference to “unprecedented pressure [on 
Community and Member State food safety systems] during recent feed and food emergencies” with 
an emphasis on the “call for action by the responsible authorities (Commission, Member States and 
the Parliament) to re-enforce, improve and further develop existing systems” (European Commission, 
2000h: 7).  
Also in the following legislative process, the direct connections between the food safety scandals and 
reforms were visible, for instance in the opinion of the Committee of the Regions which stated that 
“[a]t their worst, crises such as those over dioxins and BSE, have undermined the European 
Community's general credibility. The Commission's proposal [setting up EFSA] establishes an 
important framework for improving food safety (Committee of the Regions, 2001). A similar process 
could be observed for the structural changes in 1997 when the Commission’s Green Paper on the 
general principles of food law in the EU (European Commission, 1997h) built a bridge from the phase 
of emergency reactions to the phase of structural change. Thus, even if BSE/TSEs as a menace to 
(certain sectors and Member States of) the EU were not explicitly taken up in the final legislation that 
made up for a structural reform, the process of the legislative production still proves the connection. 
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Third, the strong securitisation of BSE/TSEs clearly bears a temporal relationship to the structural 
innovations. Just as the degree and kind of securitisation developed in two waves, all structural 
changes occurred in close temporal proximity to the moment when BSE/TSEs had entered the realm 
of a strongly securitised issue. As explained in the previous chapters, an exact expression of the 
securitisation degree is not possible on the basis of the data generate in this study. However, a 
schematic illustration of the securitisation degree is sufficient to illustrate the development of 
BSE/TSEs as a politicised or weakly securitised issue in the early 1990s and the dramatic rise of 
securitisation in 1996/1997 and 2000/2001, moving up into the realm of ‘strong securitisation’. The 
following Diagram 5-3 (see below) provides such a schematic illustration on the basis of the 
differentiation of the continuum between a-politic issues and highly securitised issues as introduced 
in chapter 2.3.1 and Figure 2-3 in particular. 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Put crisply, it is possible to argue that institutionalisation in response to BSE/TSEs occurred only after 
the kind of securitisation shifted to a hard kind and in parallel reached a sufficiently high 
securitisation degree. As long as the UK government succeeded in upholding the construction of 
BSE/TSEs as a threat which is non-transmissible to humans, securitisation stayed not only on the soft 
side of security understandings, but also at a low degree. However, given that the issue was still not 
regarded as an EU-wide problem, strong regulatory measures could not be introduced at the EU level 
at that time. In turn, in 2000, when BSE/TSEs were constructed as a highly securitised matter no 
longer limited to British and Portuguese borders, common permanent regulatory an institutional 
solutions were established to contain the disease. Hence, the present analysis reveals a chronology 
Diagram 5-3: Securitisation of BSE/TSEs and Structural Change in the EU’s Setup for Infectious Disease Control  
        (1989-2002, schematic) 
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of securitisation waves followed by systemic change which suggest – just as the rationale as laid 
down in the EU key documents – a clear linkage between the construction of BSE/TSEs as a security 
threat and the structural reforms.  
Clearly, structural changes in response to securitisation developments were not immediate. We see 
that a certain period of time usually passes after a securitisation peak before structural changes can 
be observed or enter into force. The revised article for health and consumer protection in the 
Amsterdam Treaty is a case in point, which was negotiated and concluded in 1996/1997, but entered 
into force in 1999 only. Also the proposal for the creation of EFSA was discussed since 1999, but was 
not realised before early 2002. Whereas the first securitisation wave with its peak in 1996/1997 
kicked-off a reform process in the field of foodstuff regulation, for the set of most fundamental 
reforms it was only after the second securitisation wave in 2000/2001 that they were actually 
implemented. In fact, the establishment of EFSA gained momentum primarily during the second 
securitisation wave, as exemplified by the statements by the European Council which asked for a 
speedy installation of the new authority, although the initial ideas had been brought forward in 
reaction to the first securitisation phase of BSE.  
A similar development can be seen also for securitising elements such as the treatment of risk 
materials. Here the Commission’s first proposal to introduce EU wide controls to remove certain 
specified risk material tissues was put forward in 1996 already, but the proposal was rejected, the 
decision postponed four times and finally repealed by a new decision in 2000 (European Commission, 
2000e, 2001o), just when the securitisation of the BSE/TSEs was about to accelerate again. These 
examples shows how the first securitisation wave spilled into the next one and, in this sense Diagram 
5-3 should not be read as a simplistic causal connection between securitisation wave and reform 
package. Clearly, the institutionalisation steps taken in 2001/2002 were not exclusively linked, rather 
than speeded up by the second securitisation wave.  
A reinforcing effect of the second securitisation wave is also visible in the cases of the many 
innovations that were launched as emergency measures in the 1990s but perpetuated (and 
extended) in 2001 only. Hence, the developments showed that securitisation is partly a self-
referential process and can develop its own dynamics. The creation and the role of the Scientific 
Steering Committee is an interesting case in this respect. Established as an integral part of the 
institutional reforms in 1997, the new committee soon exerted influence on the further development 
of the securitisation of BSE/TSEs. First, three leading members of the Committee proposed to create 
an independent food safety authority – an idea that was later taken up by the Commission. And 
second, their report on the geographical risk of BSE in the Member States (Scientific Steering 
Committee, 2000) meant a substantial securitisation move for the disease, which was followed by 
intensified controls and the detection of new cases all over Europe. In other words, being a result of 
the first securitisation wave, the Scientific Steering Committee contributed to the further 
securitisation in the following years and also influenced further structural changes. The committee 
exists still today, renamed Scientific Committee, as a body within EFSA to support its Scientific Panels 
on cross-cutting issues.  
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In this way the assumption is confirmed that securitisation does not (have to) stop after systemic 
changes have been implemented, but that they can feedback into the following securitisation 
process. The close feedback-connection is particularly visible if due to Treaty change a new 
responsibility is transferred to the EU. With the Amsterdam Treaty the protection of health and 
consumers became an explicit objective of the EU, thus rendering the EU a complementary provider 
of security in a field for which previously exclusively Member States were accountable. 
Naturally, in a post-reform context also de-securitising effects can occur – and can be assumed to be 
generally desired by the decision-makers when agreeing on a systemic change. As the analysis was 
not continued for the years after the establishment of EFSA, clear statements on the effects of EFSA 
on the subsequent processes are beyond the scope of the present study. However, a cursory review 
of the developments after 2002 indicates that EFSA became at least partially a de-securitising actor 
as regards BSE/TSEs who contributed to a fall of the issue on the securitisation scale. Besides EFSA, 
de-securitising effects can also be assigned to the institutionalisation of what used to be ‘emergency 
measures’. Clearly, if a measure, for instance disease monitoring, is carried out as a regular and 
constantly ongoing instrument, rather than an exceptional measure in response to a threatening 
situation, the measure (monitoring) becomes ‘conventional’ and the disease is no longer a matter 
subject to action in the realm of security beyond normal politics. In this context the circumstance 
that legislation after 2001 took place primarily in the form of technical amendments suggests that 
the disease eventually re-entered the realm of a merely politicised issue. Also the fact that after the 
establishment of EFSA and the strengthening of the Food and Veterinary Office of the Commission 
generally regular preventive and surveillance measures became more important than short-termed 
and urgent eradication programmes supports this view for the years after 2001. 
 
5.7. Conclusions 
Already in the 1980s, the Single Market for foodstuffs was established based on the mutual 
recognition of product standards, complemented by partial harmonisation of food safety measures. 
Since the detection of BSE in the UK in 1986, the existing system faced the outbreak and Europe-wide 
spread of the disease. Decision-making in the committee system turned out to be slow and measures 
adopted in the EU level incapable of stopping the further spread. These developments went along 
with a significant securitisation of BSE/TSEs in different ways, extending to European consumers, 
their confidence in the safety of food and the beef industry and ultimately to the core of the EU 
system, its institutions and the Internal Market (Ansell and Vogel, 2006). In the course of the crisis 
until the year 2002, the institutional setup and regulation related to foodstuff at the EU level 
underwent a fundamental change, with the BSE/TSEs crisis as “a Year Zero for the European Union 
food regime” (Chalmers, 2003: 532). 
The evolution in the control of food-borne infectious diseases and other potential hazards to the 
safety of food took place in both the policy as well as the polity dimension. Starting from an 
unsystematic ‘regulation patchwork’ with low compliance rates, the reforms ultimately yielded a set 
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of strong EU-wide regulatory measures against BSE/TSEs based on revised primary and food law and 
new consumer-oriented principles for food safety, a new and powerful agency for risk assessment 
and risk communication (Szawlowska, 2004, Vos and Wendler, 2006) at the heart of a reformed 
scientific advisory system and permanently altered organisational structures in the Commission. In 
the light of these developments commentators have noted that the new regulatory approach to food 
safety occurred as “a condition for the proper functioning of the internal market”, possible only after 
the mad cow crisis had distorted it (Kanska, 2004: 713, Alemanno, 2006: 243, Grant, 2012: 1035). 
The BSE/TSEs case study has presented the main course of events in the development of the EU’s 
infectious disease policy and polity as regards food-borne pathogens until 2002, has analysed how 
BSE/TSEs were subject to securitisation dynamics at the EU level of different degrees and kinds, has 
shown the different roles of the involved EU actors and has eventually made a point in revealing the 
connection between these securitisation and structural changes. By doing so it addressed the full 
spectrum of the basic research interest of this study. 
Regarding the working hypothesis as developed in chapter 2.4, the results of the case study on 
BSE/TSEs, the regulation of foodstuff and the creation of EFSA strongly support the interpretation 
that the social construction of the disease in form of strong securitisation was decisive to trigger 
systemic changes and institutionalisation processes at the EU level. Admittedly, the securitisation of 
BSE/TSEs were supported by further crises in the fields of food safety and public health, such as a 
blood contamination scandal, the dioxin crisis, the outbreak of food-and-mouth disease as well as 
“chronic problems of health care delivery in many Member States” which were not subject to 
analysis in this case study (Shears et al., 2001, Coleman, 2004: 7, Olsson, 2005, Lezaun and 
Groenleer, 2006). Also the opening of the Schengen space in 1995 might have fed into the debate, 
allowing for the free movement of people without border controls (Steffen, 2012: 1071), as well as 
the upcoming Eastern enlargement of the Community. Still, the reading of the institutionalisation of 
the years 1997 and 2001/2002 from a securitisation perspective on BSE/TSEs suggest that these 
intervening events constituted only additional input to a development that was initiated and 
dominated by the BSE/TSEs case. 
Under consideration of this qualification, the BSE/TSEs case confirms the view that securitisation can 
lead to structural changes at the EU level under the conditions of a specific form of securitisation in 
terms of degree and kind. Seeing that new food safety crises, if likely or not, can hardly be excluded 
for all times, it will be interesting to see whether the securitisation of food-borne infectious disease 
might trigger further structural adaptations in the future. The present study, however, at this point 
leaves the realm of food-borne infectious diseases and turns to the second case study which deals 
with two structural innovations in the EU’s setup to control infectious disease that occurred in the 
course of the SARS crisis, namely the creation of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control (ECDC) and the revision of the EU’s public health mandate in the Constitutional Treaty.  
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6. The Adoption of the Constitutional Treaty and  
the Creation of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control  
in the Course of the SARS Crisis 
In the year 2004, as we have seen in chapter 3.4, two developments took place that were of major 
importance for the revision of the EU’s structures for the control of infectious diseases. First, in April 
the European Parliament and the Council agreed on Regulation (EC) 851/2004 which established the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Second, in December the heads of state 
or government agreed on the ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’ which was meant to 
inter alia amend the EU’s primary law in the field of public health.122 Whereas cooperation between 
Member States for the surveillance of diseases was subject to networking activities before these 
reforms, the creation of the new Centre meant a substantial step towards the centralised 
identification, assessment and communication of current and emerging threats to human health 
from infectious diseases. Similarly, the new Treaty article III-179 established a stronger legal basis for 
the EU to respond to cross-border threats to health by introducing the supporting competence for 
their monitoring, early warning of and combating as distinctive objectives of EU action. 
Both reforms fell into the year 2004 and thus not long after a period when the outbreak of the 
‘severe acute respiratory syndrome’ (SARS) had dominated the headlines worldwide. The case study 
shall analyse in detail the context, characteristics and consequences of the EU response to SARS with 
a view to degrees, kinds and actors of securitisation as well as related institutionalisation processes. 
The chapter starts with a review of the international response to the SARS outbreak between the 
emergence of the disease in 2002 and the official announcement of its containment in July 2003. 
Unlike the BSE/TSEs case, where the disease was predominantly an EU-internal matter, the SARS case 
requires a distinction between the international and the EU response, because major SARS 
developments took place outside Europe but still provided a context for the EU processes. Therefore, 
the review looks first at the SARS outbreak in the international context (chapter 6.1). On the basis of 
this summary, the study investigates, second, the responses to SARS at the EU level (chapter 6.2).  
The chronological review of events is followed by an examination of the establishment of the ECDC, 
the revision of the public health article in the Constitutional Treaty and further structural changes in 
the EU’s setup for infectious disease control (chapter 6.3). In the following, the study analyses the 
securitisation of SARS (chapter 6.4) by looking into the EU documents in view of the degree (chapter 
6.4.1), the rise and fall of the degree (chapter 6.4.2), the kind (chapter 6.4.3) and the EU actors of the 
securitisation process (chapter 6.4.4). Given that the SARS-related EU activities have not been 
systematically processed by existing research, the thorough examination of EU primary sources will 
be of particular value. The chapter closes with a section on the connection between securitisation 
processes and structural changes (chapter 6.5) as well as a set of conclusions on the case study as a 
whole (chapter 6.6).  
                                                          
122
 As explained in chapter 3.5.2, the ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty was stopped. Central 
elements, however, were incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty so that the changes as agreed on for the 
Constitutional Treaty exerted influence on the EU’s setup. More details are provided in chapter 6.3.2. 
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6.1. Crisis and Response at the International Level 
SARS has been described as “the first major emerging infectious disease of the twenty-first century” 
(Harper, 2004: 1131) and the first infectious disease epidemic since HIV/AIDS of a truly global 
dimension (Fidler, 2003: 486). It is a respiratory illness that is caused by the SARS coronavirus (SARS-
CoV). The virus is considered to have crossed over from its original animal reservoir in bats to palm 
civets and from there into the human ecology in November 2002 (Peiris et al., 2003, Li et al., 2004). 
The first cases in humans occurred in rural farmers or food handlers in south China’s Guangdong 
province where palm civets are farmed or caught in the wild as food animals (Heymann and Rodier, 
2004, Morse, 2006: 4). After its establishment within the human population, the endogenised virus 
mainly spread under direct mucous membrane (eyes, nose, and mouth) contact conditions from 
person-to-person by infectious respiratory droplets, but the virus is also shed in faeces (WHO, 2003p: 
11, Hawker et al., 2012: 211). SARS is an extremely pathogenic disease with a short incubation period 
and a high case fatality rate with patients becoming contagious most likely only when they have 
symptoms.123 During the 2002-2003 outbreak, according to the World Health Organisation a total of 
8.096 people were notified as infected with SARS, 774 of which died (WHO, 2004). After the 
containment of the virus outbreak in July 2003, confirmed cases of SARS-CoV infections occurred 
only in the context of laboratory work without secondary transmission (Hawker et al., 2012: 210).  
The outbreak and the epidemic spread of SARS in 2002/2003 have been thoroughly reconstructed 
and documented.124 The first infection was recorded in mid-November 2002 in Foshan, a city in 
Guangdong province (Huang, 2003b: 65). Respective rumours had been picked up at that time by the 
Global Public Health Intelligence Network (GPHIN)125 and other partners of the World Health 
Organisation’s Global Outbreak and Response Network (GOARN) that aim at the early detection of 
disease outbreaks.126 In the course of the following months, several cases of an unknown atypical 
pneumonia, today associated to the SARS-CoV, began to occur in southern China, in particular among 
health-care professionals. In a report to WHO of February 11, 2003, the Ministry of Health of China 
reported an outbreak of an acute respiratory syndrome with 300 cases and five deaths since 
November 2002, but claimed that the outbreak was already under control (SARS Expert Committee, 
                                                          
123
 The incubation period is between four and five days in the case of SARS (Anderson et al., 2004: 1093). The 
case-fatality ratio describes “the proportion of those who acquire an infection that eventually die from the 
disease induced by the aetiological agent” (Anderson et al., 2004: 1094). In the case of SARS it is estimated to 
range from 0% to more than 50% with an overall percentage of 10 to 15% (WHO, 2003p: 10, Hawker et al., 
2012: 210). See also http://www.cdc.gov/sars/about/faq.html (accessed 22.01.2015). 
124
 A detailed chronology is provided by Whaley and Mansoor (2006). The most detailed report has probably 
been issued by The SARS Commission (2006). See also Greenfield (2006) and Kleinman and Watson (2006). 
125
 GPHIN is a surveillance tool that was developed by Health Canada in collaboration with WHO in 1997 to 
screen media sources, government and NGO reports for “disease outbreaks, bioterrorism threats, 
contaminated food and water supplies, nuclear material leaks, and natural disasters” (Nichter, 2008: 129, 
Zacher and Keefe, 2008: 48f). About 40 per cent of the outbreaks annually analysed by WHO comes from 
GPHIN (WHO, 2002b, National Advisory Committee on SARS and Public Health, 2003). 
126
 GOARN is a WHO-led global technical partnership which connects a set of more than 120 governmental and 
non-governmental partners and multi-partner initiatives worldwide to conduct epidemic intelligence, verify 
outbreak rumours, send out alert messages and manage global counter measures. The network was initiated in 
1997 and institutionalised in 2000 (Grein et al., 2000: 97ff, Heymann and Rodier, 2001, Institute of Medicine, 
2003: 154ff). 
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2003: 196, Zhong et al., 2003). On this basis WHO alerted its Global Influenza Surveillance Network 
(GISN)127 and activated its influenza pandemic preparedness plans, fearing that a new strain of the 
influenza virus had occurred (WHO, 2003d). It later turned out that the situation was complicated by 
the fact that two respiratory disease outbreaks occurred at the same time in Guangdong province, 
namely influenza and the first instances of SARS (Heymann, 2004: 1128, Knobler et al., 2004: 43). 
On February 21, Dr. Liu Jianlun, a 64-year-old medical professor who had treated persons suffering 
from this ‘atypical pneumonia’ and who himself showed respiratory symptoms and fever, travelled 
from Guangdong to attend a family wedding in Hong Kong (SARS Expert Committee, 2003: 198). Dr. 
Liu stayed one night in room 911 of the four star Metropole Hotel and within less than 24 hours 
infected at least 16 other persons who stayed on the same floor. The doctor was hospitalised but 
died despite treatment on March 4 (SARS Expert Committee, 2003: 18). Some of the infected persons 
were hospitalised in Hong Kong as well, where at least 99 health care workers contracted the 
disease. Other infected guests left Hong Kong and carried with them the disease to Canada, 
Singapore and Vietnam, thereby turning Dr. Liu into the ‘international index case’ for SARS (Fidler, 
2004b: 76, United States General Accounting Office, 2004, Morse, 2006: 1). Thus, the global spread 
of SARS originated “from a single person on a single day on a single floor of a Hong Kong hotel” 
(Knobler et al., 2004: 43). 
Soon after the ‘big bang’, when WHO issued an alert on the new disease occurring in Asia on March 
12, 2003, and launched international surveillance measures (WHO, 2003b, 2003a), the disease had 
already spread to further countries. WHO’s first global alert was formulated carefully, reflecting the 
difficult decision for the WHO staff in charge who wondered: “Are we mad? Are we going to panic 
the world?” (Cohen et al., 2003, Fidler, 2004b: 77). On March 15, when a medical doctor from 
Singapore was disembarked and hospitalised in Frankfurt during a stopover, the transmissible 
disease also had officially reached Europe (WHO, 2003e: 73ff). In the light of the rapid spread along 
international airline connections, WHO sent out a second, stronger global alert on the same day by 
issuing an “emergency travel advisory” to alert health authorities, physicians, and the travelling 
public to what was labelled to constitute “a worldwide threat to health” (WHO, 2003c, Fidler, 2004b: 
136). The advisory provided not only a case definition and guidance for travellers, including airline 
crews, it also gave the disease a name: ‘severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)’ (WHO, 2003c, 
Heymann, 2004: 1128).  
Given that the disease was not a novel strain of the influenza virus but a novel pathogen, health care 
workers and hospitals initially did not possess comprehensive knowledge neither on effective 
prevention measures nor symptoms nor transmission routes of SARS (Price-Smith, 2009: 142). 
“[S]pecific information regarding the nature of the organism causing this illness” did not exist and 
                                                          
127
 The WHO Network GISN, established in 1952, was one of the partners in GOARN. It today operates under 
the name ‘Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS)’. It connects national influenza centres, 
collaborating centres and WHO to give warning of a beginning pandemic and to track antigenic drift and shifts 
of influenza viruses with a view to the annual composition for effective vaccines (Heymann, 2004: 1127, Zacher 
and Keefe, 2008: 47). See also http://www.who.int/influenza/gisrs_laboratory/en/ (accessed 02.05.2015). 
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existing antibiotics and antivirals were not capable of effectively treating the new disease, leading Dr. 
Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director General of the World Health Organization, to the statement that 
“[t]his syndrome, SARS, is now a worldwide health threat” (WHO, 2003c). On March 16, WHO issued 
the first of 96 updates of its multi-country outbreak alerts on SARS. Among these updates 
extraordinary advisories can be found, for instance the recommendation against non-essential travel 
to SARS ‘hot zones’ such as Beijing or Toronto (WHO, 2003f) and the advice for airport authorities to 
screen passengers for SARS symptoms in affected areas (WHO, 2003g).  
It has been estimated that after the WHO’s travel advisories in April and May 2003, airline traffic 
went down by 40 to 50 per cent for the most affected areas. In fact, SARS meant a heavy economic 
damage for travel, trade and tourism. According to the World Bank, the airline industry lost an 
estimated 36.000 jobs alone in the Asian region (United States General Accounting Office, 2004: 35). 
And on a global scale, SARS accounted for an estimated loss to the economies of US$ 40 billion (Lee 
and McKibbin, 2004, Morse, 2006: 3).128 The causative SARS coronavirus was eventually identified on 
April 16, and on July 5, 2013, the SARS epidemic was declared contained following the break of all 
known chains of human-to-human transmission (Whaley and Mansoor, 2006: 45).129 
Whereas today the development of the SARS epidemic has been examined and the course of events 
is known, at the times of the outbreak the situation was extremely confusing. Not only was the virus 
unknown and initially believed to be a strain of influenza, Chinese authorities also attempted to 
conceal the occurrence of the disease, fearing negative consequences for the country’s economy and 
worldwide image (Huang, 2003a, Pomfret and Goodman, 2003). In fact, in the first months after the 
outbreak in November 2002, information on death and panic related to a “strange contagious 
disease” in southern China left the country only through e-mail, Internet chat rooms and text 
messages (Piller, 2003, Pomfret, 2003e, Fidler, 2004b: 74). China’s first official reactions were not 
issued before February 2003 (McNeill Jr. and Altman, 2003, WHO, 2003h, 2003i), although suspicious 
news had reached WHO since November 2002 already (WHO, 2003j: 4, Morse, 2006: 2). Only from 
mid-February onwards, China admitted that an outbreak had been taken place in Guangdong 
Province, but claimed that the disease was already under control (Fidler, 2004b: 75). Regardless of 
the request for assistance from WHO (WHO, 2003n), Chinese officials did not provide updates of 
their initial reports for more than a month and state-controlled media was not allowed to report on 
the disease (Fidler, 2003: 491, Pomfret and Goodman, 2003). Furthermore, Beijing decided to classify 
information on the pathogen as top secret so that related discussions ultimately meant a violation of 
‘national secrets’ (Huang, 2003b: 65f, Price-Smith, 2009: 141). 
In April 2003, at a time when Time Magazine reported that Chinese authorities were deliberately 
hiding infected patients from WHO professionals (Jakes, 2003) and when WHO took the 
unprecedented step to publicly accuse China for disguising the situation (Pomfret, 2003a), the 
Chinese government eventually changed its approach. It announced a ‘nationwide war’ on SARS, 
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 Other sources speak of US$30 billion to US$100 billion, but these figures may be too high (Keogh-Brown and 
Smith, 2008, Michaud, 2009: 28). 
129
 A comprehensive summary with further details on the outbreak development and WHO’s activities after 
March 16, inter alia in order to identify the virus and to trace the outbreak, can be found in (Fidler, 2004b). 
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publicly apologised for not having properly informed the public, instructed officials to stop hiding the 
severity of the situation and recalled the mayor of Beijing and the Minister of Health from their Party 
posts (Fidler, 2003: 491, Pomfret, 2003d, 2003c, 2003b, 2003f, Fidler, 2004b: 98, Price-Smith, 2009: 
141f). These measures, however, could not prevent the situation that by the end of April 2003 about 
a million people, afraid of the disease, had left Beijing for the country side and their hometowns, 
where in some parts riots occurred and roadblocks were set up by the villagers to stop the entry of 
the potentially infected refugees (Huang, 2003b, Pomfret, 2003g, Price-Smith, 2009: 143). 
China was the country of origin of the SARS outbreak and also the country with the highest number 
of infected persons (WHO, 2004). However, the disease, as we have seen, turned into a global 
epidemic to which politics also responded in a global manner. In this context WHO adopted a central 
role to coordinate international efforts. It provided communication structures and set up virtual 
networks of scientists to bring together expertise and resources from all over the world. Under the 
coordination of WHO, scientists, epidemiologists, public health experts, laboratories and clinicians 
collaborated in order to analyse the cause and characteristics of the pathogen, to monitor the 
disease and to second specialists to the regions affected by the disease. On the basis of information 
shared globally by scientists and governments, WHO also issued guidelines and advice for responding 
to SARS, including travel information and recommendations on how to detect and report cases and 
how to perform diagnostic tests. In this context the worldwide network of WHO Country and 
Regional Offices were the primary hubs to organise the support to affected regions (Knobler et al., 
2004: 44, Doberstyn, 2006, Heymann et al., 2006: 54, Morse, 2006: 2).  
A legal obligation to report SARS cases or to collaborate in SARS matters did not exist for WHO 
members at that time since the International Health Regulations had been formally revised in 1969 
and required governments to report the incidence of four diseases only: smallpox, cholera, plague, 
and yellow fever (WHO, 1983). However, in the wake of the global SARS challenge, virtually all 
countries afflicted by SARS were willing to share information and forewent their exclusive sovereign 
rights to address the problem unilaterally. And although WHO made use of previously uncommon 
measures, such as the issuance of travel advisories without explicit authorisation by WHO Member 
States or the public criticism of individual countries, its engagement was generally supported by its 
Member States (WHO, 2003j, 2003e, Heymann, 2006, Reintjes, 2008: 150). The support found 
expression not only in the daily collaboration, but also in joint statements by the World Health 
Assembly (WHA), in which Member States showed deep concern “that SARS, as the first severe 
infectious disease to emerge in the twenty-first century, poses a serious threat to global health 
security, the livelihood of populations, the functioning of health systems, and the stability and 
growth of economies” (WHO, 2003o). In addition to the resolution on SARS, the WHA also expressed 
– in the light of the experiences with SARS – its dissatisfaction with the existing International Health 
Regulations and called the WHO Member States to back a substantial IHR revision process (WHO, 
2003m, Fidler, 2004b: 103f, see also chapter 6.3.3). 
Without a detailed analysis it becomes clear the WHO-led responses to SARS at the international 
level included elements that hint at a securitisation of the disease at the international level in both 
154 
 
the verbal as well as the operational dimension. Speech acts can be found in the context of WHO’s 
public accusations of the Chinese government, global network alerts, and statements by the Director 
General or the World Health Assembly. Emergency measures included inter alia unprecedented 
travel advisories, the work of international expert teams in affected areas and extraordinary global 
conferences on SARS.130 The Member States of the European Union and their relevant national 
bodies were part of these international efforts, but additional SARS-related activities also took place 
at the European Union level. The next section explores these responses, tracks the EU activities and 
reviews the primary documents in order to prepare the ground for an analysis of the securitisation of 
the new disease at the EU level in the years from 2003 to 2004. 
 
6.2. Crisis and Response at the EU Level 
As outlined in chapter 3, essential EU structures to control infectious diseases were already in place 
at the time of the SARS outbreak. Most important, Decision 2119/98 /EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council had established a ‘Network for the Epidemiological Surveillance and Control of 
Communicable Diseases in the Community’, also called the ‘Communicable Disease Network’ (CDN), 
“to promote cooperation and coordination between the Member States, with the assistance of the 
Commission, with a view to improving the prevention and control, in the Community” (European 
Parliament and Council, 1998: Art. 1). At the time of creation, the Network was coordinated by the 
Commission, supported by the Network Committee of Member States representatives (CDNC), and 
comprised two pillars: epidemiological surveillance on the one hand and early warning on the other.  
The first pillar set up permanent communication structures that linked the Commission with the 
competent national public health authorities and surveillance institutes on specific diseases of the 
Member States to exchange information and to track these diseases. The second pillar constituted 
the ‘Early Warning and Response System’ EWRS, a web-based, confidential telematics notification 
system designed to immediately circulate important information on specified ‘events’ and outbreaks 
to accredited EWRS contact points (European Commission, 2000k, see also chapter 3.3.3). SARS was 
at the time of appearance, as a so far unknown pathogen, not on the list of communicable diseases 
to be progressively covered by the Community network under Decision No 2119/98/EC (European 
Commission, 2000a), but EWRS could still serve as the key instrument for the rapid exchange of 
information and crisis communication on the highest level of public health authorities (European 
Parliament and Council, 1998: Annex, Ammon, 2005: 1039, Guglielmetti et al., 2006, Reintjes, 2008: 
147, Schreck et al., 2009: 150ff). 
Similar to the developments at the international level, the SARS crisis covered also in the EU a 
relatively short period of time. The developments can be structured into basically three phases, 
starting with a phase from the first official EU statement on SARS in March 2003 to April 2003 
(chapter 6.2.1), a second period over the early summer 2003 in May and June (chapter 6.2.2), and a 
post-outbreak phase from July 2003 onwards (chapter 6.2.3).  
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 The first global conference on SARS took place on June 17, 2003 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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6.2.1. The Months from March to April 
At the time of the crisis, the CDN could look back at some years of cooperation, but SARS turned out 
to be the first practical test case for the warning system. The Commission had been in contact with 
WHO and monitored the SARS situation through the EWRS, but did not issue any official statement 
before March 19, 2003, when it informed the public that the first two cases of SARS in the EU were 
confirmed by German health authorities and that suspected cases had been reported by several 
Member States. It furthermore stated that the CDNC had already held an extraordinary meeting in 
Luxembourg in order to coordinate the responses of the Member States at the national level. The 
Commission’s task in this context was to encourage common approaches and criteria and to 
integrate the national responses with global measures “through regular meetings, audio-conferences 
and consultations with the Member States, Candidate Countries and WHO” (European Commission, 
2003g). The participants of the extraordinary network meeting concluded that an efficient 
surveillance system was put in place to pick up suspected and probable SARS cases, that special 
guidance for airlines and medical personnel was essential and that the EWRS would continue to 
provide the main hub for regular updates (European Commission, 2003f). 
Although the Commission declared in an initial press statement that SARS had reached the EU 
territory already and was known to spread from person-to-person, the Commission’s message was 
also formulated in a way that reassured the reader: only specific groups of persons were at particular 
risk and a functioning surveillance system was in place. At the same time, the Commission took the 
opportunity to underline that SARS demonstrated too clearly “the danger of communicable diseases” 
and that “contagious diseases require[d] a high level of preparedness across borders”. Against this 
background the Commission set up and started regularly updating a specific SARS section on the 
European Commission’s website on public health.131 It furthermore identified the need to strengthen 
existing coordination and surveillance structures on Community level. The document quoted David 
Byrne, Commissioner for Health and Consumer Protection, that the EU needed “to establish a 
structure at European level that has the scope, the stability and the capacity to respond to the threat 
from diseases in the longer term.” In order to do so, Commissioner Byrne outright announced his 
plan to prepare a proposal for the establishment of a ‘European Centre for Disease Control’ 
“responsible for carrying out tasks on the control of diseases relevant to public health” (European 
Commission, 2003f). 
Whereas in March 2003 SARS did not figure prominently in official documents at the EU level, the 
situation changed from April onwards. On April 7, Commissioner Byrne turned to the European 
Parliament to address the fundamental questions on SARS: “What is it? Where does it come from? 
How does it spread? And how can we stop it?“ (European Commission, 2003g). In his speech before 
the plenary he highlighted the great uncertainty linked to the disease, the “unknown factors” and the 
spread in a truly global environment that had triggered wide media attention and the labelling of 
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 The original URL was http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph_threats/com/sars/sars_en.htm. The link does 
not work anymore, but snapshots of the website are accessible via the Internet Archive. On the Internet 
Archive as a source for documents see also chapter 2.5.5.  
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SARS as “killer pneumonia”. His report on the successful work of the EU’s surveillance system in full 
connection to the global surveillance by WHO was accompanied by the warning that there were no 
“grounds for complacency“ and that the EU had to “be cautious, and err on the side of safety”, even 
if most of the suspected SARS cases were outside its territory (European Commission, 2003g). He 
furthermore recommended complying with the extraordinary WHO travel advisories, continuing 
strict control procedures, carrying out health screenings on departure from affected regions and 
generally reducing exposure to the disease by discouraging unnecessary travel to affected regions 
(European Commission, 2003g). Beyond the risks for public health, the Commissioner also hinted at 
the implications of the SARS outbreak in political and economic terms. In particular, travel and 
tourism in Asia were affected by the travel advisories, but also business meetings and industry 
exhibitions had to be cancelled with effects on Asia’s economy (European Commission, 2003g). 
Interestingly, just as in the first official reaction to SARS in mid-March, the Commissioner stressed 
that in his opinion the EU’s capacity to deal with infectious diseases and surveillance and 
coordination at Community level needed to be strengthened “to address the threat to public health” 
(European Commission, 2003g). By declaring that the Commission’s capacity “to extend its 
coordinating and facilitating role any further” was “at its very limit” so that new arrangements would 
be inevitable, the Commissioner straightforward established a link between the outbreak situation 
and fundamental steps of reforms – not as an emergency reaction to SARS but in view of additional 
services in the mid- and long-term (European Commission, 2003g). In this context he reminded the 
Parliament of the plans to put forward enabling legislation for the establishment of a ‘European 
Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’. 
On April 9 and 10, two days after the Commissioner’s speech at the European Parliament, the 
Communicable Disease Network Committee met again to agree on actions by Member States and 
Commission beyond EWRS surveillance to monitor and control SARS in Europe. The meeting resulted 
in two key documents to combat SARS and comparable diseases at the EU level, one on immediate 
activities (CDNC, 2003b) as well one on future actions for the longer-term (CDNC, 2003c). 
Immediate actions agreed on by the Network Committee included four areas of actions as well as a 
recommended check list for national authorities. The objectives of the agreed actions were the 
reduction of infection in travellers in affected areas, the limitation of the importation of infections, 
the early detection of imported cases and extensive public information to prevent the further spread 
of SARS. Individual measures ranged from recommendation to postpone “all but essential travel to 
areas where transmission of SARS is ongoing outside the hospital setting, from which a significant 
number of cases have been exported, or where there is concern about the completeness of reporting 
and contact tracing and strong suspicion of ongoing community transmission” to essential 
information for both passengers as well as air crews. In this respect the document also included clear 
instructions how to react in the event that a passenger or crew member was suspected to be 
infected. The Committee furthermore agreed to promote departure screenings of passengers leaving 
affected regions, but not to support general registration or health screening at ports of arrival as they 
were considered of little value and could “give the public a false sense of security” (CDNC, 2003b: 2). 
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Many of the recommendations, such as the activation of a surveillance system with specific case 
definitions and reporting procedures, were comparable to what WHO had issued a few weeks 
before. Also various explicit references to WHO lists or guidance documents can be found in the 
Committee’s conclusions.132 Obviously, a major difference to the WHO recommendations was that 
Member States were instructed to report not only to WHO, but also the Commission, be it on a daily 
basis in the case of probable detections, or “immediately” [emphasis in original] should a country 
experience the first suspected case or local transmission (CDNC, 2003b: 3). Consequently, the check 
list for national authorities, ranging from information for travellers, airport staff, political delegations 
abroad and the public, to guidance for the health services and hospitals, surveillance, alerting and 
laboratory capacities, included various points similar to the WHO’s recommendations. But also 
additional elements, such as considerations regarding the arrangements for potential restriction of 
SARS infected persons and their contacts, such as quarantine, were included. Finally, Member States 
decided to set up an ‘EU Expert Group on SARS’ to advise the Commission and Member States and to 
rapidly react to new issues, and expressed support for the global efforts to combat the disease, in 
particular by identifying experts “willing to go abroad to join EC/WHO field teams” (CDNC, 2003b: 5f). 
With a view to future actions in the mid- and long term, the Network Committee took a number of 
decisions to provide the Network with tools to better prepare for and address SARS in Europe, but 
also with the aim to respond to similar public health threats beyond SARS. As the document was 
meant to complement the agreement on instant actions, activities partly overlapped with the 
immediate measures, but none of the actions had been addressed or put in place before at the EU 
level (CDNC, 2003c: 1). Activities included further details on the SARS Expert Group and the 
assistance to WHO’s field trips, which were agreed to take place on behalf of the EU under the 
GOARN framework with EU resources to cover the missions. Furthermore, participants mandated the 
Commission and the Network Committee to standardise guidance and advice across Europe, also for 
the work of laboratories, to work on a common procedure “to minimise the risk of transmission […] 
by restricting movement (quarantine)” as well as a mechanism to “provide immediate practical 
support to EU countries […] that suspect they are experiencing an outbreak” (CDNC, 2003c: 1f). 
Other areas identified for future action at the EU level were the fields of vaccination and research. In 
this context the Commission was asked to set the development of new antiviral drugs as a priority of 
research and to explore possibilities for the coordination of the production, stockpiling and 
distribution of antivirals, antibiotics and protective equipment at the Community level (CDNC, 2003c: 
2f). In addition, it was proposed to take the SARS outbreak as an occasion to test preparedness plans 
for other diseases and also to consider a Community approach in this area (CDNC, 2003c: 3).  
Besides the central documents issued by the Network Committee, further key documents on SARS 
were issued by the Commission in April. On the one hand, the Commission put forward a proposal for 
extraordinary procedures regarding the allocation of slots in the air transport sector. The Regulation 
in place at that time (Council, 1993b) foresaw a “use-it-or-lose-it” rule which implied that “air carriers 
were not entitled to the same series of slots in the next equivalent scheduling season, unless they 
                                                          
132
 For instance to WHO 2003l and WHO 2003k. 
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can prove […] that they have operated them […] for at least 80%” (European Commission, 2003m). In 
the light of the severe decline of air travel in the beginning of 2003 resulting in part from the SARS 
outbreak, in part from the war in Iraq that had started in the same period, the Commission proposed 
a change of the rule in these exceptional circumstances (European Commission, 2003m).The 
European Economic and Social Committee supported the Commission’s proposal as it took into 
account the “exceptional circumstances” for the carriers (EESC, 2003b).  
On the other hand, SARS also played into the Commissions foreign policy activities, when President 
Romano Prodi voiced condolence about SARS cases in China in his letter to the Chinese President Hu 
Jintao. In this context Prodi labelled SARS “the first global threat toward human's health in the new 
century” and a deadly disease “that the whole world [was] endeavouring to control and fight” (also 
referred to in Council, 2003d: 6, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2003). 
 
6.2.2. The Months from May to June 
Although the EU level was strongly involved in the international and the Member States’ national 
responses to SARS in March and April already, discussions and activities reached yet another peak in 
May and June. In the beginning of May, Member States convened for an extraordinary meeting of 
the ‘Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs’ configuration of the Council, in which 
also Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director General of the WHO, as well as the accession countries 
participated. A Member of the European Parliament had claimed already on April 4 that such as 
meeting was necessary, when he found that “[t]he only certainty is that we do not know enough 
about [SARS]” (European Parliament, 2003f); the meeting, however, did not take place before May 6 
(Council, 2003c).  
In their conclusions the health ministers showed concern about the “rapid global spread of SARS and 
the significant increase of reported cases” and expressed “determination to contribute effectively to 
the containment and, hopefully, to the eventual elimination of this threat to human health” (Council, 
2003c: 5f). Although the Council underlined that the implementation of health protection measures 
was the responsibility of the national authorities, it also welcomed and expressed support for the 
work of the CDN and the Network Committee. The Council Conclusions recalled the detailed list of 
measures to combat the transmission of the disease and urged Member States as well as accession 
countries to implement both immediate and future actions. In addition to the ongoing activities, the 
Member States’ representatives also expressed the will to further strengthen both European as well 
as international capacities. In this context they encouraged the Commission to prepare a report by 
June and “consider developing a general preparedness plan on communicable diseases and health 
threats”. With a view to the international arena, the Council expressed support for WHO’s efforts to 
accelerate the revision of the International Health Regulations (Council, 2003c: 7f). The document 
closed with the acknowledgment of the “Commission’s intention to submit a proposal to create a 
European Centre for disease prevention and control” and agreed to review the situation again in 
June (Council, 2003c: 5). 
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After the extraordinary meeting of the Council, SARS also became a prominent topic for the 
European Parliament, best illustrated by the rapidly increasing number of related written questions 
to the Commission and to the Council. With reference to the rising number of suspected cases and 
deaths as well as the absence of effective antibiotics or antiviral drugs, the interventions dealt with 
the disease in the context of specific issues such as illegal migration (European Parliament, 2003g), 
the Schengen system (European Parliament, 2004k), airline air recycling (European Parliament, 
2004j), (additional) travel and airport checks (European Parliament, 2003d, 2004b), the import of 
textiles (European Parliament, 2004a) or in connection to the influenza virus (European Parliament, 
2004d, 2004l). Beyond that, more general questions regarding EU-wide measures and the EU’s 
prevention and control system as a whole were raised (European Parliament, 2003d, 2003b, 2003e, 
2004m). In many of the written questions considerable concern about the spread of the disease 
became visible, leading Members of the European Parliament to call for “urgent action by the Union 
authorities […] to devise common protection measures and strengthen cooperation between 
Member States” (European Parliament, 2003c, 2004k). When answering the questions in June and 
July 2003, the Commission applied a rather technical approach by referring to the actions already in 
place, the relevant Council conclusions (Council, 2003c) as well as the preparations regarding the 
envisaged Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. 
In June 2003, the Commission also presented its report on the measures undertaken by Member 
States and accession countries to control the outbreak of SARS. The report had been drafted 
following the request from the extraordinary meeting of the Health Council on May 6 and was 
discussed in the Council meeting on June 2/3 (Council, 2003b, European Commission, 2003a). It 
included information gathered through a questionnaire which had been prepared by the EU Expert 
Group on SARS and was sent out to the national authorities in order to compile an overview of 
adopted emergency and protection measures across all countries. The report consisted of basically 
two chapters, one on the implementation of measures and one on recommendations for future 
actions. Additionally, annexed to the report the document comprised a ‘Road Map of EU Action’ and 
summary tables.  
In general, the Commission showed satisfaction with the implementation of measures reaching from 
detection of cases and isolation measures through measures for protection of health care workers 
and infection control to guidance and information to the public, travel advice and laboratory 
organisation. In the light of the short period of time passed after the official WHO alert on the SARS 
outbreak, measures were generally considered as rapid, consistent, largely effective and in line with 
both the advice of the Network Committee and WHO’s recommendations, even if variations existed 
among Member States. Besides, the report also stressed the contribution of European laboratories to 
the global work to identify the SARS coronavirus as well as the efforts in the field of humanitarian 
assistance. Regarding the latter, in addition to the expertise provided by several countries, partly 
through EU funded programmes such as the European Programme for Intervention Epidemiology 
Training (EPIET; see also chapter 3.3.2), the European Commission’s humanitarian aid office (ECHO) 
had set up a coordinated plan with recipient countries and implementing organisations (European 
Commission, 2003a: 13f). 
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Despite the fact that “speed and efficiency at which public health measures were implemented 
throughout the European Union [was] reassuring”, the Commission also voiced severe concerns, in 
particular in the case that a localised outbreak should happen in one of the Member States 
(European Commission, 2003a: 5). It labelled SARS still “a serious threat” because of an 
“unprecedented combination of features”, including the circumstances that “no vaccine and no 
treatment” existed and the incubation period allowed “rapid spread via air travel between any two 
cities in the world” (European Commission, 2003a: 14). In general, all health systems were put under 
considerable stress, not least due to the fact that the “disease continue[d] to hit front-line human 
resources – health care staff – essential to combat the threat” (European Commission, 2003a: 14). 
Crucially, the Commission found that SARS had “incited widespread public anxiety, spreading faster 
than the virus, and causing social discomfort, economic losses and political stress”. Further 
consequences of the public’s fear such as the emergence of discrimination towards vulnerable 
communities were identified, too (European Commission, 2003a: 15). This kind of fear also 
repeatedly spoke through written questions from Members of the European Parliament to the 
Commission, for instance when labelling “SARS […] a disease whose origins have not yet been 
established and for which there is so far no cure”, which had “become the new plague of the third 
millennium, thanks to the ease with which it spreads“, and which was “affecting dozens of new 
victims every day” (European Parliament, 2003a). 
In the light of this ongoing threat scenario as drawn in the report, the Commission did not miss to 
identify further fields of activity beyond the immediate actions implemented already. In this context 
it occasionally proposed a stronger role for the Commission itself. To illustrate, proposals included 
the ideas to develop “[a]n EU consistent approach to the contents of the information communicated 
to the public, coordinated by the Commission” (European Commission, 2003a: 8), to strengthen SARS 
expertise on Community level by attaching Member States experts to DG SANCO (European 
Commission, 2003a: 15), and to apply “a common approach […] at EU level on traceability for 
passengers arriving or in-transit from affected areas, and their follow up, as well as control actions on 
the effective screening for SARS at exit sites (European Commission, 2003a: 11). Furthermore, the 
Commission envisaged to “identify best practices and sustainable actions for the development of an 
EU preparedness plan on communicable diseases with epidemic potential” (European Commission, 
2003a: 7). In the framework of such a general preparedness plan on communicable diseases, the 
Commission had already extraordinarily committed EUR 9 million to support research, in particular 
related to diagnosis, medication and vaccination before the end of 2003 (Council, 2003b: 9, European 
Commission, 2003a: 17). 
Just as in its previous interventions, the Commission took the opportunity to conclude the proposal 
for following activities with the idea of a structural reform, the establishment of a European Centre 
for Disease Prevention and Control. In this vein, the comprehensive set of future actions were 
explicitly declared to pave the way for the establishment of such a centre by 2005 (European 
Commission, 2003a: 17), also clearly set out in the annexed ‘EU Action Road Map’ (European 
Commission, 2003a: Annex).  
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In the course of the month, the Commission’s report was followed by a series of EU guidance 
documents, which were prepared with the assistance of the EU Expert Group on SARS under the 
Network Committee. A ‘Registration Card’ was designed to inform travellers to countries of the 
European Union that they were leaving an area affected by SARS and that it was possible that during 
the flight they could have been exposed to an infected person. For this reason the EU requested 
these travellers to provide contact information for the next 14 days (CDNC, 2003d). ‘Important 
Health Information’ notified travellers of their risk to have caught an infection, for which the 
incubation period could be up to 10 days so that symptoms could develop accordingly (CDNC, 
2003e). Passengers who had possible contact with SARS during a flight were informed by a technical 
guidance document that there was a risk that they had become infected as well. The document 
advised the passenger to consult a doctor, to “have contact with as few persons as possible before 
your physician sees you and gives further instructions” and not [to] go to the hospital or sit in the 
waiting room with other patients” (CDNC, 2003a). 
 
6.2.3. The Post-Outbreak Phase 
After the disease was declared contained by WHO in July 2003, also EU efforts entered a post-
outbreak phase. The period was characterised by the combination of views that the immediate 
threat of SARS had disappeared, but that activities to prepare for the re-emergence of SARS or 
similar threats were needed. The update of advice for airline personnel, where the “current risk of 
SARS in Europe” was assessed to be “very low” (CDNC, 2003f, version of September 25, 2003) or in 
relation to influenza vaccination (European Commission, 2003c) are two cases in point.  
In this context the Network Committee issued an updated guidance document on the risk of escape 
of the SARS coronavirus from laboratories (CDNC, 2004) after instances of this kind in Singapore and 
Taiwan had become public. Against the background that SARS was now seen as a “dangerous 
infection” that could re-emerge from laboratories, including those in Europe, the Committee recalled 
the WHO guidelines for handling of SARS-CoV specimens and cultures (CDNC, 2004). 
Parliamentarians remembered the Commission “that the SARS virus can strike at lightning speed” 
(European Parliament, 2004i), feared that also “[b]iological terrorism [could] never be ruled out” 
(European Parliament, 2004h) and raised the question of crisis management plans again. The 
Commission routine responses, however, showed that on their end the disease was not defined as an 
imminent threat anymore, rather than a lesson from the past from which “a great deal was learnt” 
(European Parliament, 2004i). As long as SARS was not declared contained, the assessment had been 
different, illustrated by the fact that the Commission had decided – in the light of “the significant 
threat of SARS” – not to send Commission officials to conduct anti-dumping verification visits under 
Regulation (EC) No 384/96 (Council, 1996f: Art. 16 (1)) to SARS affected areas as long as these regions 
appeared on the respective WHO list (European Commission, 2003n). 
Beyond that, issues that had been launched during the SARS crisis were finalised in the months after 
July 2003. Taking up the request from the Council to foster research in the relevant areas, the 
Commission published a special call “with the aim of developing an EU capability for strategic use of 
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R&D resources against SARS and in the event of similar outbreaks” and funded seven projects from 
this ad hoc EU research budget of about EUR 13.6 million (European Commission, 2005f: 8). Besides 
research, the initiative to find a flexible solution for air carriers regarding the allocation of slots could 
be finalised too. Seeing that “[t]he war launched in March 2003 against Iraq and the political 
developments that followed, as well as the outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS) [had] seriously affected the air transport operations of air carriers and have triggered a 
significant reduction in demand”, Parliament and Council agreed still in 2003 on an amendment on 
the common rules for the allocation of slots at Community airports (European Parliament and 
Council, 2003), before they approached a more substantial revision in 2004 (European Commission, 
2004b, European Parliament and Council, 2004c). 
 
6.3. Legal and Institutional Reform 
Coming to terms with the SARS experience did not end with the declaration that the disease was 
controlled. In fact, the crisis year 2003 was followed by a reform package in 2004 which inter alia 
comprised the two milestone innovations under scrutiny in this case study: the creation of the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the revision of the public health article in 
the EU’s primary law in the Constitutional Treaty. The following section will investigate these 
innovations in detail, embed them into the process of the SARS crisis and will also address further 
legal and institutional reforms that occurred in the wake of SARS. 
 
6.3.1. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) 
We have seen that right after the SARS outbreak had reached EU territory in March 2003, the 
European Commission started to announce and advertise a proposal for the establishment of a new 
European institution, first under the title of an ‘EU Centre for Disease Control’ (European 
Commission, 2003f), later as the ‘European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control’ (European 
Commission, 2003g). Thus, SARS and the idea of an EU centre were tied together from the start, but 
the establishment of the centre was not meant to constitute an emergency measure to immediately 
address the disease. Instead the Commission proposed the creation as a reform step in view of 
enhanced surveillance and better coordination in the future.  
The idea for such an EU centre, however, had been born already before the SARS outbreak occurred. 
In fact, in April 2003, when Health Commissioner David Byrne spoke about SARS before the European 
Parliament and when the Network Committee prepared the document on future actions for the 
longer-term, the Commission was already “well advanced in the preparation of the enabling 
legislation […] to establish such a Centre by 2005” (CDNC, 2003c: 3, European Commission, 2003g).  
The original idea to establish such a European dates back to the 1990s (MacLehose et al., 2002). In 
the years before 1998, when the CDN was set up, a basic discussion took place between advocates 
and opponents of a more centralised approach to infectious disease control at the European level. 
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For instance, during the negotiations to establish the Community Network, the Parliament had 
proposed, in a request for amendment of the respective Regulation, that information was collected 
at the level of each Member State “in order then to forward them to a central body: the European 
Centre for the Surveillance of Communicable Diseases” (European Parliament, 1996c: Amendment 8, 
Art. 1 (2)). 
The debate intensified in 1997 and 1998 with publications by experts partly arguing in favour of a 
central EU structure (Tibayrenc, 1997a, 1997b) and partly in favour of a network of national 
surveillance authorities (Giesecke and Weinberg, 1998, The Lancet (Editorial), 1998). Critics argued 
that informal meetings of the heads of the national centres surveillance centres, the so called 
‘Charter Group’, had produced good results in the past, inter alia by assisting the Commission in the 
prioritisation of infectious disease surveillance and structures (Giesecke and Weinberg, 1998, 
Weinberg et al., 1999). As we have seen in chapter 3.3.3, the decision was finally taken against the 
creation of a centre and in favour of legislation that supported the operation of an 
intergovernmental set of disease networks (European Parliament and Council, 1998).  
It was widely agreed that the network approach would be preferable, given the already available 
structures in Europe and the existing networks (European Commission, 2000a, Reintjes, 2008: 147). 
But while some contributions claimed that “[t]he idea of a central edifice seems to be politically 
dead” (Giesecke and Weinberg, 1998: 1308), other experts continued discussing the aims and 
implementation of a ‘European Centre for Infectious Diseases’ (Dove, 1998). One approach was to 
copy the structures of the US ‘Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’ (CDC) which act as a 
“higher coordinator, adviser, and data collector” whereas the US states retain responsibility for 
surveillance and prevention (Bradbury, 1998: 969). The ECID project, however, was not necessarily 
seen as an institution embedded in the EU framework but tried to build on official support from 
further countries such as Switzerland or Turkey (Tibayrenc, 1998).  
In the following years, when the CDN had been established already, the Commission fuelled the 
debate on an EU centre by contracting a set of scientists with the aim to evaluate the performance 
and improvements to be introduced in the operation of the Community network for communicable 
diseases (Brand et al., 2000, MacLehose et al., 2001). At the same time, health cooperation in health 
matters and infectious disease control became subject to high level discussion, for instance during 
the G8 meeting in Évian-les-Bains and the European Council meeting in Gothenburg, both of which 
took place in June 2001. Crucially, the Presidency Conclusions noted “that the possibility of the 
creation of a European surveillance and early warning network on health issues [should] be 
examined” (European Council, 2001b). Furthermore, a public seminar took place in November 2002 
under the auspices of the Parliament. The consultations generated fresh input and included 
recommendation to support “EU level preparedness, EU coordination of outbreak investigations, and 
provision of assistance by experts on behalf of the European Union” (European Commission, 2003b: 
5f).  
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Although national state epidemiologists, the Network Committee and further experts adopted 
conclusions favouring the creation of an EU coordinating centre (Petersen and Catchpole, 2001, 
European Commission, 2003b: 2), a main finding of the revitalised discussion was that not necessarily 
the creation of an EU institution, but that also the strengthening of the existing networks could be 
the basis for the future development (European Commission, 2003b: 6, Greer, 2012a: 1009). As Scott 
Greer puts it in one of the few academic publications dealing with the origins of the ECDC, despite 
positive voices “many of the key advocates made it clear in publications up to 2003 that they 
preferred networks to a centre” (Greer, 2012a: 1009). 
 
6.3.1.1. The Establishment of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
On July 23, 2003, two and a half week after the SARS outbreak was declared contained by WHO, the 
Commission put forward its official proposal to establish a ‘European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control’ (European Commission, 2003b). The first eleven pages of the document were dedicated 
to an explanatory memorandum that drew a general assessment of the infectious disease challenge 
both internationally and in the EU, explaining the limitations of the EU’s current network activities 
and why the Union needed the proposed institution.  
The document brimmed over with references to SARS, starting with the very first sentence of the 
memorandum that named SARS as a recent example for the “significant threat to the health and 
wellbeing of the European Union’s citizens”, which communicable disease outbreaks could pose 
(European Commission, 2003b: 2). The Commission declared that SARS had demonstrated “the 
shortcomings of present model of disease control” (European Commission, 2003b: 4) and the “lack of 
capacity to deal with serious health threats at the Community level” (European Commission, 2003b: 
36). It stressed that the virus was able “through migration or tourism […] to spread in just in a few 
weeks from China to Europe, the Americas, and Asia” (European Commission, 2003b: 4) and warned 
that “[t]he next time could well be a pandemic” (European Commission, 2003b: 36f). Beyond SARS, 
the proposal also included references to the possibility of deliberately start of an outbreak 
(bioterrorism) and further diseases or pathogens such as anthrax, HIV/AIDS or tuberculosis 
(European Commission, 2003b: 3, 10).  
The Commission described the centre as a significant step to mobilise synergies between the national 
disease centres, to better manage the existing operational instruments related to the existing 
Community Network and to provide EU policy makers and citizens with „authoritative and 
independent scientific advice on serious health threats” necessary for effective EU-wide response 
(European Commission, 2003b: 3). The plans of the Commission, however, did not foresee the 
transfer of legislative powers to the independent EU agency or the abolishment of the existing 
Communicable Disease Network (CDN). Instead, the Commission proposed to maintain the existing 
division of labour with risk management being the competence of national authorities, supported by 
the coordination and legislative provisions of the Commission in conjunction with the Network 
Committee. The ECDC’s task was meant to constitute a “centre of excellence to which the 
Commission and the Member States can go for authoritative advice and opinions” (European 
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Commission, 2003b: 7) and which ensures “efficient networking and pooling of Member States' 
scientific expertise” with the overarching aim to facilitate more effective preparedness planning 
(European Commission, 2003b: 10f). In line with the limited field of activity, the initial budget was 
proposed to be comparatively tiny, just as the number of staff.133 
Despite the various references to SARS, the Commission’s proposal for a centre was not intended to 
constitute an extraordinary measure particularly designed to address the threat of SARS. In fact, 
what the Commission aimed at was structural change of the EU’s infectious disease setup towards a 
centralisation of the existing elements and a general strengthening of capacities at the EU level in the 
future. In this vein, the Commission proposal stated that “[t]aking rapid and effective action against a 
disease outbreak, and thus being able to reassure citizens that the outbreak has been contained, will 
protect Member States' economies, as well as their public health” (European Commission, 2003b: 4). 
The Commission proposal was forwarded to the Council, the Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee in August. In its opinion of October 2003, the EESC agreed “wholeheartedly 
with the Commission’s analysis” (EESC, 2004: 59). It considered the creation “a boost to the EU’s 
public health policy as defined in Treaty Article 152” (EESC, 2004: 60) and documented that – after 
years of discussions – “since June 2003, following the outbreak of the SARS epidemic, support from 
the Member States for the proposed centre has grown considerably” (EESC, 2004: 57). 
Following an extensive policy debate on the Commission’s proposal which dealt with questions such 
as to whether the European centre should also cover non-communicable diseases, the Council 
reached a general agreement during its meeting on December 1 and 2, 2003 (Council, 2003a: 23). 
Only ten days later, on December 12, the European Council declared that the establishment of the 
centre was envisaged on the basis of the Commission’s proposal and that the seat of the centre 
should be in a town in Sweden (European Council, 2004b). On January 27, the European Parliament’s 
Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Consumer Policy adopted the report on the 
proposed ECDC Regulation (European Parliament, 2004f) which was eventually endorsed by the 
Parliament in first reading on February 10 (European Commission, 2004f). The proposed 
amendments included conceptual clarifications and editorial changes with regard to the mission of 
the ECDC, the Centre’s management and advisory bodies as well as the financing arrangements and 
the provisions for the review in the third year.  
Besides the amendments, the report acknowledged the value of the old system as “so far so (fairly) 
good” and stressed once more various limitations, from coordination problems to the small number 
of specialists available to advise the Commission. Also the fact that the financing of the old system 
was dependent on the public health programme – a circumstance that was to change with the 
creation of the new centre – was seen as counterproductive (European Parliament, 2004f: 22). 
                                                          
133
 The proposal foresaw a budget increasing from roughly EUR 5 million in 2005 (European Commission, 
2003b: 39) to EUR 30 million annual operational costs in 2007 (European Commission, 2003b: 41). The number 
of staff during the start-up phase was set to 35, progressively rising to estimated ultimate staffing level of 98 
persons (European Commission, 2003b: 41). The numbers were subject to later change. For instance, in July 
2005 the Commission mentioned in its hand-over file to transfer the responsibilities from the Commission to 
ECDC the number of an estimated staffing of 300 in the year 2013 (European Commission, 2005h). 
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Following the green light from the Council during the meeting on March 30, 2004 (Council, 2004), the 
proposal was adopted by Parliament and Council and entered into force on April 21, 2004 (European 
Parliament and Council, 2004a). As a Regulation passed on the first reading, it didn’t take more than 
nine months between July 2003 and April 2004 to complete the co-decision procedure; record time 
for the establishment of a new EU agency. Despite the intense discussions prior to the adoption, in 
particular between Commission and Member States (Ammon, 2005: 1042), the quick finalisation of 
the procedure proved all actors were willing to quickly solve the existing conflicts. According to 
Greer, “[a]lmost no interest group politics were opposed” (Greer, 2012a:1012). Although activities 
started earlier, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control was officially established on 
May 20, 2005 with its head office in Stockholm (Wigzell, 2005, Guglielmetti et al., 2006, Ammon and 
Faensen, 2009: 178).  
 
Table 6-1: Overview of the Documents in the Process Related to Regulation 851/2004 Establishing the ECDC 
(OJ) Date Author 
Reference Contents 
Doc No. 
16.09.03 COM 
(European Commission, 2003b) Proposal for a Regulation establishing the ECDC  COM(2003) 441 
final/2
134
 
02.12.03 CO 
(Council, 2003a) General agreement on COM(2003) 441 final/2 
15443/03 (Presse 354) 
29.01.04 EP 
(European Parliament, 2004f) 
Report on the Proposal for a Regulation establishing the 
ECDC A5-0038/2004 
05.02.04 EUCO 
(European Council, 2004b) 
Determining that ECDC should have its seat in Sweden to 
be determined by Swedish Government 5381/04 
05.02.04 EESC 
(EESC, 2004) Opinion on Regulation establishing the ECDC 
2004/C 32/11 
30.04.04 EP+CO (European Parliament and 
Council, 2004a) 
Regulation establishing the ECDC 
R 851/2004 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
6.3.1.2. The Mission of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
The creation of the ECDC meant a clear step towards centralisation at the EU level in various aspects 
(Liverani et al., 2012). In contrast to the previous system in which the Commission played a 
supportive role for the coordination of various initiatives of national authorities or research centres, 
the ECDC provided a central hub for these activities. The legislative basis defined the agency’s official 
mandate to “identify, assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human health from 
communicable diseases” (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: 1). In particular, the Centre is 
mandated to act on its own initiative in the case of “outbreaks of illness of unknown origin, which 
may spread within or to the Community” (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: 1).  
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 The first draft was published on July 23, 2003 (European Commission, 2003h). 
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In order to perform these tasks the ECDC shall: 
1) search for, collect, collate, evaluate and disseminate relevant scientific and technical data,  
2) provide scientific opinions and scientific and technical assistance including training,  
3) provide timely information to EU and international institutions,  
4) coordinate the European networking of bodies and  
5) exchange information, expertise and best practices to facilitate the development and 
implementation of joint actions (European Parliament and Council, 2004a: Art. 3 (2, a-e)). 
Taking over these tasks implied the gradual transfer of various responsibilities to ECDC, such as the 
editorial office of Eurosurveillance and the coordination of the training network EPIET, both of which 
became part of the ECDC in 2007, as well as the incorporation of nearly all European surveillance 
networks, previously run by national health authorities or laboratories on a project basis (Greer, 
2012a: 1016, Liverani and Coker, 2012: 922, Liverani et al., 2012: 576). Also the ability to set up EU 
teams for the technical assistance to Member States or third countries in the case of an 
epidemiological crisis were incorporated. Crucially, the ECDC was integrated into all activities related 
to the operation and further development of the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS), which 
had played a vital role during the SARS outbreak (Ammon, 2005: 1042).  
The centre did not receive legislative or direct regulative powers. In particular, the agency is not 
allowed to harmonise national law or prescribe specific measures to be implemented across the EU. 
The agency can provide risk assessment, but the management of a public health threat stayed with 
the ‘Health Threats Unit’ of Commission’s DG SANCO which coordinates the activities of the national 
institutions in line with the principle of subsidiarity (Liverani et al., 2012: 576). Member States are 
not obliged to follow ECDC’s arguments and a Decision by the Commission on the change or setup of 
new measures requires authorisation by the regulatory committee135 (Schreck et al., 2009: 150ff). 
This setup makes the ECDC a comparatively weak agency from a legal point of view. The 
competencies conferred to ECDC reflect the idea of a coordinator who facilitates the collaboration 
between national agencies and other organisations, who informs EU and Member State decision-
makers and who supports and standardises infectious disease surveillance at the EU level. In this way 
existing network structures for the surveillance of specific diseases, which had worked largely 
independently from one another, were incorporated into the new agency in view of a future 
harmonisation of their methodologies. By doing so the establishment of the ECDC did not only mean 
new support and a standardisation of infectious disease surveillance at the EU level, for instance in 
the form of a new interface for the reporting and pooling of surveillance data, the European 
Surveillance System ‘TESSy’ (since April 2008) (Ammon and Faensen, 2009: 179).136 It also 
perpetuated the funding for the surveillance networks, which had previously relied on a project-
based arrangement (Reintjes, 2008: 148, Ammon and Faensen, 2009: 178). 
                                                          
135
 Originally the Communicable Diseases Network Committee (CDNC); since the entry into force of Decision 
1082/2013/EU (see chapter 3.5.3.1), the respective committee is the ‘committee on serious cross-border 
threats to health’ (European Parliament and Council, 2013a: Art. 18). 
136 
For more information on TESSy, see Ammon and Faensen (2009) as well as 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/activities/surveillance/TESSy/Pages/TESSy.aspx (accessed 18.03.2015). 
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However, the Regulation establishing the ECDC did not set a finite list of projects. Quite the contrary, 
the agency is allowed to start discussion on new issues on its own initiative. Furthermore, provided 
an approval of the budget and a green light from the ECDC management board,137 the agency can 
“add projects on new diseases and problems at will” and, thus, “grow without new legislation” 
(Greer, 2012a: 1013). However, since viable infrastructures exist in many Member States, the 
expansion of the ECDC’s tasks is expected to occur primarily in a form of consolidation (Mätzke, 
2012: 972). 
 
6.3.2. The Revision of the Public Health Article in the Constitutional Treaty 
In addition to the creation of the ECDC, SARS also played into the reform process for fundamental EU 
law, given that the disease also appeared in the discussions of the ‘European Convention on the 
Future of Europe’ which completed its work on July 10, 2003, with the ‘Draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe’ (European Convention, 2003b). Several members of the Convention 
identified common security problems in the realm of public health as an area in which strengthened 
Union powers would be desirable. To illustrate, Andrew Duff, a UK member of the Convention and 
Member of the European Parliament, explained in the justification for a proposed amendment to the 
article on public health that “[t]he objectives of this article badly needs to be modernised to provide 
the necessary instruments to effectively respond to the real and new threats that exist from cross-
border communicable disease, such as SARS” (European Convention, 2003c).  
In this context partly far reaching formulations were put forward, for instance the right for European 
Parliament and Council to adopt “measures to combat threats to health, including communicable 
diseases and the deliberate release of biological or chemical agent” (European Convention, 2003c). 
Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister and member of the European Convention, proposed that 
the formulations laid down in the Constitutional Treaty should extend to “epidemiological 
surveillance of communicable diseases” and include “the establishment of an early warning and 
response system to prevent and control these diseases” (European Convention, 2003a). Support for a 
stronger EU role and easier decision-making procedures also came from the Commission during the 
Conventions proceedings. Commissioner Byrne argued in favour of Treaty references to a central EU 
power that “coordinates vaccinations, travel advice and other measures to prevent the spread of 
diseases such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome” (Parker, 2003). 
In contrast to these suggestions, the Convention’s Praesidium under President Giscard d’Estaing 
eventually decided that the legal basis for the coordination of action in the field of public health 
should not be changed in a fundamental way; the ‘Draft Treaty’ left major parts of the Treaty article 
on public health unchanged, despite the discussions in the Convention (Parker, 2003). Thus, the 
changes proposed in the Draft Treaty were limited to the further specification of possible 
                                                          
137
 The management board is the strategic and administrative body that comprises one member from each 
Member State, two from the Parliament and three from the Commission. Its work is supported by an advisory 
board that is in charge of the evaluation of the scientific quality and independency of the agency (Schreck et al., 
2009: 154). 
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coordination measures such as the “establishment of guidelines and indicators, the organisation of 
exchange of best practice, and the preparation of the necessary elements for periodic monitoring 
and evaluation” (European Convention, 2003b: Art. III-179 (2)). One innovation in the realm of 
infectious disease control, however, was the extension of the scope of “incentive measures” which, 
unlike in the past, were also meant “to combat the major cross-border health scourges” in the future 
(European Convention, 2003b: Art. III-179 (5)). 
However, after Giscard d’Estaing’s Convention had rejected a stronger constitutional basis for 
infectious disease control at the EU level, the article on public health underwent a substantial 
revision before the heads of state or government finally signed the Constitutional Treaty at the 
Intergovernmental Conference in Rome on October 29, 2004. In fact, in contrast to the Praesidium’s 
decision many of the far reaching ideas originally discussed in the Convention found their way into 
the final text.  
More precisely, the final formulations of the Constitutional Treaty foresaw that “monitoring, early 
warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health” was no longer subject to soft 
“incentive measure” but belonged to the primary Union actions in the field of public health, designed 
to complement national policies (Art. III-278 (1)). In line with this rise in the degree of priorities, the 
final Treaty article also added an explicit paragraph stating that “European laws or framework laws 
shall [address] measures concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-
border threats to health (Art. III-278 (4d)). Crucially, this formulation meant that cross-border threats 
to health were shifted to the realm of shared competences by the new Treaty, in contrast to 
protection and improvement of human health in general which remained in the area of supporting, 
coordinating and complementary action.  
Tracking the developments between the adoption of the Convention’s Draft Treaty and the signed 
Constitutional Treaty is beyond the scope of the study, just as the revision of the Constitutional 
Treaty that ultimately led to the ‘Lisbon Treaties’. Future studies might reveal the reasons for the 
significant differences between the documents and assess the role of the actors involved.138 
Important in the present context is that major innovations of the new legal basis included references 
to ‘serious-cross border threats to health’ as well as surveillance and response measures. Apparently, 
SARS as an individual disease did not make it into the new constitutional basis of the EU. Still, the 
new formulations were clearly designed in a way to include and address SARS and similar threats.  
The ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty was stopped after the negative referendums in 
France and the Netherlands. The new provisions concerning infectious disease control nevertheless 
partly turned into EU primary law as the reference of cross-border threat to health as a field of EU 
activity was included in the Lisbon Treaties, namely in the form of Article 168 (1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which entered into force on December 1, 2009. In this 
way, the change of the EU Treaty article on public health following the SARS outbreak determines 
infectious disease action at the EU level down to the present date. As a major adulteration in 
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 For instance, Commissioner Byrne announced after the final adoption of the ‘Draft Constitutional Treaty’ by 
the Convention that he would “continue his fight in the intergovernmental conference” (Parker, 2003). 
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comparison to the Constitutional Treaty, however, Article 168 of the TFEU did not locate measures 
concerning monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health in the 
area of shared competences. A complete overview of the changes of the public health article across 
the different EU Treaties can be found in Annex 1. 
 
6.3.3. Further Reforms 
Structural changes outside the EU are not subject to the present analysis. It should be noted, 
however, that beyond the EU level also crucial developments at the international level fell into the 
post-SARS period. In particular, the Group of Eight adopted the G8-Action plan on health in June 
2003 (G8, 2003). SARS was also subject to discussions in the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI)139 
during the meeting in Berlin in November 2003 (GHSI, 2003). Furthermore, following the intensified 
cooperation of the ten ASEAN140 countries with China, Japan and South Korea during the SARS 
epidemic (Price-Smith, 2009: 150f), several Asian countries developed the idea to establish a central 
Asian Centre for Disease Control (Tibayrenc, 2005).  
Crucially, experiences from the SARS outbreak also fed into the revision process for the International 
Health Regulations (IHR), the “only set of international legal rules binding WHO member states” 
concerning the prevention and control of infectious diseases with a potential to spread across 
borders (Heymann, 2004: 1127). According to the IHR’s last revision of 1969, the Regulations 
required the reporting of only three communicable diseases: cholera, plague and yellow fever (WHO, 
1983). In contrast, the new regulations (WHO, 2005) included broadened disease coverage, but also 
further reforms such as the use of non-governmental information on the disease outbreaks as well as 
the work with up-to-date means of communication.141 According to public health experts and legal 
scholars, the SARS case thus constituted a “historic moment in public health governance which 
induced the successful revision of the IHR in 2005” (Fidler, 2004b: 186, Price-Smith, 2009: 154). 
Also at the EU level further reforms and initiatives beyond the creation of the ECDC and the revision 
of the public health article in the Constitutional Treaty, could be observed for the field of infectious 
disease control the context of the SARS outbreak. Some of these changes were quite immediate, 
such as the “complete technological overhaul” of the Early Warning and Response System 
(Guglielmetti et al., 2006). Other reforms, such as the development of preparedness planning at the 
EU level, did not take place as promptly. 
 
                                                          
139
 On the Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) see also foot note 68. 
140
 ASEAN stands for ‘Association of Southeast Asian Nations’. It is a regional economic and political integration 
organisation with the participation of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
141
 Due to its importance for global and thus also European infectious disease control, the International Health 
Regulations (IHR) was, although adopted outside the EU context and without the EU being a contractual 
partner, identified as a milestone of infectious disease control for the EU by one interview respondent. For 
more information on the IHR new see, for instance, Fidler (2003), Tucker (2005), Baker and Fidler (2006), Baker 
and Forsyth (2007) and Michaud (2009). 
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As regards the first, the Commission found that the SARS outbreak had ”caused a huge and rapid 
flow of messages” through ERWS, which from the second week of the outbreak was characterised by 
”an overload of the EWRS mailbox [which] had a negative impact on processing and interpreting data 
and on control activities” (European Commission, 2005f: 9). Against this background the EWRS was 
technically modified, the new version of which was launched in May 2004. Besides, also the 
permanent entry of SARS to the list of communicable diseases covered by the Community Network 
(European Commission, 2007a) and the respective case definition of SARS (European Commission, 
2008e) are direct long-term updates.  
With a view to preparedness planning, the revitalisation of the idea of a strengthened supranational 
framework on pandemic planning, including measures to coordinate surveillance, public health 
interventions, vaccines, and antivirals can also be seen in the context of the SARS crisis. The 
Commission had proposed the development of a pandemic influenza preparedness plan at the EU 
level already in 2001 (European Commission, 2001m), but only with the SARS outbreak cross-country 
coordination mechanisms in this area gained sufficient momentum to kick-off a proper reform 
process (European Commission, 2005d). Seeing that a ‘Community preparedness plan’ was part of 
the list of ‘Future Actions’ as agreed on in response to SARS in April 2003 (CDNC, 2003c), the 
following influenza and generic preparedness planning at the EU level, initiated in 2004 (European 
Commission, 2004h) and 2005 respectively (European Commission, 2005b)142 can also be linked to 
the SARS outbreak. Setting the direction for several developments, the list of future measures in 
response to SARS unfolded indeed a structural impact in the further development of the further EU 
integration process. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that we can find references to infectious diseases in the EU’s security 
strategy ‘A secure Europe in a better world’ which was adopted in December 2003 (European 
Council, 2003: 2). The document was presented by the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier 
Solana, to the European Council in Thessaloniki in 2003 and formed an important reference point for 
EU external action. The document addressed especially AIDS as a global challenge, but also stated 
that “[n]ew diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats” (European Council, 2003: 2).  
 
6.4. The Securitisation of SARS 
The analysis of the response to SARS at the EU level has shown that soon after the first official 
statement by the WHO on the disease also EU institutions became active to respond to the outbreak. 
The topic triggered manifold responses by the EU and its Member States between March 2003 and 
the end of 2004, during which SARS, as a political and security issue, underwent a short and rapid 
development. On the basis of the official documents, the period under scrutiny can be best classified 
along the three phases of EU activities:  
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 On the development of preparedness plans at the EU level see also chapter 3.4.2. 
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During the initial phase in March and April 2003, SARS appeared for the first time in public 
documentation and underwent a rapid rise in terms of EU output and attention. During the second 
phase between May and June 2003, the disease reached the highest spheres in terms of both 
political agenda and SARS-related output. In July 2003, the post-outbreak phase began, during which 
the urgency of the issue faded out significantly, coming to almost an end of directly SARS-related 
activities by the end of 2004.  
The following section explores these developments from a securitisation point of view to reveal 
whether and in how far the EU utterances and reactions related to SARS fulfilled the criterions of 
securitising speech acts and extraordinary measures. In this context the first section on the degree of 
securitisation looks into the responses to SARS in terms of speech acts, security language and 
emergency measures, whereas the following section explores the rise and fall of SARS as a security 
issue. The section dealing with the kind of securitisation, in turn, investigates into the 
understanding(s) of security along the list of security parameters which were inherent to the 
construction of the disease as a matter of security concern. A final section of securitisation analysis 
deals with the roles of the involved EU actors. As set out in chapter 2.5.5, the list of documents was 
compiled on the basis of EUR-Lex extractions on the one hand and the official documentations made 
available in the internet on the other.143 
 
6.4.1. The Degree of Securitisation 
EU activities related to SARS began with the monitoring of the new disease through the Early 
Warning and Response System. Since the system was in place and working at that time already, this 
activity, however, could still be considered a standard procedure that did not necessarily mean a 
securitising activity. The begin of the securitisation process, in turn, was marked by the extraordinary 
meeting of the Network Committee and the Commission’s public statement on the outbreak in 
March, which both shifted SARS out of the realm of ordinary politics. In the following four months, 
SARS yielded numerous securitising elements.  
The speech of Commissioner Byrne before the European Parliament on the “killer pneumonia” 
(European Commission, 2003g) accelerated the development of securitisation in April and 
culminated in two key documents prepared by the Network Committee on immediate and future 
actions to combat SARS (CDNC, 2003b, 2003c). Comprising a comprehensive set of emergency 
measures, in particular the agreement on immediate actions constituted a significant boost for the 
securitisation of SARS in the operational dimension. From the outset, EU institutions repeated and 
called for strong support of the WHO recommendations and travel advisories which meant a 
substantial intervention into travel habits and economic prospects indeed. Whereas this reference to 
                                                          
143
 For explorative purposes, SARS-related written questions from the European Parliament as provided by 
EUR-Lex were analysed and classified in addition to the text corpus as defined in chapter 2.5.5. In order to 
ensure the operation with a consistently generated and analysed set of documents and to produce comparable 
results across both case studies, however, the classification of written questions and responses did not feed 
into the mathematical handling of the securitisation degree. An overview of the written questions and their 
classification is provided in Annex 2. 
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WHO already carried extraordinary measures from the international to the EU arena and can 
therefore be considered as elements of an indirect securitisation, the documents on immediate and 
future actions by the Network Committee constituted original contributions by EU Member States 
and Commission. As shown in detail in chapter 6.2, these documents encompassed numerous 
individual emergency measures ranging from recommendations to postpone “all but essential travel” 
to affected regions to the activation of a particular surveillance system and the creation of an EU 
Expert Group on SARS. In this way SARS approached the status of a highly securitised issue. 
The fact that Commission President Prodi addressed SARS in his correspondence with the Chinese 
President meant also a rise of SARS in the political hierarchies. For the European level this was even 
more the case in the beginning of May, when the EU’s Health Ministers met in an extraordinary 
meeting to discuss the situation, joined by the Director General of the WHO. The fact that the 
meeting was convened except the terms and that the Commission was assigned to compile a 
comprehensive report with information on the implementation of SARS prevention and management 
across Europe illustrate that the disease had reached a high sphere of the political agenda. The high 
number of written questions from Parliamentarians in May, many of which identified SARS as an 
extraordinary threat to public health in clear security language,144 underlines the urgency of the 
matter also from the perspective of the European Parliament. 
In June 2003, the last month before the declared containment of SARS, the Commission report 
(European Commission, 2003a) proved that Member States in the EU had indeed implemented a long 
list of emergency measures addressing specifically the spread of SARS. Although not all countries 
implemented the previously agreed recommendations in the same scope, the overall compliance 
rate was very high, in particular regarding the provision of guidance and information to the general 
public. In support of national crisis management, the Network Committee and the EU Expert Group 
on SARS also issued a set of technical guidance documents for all EU countries which revealed the EU 
level engagement beyond the constantly ongoing coordination and surveillance efforts by the 
Commission and the ERWS. The documents were designed for different target groups but did all 
employ a language that clearly pronounced the threat of SARS to the health of individuals, travellers, 
medical personnel and their relatives in general. The fact that specific documents – in contrast to 
other health risks – were set up for SARS as an individual disease to be distributed in dedicated 
environments such as airports, aircrafts or hospitals illustrates how the acute severe respiratory 
syndrome was dealt with as an exceptional issue beyond the realm of an ordinary health event. 
For the post-outbreak period after July 2003 until December 2004 less sources document a 
substantial securitisation status of SARS. In this phase, the disease was still subject to legal output, 
for instance in the context of left-overs from the outbreak period such as the slot allocation and flight 
schedule or annual reports on the affected regions. In comparison to the months before July, 
however, EU documents did not deal with SARS as a severe security threat anymore on a regular 
basis. Exceptions were mainly linked to a possible re-emergence, first as a general matter and more 
specifically after the escapes of the virus from laboratories in Asia, which occasionally fuelled the 
                                                          
144
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debate and lead the Network Committee to update the technical guidance documents. After the 
reports on the laboratories events in January 2004, the disease was subject to few securitising 
utterances only and almost disappeared from the political agenda by the end of 2004.145 
The following table provides an overview on the classification of security language and action for the 
selected EU key documents. To recall, labelling SARS “the new plague of the third millennium” 
(European Parliament, 2003a) or “a serious threat […] hits front-line human resources” (European 
Commission, 2003a: 14) was interpreted as a strong securitising move. Also permanent references to 
the rapidly rising number of reported infections and deaths contributed to the framing of SARS as an 
imminent threat. In turn, the comprehensive set of emergency measures outlined before (common 
rules for outbreak management incl. airport departure screenings, guidance documents etc.), 
complemented by the allocation of extraordinary resources to finance EU/WHO missions to affected 
countries and research on SARS, can be considered extraordinary actions which added to the 
securitisation of SARS on the operational level in response to the perceived threat. And although 
measures of a non-binding nature did not constitute highly securitising elements from the start, the 
extraordinary high compliance rate of the Member States with these requirements turned the 
measures de facto into hard emergency responses. 
 
Table 6-2: SARS-Related Speech Acts and Emergency Measures, 2003-2004 
(OJ) Date Author 
Reference Contents 
Securitisation 
Doc No. Verbal Oper. 
19.03.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003f) 
Pneumonia/SARS: risks, measures and plans 
for reform 
+ + 
IP/03/409 
07.04.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003g) 
Commission statement before the European 
Parliament: risks, measures + reform 
+ + 
Speech 163 
10.04.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003b) 
Immediate Actions for Member States and 
the Commission for the surveillance and 
control of SARS in Europe 
+ + + 
n.a. 
10.04.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003c) 
Future Actions for the longer term to address 
SARS and similar health threats in Europe  
+ + 
n.a. 
24.04.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003m) 
Air transport services: Common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports 
+ o 
COM(2003) 207 final 
14.05.03 CO 
(Council, 2003c) 
Extraordinary Council Meeting on SARS: 
Council Conclusions on immediate and future 
measures 
+ + + + 
9328/03
146
 
05.06.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003a) 
Measures undertaken by Member States and 
Accession Countries
147
 
+ + + + 
280503V3 
(continued) 
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 The fact that also the number of articles on SARS in the EU’s weekly online journal Eurosurveillance (see 
chapter 3.3.2) went down from 32 in 2003 to 6 in 2004 supports the overall trend. The content of the articles, 
however, were not subject to analysis from a securitisation perspective. 
146
 Document is identical in content with Council Document 8954/03 (Presse 122) (Council, 2003d) which, in 
turn, does not appear in the list. 
147
 Annex B containing an overview table on the SARS-related measures on national level in each Member State 
and accession country, was updated in September 2003 to complete data missing in the original document of 
June 2003 (European Commission, 2003j). 
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(continued) 
03.06.03 CO 
(Council, 2003b) 
EPSCO Council meeting, takes note of report 
280503V3 from the Commission 
o o 
9688/1/03 REV 1 
14.06.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003d) 
Technical Guidance Document: Registration 
card for travellers to the EU 
+ + + 
WD 116/V3 
14.06.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003e) 
Technical Guidance Document: Health 
information for international passengers 
from affected areas 
+ + + 
WD 117/V3 
14.06.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003a) 
Technical Guidance Document: Important 
health information for passengers  
+ + + 
WD 118/V3 
14.06.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003f) 
Technical Guidance Document: 
Recommendations for Airlines and personnel 
+ (-)
148
 + + 
WD 119/V3 
13.08.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003n) 
Consequences of SARS on Anti-Dumping and 
Anti-Subsidy Investigations 
+ o 
2003/C 191/02 
04.09.03 EP+CO (European Parliament 
and Council, 2003) 
Exceptional circumstances for air carriers and 
allocation of slots due to SARS 
+ + 
R 1554/2003 
10.09.03 COM (European Commission, 
2003k) 
SARS in EU-China Relations + o 
COM(2003) 533 final 
16.09.03 EESC 
(EESC, 2003b) 
Exceptional circumstances for air carriers and 
allocation of slots. Comparison to “9/11” 
+ o 
2003/C 220/14 
25.09.03 CDNC 
(CDNC, 2003h) 
Technical Guidance Document: SARS 
Reporting Form and Reporting Form 
Explanation 
o + + 
n.a. 
25.09.03 COM 
(European Commission, 
2003c) 
Technical Guidance Document: Important 
Health information on influenza vaccination 
and SARS 
+ o 
Doc 250903-9.1 
30.09.03 EESC 
(EESC, 2003a) 
Dramatic mishandling of the SARS epidemic 
in China; lack of change in political culture 
o o 
2003/C 234/17 
20.01.04 COM 
(CDNC, 2004) 
Technical Guidance Document: Risk of 
escape of SARS CoV from laboratories 
+ + + 
n.a. 
20.01.04 COM 
(European Commission, 
2004c) 
Technical Guidance Document: Procedure for 
communication to Member States and the 
Commission about SARS events 
o + 
n.a. 
24.02.04 COM 
(European Commission, 
2004b) 
Proposal for substantial revision of 
Regulation 95/93 on common rules for the 
allocation of slots at Community airports  
o o 
COM(2004) 136 final 
12.03.04 EP 
(European Parliament, 
2004n) 
Resolution (April 8, 2003) on Hong Kong SAR: 
public health & disease cooperation, 
establishment of alert system 
+ o 
P5_TA(2003)0142 
17.03.04 EP (European Parliament, 
2004c) 
Taiwan's observer status at the 56th World 
Health Assembly 
+ o 
P5_TA(2003)0224 
17.04.04 EP (European Parliament, 
2004e) 
EP Minutes: Statement of May 13, 2003, on 
SARS, followed by debate 
n.a. n.a.
149
 
2004/C 67 E/002 
28.06.04 COM (European Commission, 
2004d) 
Annual Report 2003 Hong Kong SAR: effects 
of SARS on economy, health systems, politics 
+ o 
COM(2004) 414 final 
16.07.04 COM (European Commission, 
2004e) 
Annual Report 2003 Macao SAR: SARS 
prevention and effects on economy 
+ o 
COM(2004) 506 final 
27.12.04 COM 
(European Commission, 
2004g) 
Annual Report on Anti-Dumping, Anti-
Subsidy and Safeguard Activities, Reference 
to 2003/C 191/02 (European Commission, 
2003n) 
o o 
COM(2004) 828 final 
+ 17 written questions from Members of the European Parliament on SARS (see Annex 2) 
Source: Own presentation.  
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 The original document of June 2003 was updated in September 2003. The update adapted the guidance 
sheet to the post-SARS phase and a particular re-emergence of the disease. Whereas in the original version 
SARS was still considered a topical threat, in the updated version the document specifies that SARS was 
declared contained and that “the current risk of SARS in Europe is estimated to be very low” (CDNC, 2003f: 1, 
version of September 25, 2003). 
149
 The document was not accessible at the time of writing. 
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6.4.2. The Rise and Fall of the Securitisation Degree 
We see that the disease which became to be known as ‘Severe Respiratory Syndrome’ was followed 
by various responses at the EU level that meet the criterions of securitising speech acts and 
emergency measures. The basic constituents for a securitisation of the disease were thus part of the 
political developments linked to the SARS outbreak. As developed in chapter 2.5.6.1, the present 
study does not claim to offer a precise measurement of the securitisation or the expression of the 
securitisation degree in form of an index, but it employs three tools to substantiate the analysis of 
the securitisation degree. First, a representation of the number of SARS-related documents and their 
assigned values is valuable to illustrate phases and peaks of the (de-)securitisation process. Second, 
for the assessment of the strength of the security discourse in the analysed set of documents it is 
helpful put the securitising elements in relation to the total number of SARS-related communications 
and to, third, calculate the average securitisation score. As regards the former, building on the 
classification of (de-) securitising elements as provided in Table 6-2 the following timeline illustrates 
the number of SARS-related documents and their assigned values by setting off securitisation moves 
against the de-securitising elements.150 
 
Source: Own presentation on the basis of securitisation degree scores assigned to the documents listed in Table 6-2. 
 
Over a period of approximately four months between March and June 2003, SARS was a highly 
securitised disease, followed by a longer phase until December 2004 in which the main EU actors 
progressively returned to a less active security-oriented modus operandi and modus loquendi, no 
longer beyond the realm of ordinary politics. More precisely, the timeline illustrates three 
securitisation phases, 1) acceleration from March to April, 2) peak from May to June, and 3) post-
outbreak phase after July 2003. Within the third phase two further securitisation waves can be 
detected. The first temporal rise in autumn 2003 occurred after a neutral phase during the summer, 
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 ++ accounts for 2 on the y-axis, + for 1, o for 0, - for -1 and -- for -2. See chapter 2.5.6.1. 
Diagram 6-1: The Rise and Fall of the Securitisation of SARS (2003-2004) 
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which can be explained by the political summer break, which typically shifts EU output to September. 
The short rise in January 2004 was linked to the escape of the SARS CoV from laboratories and the 
respective fear of a re-emergence of the virus. 
The graph also demonstrates that the securitisation of SARS took place on both the verbal as well as 
the operational level throughout the period under scrutiny. This finding is important as the 
securitisation approach requires the securitisation of an issue to occur in both dimensions in order to 
qualify the problem or situation for the status of an overall highly securitised matter. The 
securitisation degree of SARS was particularly high in the operational dimension during the second 
outbreak phase between May and June, when numerous measures were implemented. However, 
since emergency measures were adopted in groups rather than individually, the graph presented in 
Diagram 6-1 offers an approximation for illustrative purposes only. 
All in all, despite the possible identification of securitisation phases for SARS at the EU level, the exact 
timing of securitising moves is not of greatest relevance in the case of SARS, seeing that the core of 
the securitisation process took place in less than a year. In a short period like this it is decisive that 
the disease was indeed addressed and treated as a security issue in both securitisation dimensions, 
but it’s not particularly important to differentiate between individual months as it is valuable for the 
analysis of securitisation processes over a longer period of time. 
 
Table 6-3: The Degree of Securitisation of SARS Across Securitisation Dimensions 
 Verbal Securitisation Degree 
Operational 
Securitisation 
Degree 
 Low High 
High Medium SARS 
Low Low Medium 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
To confirm that the overall securitisation degree can in fact be considered high, it is essential to 
verify that not only the substantial absolute number of 28 communications between March 2003 and 
December 2004 shifted SARS into the realm of a highly securitised disease, but that also the 
discourse on the disease was dominated by a security perspective. In order to do so it is helpful to 
calculate the share of securitising communications in relation to the total number of SARS-related 
documents. The following Table 6-4 reveals that the discourse was indeed dominated by security 
language and concerns, proven by the result that roughly 78 per cent of the complete EU output was 
at least of a weakly securitising nature. In fact, the table makes visible that not a single document 
treated SARS without a securitising impact on either of the securitisation dimensions. Accordingly, 
the average score (Ø) for the EU output of +0,93 (see chapter 2.5.6.1) on the scale between the 
securitisation degree value maximums of -2 and +2 is relatively high.  
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Table 6-4: The Strength of the Security Discourse on SARS
151
 
Securitisation 
score152 
       securitising    neutral     de-securitising  
2 1 0 -1 -2 total Ø 
2
0
0
3
 -
 0
4
 Nr. of Docs 4 17 6 0 0 27 
0,93 % 14,81% 62,96% 22,22% 0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 
% / Cat. 77,78% 22,22% 0,00% 100,00% 
Source: Own calculation on the basis of the securitisation scores assigned to the documents in the verbal securitisation 
dimension as specified in Table 6-2. 
 
6.4.3. The Kind of Securitisation 
In order to make statements on the kind of securitisation the following section explores the EU’s key 
activities and documents along the list of security parameters as developed in chapter 2.3.2.2, 
ranging from the definition of the referent object(s), through the definition of the threat to the 
definition of the provision of security (see in particular Table 2-1). To recall, in this context, the 
referent object(s), the source, speed, geography, severity and predictability of the threat as well as 
the actors, policies and measures to provide security as specified in the EU legal output are analysed 
in order to reveal the security understanding(s) with which SARS was constructed as a security issue.  
A clear change in the security parameters did not occur in the short period in which the SARS crisis 
developed so that a differentiation across different phases is not necessary. 
 
6.4.3.1. The Securitisation Parameters 
At the European Union level SARS was primarily constructed as a threat for two referent objects, to 
public health and the health of specific groups of persons on the one hand, and to specific sectors of 
the economy on the other. Regarding the latter, damaging effects on business travel, trade and 
tourism sector played a noticeable role in the analysed securitising moves. Thus, we can observe a 
certain economy-centred securitisation of SARS, which was stronger linked to the economies of the 
Asian countries most affected by the disease. To illustrate, a drop by 37 % in tourist arrivals in May 
2003 to China’s Special Administrative Region (and former Portuguese colony) Macao was reported 
by the Commission to Council and Parliament (European Commission, 2004e).  
In view of the impact on the EU’s economy, the difficult situation for the air transport sector was part 
of the debate. SARS was declared to have had “seriously affected the air transport operations of air 
carriers [followed by] a significant reduction in demand” (EESC, 2003b) that triggered “an 
unprecedented crisis” (European Parliament, 2004g). The identification of air carriers as referent 
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 ‘Nr. of Docs’ specifies the number of documents with the respective score. ‘%’ refers to the share of the 
respective group of documents with the same securitisation score in per cent of the total number of 
documents. ‘% Cat.’ summarises the share of the two securitising (+2, +1), the neutral (0) and the two de-
securitising categories (-1, -2) into three broader categories, specified in per cent of the total number of 
documents. ‘Ø’ refers to the average score as calculated by the division of the sum of all scores of all EU 
documents by the number of documents for the specified periods. 
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 Securitisation score in line with Table 2-4 which relates + + to 2, + to 1, o to 0, - to -1 and - - to -2. 
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objects of an economic securitisation, however, was not linked exclusively to the SARS threat. In 
parallel to SARS, the war in Iraq and fear of terrorist attacks were also claimed to show effects on the 
European flight economy, so that SARS was identified as only one of a series of threats in that 
respect.  
As a menace to public health SARS appeared to be an extremely dangerous threat also for the 
countries inside the EU. Although the populations of the Asian countries, and in particular China, 
were identified as the main referent object of the threat, depending on the author of a securitising 
utterance also travellers, Commission officials, medical and air carrier personnel, their relatives and 
eventually the wider public in the EU were seen to be at risk. In this context it might be instructive 
that SARS entered public EU documents only after the first case had been reported for an EU 
Member State. However, throughout all outbreak phases, a high number of referent objects directly 
affected by SARS were identified only for countries outside the EU. A high number of referent objects 
inside the EU appeared only in the framework of the risk of a further transmission or potential 
infections, but not in terms of a de facto prevalence. 
As regards the securitisation parameter ‘source of threat’, the origin of SARS could not be specified in 
the first months of the outbreak. Still, suspicions that SARS could be something other than a naturally 
occurring, albeit new disease, were not raised. Only in the post-outbreak phase, when the re-
emergence of SARS was a topical question, the disease was discussed in view of an accidental or 
deliberate release, but not as its original source. All in all, the lack of knowledge on the disease and 
its characteristics played a crucial role for the securitisation of SARS, because it also affected the 
parameters ‘speed’, ‘geography’, ‘severity’ and ‘predictability’. Being a completely new 
phenomenon, great uncertainty spoke through numerous EU documents of securitising but also 
neutral actors. In particular the quick spread of the disease, combined with doubts on the reliability 
of data, was a reason for major concern, even if in some documents the risk was put into relation by 
mentioning that for a transmission from person to person very close contact was needed. Whereas 
securitising actors, in particular Members of the European Parliament, stressed the rapid increase in 
infections, neutral interventions, in particular from the Commission, underlined that only a few cases 
had been detected on the European continent so far.  
Also after the coronavirus had been identified, SARS continued to be labelled an exceptionally 
harmful menace, capable of rapid spread and with a high mortality rate in the countries of origin. 
However, effects of a SARS outbreak inside the EU were discussed mostly on a hypothetical basis. A 
main concern voiced in this context was the lack of treatment; repeatedly, we find concern 
expressed in the EU’s key documents that no effective antiviral existed. However, content related to 
the source of pathogenicity, that is the root cause of SARS to constitute a threat, was not only the 
non-availability of effective drugs, but also insufficient communication politics by the Chinese 
government whose information were considered not always reliable and distributed lately. Beyond 
that, in the post-outbreak securitisation phase, SARS was repeatedly associated with the possibility 
of the deliberate release of the virus as one form of bioterrorism. 
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With a view to the provision of security, the authors of the EU key documents identified the EU’s 
Member States as primarily responsible to implement adequate measures to protect the public from 
the threat of SARS. Clearly, it was principally up to the national authorities to inform the public and 
specific target groups, to report cases to the Commission and WHO, to setup isolation measures, etc. 
In this sense, the Member States can be seen as the primary security providers during the SARS crisis. 
The Council also repeatedly stressed the national competence in terms of outbreak management.  
WHO and EU institutions, first and foremost the European Commission (DG SANCO, partly also DG 
ECHO and DG DEVCO) as well as the Network Committee, were assigned important roles in the fields 
of disease surveillance and coordination of the nationally implemented efforts, but generally not for 
the implementation itself. In this sense, at the EU level tasks in terms of security provision were 
limited to monitoring, coordinative and advisory functions, the latter closely interconnected with 
national authorities, be it in the framework of the Network Committee, be it in the form of the EU 
Expert Group on SARS. However, due to the EU’s financial engagement related to EU/WHO 
assistance to affected countries and following the Commission’s investments into SARS research, EU 
institutions also contributed directly to the outbreak response. 
The ethical position and justification for action voiced in the EU key documents on SARS comprised 
two complementary aspects. On the one hand, the protection of referent objects on the European 
continent was a primary declared objective. Clearly, in both speech acts and emergency measures 
Member States and EU institutions aimed at the prevention of the spread of the disease into EU 
countries. At the same time, several of the EU-internal or nationally implemented measures, such as 
the information campaign or the isolation of a passenger on a stop-over flight, also meant a 
contribution to the fight against the global spread. Arguably, the containment of the disease in one 
part of the world is a pre-condition for – and a contribution to its control worldwide. Reasoning on 
this basis, however, was not explicit in the analysed documents. Still, the support of most affected 
countries in Asia also went beyond a purely self-protective stance at the EU’s borders, for instance 
due to the seconded expert teams. In other words, the basic ethical stance as part of the 
securitisation process is difficult to be determined unambiguously in the case of SARS, seeing that we 
can observe elements of self-protection focusing on the own territory as well as elements of a global 
approach of collaboration and assistance. 
It becomes clear that the EU actors dealt with SARS also in the foreign policy realm when supporting 
global efforts to fight the disease, but also beyond, as a matter in EU-China relations (European 
Commission, 2003k) or in the context of Taiwan’s status at the WHO (European Parliament, 2004c). 
However, the major policy concerned with the disease was the field of public health and only few 
activities fell into other realms such as the economy or the field of research. Interventions in the 
public health sphere also most fundamentally contributed to a rising securitisation degree. Place of 
the interventions were within the EU territory as well as in third countries, but clearly with a focus on 
the former. Despite the support for field trips to Asia and the international collaboration with WHO, 
the largest share of coordinative activities concentrated on EU borders and the immediate response 
and preparedness inside the Member States.  
181 
 
6.4.3.2. Soft and/or Hard Securitisation 
In order to sum up the different elements of the securitisation process of SARS it is helpful to return 
to the ideal types of the kind of securitisation of an infectious disease as developed in chapter 
2.3.2.3. In view of the two extremes, the soft kind of securitisation on the one hand and the hard 
kind on the other (see Table 2-2), the SARS case seems to feature at first sight many elements of the 
former form. Throughout the different outbreak phases, we find security parameters values that 
specify mainly the health of people living outside the EU as being directly threatened and only 
particular groups of persons inside the EU. These referent objects are threatened by a naturally 
occurring disease that appears somehow manageable in the EU. In other words, the impact of the 
disease was considered to be strong only far away. Despite these securitisation parameters that tend 
to the soft extreme, the overall assessment of the securitisation of SARS is different. In fact, it can be 
argued that also SARS was securitised in a way close to the hard kind, for mainly four reasons.  
First, the EU actors identified as security referent objects did not only belong to the group of 
travellers and businesspeople, which is potentially a very large group, but also the group of health 
care professionals. The latter is essential for the functioning of the basic health system which in turn 
belongs to the vital functions expected to be provided by the State. In other words, the particularly 
threatened groups comprised both many EU referent objects as well as referent objects vital to the 
functioning of the health systems in Europe as a whole. Beyond that, also the securitisation of SARS 
with a view to specific sectors of the economy supports the view of a securitisation in the sense of a 
hard kind. 
Second, the EU actors’ view on SARS was dominated by uncertainty. A great number of unknown but 
important factors such as the identification of the pathogen or the exact route of its transmission 
went along with a securitisation of SARS as an unpredictable and extremely severe threat, in 
particular during the early outbreak period. The unpredictability and severity seem to have 
superimposed arguments like the far distance of the outbreak or the low morbidity in the EU by 
increasing the assumed potential of SARS to mean a substantial threat also inside the EU.  
Third, the values for the security parameters ‘security provider’ (states and IOs rather than (I)NGOs) 
and the primary policies concerned (public health, economy) in both the verbal and the operational 
dimensions also shift the securitisation of SARS rather to the hard extreme. Fourth and finally, in line 
with the expected values for the hard kind, surveillance was carried out at the regional level through 
the EWRS (although reported globally in parallel), prevention and preparedness were limited to the 
own territory and also the immediate response concentrated on the European continent, although 
assistance to affected countries was provided too.  
The following Table 6-5 provides a schematic classification of the securitisation of SARS along the full 
set of securitisation parameters, identifying for each a tendency rather towards the soft (left side) or 
the hard kind (right side) on the horizontally illustrated spectrum of security understandings. On the 
basis of the full breakdown of all parameter the table makes visible what the text analysis has found, 
namely that in the period between 2003 and 2004 SARS was securitised at the EU level in a way 
closer to a hard kind of securitisation.  
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Table 6-5: The Kind of Securitisation of SARS (schematic) 
Dimension Security Parameter Soft Kind Hard Kind 
V
er
b
al
 
Referent object Human    x  
Vital to State / 
EU 
Min. Referent object Few     x Many 
Source of Threat Natural x     Manmade 
Source of Pathogenicity 
Development, 
Health Care 
  x ---→ x
153
 
Terror, Enemy 
Globalisation 
Speed of Threat Slow / Attrition     x Fast / Outbreak 
Geography of Threat Far / “Not Us”    x  Close / “Us” 
Threat Severity Low     x High 
Predictability of Threat High     x Low 
Ethical Stance 
Common 
Humanity 
   x  Self-Protection 
V
e
rb
al
 &
 
O
p
e
ra
ti
o
n
al
 
Security Provider 
State (+INGO) + 
Non-State 
 
    x States (+IOs) 
Primary Policy 
Humanitarian Aid, 
Development, 
Human Rights 
 
   x  
Foreign & Secur. 
Economy,  
Public Health 
O
p
e
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ti
o
n
al
 
Ta
rg
et
 a
n
d
 
G
eo
g
ra
p
h
y 
o
f 
M
ea
su
re
 
Surveillance Global   x   National / EU 
Prevention Global   x   National / EU 
Preparedness Global     x National / EU 
Response Global    x  National / EU 
Source: Own presentation. 
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 Initially Chinese reporting practice, later globalisation effects and bioterrorism. 
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6.4.4. The Role of the Different EU Actors 
Studying the forms of securitisation is not limited to the timing, the dimensions, the degrees and 
kinds of securitisation, but also includes an analysis of the set of securitisers that contributed to the 
processes at the EU level. We have seen that the securitisation of SARS cannot be understood as a 
homogenous process in which all EU actors were involved in the same manner. Quite the contrary, 
some potentially influential actors such as the European Council did not contribute to the (de-
)securitisation of SARS at all. And also among the active institutions, ranging from the Parliament and 
the Council to the Network Committee and the Commission, we could observe quite different 
approaches to the (de-)securitisation of the disease.  
Building on the EU documents without considering the Parliaments written questions and respective 
answers from Commission or Council, the European Commission and the Communicable Disease 
Network Committee were the most important actors for the securitisation of SARS. In line with the 
tasks and competences assigned to these institutions, the Network Committee was a stronger 
securitiser in the operational dimension, whereas the Commission contributed to securitisation more 
in the verbal dimension. However, a clear-cut differentiation between Commission, the EU Expert 
Group and the Network Committee is difficult in some cases, given that these documents were 
issued jointly and published without further details on the main or responsible author. 
With the Network Committee as a specialised tool for Member States to coordinate their efforts with 
the support of the Commission, and after its establishment also with the support of the EU Expert 
Group on SARS, the Council was comparably passive as regards SARS-related output. By convening 
extraordinarily and by deciding on the immediate and future measures to combat SARS in the 
European Union, the Council, however, was despite its limited output one of the most influential 
actors for the EU’s SARS response, in particular for the mid-term development of EU-wide measures. 
In this context it is noteworthy that the European Council did not address SARS in any of its 
Presidency Conclusions of the period in question, not even when the creation of the European Centre 
of Disease Prevention and Control was discussed and finally decided. For this reason the Council on 
the side of the intergovernmental institutions of the EU, and the President of the European 
Commission on the side of the supranational institutions were the highest political levels that dealt 
with SARS in the European arena.154  
For the European Parliament it can be noted, on the basis of the official statements, that the 
institution as a whole was not a particularly strong securitiser. In fact, besides its contribution to 
Regulation 1554/2003 (European Parliament and Council, 2003) regarding the exceptional 
circumstances for air carriers, the Parliament did not produce any output. Naturally, the picture 
would change, if the Parliament’s debates and written questions were taken into account as well. 
However, as outlined in chapter 2.5.5, written questions are not part of the text corpus as generated 
and analysed consistently across the case studies of this work. A look into the written questions for 
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 In the international arena SARS was also addressed in June 2003 by the Group of Eight (G8), a forum in 
which not only four EU Member States (France, Germany, Italy and the UK) but also the European Commission 
participates. SARS was in particular addressed by the ‘G8 Action Plan on Health’ (Group of Eight (G8), 2003). 
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explorative purposes, however, shows that in particular during the peak securitisation phase in May 
2003, the members of the European Parliament were extraordinarily active and substantially 
contributed to the securitisation of SARS on the verbal dimension.155  
For the European Commission we could observe an overall ambiguous picture regarding its role as a 
securitiser. On the one hand, DG SANCO and Commissioner Byrne constantly underlined the threat 
exerted by SARS, in particular with reference to the upcoming proposal for the establishment of the 
ECDC. On the other hand, the Commission balanced strong securitisation moves with reference to 
the future tasks of ECDC or by emphasising that surveillance measures were in place and well-
functioning. In this sense, the report on the measures undertaken by Member States is instructive, in 
which the Commission summarised:  
“The first lesson learnt is that EU was able to contain the outbreak and to deal with a low 
number of SARS cases. This reflects the general success of the public health measures put in 
place. The question remains if the EU could respond with the same efficacy to a larger SARS 
epidemic or to outbreaks of different communicable diseases. A comprehensive and 
intersectoral preparedness plan is needed to strengthen the health services at local as well as 
at central level” (European Commission, 2003a: 14). 
Apart from Parliament, Commission, Network Committee and Council, few other further actors 
contributed to the securitisation of SARS at the EU level, namely the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) as well as the WHO. The EESC’s influence was limited to an intervention related to 
the air transport crisis. In line with the institution’s general mandate, it emphasised the threat of 
SARS to the air carrier economy rather than securitising SARS as a threat to public health. In contrast, 
WHO emphasised SARS’ danger for public health. The WHO, in turn, does not belong to the actors 
under scrutiny for the securitisation procedures in the present study. However, given the numerous 
references in the EU documents, it can nevertheless be regarded as an influential indirectly 
securitising actor also at the EU level.  
Similar to this indirect securitisation further securitising elements from non-EU actors appear in the 
EU documents. In particular the public fear of the disease became part of the equation, when the 
Commission found that SARS had “incited widespread public anxiety, spreading faster than the virus” 
(European Commission, 2003a: 15). Crucially, according to the Commission these concerns of the 
public also caused “social discomfort, economic losses and political stress” as well as the emergence 
of discrimination towards vulnerable communities (European Commission, 2003a: 15). In other 
words, it was, strictly speaking, not only SARS that was securitised as a threat; additionally it was also 
the public fear of SARS that was securitised at the EU level with own or reinforcing effects for not 
only the economy, but also more generally for social life. Clearly, the present analysis of the 
securitisation of SARS is limited to utterances and counter measures of EU actors, but this example 
shows how pressure from the public or “extensive media attention” (European Commission, 2003g) 
can become manifest or at least shine through in EU documents.  
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 A full classification of the SARS-related written questions and responses was carried out for explorative 
purposes and can be found in Annex 2. 
185 
 
6.5. Securitisation and Structural Change 
Chapter 6.4.2 has shown that SARS underwent a rapid rise on the vertical securitisation spectrum 
from a non-existent political phenomenon to a matter that can be regarded as highly securitised at 
least during the first half of the year 2003. With a view to the predominant kind of securitisation for 
SARS, chapter 6.4.3 has shown the overall combination of security parameters predominantly leaned 
to the extreme that made up for a rather hard kind of securitisation. Probably linked to the overall 
short securitisation phase, a substantial shift from one kind to another could not be observed. 
Taking these findings together it becomes clear that the disease was not only pushed to a high 
degree of securitisation, but that the securitisation also took place in the form of a hard kind. Taking 
up the securitisation approach as developed and applied in this study, this specific combination of 
degree and kind makes up for SARS as an issue that was strongly securitised at the EU level – even if 
the securitisation was limited to a relatively short period of time. Accordingly, the disease can be 
located in the upper right corner of the coordination system of securitisation as introduced in 
chapter 2.3.3. 
 
Figure 6-1: SARS in the Coordination System of Securitisation 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
The securitisation of the disease thus assumed a form which was hypothesised to bear the potential 
to cause institutionalisation in the political system of the EU. Recalling the definition as developed in 
chapter 2.3.4.1, a systemic change is understood as relatively persistent and systemic modification of 
rules, procedures, policy priorities, resource allocation, distribution of competences and 
organisational structures in the field of EU infectious disease control. With a view to these criterions 
not all of the legal and institutional reforms revealed in chapter 6.3 do qualify as a structural change. 
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However, the two innovations that were selected for an in-depth case study from the list of key 
developments in the EU’s evolution of infectious disease control (chapter 4), namely the 
establishment of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the revision of the 
public health article in the Constitutional Treaty, certainly meet the definition of institutionalisation. 
The establishment of the ECDC was a particularly visible reform that became even physically manifest 
in Swedish bricks and stones, but beyond that the decision also implied further systemic changes. 
First, the allocation of an annual (albeit comparatively small) budget to run the new institution also 
meant a structural re-allocation of resources. In addition, also the agency’s responsibility for the 
coordination of the already existing disease networks came along with financial implications. While 
those networks relied to a large extent on ad hoc financing by the EU’s public health programme 
before the transfer to ECDC, the new institutional embeddedness implied a perpetuation of the 
funding.  
Second, the creation of the ECDC also changed procedures and collaboration patterns, given that the 
system for scientific advice was modified due to the outsourcing of risk assessment to the ECDC, a 
body with strongly increased scientific capacity. At the same time, however, it should be noted that 
despite the setup of ECDC, the collaboration in infectious disease matters at the EU level also showed 
strong aspects of continuity. More precisely, basic forms of cooperation remained the same, given 
that Member States remained the responsible actors in terms of outbreak management and the 
provision of health care, disease treatment etc. Beyond that also the network approach to 
cooperation remained principally the same, even if the ECDC took over the coordinator function from 
the Commission. 
As analysed in chapter 6.3, the revision of the EU’s primary law occurred somewhat circuitous and 
delayed. Whereas the Convention’s Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2003) had 
not foreseen a major revision, the finally signed Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004) 
did include major innovations in the field of infectious disease control. Finally, following the stop of 
the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty, some of these changes were nonetheless taken 
over in the Lisbon Treaty with the amendment that measures concerning monitoring, early warning 
of and combating serious cross-border threats to health were not assigned to the realm of shared 
competences. Expert interviews could not help reveal how these changes occurred, an explanation 
for which is beyond the scope of the study. For future research, however, translating the working 
hypothesis of the present study to this situation it could be argued that cross-border threats to 
health were no longer sufficiently securitised at the time when the Lisbon Treaty was concluded in 
2007 (at that time called ‘Reform Treaty’). 
However, since the Lisbon Treaty did not enter into force before 2009, the substantial revision of the 
public health article turned into EU law only more than six years after the securitisation of SARS. The 
introduction of the monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to 
health as a distinctive field of EU activity eventually resulted in one of the cornerstones of the EU’s 
infectious disease control today, namely Decision 1082/2013/EU on serious cross-border threats to 
health (European Parliament and Council, 2013a). Hence, these developments originally date back to 
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the period of the SARS crisis. Although the TFEU located the revised article on public health and its 
infectious disease-related innovations in the field of supporting competences, the new formulation 
still meant a clear and far-reaching revision of the EU’s competencies as laid down in primary law. 
Against this background it is possible to summarise that an alteration of the previous EU setup took 
place in all four aspects of institutional change, namely regarding the forms of collaboration and 
procedures (e.g. system of scientific advice), the allocation of resources (ECDC and perpetuation of 
network funding), the (limited) transfer of competencies (Constitutional Treaty / Treaty of Lisbon) 
and the establishment and organisation of institutions (ECDC). 
 
Table 6-6: Institutionalisation that Occurred in the Course of the SARS Crisis 
30.04.04 EP+CO (European 
Parliament and 
Council, 2004a) 
Establishment of a European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 
incl. the modification of the system of scientific advice and the 
perpetuated funding of previously ad hoc-financed networks 
R 851/2004 
16.12.04 IGC (Treaty Establishing 
a Constitution for 
Europe) Introduction of monitoring, early warning of and combating serious 
cross-border threats to health as field of EU action (supporting 
competence) 
Article III-278 
30.03.10 IGC (Treaty on the 
Functioning of the 
European Union) 
Article 168 TFEU 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
A series of arguments indicate a clear connection between the securitisation of SARS and the 
identified institutionalisation processes. The reforms fell not only into the realm of EU cooperation in 
infectious disease matters and made reference to security language, they were also designed in a 
way that exactly addressed the central components used during the SARS outbreak. To illustrate, the 
ECDC was mandated to “identify, assess and communicate current and emerging threats to human 
health from communicable diseases” and to act, also on own initiative, to “outbreaks of illness of 
unknown origin, which may spread within or to the Community” (European Parliament and Council, 
2004a: 1). SARS falls, more than any other disease of the years under scrutiny, in this category. Also 
the ECDC’s ability to set up EU teams for the technical assistance to Member States or third countries 
in the case of an epidemiological crisis, as it had just taken place in the case of SARS, and the 
incorporation of the revised Early Warning and Response System (EWRS), which was one of the 
central communication instruments during the SARS crisis, exemplify the close connection. This 
interpretation is also supported by the information retrieved from elite interviews. 
Crucially, rather than addressing infectious diseases as one of a set of health challenges, both ECDC’s 
founding regulation and the Constitutional Treaty address infectious diseases as ‘threats’ or ‘cross-
border threats’ and, thus, with the vocabulary of security language – despite the technical nature of 
the documents. An interesting side not is that in the 480 pages of the Constitutional Treaty the word 
‘threat’ occurs only seven times in total. Most references are linked to war or terrorism, but two of 
them occur in relation to (potential) cross-border health problems.  
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The close connection between the use of security language and reform is also visible in the context of 
the production: Not only was the creation of ECDC repeatedly proposed by Commissioner Byrne in 
the same breath that constructed SARS as a security issue (European Commission, 2003f). Also the 
proposal made explicit reference to a set of threatened referent objects, when stating that “[m]ajor 
communicable disease outbreaks impact the whole of a society, not just its health sector. For 
instance, the SARS outbreak had an immediate, negative impact on economic growth in the Asian 
countries it affected. SARS may also, more indirectly, have had a negative impact on the EU 
economy” (European Commission, 2003b: 4). In this context the Commission’s proposal salvaged the 
idea of agency creation from the securitisation phase by combining the language of securitisation 
with a legislative proposal for a substantial reform. In a similar fashion also the proposed 
modifications of the public health article of the Constitutional Treaty in the discussions of the 
Convention were backed by references to the threat of SARS. 
On a most fundamental level, the temporal relation between securitisation and structural change is 
another strong argument in favour of the assumed linkage between the two processes. As explained 
before, the precise timing in terms of weeks or months of securitising moves is not particularly 
relevant in the SARS case since the main process developed over a phase of less than a year. It is 
rather important that the period of rapidly increasing and ultimately strong securitisation of an 
infectious disease was indeed followed by fundamental modifications in the EU’s setup to respond to 
infectious diseases – as schematically illustrated by Diagram 6-2 (see below). 
 
Source: Own presentation.
Diagram 6-2: Securitisation of SARS and Structural Changes in the EU’s Setup for Infectious Disease Control 
  (schematic, 2003-2004) 
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Given the scope of the modifications, agency setup and Treaty change, the time span between the 
strong and hard securitisation of SARS on the one hand and systemic change on the other is actually 
very short.156 This circumstance can be explained for both structural changes by the fact that the 
SARS threat hit the EU authorities at a time when revision processes were already in progress 
anyway. In the case of the amendment of the public health article, the Convention on the Future of 
Europe constituted a forum that had been particularly designed to discuss a fundamental change of 
the Treaty. Naturally, when SARS appeared as an issue at the EU level it was not a far-fetched idea to 
take up the then-ongoing outbreak and feed respective reform ideas into the ongoing revision 
process. In other words one could say that the securitisation of SARS occurred at the right time to 
provide an obvious justification for strengthened EU competencies to combat infectious diseases.  
Also the creation of the ECDC was about timing, but in a different way. We have seen that the 
original idea for a central European disease control institution dated back to the 1990s and that since 
then discussions went on, even after the – for the time being – final decision in 1998 to opt for a 
network-approach at the EU level. In particular the Commission pursued the idea of an EU centre in 
detail already before the SARS crisis. The visit of Commissioner Byrne in October 2001 to the US 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), the world leading institution of its kind and desired role model for 
an EU equivalent in the eyes of for many advocates, and his experience with the creation of the 
European Food Safety Authority in 2002 might have contributed to the conviction within the 
Commission that the creation of an ECDC was a desirable innovation, already before 2003.  
When in 2003 the debates on the risk of SARS in particular and infectious diseases in general 
intensified, it seems that from the Commission’s perspective the right time had come to launch a 
campaign in favour of the establishment of the agency. As shown in chapter 6.2.1, the plan for the 
creation of the ECDC and references to an advanced state of affairs regarding the respective 
legislative proposal could be found already in the very first interventions in response to the outbreak.  
Hence, whereas the securitisation of SARS was capable of intensifying the already ongoing revision 
process of the EU’s primary law during the Convention’s discussions, it served a different function in 
the context of the ECDC creation. Here, the strong securitisation opened a window of opportunity for 
the establishment of the agency which proponents had advocated already for many years. 
  
                                                          
156
 In this context ‘treaty change’ refers to the signing of the Constitutional Treaty.  
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6.6. Conclusions 
In its resolution on the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome the World Health Assembly labelled SARS 
“the first severe infectious disease to emerge in the twenty-first century” (WHO, 2003o). When the 
virus appeared, it had never been detected in humans before. It turned out to be transmissible from 
human-to-human and was characterised by a worrying case fatality ratio. Neither adequate diagnosis 
nor treatment existed, let alone vaccination. The last time the world had seen a pathogen emerge 
with comparable characteristics was in the 1980s, when the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) 
started unfolding its devastating effects worldwide (Fidler, 2003: 490).  
In June 2003, a month before the disease was declared contained, the European Commission 
concluded “that EU was able to contain the outbreak and to deal with a low number of SARS cases” 
(European Commission, 2003a: 14). At that time, in line with the division of competences leaving 
disease management to the national level, Member States had – with the support and coordination 
from both the EU and international level – undertaken a comprehensive set of measures to control 
the outbreak of SARS; however, concerns persisted, also in view of similar situation in the future. In 
this situation advocates of a stronger EU role, many of which had strong ties to the European 
Training Programme EPIET (Greer, 2012a: 1008), stressed the value of the joint efforts to successfully 
combat the disease. At the same time, concerns were further fuelled by interpreting SARS a ‘warning 
shot’ for something worse to come.  
In this atmosphere the experts from the Commission and Member States agreed on a series of ideas 
what could be done at the EU level in the future. As explained in the previous section, the facts that a 
Convention on the future of Europe was convening at the same time and that plans for an agency for 
infectious disease matters had already been drawn up, facilitated a rapid and fundamental reform. In 
the end, the EU’s structural setup was substantially reformed, although SARS cases occurred in eight 
Member States only, with a total number of 32 infected persons, all of which but one recovered from 
the disease (CDNC, 2003g). 
Reviewing these developments makes clear that in the EU SARS was primarily about the perception 
and construction of a potential threat to human health and not about de facto infections, illness and 
death. It does not belong to the objectives of the present study to evaluate the adequacy of activities 
or effects. The fact, however, that SARS was described as an “epidemic of fear” (Price-Smith, 2009) 
with an enormous impact on the political and social level, the media and specific industry sectors 
disproportionate to the direct human health impact (Knobler et al., 2004: 1, Michaud, 2009: 29) 
supports the constructivist core argument of the securitisation approach: (in)security is essentially 
subjective.  
Consequently, once security concerns start influencing or even become the main driver of the 
political processes, immediate actions and structural changes do not necessarily respond to the 
threat, but to the subjective perception of the threat. In this context it is not decisive whether 
alternatives existed, for instance to the creation of an agency in form of “the pre[-]existing division of 
labo[u]r among the [M]ember [S]tates, WHO, the Council of Europe, existing EU networks, and to a 
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lesser degree the European Commission” (Guigner, 2006, Greer, 2012a: 1008). It also does not 
matter whether the ECDC is a weak agency a “hub or hollow core”. By contrast, the deciding factor 
was the “political imperative to ‘do something’” after the SARS experience (Greer, 2012a: 1010). 
The results of the case study on SARS strongly support the interpretation that the social construction 
of the disease in form of strong securitisation was pivotal for this political imperative and thus the 
trigger for institutionalisation processes in the EU. This finding does not exclude that parallel 
developments and other factors fed into the process. To illustrate, further potentially influential 
factors were the generally changed view on infectious diseases after the spread of HIV/AIDS and the 
link to bioterrorism after the 2001 anthrax scare, the perceived threat of an influenza pandemic, the 
war in Iraq, the upcoming ‘big bang’ enlargement of the European Union, the establishment of EFSA 
and EMA and the experience of pro-integrationist policy advocates such as Commissioner Byrne with 
the creation of these agencies. Still, the investigation into the SARS case on the basis of the selected 
key documents first and foremost suggests a confirmation of the hypothesis set out in chapter 2.4 on 
the linkage between a specific combination of degree and kind of securitisation on the one hand, and 
structural change on the other.  
In order to address the fundamental research question as put forward in the introduction and in 
more detail in chapter 2.4 of this study, this case study has analysed how the EU responded to SARS 
and how the disease was subject to securitisation dynamics at the EU level. In this context the 
chapter has also examined the different roles of the involved EU actors. It has furthermore gathered 
information on the development of the EU’s infectious disease policy and polity between 2003 and 
2004, in particular the creation of the ECDC and the change of the EU’s legal basis for action in the 
field of infectious diseases in the Constitutional Treaty, and has connected them to the securitisation 
processes. In the following concluding chapter, the results will be related to the findings of the case 
study that focused on the revision of the EU’s legal basis for food safety in the Amsterdam Treaty and 
the creation of EFSA following the BSE/TSEs crisis.  
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7. Conclusions 
Infectious diseases affect millions of people worldwide every year and are one of the main causes of 
death (WHO, 2015a). In the last years there was hardly any time when specific disease outbreaks did 
not appear somehow prominently in the media and on the political agendas, be it the novel avian 
influenza subtype H7N9 that occurred in China in 2013, be it the epidemic spread of ebola in West 
Africa in 2014/2015.  
The variety of diseases that are labelled infectious is rich, and so is the variety of ways how the threat 
exerted from infectious diseases is perceived and politically responded to. Not every disease is 
regarded as an acute threat to security or even health. While in some regions vaccination rates for 
measles decrease, suggesting that it has lost the image of a terrifying disease, public outcry is 
typically intense as soon as reports occur about a new or re-emerging ‘killer virus’. Also political and 
public health interventions differ significantly from disease to disease, ranging from the massive 
stockpiling of antiviral medication, as occurred in the course of the H1N1 ‘swine flu’ outbreak in 
2009, to largely inactivity and neglect, for instance with regard to leishmaniasis or dengue fever. 
At the European Union level a dynamic development took place in the realm of infectious disease 
control in the last decades. In the year 1990, EU primary law did not even enshrine the protection of 
public health as an independent policy objective; in 2015, the EU’s mandate and setup to control 
infectious diseases inter alia comprises a clear legal basis in the Lisbon Treaties to combat cross-
border health threats, a complex system of facilities to surveil and respond to a large number of 
diseases, including unknown pathogens, a set of specialised agencies that communicate about health 
risks and that advice decision-making in the EU, as well as an encompassing public health programme 
which is run by a dedicated executive agency. 
Astonishingly, this vibrant evolution in the EU’s setup to control infectious diseases took place largely 
unobserved by academic scholars. It was therefore the purpose of the present study to shed light on 
these institutionalisation processes and to investigate into the reasons for the development. Against 
the background that health in general and infectious diseases in particular are nowadays tied to 
security by both the political realm as well as academia in an unprecedented way, the investigation 
into the reasons for the EU’s infectious disease infrastructure was undertaken from a securitisation 
perspective. Seeing that the existing literature on the subject is, however, inconclusive, in particular 
regarding the European Union, the study aimed at responding to the striking political and academic 
relevance of the topic at the intersection of three – in this combination so far unrelated strands – of 
research, namely European integration, infectious disease control and securitisation. 
The following concluding chapter of the study will bring together the core elements of the study in 
five steps. The first sections serves the purpose to provide a synthesis of the empirical findings 
regarding the institutionalisation of infectious disease control in the European Union (chapter 7.1) 
and the securitisation of infectious diseases at the EU level (chapter 7.2). The aim is to derive 
overarching conclusions across the case studies before returning in chapter 7.3 to the research 
question and the hypothesis on the potential effects of securitisation on institutionalisation 
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processes in the EU. Chapter 7.4 is dedicated to assessing the limitations of the study that result from 
the conceptual and the methodological approach. Seeing that the novel securitisation framework as 
developed and applied by the present study contains a set of innovations, a thorough reflection on 
concept and methods can also contribute to direct future research. Therefore, the chapter continues 
with an agenda for future analyses that could complement the findings and advance the approach, 
before some final thoughts on the topic close the study as a whole (chapter 7.5). 
 
7.1. The Institutionalisation of Infectious Disease Control at the EU Level 
With a basic research interest in the evolution of the EU’s infectious disease policy and polity 
between 1993 and 2014, the study put a focus on key developments and institutionalisation 
processes at the EU level, the latter understood as relatively persistent and systemic changes 
regarding rules, procedures, policy priorities, resource allocation, division of competences and 
organisational structures in the field of EU infectious disease control, also referred to as structural or 
systemic changes. Before turning to the conditions under which this evolution took place, it is 
valuable to recall what exactly has been or is being institutionalised (Stone Sweet et al., 2001: 22).  
On the basis of the empirical analysis we can conclude that the institutionalisation of EU infectious 
disease policy occurred basically in four interconnected areas.  
First, we could observe a stepwise increase of EU competences to combat infectious diseases. The 
widening and deepening of the EU’s public health portfolio has been fed in two ways: in a horizontal 
way following the shifting of responsibilities from other EU policies to the realm of public health, 
particularly regarding veterinary and food safety affairs, and in a vertical way, for instance due to the 
introduction of additional policy objectives at the EU level and the compulsory adjustment of existing 
national surveillance and disease reporting structures to the administration at the EU level. This 
development found expression in the change of the EU’s legal fundament, the EU Treaties, and in the 
form of extensive regulatory legislation whose implementation is monitored and enforced by EU 
actors, for instance by the inspections of the Commission’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO). 
Second, the EU’s setup to control infectious diseases was subject to persistent changes regarding its 
institutional and organisational structures. For the period between 1993 and 2014, we could observe 
the establishment of not less than four specialised agencies (EMA, EMCDDA, EFSA, ECDC) as well as 
one executive agency (PHEA/EAHC/CHAFEA) all of which decisively contribute, albeit working under 
broader mandates, to the control of infectious diseases at the EU level. With the Health Security 
Committee (HSC) another key forum has transformed from a temporary informal institutions into a 
key consulting and advisory institutions for the overall coordination of public health risk assessment 
regarding cross-border threats to health. Beyond the creation of these new institutions also 
permanent re-organisations of existing structures took place, best illustrated by the fusion of the 
public health and the food safety portfolio within the European Commission or the combination of 
the grown set of surveillance, warning and outbreak response facilities into a clustered management 
structure for acute health emergency crises (HEOF). 
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Third, changes related to EU competences and infrastructure implied far-reaching consequences for 
infectious disease control-related rules and procedures. At the most fundamental level we have seen 
modifications in the relevant legislative procedures, for instance by the introduction of the co-
decision (ordinary legislative) procedure for the adoption of measures in the veterinary and 
phytosanitary fields which have as their direct objective the protection of public health.  
At the applied level the (re-)focusing of the disease reporting and alert infrastructure to the 
European level is a pattern that occurred for infectious disease threats (EWRS), but also for food and 
feed (RASFF) and health threats due to deliberate release of chemical, biological and radio-nuclear 
agents (RAS BICHAT). In particular regarding the EWRS the creation of the ECDC was a pivotal step as 
it meant a clear centralising transformation of an existing network of disease surveillance networks 
to a single host. A fresh example for a change of procedures that bears the potential to constitute a 
systemic transformation is the recently established framework regarding the joint procurement of 
pandemic vaccines and medications. 
Fourth, the empirical analysis has shown that the evolution of EU infectious disease control also 
included the development and a shift of policy priorities. Infectious diseases were and are subject to 
a wide range of EU policies, including research, humanitarian aid, development policy and veterinary 
policy, which could not be investigated in detail in the framework of the present study. In the 
confined field of public health and food safety, however, we could observe how the expansion of 
infectious disease control activities went along with a shifting focus from disease-specific research 
networks to regulation in consumer protection and veterinary issues to the development of 
preparedness and response facilities for cross-border health threats.  
The latter progressed primarily under the label of ‘health security’, illustrated by initiatives from the 
Health Security Committee, the ‘health security’ strand in the EU’s ‘Programme of Community Action 
in the Field of Public Health’ and the development of a ‘Health Security Agenda in the EU and 
Internationally’. As one of the most recent developments, we could observe a certain form of 
externalisation of the previously only EU-internal role for public health to the global arena. This step 
includes the definition of the EU’s role in global health and the use of external policies for health 
objectives in the sense of health diplomacy, aiming at the strengthening of the voice and credibility 
of the EU as an external actor.  
The study has not examined in detail the budgetary implications of this evolution but it goes without 
saying that these developments included a substantial and permanent allocation of resources, for 
instance to run the infectious disease-related tasks of the agencies or to implement the infectious 
disease-related activities of the public health programme. It thus becomes clear that 
institutionalisation does not refer to a single phenomenon or a distinct field of EU activity. Instead, 
institutionalisation in the context of EU infectious disease control refers to multifaceted 
formalisation, perpetuation and extension processes in an intersectoral arena of governance (Stone 
Sweet et al., 2001: 22). 
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Today, the still evolving system at the EU level can be characterised as a setup of a first and foremost 
territorial and self-protective nature that focuses on infectious disease threats to EU citizens, in 
particular in their roles as consumers, travellers or workers. At the same time, infectious disease 
policy is also related to the support of affected economic sectors from the impact of health crises. 
Given the fundamental roots of the EU in a Common Market, the system therefore features a triangle 
of partly conflicting priorities which can be found in similar forms for most phases in the history of 
infectious disease control, namely the simultaneous desire (1) to protect public health, (2) to protect 
the economy from consequences of disease and (3) to protect the free movement of goods and 
people. In the last years, also rising awareness of EU-external aspects of disease control and the 
objective to combine internal and external policy tools have contributed to this setup, which 
becomes more complex the more relevant policy fields are considered. 
Public health ranks low in terms of EU competences so that infectious disease control in this realm 
generally needs to build on the political will of Member States to follow the advisory and 
coordinative engagement of relevant EU institutions. EU infectious disease control, however, also 
takes place when EU-wide inspections are carried out to audit and enforce the compliance of 
Member States with EU food safety regulation. In this realm, infectious disease control is better 
integrated into the dynamics of the Internal Market. It follows from this connection that the gradual 
harmonisation and centralisation process in infectious disease control towards the EU regional level 
is farther advanced in the field of human diseases that are linked to animals or products than in the 
field of, for instance, contagious or air-borne diseases. 
Both of the two interlinked areas under scrutiny, public health and food safety, however, have 
developed in connection to some form of security reference and under the guiding principle of a 
clear distinction between centralised risk assessment on the one hand, and a management system to 
coordinate national responses on the other. The development of the last decades took place under 
the general dictum of the Member States to defend health management affairs as a national domain. 
Still, over the last decades, occasionally the system transformed in a way that established or 
strengthened EU-wide structures to support this ‘national task’. 
 
7.2. The Securitisation of Infectious Diseases at the EU Level 
Beyond the research interest in the institutionalisation of infectious disease control, it belonged to 
the objectives to investigate the conditions for the systemic development at the EU level. More 
precisely, the study worked under the basic assumption that the institutionalisation of EU infectious 
disease control was linked to specific forms of securitisation of (specific) infectious diseases. This 
assumption was reasonable in the light of the general trend to relate infectious diseases to the term 
‘securitisation’ and given the claim of previous research that institutionalisation and regionalisation 
of disease prevention and control in Europe had been impacted by public health threats in the sense 
of a ‘good epidemic’. Crucially, the general linkage was also confirmed by practitioners who were 
involved in the institutionalisation processes. 
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Against this background the study approached a set of most relevant systemic changes – food safety 
reforms, the revision of the public health article in the Amsterdam and in the Constitutional Treaty as 
well as the creation of EFSA and the ECDC – from the perspective of a modified securitisation 
approach which was designed to accurately grasp and differentiate between the various forms 
securitisation can take.  
With the overarching aim to explore the conditions of the linkage between institutionalisation and 
securitisation, and by reflecting the components of the novel securitisation framework, the study 
engaged in two case studies that followed the question when, by whom, in which dimensions, to 
what degree and in which kind the securitisation of two selected infectious diseases took place at the 
EU level. BSE/TSEs on the one hand and SARS on the other were selected for a detailed analysis on 
the basis of a review of the (little) available literature dealing with (some of) the selected structural 
changes. The selection seemed reasonable due to the temporal relation of the occurrence of the 
diseases and the adoption of the reforms and was later also strongly supported by interview 
respondents. At the same time, given some fundamental differences between the diseases, such as 
incidence rates, infection paths or outbreak period, the two diseases promised to constitute a 
particularly interesting choice for the analysis from a constructivist angle.  
Building on the findings of the case studies it is possible to draw lessons regarding the forms of 
securitisation of infectious diseases in the EU by examining and comparing (1) the timing of 
securitisation, (2) the actors of securitisation, (3) the dimensions of securitisation, (4) the degrees of 
securitisation as well as (5) the kinds of securitisation. 
 
7.2.1. The Timing of Securitisation 
The securitisation of BSE/TSEs and SARS occurred at times when outbreaks of the respective diseases 
were already ongoing. In the case of BSE/TSEs, the overall development referred to a long process 
over a period of more than 12 years in total in which the disease underwent different, self-
reinforcing securitisation phases and two securitisation peaks; in case of SARS case the period of less 
than 12 months was rather short. Hence, it follows that securitisation in the EU as such is not bound 
or limited to specific time frames. At first glance, the securitisation of SARS and BSE/TSEs seemed to 
have occurred quite differently, namely very quickly after the detection of SARS, whereas BSE was 
observed for a couple of years without a substantial shift regarding its securitisation.  
This observation is, however, not the full story, because in both cases the securitisation occurred 
rapidly after a critical key development had taken place: the confession that BSE was transmissible to 
humans on the one hand, and the news that first cases of SARS had been confirmed in the EU on the 
other. This finding suggests not only that the detection of a new disease alone does not make up for 
a security problem, it also allows for the statement that also ongoing disease outbreaks can become 
subject to rapidly altered securitisation dynamics. 
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Given the focus of the study on securitisation as an explans rather than an explanandum, the 
question as to when securitisation occurs does not extend to the conditions for successful 
securitisation. However, it should be noted that despite the clear indication that securitisation was 
triggered by ‘real world’ events in the course of a de facto disease outbreak, securitisation should not 
be regarded as an expression of diseases incidence rates or be confused with the sheer detection of 
the disease. Diagram 7-1 (see below) contrasts the annual incidence rates157 for BSE for the countries 
with the highest incidence rates (UK, Ireland, Portugal) with the schematic illustration of the 
securitisation degree for BSE as presented in chapter 5.6. The diagram makes clear that incidence 
rates and securitisation were largely decoupled from one another. During the peak of the BSE 
epidemic in the UK, that is the time when most animals were infected in the entire Community, the 
disease was basically un-securitised; BSE/TSEs turned into a highly securitised matter for the first 
time when the number of BSE cases was already in decline. Hence, the morbidity rate of the disease 
does not allow drawing conclusions on the understanding of the disease as a security threat. 
Source: Own presentation on the basis of Diagram 5-3 and annual incidence rates for BSE as provided by the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (number of indigenous cases per million bovines aged over 24 months) at 
http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-data/annual-incidence-rate-in-the-united-kingdom/ and 
http://www.oie.int/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-data/annual-incidence-rate/ (accessed 09.01.2015).
158
  
                                                          
157
 Since the incubation period is unknown for man who has consumed BSE contaminated beef products, but 
can be up to 30 years in the case of other human TSEs, the incidence rates refers to BSE. 
158
 Due to the high incidence rates for the UK in comparison to other countries, the diagram features a broken 
y-axis. The illustration of the securitisation of BSE/TSEs (yellow line) should not be read as an expression of the 
values as specified on the y-axis; it is a schematic illustration on the basis of Diagram 5-3, the overlay of which 
serves only the purpose to reveal possible dependencies between the overall securitisation development and 
the de facto prevalence of confirmed BSE cases. 
Diagram 7-1: Annual BSE Incidence Rates and the Rise and Fall of the Securitisation of BSE/TSEs (schematic) 
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If an influence of the incidence rate on securitisation can be deducted from Diagram 7-1, it is not the 
total number of infected animals, but the number of countries with infected animals. In the case of 
BSE/TSEs the number of countries with confirmed BSE cases increased throughout Europe from 6 in 
1999 to 16 in 2001 (both incl. Switzerland). As this development went along with a (second) 
securitisation wave, it can be argued that the number of countries in which infections could be found 
played into the securitisation at the EU level. It thus feeds into the analysis of the securitisation kind 
that disease outbreaks in individual Member States are less likely to translate into securitisation 
processes at the EU level than EU-wide developments. 
 
7.2.2. The Actors of and in the Securitisation Process 
At the EU level securitisation of infectious diseases cannot occur on the basis of the activities of a 
single actor; it requires the collaboration of different actors and majorities within institutions to lift a 
disease out of the realm of ordinary politics. To illustrate, due to its role in the coordination of 
disease management the Commission had a pivotal role in the securitisation processes related to 
BSE/TSEs and SARS, in particular on the operational dimension. However, decisions by the 
Commission could be adopted only following the approval of Member States’ representatives, 
typically established in the respective committee. Such a system of checks and balances leads to the 
circumstance that securitisation can be hampered or even prevented, if the stance toward a given 
diseases is disputed either among or within involved institutions. In the case of BSE/TSEs the ‘BSE 
Subgroup of the Veterinary Committee’, the Council and the European Council were cases in point. In 
this sense, if securitisers typically adhere to the means and functions foreseen by the political 
system, be it the executive function of the Commission or the control function of the Parliament, 
securitisation is contingent upon the same structures as ordinary policy-making.  
This finding supports the conceptualisation of the ‘audience’ of securitisation as developed for the 
purpose of this study. To recall, according to the securitisation framework the process of 
securitisation can be understood as an intersubjective discursive practice which is incomplete as long 
as the securitising move is not followed by indication of acceptance by a relevant audience (see 
chapter 2.2). As explained in chapter 2.5.3 the audience acceptance was not subject to distinct 
analysis in the present study following the assumption that the political system of the EU requires 
acceptance among various actors to produce (potentially) securitising documents in the first place. 
Following the empirical analysis dealing with the disease-related political interactions it can be 
concluded that the conceptualisation of the enabling audience as inherently in-built into the 
configuration of EU actors was well justified. 
Beyond that, the fact that securitisation can follow the decision-making patterns as laid down in the 
political system also implies that securitisation potentially bears, just as any political process, a 
tactical component. In the cases of BSE/TSEs and SARS this tactical aspect of securitisation found 
expression in emphasising, downplaying or omitting the security dimension of a disease, depending 
on the actor in question. To illustrate, during the BSE/TSEs crisis crucial actors like the Commission or 
the UK government (within the Council and committee system) took a neutral stance or trivialised 
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the problem and thus contributed to de-securitisation or at least did not fuel further securitisation. 
The former actor was possibly considering economic export interests, the latter faced severe 
criticism for the administration of the crisis. Furthermore, calmative efforts are an integral part of 
any crisis management process. Consequently, none of the respective actors had an interest in a 
prioritisation of the issue. In turn, if a higher securitisation might promise or facilitate desired effects, 
actors can also deliberately fuel the securitisation process. The Commission’s position in the SARS 
crisis is an interesting point in that respect. On the one hand it tried to convey the impression that, 
with input from the Commission, efficient crisis management was pursued; on the other hand it fed 
the securitisation of infectious diseases beyond SARS when it argued in favour of the creation of the 
ECDC. 
Examining the exact actor constellation that finally enabled the securitisation of the diseases was 
beyond the scope of the present study. It is however important to conclude that actors at the EU 
level can make use of existing structures when it comes to influencing the securitisation process. The 
political system provides in-built capacities for (de-)securitisation on both the verbal and the 
operational dimension so that rules do not necessarily have to be broken in order to account for a 
securitising move. The capacity is most clearly illustrated by the Parliament’s right to table a motion 
of censure against the Commission, but also less exceptional emergency measures which are jointly 
adopted by Commission and Member States or at the level of the European Council serve the same 
function. Actors might still leave the realm of ordinary rules in specific instances, but this is also true 
for attempts to achieve the de-securitisation of a threatening disease. The UK’s empty chair politics 
during the BSE/TSEs crisis that eventually resulted in a partial lifting of the UK embargo is a case in 
point. 
Finally, with a view to the group of securitisers it is noteworthy that the typical set of potentially 
securitising EU actors (Parliament, Commission, Council, European Council etc.) was not the only 
source for securitising elements and documents that influenced the analysed securitisation 
processes. In the case of SARS we could observe how the WHO as a non-EU actor could ‘speak 
through’ the legal output of the EU and accounted for a securitising point of reference. In other 
words, although being located outside the group of EU securitisers, the influence of WHO as an 
external securitiser became manifest and fuelled the securitisation processes at the EU level. 
Additional sources for securitising moves were also established during the securitisation of the 
diseases. The Scientific Steering Committee, a body that had been created in the course of the 
securitisation of BSE/TSEs, contributed to the further securitisation of BSE/TSEs following its 
dedicated task to deal with the disease. A similar example in the SARS case was the EU Expert Group 
on SARS. These examples make clear that the ad hoc creation of institutions which are typically 
sought to ease the situation and thus to contribute to de-securitisation, can at least temporarily 
perpetuate or even increase the securitisation of an issue. 
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7.2.3. The Dimensions of Securitisation 
The study has shown that the picture of verbal and operational securitisation was almost identical for 
both securitisation processes. Both BSE/TSEs and SARS were securitised in a balanced way in both 
the verbal as well as the operational dimension. Clearly, different results in favour of the 
predominance of the securitisation on the verbal dimension would be possible if the data set was 
compiled in a different way, for instance by including parliamentary debates or press releases. 
However, a higher number of speech acts or a different relation between verbal and operational 
securitisation would not have changed the basic – and decisive – finding that a substantial number of 
both emergency measures and speech acts together met the basic criterions for an overall high 
securitisation of the diseases. 
Having said this, two points are particularly notable with regard to the securitisation across 
dimensions: First, it seems that at the EU level securitisation can be driven substantially by action (in 
the operational dimension). An example is the legal output during the BSE/TSEs crisis, when the 
European Commission issued a series of securitising moves in the operational dimension without 
reaching an equivalent securitisation degree in the verbal dimension.159 Second, actors were capable 
of an operational securitisation not only in the case of BSE/TSEs, where the Community could build 
on stronger legal competences in the EU Treaties and established case law; also SARS was highly 
securitised on the operational level, although the responsive measures to be adopted in the EU were 
agreed on in the Network Committee without a specific point of reference in the Treaty and in the 
form of non-binding recommendations. The measures still accounted for operational securitisation 
since Member States responded with a high compliance rate.  
These finding illustrate that the adoption of joint extraordinary responses does not require an explicit 
mandate at the EU level; quite the contrary, operational securitisation can also be initiated at the EU 
level on the grounds of weak (and principally also without) legal competence and still turn into 
veritable operational securitisation following the de facto implementation of the Member States. In 
this sense, through encouragement, providing information, establishing legislative frameworks and 
the transfer of best practice the EU is capable to securitise at the operational level by ‘nudging’ 
Member States in particular directions (Grant, 2012: 1032f). 
 
7.2.4. The Degree of Securitisation 
The securitisation degree was introduced in the present study as an innovative instrument to locate – 
at least schematically – an issue on the security continuum between a lowly and a highly securitised 
matter. Following the analysis along a set of securitisation degree indicators it has become clear that 
due to the strength of the security discourse, the number of speech acts, the position of the 
securitisers and the number and strength of emergency measures, including the allocation of 
resources, both BSE/TSEs and SARS entered the realm of a highly securitised issue – with BSE/TSEs 
having reached an overall higher securitisation degree. The finding could be derived from thorough 
                                                          
159
 Due to the activities of other actors, however, the overall distribution remained balanced. 
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text analysis which revealed that both diseases were (temporarily) subject to intensive debate in 
security language up to the highest levels of the EU’s political spectrum. A full wide-ranging set of 
extraordinary measures was adopted and went along with massive budgetary implications, 
particularly in the case of BSE/TSEs, that resulted from the emergency responses. 
The qualitative content analysis of the EU legal output in view of the securitisation degree indicators 
was substantiated by the application of a set of measuring instruments. More precisely, we have 
seen a rapidly rising number of documents dealing with BSE/TSEs in its securitisation peaks, adding 
up to more than 31 for the years 1996/1997 and 26 in 2000/2001, as well as 27 documents for SARS 
in 2003/2004. This rise in the sheer number of disease-related documents was accompanied by the 
rise of the total securitisation score, which is the sum of the scores assigned to the EU documents on 
the scale between +2 and -2 for each dimension (verbal and operational). The respective calculation 
yielded the result that BSE/TSEs achieved the highest peak in 1996 with an overall score of 43. SARS, 
in turn, reached a total score of 38 in 2003. 
A similar picture could be drawn regarding the strength of the security discourse. Calculating the 
share of the set of securitising document in relation to the total number of disease-related 
documents illustrated for both diseases that security language clearly dominated in the phases when 
the securitisation degree peaked. In the case of BSE/TSEs the share was exceptionally high in 
1996/1997 when roughly 84 per cent of all utterances were of a securitising nature in the verbal 
dimension, and still dominant in 2000/2001 with a share of roughly 70 per cent. SARS, in turn, 
reached a share of approximately 78 per cent of securitising utterances in 2003/2004. Finally, also 
the average securitisation scores, that is the mean score between +2 and -2 calculated by the division 
of the sum of all values of all utterances by the total number of utterances, speaks a similar language. 
BSE/TSEs reached a high average of +1,06 in 1996/1997 and still a substantial mean of roughly +0,7 in 
2001/2002. The average score of SARS was +0,96. 
Comparing these figures does not only help verify the analysis and interpretation of the text corpus 
regarding the rise and fall of the securitisation degree. From a methodological point of view it is also 
interesting to note that calculated figures for both case studies – produced under identical 
systematic conditions regarding the compilation and analysis of the data set – are clearly located in 
the same ranges for (1) the total number of documents, (2) the total securitisation score, (3) the 
share of securitising documents as well as (4) the average securitisation score. As emphasised from 
the start, the tool kit to examine the securitisation degree was not designed as direct mathematical 
expressions or as a sort of index. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the measuring instruments to 
assess the securitisation indicators from a quantitative side, with which so far no experience existed, 
yielded results across case studies that can be reasonably put in relation.  
Hence, the results that could be generated by the introduction of the securitisation degree did not 
only allow for a novel comparative assessment of the strength and the rise and fall of diseases as 
security threats, and thus for a clearer assessment of securitisation as such; beyond that, the results 
also militate in favour of the combination and application of methods. 
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7.2.5. The Kind of Securitisation 
The kind of securitisation was developed in the present study as an innovative tool to reveal the 
underlying understanding(s) of security as inherent to the securitisation process. Building on a 
comprehensive set of securitisation parameters to distinguish between different disease-related 
security concepts depending on (1) the definition of the referent object, (2) the definition of the 
threat and (3) the definition of the security provision, the instrument was designed to reflect 
academia’s consent that security is an essentially contested term. In the light of a high number of 
possible combinations of the securitisation parameters the study worked with a spectrum of security 
understandings that ranged from the soft to the hard extreme.  
The analysis of the diseases-related documents in view of the securitisation parameters has 
produced the result that EU actors have securitised both BSE/TSEs and SARS in a rather hard kind. 
After the securitisation of BSE/TSEs had undergone changes, particularly following the change of the 
referent object from animals to humans and the beef and veal sector and following the expansion of 
the problem from a few Member States to the entire EU, both diseases were similarly seen as close 
and severe security problems for which no cure existed, which were hard to predict and which 
threatened not only the health of many people but also specific sectors of the European economy. 
Accordingly, in both cases the adopted measures, partly extremely invasive, were located in the 
realm of the Common Market and public health, the latter primarily via veterinary measures with the 
direct objective to protect public health in the case of BSE/TSEs. All major fields of disease control, 
ranging from surveillance to prevention, preparedness and response, were predominantly targeted 
towards the EU territory and the close neighbourhood, except for a number of international support 
and surveillance measures by the EU in the case of SARS and extra-EU trade affairs in the case of 
BSE/TSEs.  
Given the great differences between BSE/TSEs and SARS, be it with regard to the infection path, the 
incubation period or the time span of the outbreak, this general finding supports the constructivist 
approach to the study of security. It belongs to the insights of this research that the securitisation of 
both diseases occurred, on an abstract level, in a comparable fashion regarding the underlying 
security understanding, regardless of the characteristics of the diseases and the features of the 
outbreaks.  
Still, despite the overall dominance of hard securitisation parameters, the kind of securitisation was 
more complex it both cases than it could be expressed in detail by the placement of the disease-
related security construction on the simplified axis between soft and hard. This is not only due to the 
schematic classification of a comprehensive set of parameters, each of which can take multiple 
values; it is also because of the fact that not all of the parameters that could be derived as relevant 
elements from the existing research, were similarly applicable in the case studies. To illustrate, for a 
case like the BSE/TSEs crisis, which constituted a problem that originated inside the EU, it is not 
reasonable to expect that EU activities primarily target referent objects outside the EU.  
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At the same time, a clear differentiation was not always possible as specific parameters did not figure 
prominently in the analysed text corpus. More precisely, the ethical stance, the source of the threat 
or the source of pathogenicity could not always be unambiguously derived so that a clear definition 
or differentiation along the pre-defined extremes was difficult. Also, although the list of security 
parameters that make up for a securitisation kind was compiled in a comprehensive fashion (chapter 
2.3.2), the empirical analysis has brought up new elements which did not appear in the existing 
literature and were therefore difficult to fit into the existing concept. To illustrate, China’s 
(dis)information policy during the SARS crisis turned out to be an important source for the perceived 
pathogenicity of the disease; a value that is hardly classifiable along simplified security spectrum 
between soft and hard. Still, these challenges were limited to exceptional cases and the fact that 
some parameters did not occupy a prominent position in the cases of BSE/TSEs and SARS does not 
mean that they are irrelevant for the construction of other diseases as security threats in general. 
All in all, on the basis of the experiences from the two case studies it seems that the definition of the 
referent object and the number of referent objects, the geography of the threat, its severity and 
predictability belong to those parameters that were addressed most clearly and that were of greatest 
relevance for the overall securitisation kind. The analysis thus suggests that probably not all elements 
on the predefined list of security parameters are of the same importance in securitisation processes. 
In the case of the SARS crisis we have seen that in particular the parameter regarding the 
predictability of the threat can superimpose other factors. At the same time, a striking feature of 
both case studies was that parallel constructions of the disease as a threat to different referent 
objects took place. To recall, for BSE/TSEs we observed a construction of insecurity regarding the 
health of animals, the health of consumers, the beef and veal market, and the Internal Market (all 
inside the EU); for SARS, in turn, a definition of the disease as a threat to the health of persons and 
the economies in Asia and the EU, within the latter most notably related to travellers and aircrews, 
medical personnel and the (air) transport sector – with a high perceived risk of a further spread. 
What lessons can we draw from these observations? First, public health and economic questions 
played the most important roles for the construction of the diseases as security threats. The share of 
speech acts and extraordinary measures that aimed at safeguarding the health of important industry 
sectors and more generally the functioning of the Internal Market, in particular during the BSE/TSEs 
crisis, might appear high at first glance. In this context, however, it is important to remember that 
the Community is bound to the legal mandate enshrined in EU law when it comes to implementing 
action. Public health was and is located among the EU policy fields that complement national policies 
and which foresees that the individual Member States are responsible for the implementation of 
protective or responsive measures. In contrast, agriculture policy, on which basis the exceptional 
market support measures during the BSE/TSEs crisis were adopted, is an integral component of the 
Community’s Common Market.  
Against this background the high number of files that dealt with the economic implications of the 
disease can be put in perspective. The division of competences in the multi-level system simply 
provides more opportunities for securitisation at the EU level in the economic realm. Since the 
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economy is not only one of the ‘core businesses’ of the Union but also belongs to the elements that 
are vital to both the State and the EU, a hard securitisation of infectious diseases was eventually 
facilitated by the EU’s Common Market competences in both cases. However, the case of SARS has 
shown that also a weaker public health legal mandate can yield hard securitisation. 
Second, in the course of the securitisation process the original threat exerted by a disease can 
translate into the securitisation of related aspects. We have seen that in the case of BSE/TSEs it was 
not directly the disease that was considered to threaten the beef market, but the lack of consumer 
confidence in food safety that became manifest in the course of the crisis. It was not directly 
BSE/TSEs that threatened the political regularity at the EU level, but the no confidence motion of the 
European Parliament that followed from the credibility which the Commission had lost during 
BSE/TSEs crisis. In a similar fashion, in addition to the threat that SARS meant to human health, the 
widespread public anxiety of SARS was seen to threaten social and political life. Hence, it appears 
that the securitisation of infectious diseases sometimes shows itself indirectly through other ‘vectors 
of danger’ which construct further threats to further referent objects of security, thereby initiating a 
chain reaction of self-reinforcing securitisation processes. 
On the whole, the manifold valuable results that could be generated under consideration of the 
securitisation parameters established in this study confirm the usefulness and relevance of the kind 
of securitisation as a novel tool to better capture and analyse the securitisation of diseases. The fact 
that it was purposefully designed as an open instruments that is capable to grasp basically any 
security understanding of any actor implies that it demands accurate and careful handling; it is, 
however, not only the first tool that offers an explicit structure for the systematic comparison of 
disease-related constructions of (in)security, but also one of the few attempts to adequately reflect 
the constructivist nature of securitisation. 
 
7.3. Securitisation and Institutionalisation 
The examination of the research question on the conditions under which the securitisation of 
(specific) infectious diseases could explain institutionalisation was carried out in consideration of a 
hypothesis on the assumed linkage. It was argued that it was the specific combination of a high 
degree and a hard kind of securitisation of infectious diseases by EU actors (independent variable) 
that constitute the critical conditions and ultimately the cause of institutionalisation of infectious 
disease control at the EU level (dependent variable). Research question and hypothesis aimed at 
shedding light on one of the main puzzles that the academic literature on infectious disease control 
currently faces, namely that in the past some epidemics or disease-related crisis provoked big 
changes, whereas others came and went without (Greer and Mätzke, 2012: 902). The argument was 
that in order to break the stability of public health policy and polity and to enable major modification 
of the infectious diseases control setup the condition of a specific construction of ‘strong’ insecurity 
was decisive; and not just any form of “repeated crises that keep the need for robust public health 
constantly at the top of the political agenda nationally and internationally” (Fidler, 2004b: 169f).  
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When it comes to examining the link between securitisation and institutionalisation it is helpful to 
recall four conditions that are essential for the test of causation. In order to verify that securitisation 
(the cause) has indeed triggered institutionalisation (the effect) at the EU level it is required a) that 
cause and effect change together or co-vary, b) that the effect occurs after the cause, c) that the 
process by which effects are caused can be identified and d) that cause and effect do not change due 
to some third factor (Manheim et al., 2008: 23f). 
The case studies have shown, illustrated by Diagram 5-3 and Diagram 6-2, that the first two 
conditions were met in both cases. Strong securitisation and institutionalisation clearly followed in a 
reasonable temporal relation in which the former preceded the latter. In view of the causal linkage in 
terms of the process by which changes regarding securitisation caused changes in institutionalisation, 
both case studies revealed that the reforms did not only exactly address contentwise what had been 
subject to the securitisation process, but that the reform processes referred to previously securitising 
initiatives and built on the security reasoning of the securitisation phase. 
The scenarios in which securitisation and institutionalisation occurred in this connection, however, 
were not all of the same form. To recall, the extension of the public health article in the 
Constitutional Treaty in favour of the inclusion of a mandate to “combat cross-border threats to 
health” took place in the context of an overall fundamental revision of the EU’s primary law which 
was ongoing anyway. In contrast, the re-organisation of the food safety infrastructure in the 1990s 
occurred after the European Parliament had set up a temporary committee of inquiry that reported 
on “alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Community law” 
(European Parliament, 1997b). Hence, the securitisation of infectious diseases seems to affect 
structural changes in different ways and on the basis of different settings. Based on the investigation 
of the two case studies we can identify basically five scenarios. 
1) Strong securitisation can be followed by institutionalisation in the form of the formalisation, 
perpetuation and centralisation of structures that already existed in an informal, temporal or 
de-centralised form (exemplified by the communicable diseases networks). 
2) Strong securitisation can be followed by institutionalisation in the form of a consolidation, 
formalisation and perpetuation of emergency measures that were originally adopted 
separately as informal or temporary arrangements (exemplified by the measures regarding 
the feeding of ruminants). 
3) Strong securitisation can be followed by institutionalisation in the form of a deepening 
and/or widening of an ongoing reform process (exemplified by the Constitutional Treaty). 
4) Strong securitisation can be followed by institutionalisation in the form of new, original 
reform processes that address the problem in view of an improved setup for similar 
situations in the future (exemplified by the re-organisation of the system for scientific 
advice). 
5) Strong securitisation can be followed by institutionalisation in the form of an acceleration of 
a reform process to adopt structural changes that had been envisaged by advocates before 
(exemplified by the creation of the ECDC).  
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The scenarios differ in terms of the course of action and the exact institutionalisation content, but 
they share the characteristics that during the reform process the proposals for systemic change were 
connected to the securitised diseases, be it in form of an accompanying explanation, such as the 
Commission’s communication on the re-organisations in the area of consumer health and food safety 
in 1997, be it in the form of contributions to a larger revisions process such as the European 
Convention in 2003. And although there is, naturally, no evidence that the other institutionalisation 
steps in the evolution of EU infectious disease control as provided in chapter 3.6 also fall under one 
of the scenarios, at least for the two case studies of this study it seems indeed that three of the four 
conditions to test causation (joint change, temporal relation, identified process) are clearly met.  
The fourth condition demands that cause and effect should not change due to some third factor 
(Manheim et al., 2008: 23f), a criterion which is more challenging to meet for two reasons. First, the 
number of two case studies, even if one of them covers a long period over two securitisation phases 
as in the case of BSE/TSEs, is not high enough to rule out that developments other than securitisation 
constituted the cause for institutionalisation. Clearly, more analyses with results that are consistent 
with the proposed relation could provide overall stronger evidence and allow for better 
generalisability. Second, the investigation has shown that other factors cannot be ruled out to have 
affected the analysed processes. In the case of the BSE/TSEs-related institutionalisation also the 
dioxin scandal and the foot and mouth disease have fed into an overall risen securitisation status for 
infectious diseases, just as the anthrax incidences following 9/11 in the US and the experiences with 
HIV/AIDS and influenza pandemics in the case of SARS-related institutionalisation. These incidences 
can not only be considered to have provided a breeding ground for the securitisation of BSE/TSEs and 
SARS, most likely they were also subject to securitisation dynamics themselves. In other words, 
claiming exclusive explanatory power for the securitisation of the analysed diseases could go too far. 
Beyond that, it should be noted that approaches that are not directly related to the construction of 
(in)security also offer convincing explanations for the observed phenomena. For instance, we have 
seen that scientific experts played a prominent roles in both infectious disease-related securitisation 
and institutionalisation processes. Consequently, an investigation of the influence of epistemic 
communities (Haas, 1992) can produce valuable insights (Mätzke, 2012: 970, Steffen, 2012: 1085). 
Similarly, the analysis of the evolution of infectious disease control has indicated that both functional 
pressures (Haas, 1964) as well as path-dependencies (Pierson, 1996) were important features of the 
development (Krapohl, 2008: 13).  
It follows from parallel developments and the value of additional explanation models that we must 
be cautious when it comes to claiming exclusive explanatory power for securitisation as the cause for 
institutionalisation. Still, on the basis of the case studies we can principally answer the basic research 
question of this study that securitisation can explain institutionalisation under the condition that 
securitisation occurs at least temporarily to a high degree in a predominantly hard kind. Beyond this 
specific form of strong securitisation, securitisation and institutionalisation need to be tied together 
as regards content as well as in a procedural and temporal way. More precisely, institutionalisation 
can be explained by securitisation under the condition that the institutionalisation step addresses 
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(aspects of) the securitised situation, that the negotiation on the institutionalisation step is related to 
the security discourse and that the institutionalisation process is initiated, not necessarily concluded, 
in a timely manner. Furthermore, the set of scenarios compiled on the basis of the case studies 
suggest that ongoing reform processes, policy advocates and the existence of institutionalisation 
plans that had already been drawn up may mean important facilitating conditions.  
Under these conditions strong securitisation indeed seems to constitute a convincing explanation for 
the analysed changes in the EU’s infectious disease control setup, if it is understood as the decisive 
factor to change the calculus of the relevant EU actors so that a re-evaluation of the existing setup 
became possible, and thus as the ultimate driver of the institutionalisation process.  
This assessment should be seen against the background that the hypothesised linkage was not 
proposed as an explanation that precludes the influence of intervening factors. In contrast, parallel 
developments might not only have fuelled the securitisation of BSE/TSEs and SARS, they might also 
have directly influenced the institutionalisation process in other ways. It therefore appears 
appropriate to assume that institutionalisation occurred under the influence of a convergence of 
different factors, among which, however, securitisation occupies the dominant position. With a view 
to the working hypothesis this qualification suggests that the overall picture should be viewed in the 
sense that securitisation served the function of a potent facilitator of change, a dynamic process that 
unfolded the power to open windows of opportunities for institutionalisation, but not as the single 
cause.  
 
7.4. Limitations of the Study and a Future Research Agenda 
The reflection on a chosen (or developed) approach should not be restricted to a true-or-false 
assessment in an absolute sense but extend to an evaluation in terms of greater or rather limited 
usefulness (Manheim et al., 2008: 17). Given the detailed insights which we could gain from the 
analysis into an observed phenomenon which so far had been neither systematically conceptualised 
nor assessed with analytic rigour, the approach of the present study can be viewed as useful indeed.  
Still, despite the advancements of the framework also the present study faced conceptual and 
methodological challenges. One of the difficulties is familiar to every scholar engaged in the study of 
infectious disease control, namely the fact that the intersectoral and multi-level nature of infectious 
disease control makes it difficult to separate the different relevant policies and political levels. 
Dealing primarily with infectious disease control in the realms of EU public health policy and food 
safety as two most relevant fields thus means that the focus can neither adequately cover relevant 
developments in other related fields, nor factors that derive from other political levels, be it the local, 
national or international level. In addition, the investigation with a strong focus on the unidirectional 
connection between securitisation and institutionalisation for selected diseases and examples of 
institutionalisation does not fully reflect the dynamic feedback influences that operate between the 
processes.  
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Naturally, (de-)securitisation does not stop after the adoption of structural changes but continues 
under changed circumstances - an aspect that could in part be covered by the case study dealing with 
the food safety reforms but which deserves further clarification in the future. 
The dynamic of securitisation could also not fully be covered due to the composition of the data set. 
In absence of a clearly defined European public sphere and with a view to the primary research 
interests the text corpus was systematically generated as a set of documents that was limited to 
official EU utterances. It thus allowed for a good comparability across case studies. The clear focus on 
EU output from EUR-Lex and official disease-specific websites, however, came with the disadvantage 
that the analysis did not include media sources and parliamentary debates, which implied that the 
presumably strongest securitisation moves were not included in the analysis. In fact, securitisation is 
usually much clearer visible in oral and media contributions than in official output which often is 
cautiously formulated due to the reassuring function of official statements in the process of risk and 
outbreak management.160 
The clearest limitation of the study follows from the exclusive research focus on successful examples 
of institutionalisation as an effect of securitisation. The case studies were selected explicitly with the 
aim to examine examples of institutionalisation which were preceded by disease outbreaks whose 
securitisation characteristics were not known but could be expected to be of a rather strong form. 
Hence, empirical testing with this focus constitutes only a first step for the verification of the 
hypothesis. In order to waterproof the proposed connection, the analysis should be followed by a 
series of attempts of falsification, in particular by analysing further diseases that assumed the status 
of a weakly or averagely securitised issue only and that most comprehensively address the spectrum 
of securitisation parameters. For the purpose of this study, however, limiting the evidence in this 
respect can be deemed appropriate in the light of the novelty of the concept, the limited existing 
research in the field and in particular the primary research interest of the study in the reasons for 
change in the EU’s infectious disease control structures, rather than in the (absence of) effects of 
weak or average securitisation or the unclear causes of systemic stability.  
However, the study could show that the securitisation approach as developed for this analysis is 
characterised by good applicability, that it allows for the generation of valuable results also in 
unexplored territory and that the basic hypothesis could be positively approved in two cases. It is up 
to future research to refine our understanding of the linkage of securitisation and institutionalisation 
by analysing more cases and examine in detail whether actually only strong securitisation facilitates 
structural change, whereas other forms do not. In this context the further development of the 
hypothesis towards a dynamic model appears a particularly promising step. More precisely, future 
studies could continue to engage with the same research question on the conditions under which 
securitisation explains institutionalisation, but should approach the question from the hypothesis 
that the form of securitisation determines the probability and eventually also the form of 
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 A test on the impact of parliamentary interventions on the securitisation process in the case of SARS as 
provided in Annex 2, however, has shown that despite an overall increased height of the verbal securitisation 
degree the results did not differ significantly from the results generated by the ordinary assessment method. 
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institutionalisation. In this sense, case studies could deal with the securitisation of diseases that are 
less likely to be subject to strong securitisation than it was the case for BSE/TSEs and SARS and also 
focus on forms of institutionalisation that are weaker than the creation of an agency or the revision 
of primary law. By doing so future research could differentiate between combinations of softer kinds 
or lower degrees of securitisation and examine them in view of the potential to trigger (what form 
of) structural change. Based on the experiences and results gained from the present study, the 
following sophisticated model in Figure 7-1 could serve as a point of reference to be debugged by 
future studies. 
 
Source: Own presentation 
 
Beyond the testing of a further developed hypothesis, future research could particularly add value to 
the findings of the present study in four ways:  
First, additional case studies could help identify overarching pattern which are not visible at the 
moment but for which first indication could be detected. An assessment of the potential 
interdependence between the change of degree and kind of securitisation would be interesting just 
as an examination of cases of asymmetric securitisation across verbal and operational securitisation 
dimension.  
 
Figure 7-1: Hypothesising on Institutionalisation as an Effect of Securitisation (dynamic) 
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Second, additional case studies could work on determining the importance of certain securitisation 
indicators and parameters which did not occupy a prominent position in the securitisation of 
BSE/TSEs and SARS. In this context the thorough analysis of the securitisation of a set of diseases that 
is typically assorted to the developing world appears fundamental. Future studies would thus allow 
for the refinement of the methods employed, in particular related to the study of the securitisation 
parameters.  
Third, further case studies on the securitisation of different diseases in the same period would mean 
that the effects of parallel securitisation processes could be better understood. In principle it seems 
that infectious diseases are not securitised as one threat, but that securitisation occurs for specific 
diseases (Reiners, 2013). However, the SARS case has shown that the disease was frequently put in 
relation to the anthrax scare of 2001 so that the securitisation of anthrax was eventually re-activated 
and fuelled the securitisation of SARS. In the same way did also the impact of the securitisation of 
SARS did not come to an end in 2004. Similarly, the parallel occurrence of diseases on the political 
agendas might add up to a general securitisation of infectious diseases. Hence, it seems valuable not 
only to examine in more detail the mutually reinforcing influences of consecutive or parallel 
securitisation processes, but also to establish instruments that express the overarching predominant 
securitisation degree and kind which accumulate the securitisation processes related to individual 
diseases. 
Finally, case studies that cover more infectious disease-related policies, such as development and 
humanitarian aid, could add to the validity of the core arguments beyond the realms of public health 
and food safety. In particular the external dimension of the EU’s infectious disease control structures 
and the link to the global governance structures deserve detailed analyses from a securitisation 
perspective. Also the review of the infectious disease-related efforts in the field of research policy 
could address existing gaps in the complex picture; even if tracing such elements might be a 
challenging endeavour (Ernst et al., 2010). Last but not least, it seems promising to test the 
applicability of the novel elements of the securitisation approach in other policies outside the realm 
of infectious disease control, for instance in the field of energy policy. Clearly, such an adaptation 
would require the abstraction of the existing and possibly the development of additional 
securitisation parameters. 
Many further important questions and aspects could be added to the research agenda of the future, 
not least due to the fact that the EU’s infectious disease control policies and polity are still subject to 
ongoing development. The joint procurement initiative is expected to yield first concrete results soon 
and the Commission’s review process in autumn 2015 to draw lessons from the ebola crisis of 
2014/2015 will provide an opportunity to envisage future structural adaptations.  
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7.5. Security Advice 
The link between infectious diseases and (in)security is as old as the link to travel and trade (McNeill, 
1989). Also in the evolution of infectious disease control in the European Union these notions were 
intrinsically tied together, illustrating how the field is characterised by tensions that arise from 
contradictory demands related to health, security and the economy. Common institutions, rules, 
procedures and programmes have functional advantages in times of globalisation and even more 
within a Single Market when it comes to efficiently managing cross-border threats to health. The 
establishment and extension of these cooperative structures, however, is a political question that 
involves the struggle for power, competences and resources, just as most other political affairs.  
Observers of these processes have noted that disease outbreaks and crises could facilitate the 
evolution of such structures throughout history; be it the creation of the Office International 
d'Hygiène Publique in 1907 following a cholera epidemic, be it the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control in 2004 after the spread of SARS. The present study has put this observation 
into perspective by arguing that the construction of diseases as specific threats to security open 
windows of opportunities that enable fundamental policy and polity change in the European Union. 
Given the large potential for the securitisation of infectious diseases in the future, analysts and 
stakeholders are advised not to leave the institutionalisation of EU infectious disease control 
unattended.  
The perceived need that follows from securitisation to structurally change something, however, does 
not necessarily imply that the adopted reform actually improves the situation substantially for the 
future. For instance, the creation of EFSA was generally welcomed by analysts for the increased 
transparency (Kreher, 1997: 242, Groenleer, 2009: 101), but some stakeholders did not consider the 
reform a great difference in practical terms and more of symbolic nature (Krapohl, 2008: 164). This 
fact reminds us that at the end of the day, from a securitisation point of view it neither matters 
whether a disease or situation is ‘really’ dangerous, nor whether any systemic reform constitutes a 
‘real’ improvement for the security situation. Decisive are the reform’s implications for the 
perception of the threat, in particular the reform’s power to structurally de-securitise the issue and 
treat the previously securitised matter as a matter of normal politics in the future.  
It has not been the purpose of the study to assess the usefulness of institutionalisation of infectious 
disease control in the European Union. However, given that structural change in response to 
securitisation can be as rational or irrational as the securitisation of the issue itself, it should not be 
forgotten that both the securitisation of diseases as well as institutional change are subject to highly 
tactical considerations. Consequently, advocates of reform who feel tempted to understand this 
study as a guidebook on how to securitise a disease in which form must bear in mind that 
securitisation is not necessarily in the interest of the ‘best’ or most functional reform. Accordingly, 
advocates of systemic stability who understand the absence of securitisation as a suitable indicator 
for a state of ‘real’ security are advised to remember that “security / Is mortals' chiefest enemy" 
(Shakespeare, 1988: Act 3, Scene 5, Line 31).  
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Annex 1: The Evolution of the Public Health Article in the EU Treaties 
 
Table A-1-1: The Amendment of the Public Health Article in the Course of the BSE/TSEs Crisis
161
 
Treaty of Maastricht Treaty of Amsterdam Treaty of Nice 
1992 / 1993162 1997 / 1999 2001 / 2003 
Art. 129 Art. 152 Art. 152 
1. The Community shall contribute towards 
ensuring a high level of human health 
protection by encouraging cooperation 
between the Member States and, if 
necessary, lending support to their action. 
1. A high level of human health protection 
shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community policies 
and activities. 
1. A high level of human health protection 
shall be ensured in the definition and 
implementation of all Community policies 
and activities. 
Community action shall be directed 
towards the prevention of diseases, in 
particular the major health scourges, 
including drug dependence, by promoting 
research into their causes and their 
transmission, as well as health information 
and education. 
 
 
Community action, which shall complement 
national policies,  
shall be directed towards improving public 
health, preventing human illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources of danger to 
human health. Such action shall cover the 
fight against the major health scourges by 
promoting research into their causes, their 
transmission and their prevention, as well as 
health information and education. 
Community action, which shall complement 
national policies, shall be directed towards 
improving public health, preventing human 
illness and diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to human health. Such action shall 
cover the fight against the major health 
scourges, by promoting research into their 
causes, their transmission and their 
prevention, as well as health information 
and education. 
Health protection requirements shall form a 
constituent part of the Community's other 
policies. 
[moved to 1.]  
 The Community shall complement the 
Member States' action in reducing drugs-
related health damage, including 
information and prevention. 
[taken from 1.] 
The Community shall complement the 
Member States' action in reducing drugs-
related health damage, including 
information and prevention. 
 2. The Community shall encourage 
cooperation between the Member States in 
the areas referred to in this Article and, if 
necessary, lend support to their action. 
2. The Community shall encourage 
cooperation between the Member States in 
the areas referred to in this Article and, if 
necessary, lend support to their action. 
2. Member States shall, in liaison with the 
Commission, coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the Member 
States, take any useful initiative to promote 
such coordination. 
Member States shall, in liaison with the 
Commission, coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the Member 
States, take any useful initiative to promote 
such coordination. 
Member States shall, in liaison with the 
Commission, coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the Member 
States, take any useful initiative to promote 
such coordination. 
3. The Community and the Member States 
shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international 
organizations in the sphere of public health. 
3. The Community and the Member States 
shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international 
organisations in the sphere of public health. 
3. The Community and the Member States 
shall foster cooperation with third countries 
and the competent international 
organisations in the sphere of public health. 
4. In order to contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives referred to in 
this Article, the Council: 
- acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 189b, after consulting 
the Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, shall adopt 
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives referred to in 
this article through adopting: 
4. The Council, acting in accordance with the 
procedure referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, shall contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives referred to in 
this Article through adopting: 
 (a) measures setting high standards of 
quality and safety of organs and substances 
of human origin, blood and blood 
derivatives; these measures shall not 
prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures; 
(a) measures setting high standards of 
quality and safety of organs and substances 
of human origin, blood and blood 
derivatives; these measures shall not 
prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent 
protective measures; 
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(continued) 
 (b) by way of derogation from Article 37, 
measures in the veterinary and 
phytosanitary fields which have as their 
direct objective the protection of public 
health; 
(b) by way of derogation from Article 37, 
measures in the veterinary and 
phytosanitary fields which have as their 
direct objective the protection of public 
health; 
incentive measures, excluding any 
harmonization of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States; 
(c) incentive measures designed to protect 
and improve human health, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States. 
(c) incentive measures designed to protect 
and improve human health, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and regulations 
of the Member States. 
- acting by a qualified majority on a 
proposal from the Commission, shall adopt 
recommendations. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority 
on a proposal from the Commission, may 
also adopt recommendations for the 
purposes set out in this article. 
The Council, acting by a qualified majority 
on a proposal from the Commission, may 
also adopt recommendations for the 
purposes set out in this Article. 
 5. Community action in the field of public 
health shall fully respect the responsibilities 
of the Member States for the organisation 
and delivery of health services and medical 
care. In particular, measures referred to in 
paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or medical use of 
organs and blood. 
5. Community action in the field of public 
health shall fully respect the responsibilities 
of the Member States for the organisation 
and delivery of health services and medical 
care. In particular, measures referred to in 
paragraph 4(a) shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or medical use of 
organs and blood 
Source: Own presentation. 
 
Table A-1-2: The Amendment of the Public Health Article in the Course of the SARS Crisis
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Treaty of Nice Draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe  
Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe 
Treaty of Lisbon 
2001 / 2003 2003 2004 2007 / 2009 
Art. 152 Art. III-179 Art. III-278 Art. 168 
[…] […] […] […] 
Community action, which shall 
complement national policies, 
shall be directed towards 
improving public health, 
preventing human illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to human health. 
Such action shall cover the fight 
against the major health 
scourges, by promoting 
research into their causes, their 
transmission and their 
prevention, as well as health 
information and education. 
Action by the Union, which shall 
complement national policies, 
shall be directed towards 
improving public health, 
preventing human illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to physical and 
mental health. 
 
Such action shall cover the fight 
against the major health 
scourges, by promoting 
research into their causes, their 
transmission and their 
prevention, as well as health 
information and education. 
Action by the Union, which shall 
complement national policies, 
shall be directed towards 
improving public health, 
preventing human illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to physical and 
mental health. 
 
Such action shall cover: 
(a) the fight against the major 
health scourges, by promoting 
research into their causes, their 
transmission and their 
prevention, as well as health 
information and education; 
(b) monitoring, early warning of 
and combating serious cross-
border threats to health. 
Union action, which  
shall complement national 
policies, shall be directed 
towards improving public 
health, preventing human 
physical and mental illness and 
diseases, and obviating sources 
of danger to physical and 
mental health.  
Such action shall cover the fight 
against the major health 
scourges, by promoting 
research into their causes, their 
transmission and their 
prevention, as well as health 
information and education, and 
monitoring, early warning of 
and combating serious cross-
border threats to health. 
[…] […] […] […] 
2. The Community shall 
encourage cooperation 
between the Member States in 
the areas referred to in this 
Article and, if necessary, lend 
support to their action. 
2. The Union shall encourage 
cooperation between the 
Member States in the areas 
referred to in this Article and, if 
necessary, lend support to their 
action. 
2. The Union shall encourage 
cooperation between the 
Member States in the areas 
referred to in this Article and, if 
necessary, lend support to their 
action. It shall in particular 
encourage cooperation 
between the Member States to 
improve the complementarity 
of their health services in cross‑
border areas. 
2. The Union shall encourage 
cooperation between the 
Member States in the areas 
referred to in this Article and, if 
necessary, lend support to their 
action. It shall in particular 
encourage cooperation 
between the Member States to 
improve the complementarity 
of their health services in cross-
border areas. 
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(continued) 
Member States shall, in liaison 
with the Commission, 
coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes 
in the areas referred to in 
paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the 
Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such 
coordination. 
Member States shall, in liaison 
with the Commission, 
coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes 
in the areas referred to in 
paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the 
Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such 
coordination, in particular 
initiatives aiming at the 
establishment of guidelines and 
indicators, the organisation of 
exchange of best practice, and 
the preparation of the 
necessary elements for periodic 
monitoring and evaluation. The 
European Parliament shall be 
kept fully informed. 
Member States shall, in liaison 
with the Commission, 
coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes 
in the areas referred to in 
paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the 
Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such 
coordination, in particular 
initiatives aiming at the 
establishment of guidelines and 
indicators, the organisation of 
exchange of best practice, and 
the preparation of the 
necessary elements for periodic 
monitoring and evaluation. The 
European Parliament shall be 
kept fully informed. 
Member States shall, in liaison 
with the Commission, 
coordinate among themselves 
their policies and programmes 
in the areas referred to in 
paragraph 1. The Commission 
may, in close contact with the 
Member States, take any useful 
initiative to promote such 
coordination, in particular 
initiatives aiming at the 
establishment of guidelines and 
indicators, the organisation of 
exchange of best practice, and 
the preparation of the 
necessary elements for periodic 
monitoring and evaluation. The 
European Parliament shall be 
kept fully informed. 
… … … … 
4. The Council, acting in 
accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic 
and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, shall 
contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives referred to in 
this Article through adopting: 
4. European laws or framework 
laws shall contribute to the 
achievement of the objectives 
referred to in this Article by 
establishing the following 
measures in order to meet 
common safety concerns: 
4. By way of derogation from 
Article I‑12(5) and Article I‑
17(a) and in accordance with 
Article I‑14 (2)(k), European 
laws or framework laws shall 
contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives referred to in 
this Article by establishing the 
following measures in order to 
meet common safety concerns: 
 
4. By way of derogation from 
Article 2(5) and Article 6(a) and 
in accordance with Article 
4(2)(k) the European Parliament 
and the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, shall 
contribute to the achievement 
of the objectives referred to in 
this Article through adopting in 
order to meet common safety 
concerns: 
[…] […] […] […] 
  (c) measures setting high 
standards of quality and safety 
for medicinal products and 
devices for medical use; 
(c) measures setting high 
standards of quality and safety 
for medicinal products and 
devices for medical use. 
  (d) measures concerning 
monitoring, early warning of 
and combating serious cross-
border threats to health. 
 
 
[deleted, extenuated in 5.] 
 European laws or framework 
laws shall be adopted after 
consultation of the Committee 
of the Regions and the 
Economic and Social 
Committee. 
Such European laws or 
framework laws shall be 
adopted after consultation of 
the Committee of the Regions 
and the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
[moved to 4.] 
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(continued) 
(c) incentive measures designed 
to protect and improve human 
health, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member 
States. 
5. European laws or framework 
laws may also establish 
incentive measures designed to 
protect and improve human 
health and to combat the major 
cross-border health scourges, 
excluding any harmonisation of 
the laws and regulations of the 
Member States. It shall be 
adopted after consultation of 
the Committee of the Regions 
and the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
5. European laws or framework 
laws may also establish 
incentive measures designed to 
protect and improve human 
health and in particular to 
combat the major cross‑border 
health scourges, as well as 
measures which have as their 
direct objective the protection 
of public health regarding 
tobacco and the abuse of 
alcohol, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member 
States. They shall be adopted 
after consultation of the 
Committee of the Regions and 
the Economic and Social 
Committee. 
5. The European Parliament and 
the Council, acting in 
accordance with the ordinary 
legislative procedure and after 
consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions, may 
also adopt incentive measures 
designed to protect and 
improve human health and in 
particular to combat the major 
cross-border health scourges, 
measures concerning 
monitoring, early warning of 
and combating serious cross-
border threats to health, and 
measures which have as their 
direct objective the protection 
of public health regarding 
tobacco and the abuse of 
alcohol, excluding any 
harmonisation of the laws and 
regulations of the Member 
States. 
[…] […] […] […] 
5. Community action in the field 
of public health shall fully 
respect the responsibilities of 
the Member States for the 
organisation and delivery of 
health services and medical 
care. In particular, measures 
referred to in paragraph 4(a) 
shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or 
medical use of organs and 
blood 
7. Union action in the field of 
public health shall fully respect 
the responsibilities of the 
Member States for the 
organisation and delivery of 
health services and medical 
care. In particular, measures 
referred to in paragraph 4(a) 
shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or 
medical use of organs and 
blood. 
7. Union action shall fully 
respect the responsibilities of 
the Member States for the 
definition of their health policy 
and for the organisation and 
delivery of health services and 
medical care.  
The responsibilities of the 
Member States shall include the 
management of health services 
and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources 
assigned to them. The measures 
referred to in paragraph 4(a) 
shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or 
medical use of organs and 
blood. 
7. Union action shall respect the 
responsibilities of the Member 
States for the definition of their 
health policy and for the 
organisation and delivery of 
health services and medical 
care.  
The responsibilities of the 
Member States shall include the 
management of health services 
and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources 
assigned to them. The measures 
referred to in paragraph 4(a) 
shall not affect national 
provisions on the donation or 
medical use of organs and 
blood. 
Source: Own presentation. 
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Annex 2: The Securitisation Degree of SARS Including the SARS-Related 
Written Questions from the European Parliament and Respective Answers 
 
Table A-2-1: SARS-Related Written Questions and Respective Answers 
07.11.03 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003f) 
EP Written Question of April 4, 2003: 
Preventive measures to combat SARS 
+ + o 
2003/C 268 E/212 COM Answer of May 12, 2003: risks and 
measures 
o o 
21.11.03 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003g) 
EP Written Question of May 6, 2003: Illegal 
immigration and the spread of the SARS virus 
+ o 
2003/C 280 E/174 
COM Answer of June 10, 2003:
164
 Reference 
to Council Conclusion 9328/03 (Council, 
2003c), reference to ECDC preparations 
o o 
21.11.03 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003d) 
EP Written Question of May 6, 2003: 
European-wide measures, creation of ECDC, 
airport checks 
+ +  o 
2003/C 280 E/176 COM Answer of June 10, 2003:
165
 Reference 
to Council Conclusion 9328/03 (Council, 
2003c), reference to ECDC preparations 
o o 
21.11.03 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003b) 
EP Written Question of May 7, 2003: SARS 
prevention and control plan for the 
continent as a whole 
+ + o 
2003/C 280 E/174 COM Answer of June 10, 2003:
166
 Reference 
to Council Conclusion 9328/03 (Council, 
2003c), reference to ECDC preparations 
o o 
21.11.03 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003e) 
EP Written Question of May 13, 2003: 
coordinated EU response to SARS 
o o 
2003/C 280 E/176 
COM Answer of June 10, 2003:
167
 Reference 
to Council Conclusion 9328/03 (Council, 
2003c), reference to ECDC preparations 
o o 
26.02.04 EP+CO 
(European Parliament, 
2004k) 
EP Written Question of May 13, 2003: urgent 
action to stop SARS, improve Schengen 
+ + o 
2004/C 51 E/131 
Council Answer of October 7, 2003: 
Reference to Council Conclusion 9328/03 
(Council, 2003c) 
o o 
26.02.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003c) 
EP Written Question of May 13, 2003: urgent 
action to stop SARS, improve Schengen 
+ +  o 
2003/C 280 E/178 
COM Answer of June 10, 2003: Reference to 
Council Conclusion 9328/03 (Council, 2003c), 
reference to ECDC preparations 
o o 
15.01.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004l) 
EP Written Question of May 16, 2003: WHO 
warning about H7N7 A virus 
o 
168
 o 
2004/C 11 E/233 COM Answer of July 18, 2003:
169
 risks and 
measures, reference to ECDC preparations 
+ o 
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 Joint answer to written questions E-1521/03, E-1547/03, P-1604/03, E-1613/03 and E-1617/03. 
165
 Joint answer to written questions E-1521/03, E-1547/03, P-1604/03, E-1613/03 and E-1617/03. 
166
 Joint answer to written questions E-1521/03, E-1547/03, P-1604/03, E-1613/03 and E-1617/03. 
167
 Joint answer to written questions E-1521/03, E-1547/03, P-1604/03, E-1613/03 and E-1617/03. 
168
 The MEP question securitises infectious diseases in general and influenza in particular, but does not make 
reference to SARS. The answer by the Commission, however, also refers to SARS. 
169
 Joint answer to written questions E-1651/03 and E-1657/03. 
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(continued) 
15.01.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004b) 
EP Written Question of May 19, 2003: danger 
of imported SARS by air travel; lack of checks 
upon arrival in EU 
+ + o 
2004/C 11 E/236 
COM Answer of June 24, 2003:
170
 risks and 
measures 
+ o 
15.01.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004m) 
EP Written Question of May 19, 2003: 
Genesis of new diseases, preparations for a 
SARS epidemic 
+ + o 
2004/C 11 E/235 
COM Answer of June 24, 2003:
171
 risks and 
measures 
+ o 
15.01.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004d) 
EP Written Question of May 19, 2003: link 
between avian influenza and SARS 
+ o 
2004/C 11 E/234 COM Answer of July 18, 2003
172
: risks and 
measures, reference to ECDC preparations 
+ o 
15.01.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004a) 
EP Written Question of May 26, 2003: 
Measures to prevent SARS in textiles 
+ o 
2004/C 11 E/262 COM Answer of June 27, 2003: goods from 
affected countries do not pose risk 
o o 
08.04.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004j) 
EP Written Question of May 28, 2003: SARS 
and airline air recycling 
+ o 
2004/C 88 E/379 COM Answer of 15 July, 2003: Reference to 
(CDNC, 2003f) 
+ o 
06.02.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004g) 
EP Written Question of June 6, 2003: Air 
carriers and unemployment 
o o 
2004/C 33 E/186 COM Answer of 14 July, 2003: 
Unprecedented crisis of air transport sector 
+ o 
06.02.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2003a) 
Written Question of June 25, 2003: SARS 
emergency: preventive measures needed? 
++ o 
2004/C 33 E/217 Commission Answer of July 15, 2003: disease 
contained, no additional measures needed 
- - o 
27.03.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004h) 
EP Written Question of September 23, 2003: 
Isolation units in hospitals 
+ o 
2004/C 78 E/0457 COM Answer of October 16, 2003: 
Competences and measures 
o o 
27.03.04 EP+COM 
(European Parliament, 
2004i) 
EP Written Question of January 20, 2004: EU 
prevention and response, changes since 2003 
+ + o 
2004/C 78 E/0971 
COM Answer of February 19, 2004: better 
preparedness, reference to ECDC 
preparations 
- - o 
Source: Own presentation. 
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 Joint answer to written questions E-1658/03 and E-16589/03. 
171
 Joint answer to written questions E-1658/03 and E-1659/03. 
172
 Joint answer to written questions E-1651/03 and E-1657/03. 
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Source: Own presentation on the basis of the securitisation degree value assigned to the key documents listed in Table 6-2. 
and Table A-2-1. 
Diagram A-2-1: The Rise and Fall of the Securitisation Degree of SARS (2003-2004) including SARS-Related Written 
Questions from MEPs and Respective Answers 
